Justia Utilities Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court held that a common pleas court has subject-matter jurisdiction to determine whether an easement granting a public utility the right to trim, cut and remove trees, limbs, underbrush or other obstructions permits the public utility to use herbicide to control vegetation within the easement.At issue was whether a public utility may remove vegetation from an easement by use of herbicide. The court of common pleas dismissed this matter as falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO). The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) this case was not within the exclusion jurisdiction of the PUCO and may be heard and decided by the court of common pleas; and (2) the court of appeals went beyond the narrow issue presented on appeal when it examined the merits of the case and determined that the language of the easements was ambiguous. View "Coder v. Ohio Edison Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Public Utilities Commission finding that Suburban Natural Gas Company failed to prove the allegation in its complaint that Columbia Gas Company of Ohio, Inc. had improperly used one of its demand-side management (DSM) programs to unlawfully gain an anticompetitive advantage over Suburban, holding that Suburban failed to demonstrate reversible error.Suburban and Columbia each provided natural-gas distribution service to customers in southern Delaware County. Under the DSM program at issue in this case, Columbia was authorized to offer cash incentives directly to residential builders to construct homes that exceeded certain energy efficiency standards. Suburban filed a complaint alleging that Columbia used this program to pay financial incentives to a home builder to displace Suburban as the provider of natural gas to a planned residential subdivision. The Commission entered an order finding that Suburban had failed to prove the allegations in the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Suburban failed to demonstrate that the Commission erred in deciding the complaint in Columbia's favor. View "Surburban Natural Gas Co. v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a consolidated cases filed by plaintiff Northern New England Telephone Operations, LLC d/b/a FairPoint Communications-NNE (FairPoint), against several New Hampshire towns and cities, asserting claims of ultra vires taxation and disproportionate taxation. As “representative municipalities” in the “test cases” established for this litigation, defendants, the Town of Durham and the Town of Hanover (Towns), appealed two superior court orders challenging: (1) the grant of summary judgment on the ultra vires ruling because they contended the agreements authorizing such use or occupation did not satisfy the requirements of RSA 72:23, I(b) (2012) (amended 2017, 2018, 2020); and (2) the superior court’s decision after trial, arguing that the court committed several errors in concluding that FairPoint was entitled to abatements of its tax assessments from the Town of Durham and the Town of Hanover for tax years 2013 and 2011 respectively. The New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed with the Towns that the superior court erred with respect to the tax on the value of FairPoint's use or occupation of municipal rights-of-way was ultra vires. FairPoint’s use or occupation of municipal rights-of-way was not pursuant to a perpetual lease that gave rise to an independently taxable property interest; FairPoint met its burden to prove it was taxed disproportionately by the Towns. Judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part and consequently abating the two tax assessments at issue. View "Northern New England Telephone Operations, LLC d/b/a FairPoint Communications - NNE v. Town of Acworth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court concluding that the Montana Public Service Commission (PSC) arbitrarily and unlawfully reduced solar qualifying facility (QF) standard-offer rates by excluding carbon dioxide emissions costs and NorthWestern Energy's avoided costs of operating its internal combustion engine resource units from the avoided-cost rate, holding that the district court did not err.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the district court did not err in determining that the PSC did not comply with the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) and Montana's mini-PURPA when it set the standard-offer contract rates and maximum contract lengths for qualifying small (QF-1) solar power producers. The PSC's decision to reduce the standard-offer QF-1 rates was arbitrary and unreasonable because the PSC failed to consider future carbon costs and failed to provide a reasoned decision in departing from its recent precedent. Further, the PSC unreasonably failed to consider NorthWestern's cost of operating its new internal combustion engine resources when setting the avoided-cost rate. View "Vote Solar v. Montana Department of Public Service Regulation" on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute over control of sewerage service to Point Wells, located just north of the King County, Washington border, within the boundaries of Snohomish County and Olympic View Water and Sewer District (Olympic). The issue presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review was a determination of the effect of a 1985 superior court order which purported to annex the Point Wells service area from King County to Ronald Wastewater District (Ronald). Resolution of this issue required interpretation of former Title 56 RCW (1985) and former RCW 36.94.410-.440 (1985) to determine whether the 1985 court had authority to approve the transfer and annexation. The trial court held that the 1985 Order annexed Point Wells to Ronald. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that King County could not transfer annexation rights that it did not have. Finding no reversible error in the appellate court's conclusion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Ronald Wastewater Dist. v. Olympic View Water& Sewer Dist." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court overruled the decision of the Public Service Commission (PSC) rejecting a proposed development of an eighty-megawatt solar energy facility near Billings, Montana, holding that the PSC violated the requirements of the federal Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) and state law precluding discrimination against solar energy projects.The district court reversed and remanded the PSC's order setting terms and conditions of MTSUN, LLC's proposed eighty megawatt solar project based on findings of violations of due process, PURPA, and Montana's mini-PURPA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in concluding that the PSC's determinations were arbitrary and unlawful; and (2) relied on record evidence in determining the existence of a legally-enforceable agreement and the avoided-cost rates. View "MTSUN, LLC v. Montana Department of Public Service Regulation" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) determining that Direct Energy Business, LLC had established that Duke Energy Ohio, Inc.'s failure to provide accurate readings of the generation usage of one of Direct's customers constituted inadequate service, holding that Duke Energy was not acting as a public utility when serving as Direct's meter-data-management agent.Direct purchased electric generation services from the operator of a wholesale power market and resold them to end-use customers through Duke Energy's distribution system. Duke Energy acted as Direct's meter-data-management agent, providing electric usage data about Direct's customers to the wholesale market operator, which then used the data to invoice Direct for its purchases. When Duke Energy failed to calculate usage data for one of Direct's large customers, Direct filed a complaint against Duke Energy with the PUCO. The PUCO ruled in favor of Direct. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the PUCO with instructions for it to dismiss Direct's complaint, holding (1) the PUCO lacked jurisdiction over this matter because PUCO's jurisdiction is confined to the supervision of "public utilities"; and (2) Duke Energy did not act as a public utility under the facts of this case. View "In re Complaint of Direct Energy Business, LLC v. Duke Energy Ohio, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a Public Service Commission order setting rates an electric utility had to pay to solar and other qualifying renewable energy producers for electricity the utility will then sell to its customers. The South Carolina Supreme Court dismissed the appeal because two of the appellants lacked standing to appeal, and the appeal was moot as to the remaining appellant. View "SC Coastal Conservation League v. Dominion Energy" on Justia Law

Members of Delta Electric Power Association filed a lawsuit against the cooperative seeking the return of excess revenue and receipts. Delta moved to compel arbitration. The trial court found that the arbitration clause contained in the bylaws was procedurally unconscionable and denied Delta’s motion to compel. After Delta appealed the trial court’s decision, the Mississippi Supreme Court decided Virgil v. Southwest Mississippi Electric Power Association, 296 So. 3d 53 (Miss. 2020), in which it found an arbitration agreement contained in a cooperative’s bylaws to be valid and enforceable. Because the Supreme Court determined the issues in this case were almost identical to the issues decided in Virgil, precedent required it Court to reverse the trial court’s decision denying Delta’s motion to compel arbitration. View "Delta Electric Power Assn. v. Campbell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court affirming Defendant's magistrate court conviction for operating an onsite wastewater system without a permit, holding that the City's ordinance as applied to Defendant was not an ex post facto law.Defendant was convicted for failure to obtain a permit in violation of Rapid City Municipal Code (RCMC) 13.20.800. On appeal, Defendant argued that RCMC 13.20.800 violated the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal constitutions, was preempted by state administrative rules, and exceeded Rapid City's authority since Defendant lived outside of the city's limits. The circuit court affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the City's sewerage permit ordinance was not an ex post facto law because it punished Defendant for conduct occurring after the ordinance was enacted; (2) RCMC 13.20.800 does not conflict with state administrative regulations; and (3) there was no merit to Defendant's argument that the City lacked authority to enforce the ordinance beyond its municipal boundaries. View "City Of Rapid City v. Schaub" on Justia Law