Justia Utilities Law Opinion Summaries

Article XIIIC was added to the California Constitution in 1996 after the passage of the Right to Vote on Taxes Act, or Proposition 218. Article XIIIC required that any new tax or increase in tax be approved by the voters. In 2010, article XIIIC was amended when Proposition 26 passed. Since then, “'tax' has been broadly defined to encompass 'any levy, charge, or exaction of any kind imposed by a local government.'” Several charges were expressly excluded from this definition, but at issue in this case are charges “imposed for a specific government service or product provided directly to the payor that is not provided to those not charged, and which does not exceed the reasonable costs to the local government of providing the service or product.” The government service or product at issue was electricity: Appellant was an individual residing in the City of Anaheim (the City) who claimed her local public electric utility approved rates which exceed the cost of providing electricity. She claimed the City has been transferring utility revenues to its general fund and recouping these amounts from ratepayers without obtaining voter approval. But because voters approved the practice through an amendment to the City’s charter, the Court of Appeal concluded the City has not violated article XIIIC, and affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the City on this basis. View "Palmer v. City of Anaheim" on Justia Law

In this class action, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's judgment that certain sanitation fees constituted an illegal exaction and that the City of Fort Smith was unjustly enriched because the class paid money expecting to receive recycling services, holding that the circuit court clearly erred.Plaintiff, on behalf of the citizens and taxpayers of Fort Smith (class), brought this action against the City after discovering that Fort Smith was dumping almost all of its recyclables in a landfill, claiming that Fort Smith's collection of monthly sanitation charges, including recycling fees, was an illegal exaction and that the City had been unjustly enriched. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the action, holding (1) because Fort Smith used the sanitation fee to collect and dispose of sanitation, the circuit court's finding that the fee was an illegal exaction was clearly erroneous; and (2) the damages evidence Plaintiff presented was not a valid measure of restitution. View "City of Fort Smith v. Merriott" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) rejecting the power purchase agreement between Hu Honua and the Hawai'i Electric light Company, Inc., holding that there was no error in the PUC's decision to reject the power purchase agreement between the parties.At issue was the denial of Hua Honua's request for regulatory approval to supply energy to Hawai'i Island using a biomass power plant. In declining to approve the project on remand, the PUC found that the project would produce massive greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and significantly increase costs for rate-payers. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the PUC understood its public interest-minded mission and properly followed this Court's remand instructions to consider the reasonableness of the proposed project's costs in light of its GHG emissions and the impact on Intervenors' right to a clean and healthful environment. View "In re Haw. Electric Light Co., Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed the Episcopal Diocese or Rhode Island's challenge to an order of the Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission (PUC) that permitted the Narragansett Electric Company to charge the diocese for electricity transmission costs associated with a proposed solar development project on diocese property in Glocester, holding that the matter was moot.On appeal, the diocese argued that the PUC's order was unlawful and unreasonable for several reasons, including the assertion that the PUC subjected the diocese to a biased proceeding in violation of state law. After the Supreme Court remanded the matter to the PUC for consideration of newly discovered evidence Narragansett determined that the diocese was not subject to the challenged interconnection costs. The Supreme Court declined to address the merits of the diocese's appeal, holding that the matter was moot. View "In re Petition of the Episcopal Diocese of R.I. for Declaratory Judgment" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court concluding that Pleasant Grover (City) had the power to enact a three-tiered "transportation utility fee" (TUF) but reversed the court's ruling that the TUF was actually a tax, holding that remand was required.The subject TUF charged local property owners a monthly fee corresponding to the "intensity" with which they used City roads, as determined by a study of user demand on the City's roadways, and the generated funds were to be used to repair and maintain city roadways only. At issue was whether the City had the authority to enact the TUF and whether the City properly characterized the TUF as a fee or if it was in fact a tax requiring the City to follow specific enactment procedures. The district court held that the TUF was actually a tax based on its purpose. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the City acted within its discretion in enacting the TUF; but (2) the purpose of the TUF was characteristic of a fee because it was a specific charge for a specific purpose. View "Larson v. Pleasant Grove City" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) denying the petition for a declaratory judgment filed by Block Island Power Company (BIPCo), holding that there were no grounds to overturn the PUC's decision.In 2009, the legislature enacted R.I. Gen. Laws 39-26.1-7 (the enabling act) authorizing the Town of New Shoreham Project. In 2017, BIPCo sought a declaratory judgment declaring that the enabling act required the costs for BIPCo's interconnection facilities and backup transformer to be socialized across all electric ratepayers in the state, not just those in the Town. The PUC issued a judgment against BIPCo. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the PUC's reading and application of the statute was without error. View "In re Block Island Power Co. Petition for Declaratory Judgment" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order of the Public Utilities Commission denying the petition of Maine Coalition to Stop Smart Meters for reconsideration of a previous order approving revised terms and conditions for the smart-meter opt-out program created by Central Maine Power (CMP), holding that there was no abuse of discretion.The revised terms and conditions of the smart-meter opt-out program at issue allowed CMP to install solid-state meters, which are smart meters with the transmitting function disabled, instead of electromechanical (analog) meters for opt-out customers. The Coalition filed a petition for reconsideration. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission's finding that solid-state meters are safe was not supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the Commission's decision to approve the revised terms was not arbitrary or unreasonable, unjust, or unlawful and was supported by competent evidence in the record. View "Maine Coalition to Stop Smart Meters v. Public Utilities Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the Town of Marana violated Ariz. Rev. Stat. 9-463.05 by assigning the entire cost of upgraded and expanded wastewater treatment facilities to future homeowners through development impact fees.\Applying the Home Builders Ass'n of Central Ariz. v. City of Scottsdale, 187 Ariz. 479 (1997), the court ruled that the development impact fees bore a presumption of validity and that section 9-463.05 was satisfied because the development fees resulted in a beneficial use to the development. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals and reversed the trial court, holding (1) in applying section 9-463.05 as amended, the court of appeals erroneously applied from City of Scottsdale a presumption of validity to the Town's assessment of development fees; and (2) the Town violated section 9-463.05 by making future development bear 100 percent of the cost of acquiring the wastewater treatment facility and bearing nearly all of the cost of upgrading, modernizing, and improving the facility. View "Southern Ariz. Home Builders Ass'n v. Town of Marana" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed I'm part the order of the district court granting summary judgment to the State and Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (State) regarding interpretation of a settlement agreement between the parties, holding that the district court erred by reaching the merits of a nonjusticiable issue.In this case stemming from settled litigation between the parties involving the State's rent claims against utility companies for use of riverbed acreage occupied by their hydroelectric projects. On appeal, defendant Avista Corporation argued that the district court erred in concluding that the agreement's provision governing a conditional reduction of rent would not provide a retroactive credit for past rent paid by Avista. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) a portion of the district court's order must be reversed as being unripe and constituting an advisory opinion about speculative issues that may never arise; and (2) the district court properly declared that "Avista [was] required to continue to pay the annual full market rental rate as set forth in the Settlement, Consent Judgment, and Lease." View "State Dep't of Natural Resources & Conservation v. Avista Corp." on Justia Law

In three related actions, privately held public utilities sued for property tax refunds for fiscal years 2014-2015 and 2015-2016, following the County’s denial of refund claims submitted under Revenue and Taxation Code section 5097. Section 100(b) establishes formulas for calculating the debt-service component of certain property taxes. Pursuant to that statute, Santa Clara County imposed taxes on the utilities’ properties at rates higher than those imposed on non-utility properties. Although section 100(b) was enacted in 1986, the utilities argued that imposition of a higher debt-service tax rate on their property, under the statutory formulas, violated California Constitution article XIII, section 19, which provides that the state-assessed property of certain regulated utility companies “shall be subject to taxation to the same extent and in the same manner as other property.”The trial court denied motions to dismiss, holding that the County had not carried its burden of establishing that the utilities cannot state a claim. The court of appeal reversed. Article XIII, section 19, does not mandate that utility property be taxed at the same rate as other property. Instead, it provides that, after utility property is assessed by the State Board of Equalization, it shall be subject to ad valorem taxation at its full market value by local jurisdictions. View "County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County" on Justia Law