Justia Utilities Law Opinion Summaries

In 2009, Minnesota Power sought an increase in service rates of approximately 18.9 percent. As part of its submission to the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, Minnesota Power also requested an interim rate increase of approximately $73.3 million. The Commission decided to set the interim rate increase at approximately $48.5 million after finding exigent circumstances existed. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the Commission did not err in finding exigent circumstances and did not abuse its discretion in setting interim rates. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that substantial evidence supported the Commission's decision to set Minnesota Power's interim rate increase at $48.5 million. View "In re Application of Minn. Power for Auth. to Increase Rates for Elec. Serv. in Minn." on Justia Law

Appellants, the New Mexico Attorney General and New Mexico Industrial Energy Consumers, asked the Supreme Court to vacate and annul the final order in PRC Case No. 11-00308-UT (Case 308 Final Order) because it permitted Public Service Company of New Mexico (PNM) to earn returns on the operating expenses incurred from energy efficiency programs. Appellants argue that such returns are inconsistent with New Mexico law. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Case 308 Final Order was consistent with the PRC’s ratemaking authority under the New Mexico Public Utility Act, the New Mexico Efficient Use of Energy Act, and with the Court's holding in "Attorney General v. New Mexico Public Regulation Commission" (258 P.3d 453). Furthermore, the Court held that Case 308 Final Order was supported by substantial evidence and was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Case 308 Final Order. View "NMAG v. NMPRC" on Justia Law

Appellant, a public utility (Utility), provided natural gas to intervening Appellee, an apartment complex. In 2008, Utility informed Appellee that it would disconnect gas service to the entire complex if Appellee did not bring all apartment units into compliance with the National Fire Protection Association's National Fuel Gas Code (NFG Code) within two months. Appellee subsequently filed a complaint against Utility with the Public Utilities Commission (Commission), alleging that Utility had unreasonably and unlawfully threatened to disconnect gas service to all units if Appellee refused to retrofit the ventilation system in each apartment to meet NFG Code requirements. The complaint requested that the Commission prohibit Utility from terminating service and requiring expensive remedial construction. The Commission found in favor of Appellee. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that none of Utility's six propositions of law had merit. View "Cameron Creek Apartments v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc." on Justia Law

Entergy, owner and operator of the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station, filed suit against Vermont, raising claims challenging Vermont statutes governing Vermont Yankee (Acts 74, 160, and 189) and other claims related to Vermont's attempt to condition its grant of permission to operate Vermont Yankee on the execution of a power purchase agreement that favored Vermont retail consumers. The court affirmed the district court's grant of declaratory judgment that Act 74 and Act 160 were facially preempted by the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. 2011-2281; reversed the district court's determination that Vermont's efforts to condition a new Certificate of Public Good for Vermont Yankee on the execution of a favorable power purchase agreement violated the dormant Commerce Clause; affirmed the district court's determination that Entergy's challenge under the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 791-828c, was unripe; affirmed the district court's grant of a permanent injunction enjoining defendants from enforcing sections 6522(c)(2) or 6522(c)(4) in title 10 of the Vermont Statutes, as enacted by Act 74, or sections 248(e)(2), 248(m), or 254 in title 30 of the Vermont Statutes, as enacted by Act 160; and vacated the district court's permanent injunction enjoining defendants from conditioning the issuance of a Certificate of Public Good on the execution of a below-wholesale-market power purchase agreement between Entergy and Vermont utilities or otherwise requiring Vermont Yankee to sell power to Vermont utilities at preferential rates.View "Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee v. Shumlin" on Justia Law

In assessing the value of electric power plants for purposes of property taxation, assessors may not include the value of intangible assets and rights in the value of taxable property. An electric company purchased "emission reduction credits" (ERCs), which the company had to purchase to obtain authorization to construct an electric power plant and to operate it at certain air-pollutant emission levels. These ERCs constituted intangible rights for property taxation purposes. In assessing the value of the power plant using the replacement cost method, the State Board of Equalization (Board) estimated the cost of replacing the ERCs. In also using an income approach in assessing the plant, the Board failed to attribute a portion or the plant's income stream to the ERCs and to deduct that value from the plant's projected income stream prior to taxation. In analyzing the Board's valuation of the power plant, the Supreme Court held (1) the Board improperly taxed the power company's ERCs when it added their replacement cost to the power plant's taxable value; and (2) the Board was not required to deduct a value attributable to the ERCs under an income approach. Remanded. View "Elk Hills Power, LLC v. Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law

Atmos Energy Corporation, a local distributing company, contracted with independent gas marketing companies to purchase natural gas then delivered gas to customers through local pipelines. Following an audit, Missouri Public Service Commission (PSC) staff indicated that Atmos had failed to comply with affiliate transaction rules by failing to document properly the fair market value and fully distributed cost of its transactions with its affiliate, Atmos Energy Marketing LLC (AEM). The staff then proposed a disallowance regarding Atmos' transactions with AEM. After an evidentiary hearing, the PSC found compliance with the affiliate transaction rules and rejected the proposed disallowances. The Office of Public Counsel (OPC) appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the PSC erred in relying upon a presumption of prudence in rejecting staff and OPC's proposed disallowance regarding Atmos's transactions with AEM. Remanded. View "Office of Pub. Counsel v. Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Portland General Electric Company (PGE) appealed a Court of Appeals decision that reversed and remanded a trial court order that denied Lexington Insurance Company's motion to set aside a default judgment entered in PGE's favor. Specifically, the issues were: (1) whether a default judgment awarding monetary relief violated ORCP 67C if the complaint did not specify amount of damages sought; and (2) if so, whether that omission rendered the judgment voidable or void. The Supreme Court held the judgment in question here did not violate ORCP 67C and that the judgment was not void. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. View "PGE v. Ebasco Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant condemned a pair of easements on the residential property of Plaintiffs to facilitate the placement of high-voltage transmission lines. Plaintiffs filed a right-to-take action, arguing that because the proposed easements would cover more than half of their property and render their residential improvements obsolete, they would be left with an "uneconomic remnant" under Wis. Stat. 32.06(3m). The circuit court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, concluding that Plaintiffs' property, after the taking of the easements, was an uneconomic remnant, and ordered Defendant to acquire the entire property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that after Defendant took two easements for transmission lines, Plaintiffs' property was an uneconomic remnant because its condition was such that it was of substantially impaired economic viability as either a residential or an industrial parcel. View "Waller v. Am. Transmission Co." on Justia Law

In 2005, a limited liability company and its owners (plaintiffs), on behalf of other similarly situated telephone customers, filed a complaint seeking to certify a class action lawsuit against United Telephone Company of Ohio (UTO), which provided Plaintiffs with telephone service. Plaintiffs claimed that their phone bills from UTO contained unauthorized charges from third parties. The trial court ultimately denied Plaintiffs' amended motion for class certification. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the order of the trial court, holding (1) a trial court must conduct a rigorous analysis to ensure the prerequisites of Ohio R. Civ. P. 23, under which plaintiffs must establish seven prerequisites in order to certify a class action, are satisfied; and (2) even though the trial court's consideration of the merits in this case was improper, its order denying certification of the class was correct because Plaintiffs' proposed amended class did not satisfy the prerequisites of Rule 23. View "Stammco, LLC v. United Tel. Co. of Ohio" on Justia Law

Portland Generating Station is a 427-megawatt, coal-fired, electricity generating plant in Northampton County, Pennsylvania, directly across the Delaware River within 500 feet of Warren County, New Jersey. The EPA found that Portland emits sulfur dioxide in amounts that significantly interfere with control of air pollution across state borders. In response to a petition under the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7408, 7409)), the EPA imposed direct limits on Portland‘s emissions and restrictions to reduce its contribution to air pollution within three years. The Third Circuit upheld the EPA actions. It was reasonable for the EPA to interpret Section 126(b) as an independent mechanism for enforcing interstate pollution control, giving it authority to promulgate the Portland Rule. The contents of the Portland Rule are not arbitrary, capricious, or abusive of the EPA‘s discretion. View "GenOn REMA LLC v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency" on Justia Law