Justia Utilities Law Opinion Summaries

Braintree, and other municipally owned utilities in southeastern Massachusetts, petitioned for review of four orders of the Commission. The orders denied petitioners' claim that they were being unjustly charged in order to ensure system reliability on Cape Code. The dispute was first addressed in a FERC-approved settlement agreement that reserved certain litigation rights to the petitioners. Because the Commission reasonably resolved the claims that were reserved, and reasonably construed the settlement agreement to foreclose petitioners' additional claims, the court affirmed the Commission's orders and denied the petitions for review. View "Braintree Electric Light Dept., et al. v. FERC, et al." on Justia Law

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires incumbent local exchange carriers to lease to new competitive LECs, unbundled, at cost, facilities and services (elements) that the FCC deems necessary to provide local telephone service, 47 U.S.C. 251(c)(3), (d)(2). Section 271 requires "Bell operating" companies that seek to provide long-distance service, such as AT&T, to make available a competitive checklist of services to facilitate competition in the local phone service market. In response to regulatory developments, Kentucky competitive LECs asked the state commission to require AT&T to continue de-listed elements. The commission agreed. A district court enjoined enforcement and ordered the commission to calculate the amount a competitive LEC owed AT&T for services obtained at the unlawfully imposed rate. The commission issued another order requiring AT&T to provide de-listed elements at a regulated rate. The court entered another injunction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, upholding conclusions that the commission may not require continued unbundling of de-listed elements; that FCC regulations do not require AT&T to provide to competitive LECs equipment known as a line splitter; and that FCC regulations do not require AT&T to provide unbundled access to high-speed fiber-optic loops in new service areas. LECs, upon request, must package unbundled network elements provided under section 251 with elements mandated only by section 271View "Bellsouth Telecomm., Inc. v. KY Pub. Serv. Comm'n" on Justia Law

PSEG challenged orders of the FERC accepting the results of an auction for electric generation capacity conducted by ISO New England. In those orders, FERC approved ISO New England's determination that PSEG's resources in Connecticut could not reduce their capacity supply obligation because doing so would endanger the system's reliability. FERC also held that ISO New England could reduce the per unit price paid to PSEG for that capacity. The court held that because the latter holding was based on tariff provisions that the FERC thought were clear but now conceded were ambiguous, and because in the course of construing those provisions it failed to respond to PSEG's facially legitimate objections, the petition was granted and the orders were remanded for further consideration. View "PSEG Energy Resources & Trade, et al. v. FERC" on Justia Law

AMEA purchases power wholesale from various sources, including Southern, and sells it to 11 municipally owned utilities in Alabama. AMEA uses "unbundled" transmission service provided by one of Southern's subsidiaries. When AMEA uses Southern's transmission system for such unbundled transmission, it pays the "Open Access Transmission Tariff" paid by any party receiving such service from Southern. Southern also sells power directly to retail consumers in Alabama. For the transmission of these "bundled" retail sales, it uses the Alabama component of its transmission system, which has lower unit costs than its transmission system as a whole. According to AMEA, the relatively high cost of transmission service in Georgia drives Southern's systemwide average above its Alabama unit costs. AMEA subsequently filed a complaint with FERC, challenging the rate differential. At issue was whether Southern's pricing violated FERC's comparability policy. Giving FERC the appropriate level of deference on its interpretation of its own orders, the court concluded that it did not. Accordingly, the petition for review was denied. View "AL Municipal Elec. Authority v. FERC" on Justia Law

After several failed attempts to establish a voluntary interconnection agreement, the two telecommunications companies went into arbitration with defendant, the Telecommunications Regulatory Board of Puerto Rico. Following a remand, the Board approved a final interconnection agreement pursuant to its authority under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 251. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the Board. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that various provisions were arbitrary. View "Worldnet Telecomm., Inc. v. PR Tel. Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, in these related appeals, was the Trustee in the Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases of LGI Energy Solutions, Inc. and LGI Data Solutions Company, LLC, which were in the business of providing utility-management and billing services to restaurants and other customers. These consolidated appeals involved seven adversary proceedings by the Trustee to avoid payments made by LGI Energy to defendant utilities prior to the bankruptcy. The Trustee contended that such payments were preferential and/or fraudulent transfers under the Bankruptcy Code and applicable state law. The Bankruptcy Court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants based on its conclusion that the payments they received for the utilities were not an asset of either debtor. The court held that the bankruptcy court's ruling was inconsistent with Minnesota law and Eighth Circuit precedent. If a trust or agency relationship was intended to be created by the agreements between LGI Energy and its customers, then defendants were nevertheless required to prove that LGI Energy honored that relationship and treated the funds accordingly. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded. View "Stoebner v. Consumers Energy Company, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a non-profit, member-owned, water company serving rural areas of Ross County, Ohio. To finance its system, plaintiff borrowed nearly $10.6 million from the USDA. The disputed area of the county includes properties served by the city and properties served by plaintiff. Each has objected to the other's extension of new lines to the area. The district court granted plaintiff summary judgment, finding that the company is protected under the Agriculture Act, 7 U.S.C. 1926(b)(2), based on its obligations under the USDA contract, had a legal right to serve the area under a contract with the county, and did not have unclean hands. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.View "Ross Cnty. Water Co., Inc v. City of Chillicothe" on Justia Law

PRTC, telecommunications local exchange carrier under the jurisdiction of the Telecommunications Regulatory Board of Puerto Rico and the FCC, entered into an interconnection agreement with Sprint. In a dispute concerning compensation, the Board held that under the agreement''s change-of-law provision PRTC and Sprint were to reciprocally compensate each other for internet-service-provider bound traffic in accordance with an interim compensation order set forth by the FCC in its ISP Remand Order. The Board dismissed Sprint's claim that PRTC had overcharged for termination of transit traffic. The district court upheld the Board. The First Circuit reversed in part. The ISP Remand Order did not alter existing contractual obligations and, therefore, did not trigger the change-of-law provision. The court affirmed dismissal of the overbilling claim. View "PR Tel. Co., Inc. v. Sprintcom, Inc." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from FERC's statutory mandate set out in the Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 U.S.C. 824-824w, to ensure that all rates and charges made, demanded, or received by power wholesalers were just and reasonable. Petitioners subsequently sought review of FERC's final order (Order 697), contending that the order violated FERC's governing statutes. In Order 697, FERC codified the existing limited market-based policy, along with multiple enhancements, in a final rule. At issue was whether the market-based regulatory policy established by FERC's order was permissible under the law. Taking into account Chevron deference, the law of the circuit, other relevant precedent, and the direction of the Supreme Court as to how the court should approach such administrative law issues concerning federal agencies, the court concluded that Order 697 did not per se violate the FPA. View "Montana Consumer Counsel v. FERC; Upper Peninsula Power Co., et al. v. FERC; Public Citizen, Inc., et al. v. FERC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff owns 2,485 acres containing Indiana's only antebellum plantation and 2,000 acres of "classified forest," with endangered species habitats. A utility company has a lease for storing and extracting oil and natural gas on portions of the property. The Lease continues so long as "oil or gas is produced in paying quantities" or "the Property continues to be used for the underground storage of gas" and will terminate upon the utility's surrender or failure to make payments. The lease contains provisions to protect historic sites and to calculate damage to trees, requires notice of utility activity, and requires that the utility's use be "as minimally necessary." Plaintiff sought damages and to terminate the lease and evict the utility. The district court entered judgment for the utility, finding that a disagreement about the use of land was not an express reason for termination and that the lease specifically provided that damages were the proper remedy. Plaintiff dismissed the damages claim with prejudice to appeal the ejectment claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff did not show that damages are inadequate to compensate for the harm to its property. View "Cedar Farm, Harrison County, Inc. v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co" on Justia Law