Justia Utilities Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant contended that it was a "public utility" under OCGA 48-1-2 and, as such, was required under OCGA 48-5-511 to make an annual tax return of its Georgia property to the Georgia Revenue Commissioner rather than to the Chatham County tax authorities. Appellant filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment and for writ of mandamus in superior court, seeking to have the trial court recognize appellant as a "public utility" and to order appellee to accept appellant's annual ad valorem property tax return. The trial court granted appellee's motion to dismiss the complaint based on appellant's failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because the doctrine of sovereign immunity was applicable to the claims. The court reversed and held that it need not address whether sovereign immunity would act as a bar to appellant's declaratory action, as it was clear that, if the declaratory action were barred by sovereign immunity, appellant's mandamus action would still remain viable.View "Souther LNG, Inc. v. MacGinnitie" on Justia Law

Fitchburg appealed from a ruling of the department requiring it to reimburse its customers over $4.6 million in gas supply costs incurred during the 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 purchasing seasons. The court concluded that the department's determination that Fitchburg's purchasing plans required preapproval was erroneous, as the plans incorporated only traditional risk management techniques that had previously never been subject to the department's preapproval. Penalizing Fitchburg for failing to seek preapproval, when such preapproval was never required, exceeded the department's authority and amounted to an error of law. With respect to the allegedly imprudent purchases, the court agreed with the department that one of the purchases at issue was unreasonable and imprudent, but held that the department's findings of imprudence with regard to the balance of the purchases in 2007 and 2008 were not supported by substantial evidence.View "Fitchburg Gas and Electric Light Co. v. Dept. of Public Utilities" on Justia Law

Evercom Systems provided telephone services to inmates in correctional facilities throughout the country. When Evercom billed a customer for collect calls he did not accept, the customer lodged a complaint to the Iowa Utility Board. The Board imposed a civil penalty for a "cramming" violation based on improper billing for collect telephone calls under Iowa Code 476.103 and Iowa Admin. Code r. 199-22.23. The district court reversed the agency's decision and imposition of the civil penalty, concluding that the Board misinterpreted the law and that no cram occurred. The court of appeals reversed the district court and reinstated the civil penalty. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and affirmed the district court, holding that Evercom's actions did not constitute a cram under rule 199-22.23. Remanded for dismissal.View "Evercom Sys., Inc. v. Utils. Bd." on Justia Law

Appellee was injured by a falling tree located near, but outside, an easement maintained by Utility Company. Utility Company had hired Service Contractor to inspect trees along its power lines and to remedy any situation in which trees or vegetation might affect the lines. Appellee filed suit against Appellants, Utility Company and Service Contractor, alleging that they were liable for Appellee's injuries based upon their failure to inspect, maintain, and remove the tree or to warn the landowner and the public of the danger raised by the tree. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellants, concluding that they owed no duty to Appellee and that Appellee was not a third-party beneficiary under the Appellants' contract. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the contract was ambiguous regarding whether Appellee had enforceable rights as an intended third-party beneficiary. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) for an injured party to qualify as an intended third-party beneficiary under a written contract, the contract must indicate an intention to benefit that third party; and (2) because the contract between Appellants did not indicate an intent to benefit Appellee, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Appellants.View "Huff v. FirstEnergy Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an environmental organization, filed this administrative mandamus action to challenge the issuance of a federally required permit authorizing the Moss Landing Powerplant (MLPP) to draw cooling water from the adjacent Moss Landing Harbor and Elkhorn Slough. This case presented issues concerning the technological and environmental standards, and the procedures for administrative and judicial review, that apply when a thermal powerplant, while pursuing the issuance or renewal of a cooling water intake permit from a regional board, also sought necessary approval from the State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission (Energy Commission), of a plan to add additional generating units to the plant, with related modifications to the cooling intake system. The court held that the superior court had jurisdiction to entertain the administrative mandamus petition here under review. The court also held that the trial court erred when it deferred a final judgment, ordered an interlocutory remand to the board for further "comprehensive" examination of that issue, then denied mandamus after determining that the additional evidence and analysis considered by the board on remand supported the board's reaffirmed findings. The court further held that recent Supreme Court authority confirmed that, when applying federal Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1326(b), standards for the issuance of this permit, the Regional Water Board properly utilized cost-benefit analysis. The court declined to address several other issues discussed by the parties. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.View "Voices of the Wetlands v. CA State Water Resources Control Bd., et al." on Justia Law

Appellant TW Telecom of New Mexico (TW Telecom) appealed a final order issued by the New Mexico Public Regulation Commission (PRC) in "In the Matter of the Development of an Alternative Form of Regulation Plan for Qwest Corporation" (AFOR III Final Order). TW Telecom claimed that the PRC (1) adopted certain conclusions from a previous final order, lacking justification in the AFOR III record; (2) deregulated Qwest Corporation's (Qwest) rates in violation of the New Mexico Telecommunications Act and the separation of powers doctrine in the New Mexico Constitution; and (3) deprived TW Telecom of proper due process. The claims raised in this appeal involved three cases before the PRC that concerned the development of various alternative forms of regulation plans issued by the PRC, and Qwest's compliance with the terms and conditions therein.  The cases addressed various issues, including pricing provisions and detailed requirements for the filing of tariff changes, tariffs for new services, promotional offerings, packaged services, and individual contracts for services. Upon review, the Supreme Court annulled and vacated AFOR III Final Order and remanded the case back to the PRC for further proceedings. The Court concluded that the PRC indeed violated TW Telecom's due process because it adopted conclusions from a previous proceeding without affording the parties an opportunity to be heard. The Court did not address TW Telecom's second claim. View "TW Telecom of New Mexico v. New Mexico Public Regulation Comm'n" on Justia Law

This appeal challenged a final order of the Public Utility Commission (PUC) in a true-up proceeding under Chapter 39 of the Utilities Code. AEP Texas Central Co. (AEP), a transmission and distribution utility, and CPL Retail Energy, L.P., its affiliated retail electric provider, initiated a proceeding under section 39.262 to finalize stranded costs and other true-up amounts and the state, several municipalities, and several other parties who were consumers of electricity or represent consumer interests (collectively, consumers), intervened in the proceeding. The issues before the court concern market value, net book value (NBV), and the capacity auction true-up. The court held that where, as here, the utility managed to sell its stake in a nuclear plant, the court saw no error in using the sale of assets method, which was, if anything, the preferred method for valuing generation assets. The court also held that it saw no error in PUC's approach where the interest rate AEP received on its stranded costs was grossed up. The court further held that section 39.262 unambiguously specified that the statutory capacity auction price, not some other blended price the PUC found more appropriate, must be used in calculating the capacity auction true-up amount. On remand, the PUC must recalculate the capacity auction true-up in a manner consistent with the court's opinion in State v. PUC, rather than relying on the proxy price it selected in the true-up proceeding. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review, affirming in part and reversing in part.View "AEP Texas Central Co. v. Public Utility Comm'n of Texas, et al." on Justia Law

The state public utilities commission approved a power-purchase agreement (PPA) between National Grid and Deepwater Wind, the respondents. Under the PPA, Deepwater Wind agreed to construct an offshore wind farm in state waters and then sell the generated electricity to National Grid, a statewide power distributor. National Grid, in turn, pledged to purchase the generated electricity and apportion the cost of building the wind farm to in-state ratepayers over the course of the twenty-year contract. Dissatisfied with National Grid's cost-distribution plan, petitioners Toray Plastics and Polytop challenged the commission's assessment that the PPA met all statutory preconditions for approval. The Supreme Court affirmed the commission's decision, concluding that the commission accurately interpreted and applied the law by making findings that were lawful and reasonable, fairly and substantially supported by legal evidence, and sufficiently specific for the Court to ascertain that the evidence upon which the commission based its findings reasonably supported the result.View "In re Review of Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a company that processed perlite for horticultural and construction use, sued respondent alleging several counts for damages based on the claim that natural gas being supplied to petitioner was contaminated with debris that caused damage to petitioner's furnaces. Discovery and trial preparation were undertaken, during which time the parties engaged in numerous disagreements concerning discovery and other matters. Neither party filed a motion to have the case reset for trial and respondent subsequently filed a notice of lack of prosecution under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(e), alleging that there had been no record activity for the prior ten months. At issue was the proper interpretation of rule 1.420(e), which provided for involuntary dismissal of court actions for lack of prosecution. The court held that the filing made by petitioner during the sixty-day grace period set forth in rule 1.420(e) met the rule's requirement for record activity and therefore, precluded dismissal for lack of prosecution. Accordingly, the court quashed the decision of the First District and approved the conflict cases certified by the First District.View "Chemrock Corp. v. Tampa Elec. Co., etc. " on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendant seeking a declaratory injunction that defendant did not have an easement on their property, damages for trespass and conversion for a 2007 and 2008 incident, an injunction against further trespass, and attorney fees. Defendant asserted as a defense that the lawsuit was filed after the one-year statute of limitations under OCGA 46-3-204. At issue was whether summary judgment against plaintiffs was proper. The court affirmed the trial court's rejection of plaintiffs' constitutional challenges to the one-year statute of limitations. The court then affirmed in part and reversed in part the grant of summary judgment because issues of material fact remained regarding the existence of a valid prescriptive easement and plaintiffs' trespass and conversion claims based on defendant's 2008 actions were not barred by OCGA 46-3-204.View "Daniel, et al. v. Amicalola Elec. Membership Corp." on Justia Law