Justia Utilities Law Opinion Summaries

In 2004, the Berkeley County Water District and Sewer District filed requests with the Public Service Commission (PSC) to charge capacity improvement fees (CIFs) due to rapid population growth in the county. The PSC approved the requested CIFs. Petitioners subsequently filed a declaratory judgment action in the circuit court, seeking relief from paying the CIFs. The circuit court found that the PSC lacked jurisdiction to establish the CIFs. However, the Supreme Court found Petitioners had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies before the PSC and reversed. Subsequently, the PSC discontinued the CIFs, finding that the Sewer District and Water District no longer satisfied the criteria for charging the CIFs. Thereafter, the PSC granted Petitioners' motion to deny the Water and Sewer Districts' petitions for reconsideration. Petitioners appealed to challenge errors they alleged were contained in the PSC's final order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Petitioners were judicially estopped from challenging the errors. View "Larry V. Faircloth Realty, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n" on Justia Law

In 2008, the Public Utilities Commission approved a merger between FairPoint Communications-NNE (FairPoint) and Verizon Maine (Verizon). The merger order committed FairPoint to expanding DSL availability in Maine to certain percentages within certain periods of time. The merger order incorporated an amended stipulation presented by FairPoint and other parties. Approximately twenty months later, FairPoint filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The Commission agreed to reduce FairPoint's ultimate broadband buildout obligations from ninety percent addressability to eighty-seven percent. Fairpoint subsequently notified the Commission that it had expanded broadband buildout to the level of eighty-three percent. The Commission disagreed, concluding that FairPoint had used the wrong measure of addressability and therefore overstated its results. At issue on appeal was how "addressability" would be measured when calculating FairPoint's broadband buildout commitments in Maine. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the merger order was an order of the Commission and not a consent decree, and therefore, the Commission did not err by failing to interpret the merger order in a manner consistent with the intent and understanding of the parties to the stipulation; and (2) the Commission did not err in its definition of "addressability." View "N. New England Tel. Operations LLC v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Petitioner objected to an order of the FERC that allowed certain rates to be reduced as a corrective to the exercise of "supply-side" market power, but which declined to resolve petitioner's call for a parallel intervention to protect suppliers from what petitioner called "buy-side" market power. Concluding that the court had jurisdiction to consider petitioner's arguments, the court concluded that it had no reason to think that "the total effect of the rate order" was unjust and unreasonable, but the court had affirmative reason to believe that petitioner would have an adequate opportunity to pursue remedies for possible uneconomic entry. The court further concluded that the Commission did not abuse its discretion; in struggling to address the complexities posed by regional integration and independent systems operators, the Commission has pursued an iterative process with the court's explicit approval at least in one case, TC Ravenswood v. FERC; the specific context of the mitigation orders here exemplified the iterative process; and the court rejected petitioner's argument that the Commission violated due process and other obligations by neglecting to answer petitioner's arguments and proposals. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "TC Ravenswood, LLC v. FERC" on Justia Law

In its tax return for the year 1997, ConEd claimed multiple deductions pertaining to a lease-in/lease-out (LILO) tax shelter transaction under which a Dutch utility, EZH, a tax-indifferent entity because it is not subject to U.S. taxation, conveyed to ConEd a gas-fired cogeneration plant that delivers power to customers in the Netherlands, then leased it back, followed by a reconveyance to EZH and a sublease. The stated purpose of the arrangement was tax avoidance. LILO transactions accelerate losses to the taxpayer and defer gains. The transaction provided several upfront deductions that allowed ConEd to pay lower taxes in 1997 (and in later years) than it otherwise would have. The IRS disallowed these claimed deductions and assessed a deficiency of $328,066. ConEd paid the deficiency and filed a refund claim; when this claim was denied, ConEd filed suit. The Claims Court awarded ConEd a full refund. The Federal Circuit reversed, applying the substance-over-form doctrine to conclude that ConEd’s claimed deductions must be disallowed. There was a reasonable likelihood that EZH would exercise its purchase option at the conclusion of the ConEd sublease, thus rendering the master lease illusory. View "Consol. Edison Co. of NY v. United States" on Justia Law

801 Skinker Boulevard Corporation (801), a corporation operating as a residential cooperative, sought a refund for sales taxes under Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.030.2, which indicates that utilities purchased for residential units for common areas and facilities shall be deemed to be for domestic use. The refund request concerned state sales tax charged and paid on electric and natural gas utilities purchased from 2006 through 2009. 801 filed for a refund of sales tax on its Union Electric (Ameren) and Laclede Gas Company (Laclede) bills. Ameren and Laclede also filed for refunds on behalf of 801. Ameren and Laclede's applications were denied. 801, Ameren, and Laclede (Taxpayers) subsequently filed a request for a refund of sales tax with the Administrative Hearing Commission, alleging that the utilities were purchased for domestic use by the individual owners and residents of 801 in accordance with section 144.030.2. The Commission denied the request. The Supreme Court reversed and ordered a full refund of the sales tax paid, holding that Taxpayers were entitled to the exemption and refund of their sales taxes pursuant to section 144.190.2, as 801's utility purchases were deemed by statute to be for "domestic use" and, thus, were exempt from sales tax. View "801 Skinker Boulevard Corp. v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

Petitioners filed a complaint with the Montana Public Service Commission (PSC), alleging that Northwestern Energy had been overcharging consumes for its street lighting services. The PSC dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed but remanded with instructions to remand the case to the PSC for a redetermination of whether to allow the filing of an amended complaint. On remand to the district court, Petitioners filed a motion seeking $1,137 in costs incurred while responding to objections before the PSC and courts. Petitioners also renewed a motion asking the district court to initiate an immediate rate reduction pending the PSC's final decision. The district court denied both of the Petitioners' requests and remanded to the PSC. The Supreme Court affirmed that order, holding that the district court did not err in (1) denying Petitioners their costs for the initial proceedings in district court and first appeal to the Supreme Court, and (2) denying Petitioners' request for a temporary rate decrease, pending the PSC's decision on remand. View "Williamson v. Mont. Pub. Serv. Comm'n" on Justia Law

NextEra Energy Resources, LLC appealed the Iowa Utility Board's decision to grant advance ratemaking principles to MidAmerican Energy Company for a proposed wind generation facility. The district court affirmed the Board. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board properly interpreted and applied Iowa Code 476.53; (2) substantial evidence supported the Board's findings; (3) Iowa Code 476.43 was not applicable to this ratemaking proceeding; and (4) section 476.53 as applied to a rate-regulated public utility that may compete in the wholesale energy market did not violate the Equal Protection clauses of the Iowa or U.S. Constitutions or the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.View "Nextera Energy Res., LLC v. Iowa Utils. Bd." on Justia Law

Covanta Maine, LLC (Covanta), a subsidiary of Covanta Energy, appealed from orders of the Public Utilities Commission denying Covanta's requests for certification of two of its facilities as Class I new renewable resources. Covanta argued that the Commission erred by basing its conclusion that the facilities were not refurbished on the ratio of Covanta's expenditures in the facilities to the value of those facilities, and it therefore asserted that the Commission improperly denied certification of its two facilities. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Commission, holding that the Commission erred by establishing a requirement that the expenditures meet some minimum level that equals an unspecified percentage of the total value of the facility. Remanded. View "Covanta Maine, LLC v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n" on Justia Law

This case concerned the mechanics of NSTAR's, an electric distribution company, attempt to shift the recovery of one of it supply-related costs, supply-related bad debt costs, from its distribution rates to its supply rates. NSTAR filed a petition, through which it sought to begin recovery of its supply-related bad debt costs through its supply rates rather than, as before, through its distribution rates. Not withstanding that contention, the department conditioned its approval of NSTAR's petition on a corresponding reduction in NSTAR's distribution rates. The court concluded that the department had failed to provide an adequate statement of its reasons for imposing the condition. Specifically, the court was unable to determine whether this aspect of the department's order rested on a determination that NSTAR did not follow the correct procedural path in removing supply-related bad debt costs from its distribution rates, or rather on a determination that NSTAR did not in fact remove such costs from its distribution rates at all. The court concluded further that certain of the department's factual determinations were not adequately supported by subsidiary findings and that an aspect of the department's analysis was legally erroneous. Accordingly, the department's order was to be vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings.View "NSTAR Electric Co. vs. Dept. of Public Utilities" on Justia Law

Electric distribution utilities that opt to provide service under an electric security plan must undergo an annual earnings review. If their plan resulted in "significantly excessive earnings" compared to similar companies, the utility must return the excess to its customers pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 4928.143(F). In the case below, the Public Utilities Commission found that Columbus Southern Power's 2009 earnings were significantly excessive by over $42 million. There were three appeals from the order. Columbus Southern Power asserted that section 4928.143(F) was unconstitutionally vague, and the Ohio Energy Group and the Office of the Ohio Consumers' Counsel (collectively, OEG) and Industrial Energy Users-Ohio (IEU) raised different arguments that the commission erred in applying the statute. The Supreme Court affirmed the commission's order, holding (1) the statute was not unconstitutionally vague, and (2) neither OEG nor IEU showed that the commission unreasonably interpreted or applied section 4928.143(F). View "In re Columbus S. Power Co." on Justia Law