Justia Utilities Law Opinion Summaries

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A group of single-family residential (SFR) water customers challenged the City of San Diego’s tiered water rate structure, which imposed higher rates for increased water usage, arguing that these rates exceeded the proportional cost of service attributable to their parcels as required by California Constitution article XIII D, section 6(b)(3) (enacted by Proposition 218). The City’s water system serves a large population and divides customers into several classes, but only SFR customers were subject to tiered rates; other classes paid uniform rates. The City’s rates were based on cost-of-service studies using industry-standard methodologies, including “base-extra capacity” and “peaking factors,” but the plaintiffs contended these methods did not accurately reflect the actual cost of providing water at higher usage tiers.The Superior Court of San Diego County certified the case as a class action and held a bifurcated trial. In the first phase, the court found that the City failed to demonstrate, with substantial evidence, that its tiered rates for SFR customers complied with section 6(b)(3), concluding the rates were not based on the actual cost of service at each tier but rather on usage budgets and conservation goals. The court also found the City lacked sufficient data to justify its allocation of costs to higher tiers and that the rate structure discriminated against SFR customers compared to other classes. In the second phase, the court awarded the class a refund for overcharges, offset by undercharges, and ordered the City to implement new, compliant rates.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, affirmed the trial court’s judgment with directions. The appellate court held that the City bore the burden of proving its rates did not exceed the proportional cost of service and that the applicable standard was not mere reasonableness but actual cost proportionality, subject to independent judicial review. The court found substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings that the City’s tiered rates were not cost-based and thus violated section 6(b)(3). The court also upheld class certification and the method for calculating the refund, and directed the trial court to amend the judgment to comply with newly enacted Government Code section 53758.5, which affects the manner of refunding overcharges. View "Patz v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

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One Power Company challenged two orders issued by the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) regarding Ohio Power Company’s fifth electric-security plan. The first issue concerned a protective agreement governing access to confidential discovery materials. One Power argued that the agreement unreasonably prevented its chief executive officer and expert witness, an employee, from accessing all discovery, which allegedly disadvantaged its ability to litigate. The second issue involved the commission’s decision to continue a nonbypassable basic-transmission-cost rider, meaning all customers—including those who purchase generation service from competitive suppliers—must pay the charge.After AEP Ohio filed its application for the fifth electric-security plan, One Power intervened and sought broader access to confidential materials. The PUCO’s attorney examiner denied One Power’s motion for a more permissive protective agreement, finding the proposed limits reasonable. One Power’s interlocutory appeal was also denied. At the evidentiary hearing, One Power renewed its objections, but the commission affirmed the examiner’s rulings and later denied rehearing. Regarding the transmission rider, the commission maintained its nonbypassable status, citing the need for further study before making major changes and noting consistency with prior practice. One Power’s rehearing application on this issue was also denied.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed whether the PUCO’s orders were unlawful or unreasonable. The court held that One Power failed to demonstrate particularized harm from the protective agreement and that the commission acted within its statutory and regulatory authority in continuing the nonbypassable rider. The court found no violation of state electric policy or commission precedent. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the PUCO’s orders. View "In re Application of Ohio Power Co." on Justia Law

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Dayton Power and Light Company (DP&L), operating as AES Ohio, sought approval from the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) regarding whether its electric security plan (ESP) resulted in significantly excessive earnings for the years 2018 and 2019. The ESP is a mechanism for setting the standard generation rate for customers who do not choose a competitive supplier. During this period, DP&L also transitioned from its third ESP (ESP III) back to its first ESP (ESP I) after the commission invalidated a similar rider in another utility’s plan, following a decision by the Supreme Court of Ohio. DP&L’s parent company, AES Corporation, made substantial capital contributions to support future investments in grid modernization.PUCO consolidated several related cases and found that DP&L’s ESP resulted in excessive earnings of $3.7 million in 2018 and $57.4 million in 2019. However, PUCO determined that DP&L could offset these excessive earnings with its commitment to future capital investments, and therefore, no refund to consumers was required. PUCO also found that DP&L’s ESP passed the required quadrennial review tests, including a prospective analysis of earnings and a comparison to market-rate offers. The Office of the Ohio Consumers’ Counsel (OCC) appealed, challenging the refusal to order refunds and the continued collection of a rate-stabilization charge. DP&L filed a protective cross-appeal, asserting alternative grounds for affirmance.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that PUCO was not authorized under R.C. 4928.143(F) to allow DP&L to retain significantly excessive earnings based solely on its commitment to future investments. The court reversed PUCO’s orders and remanded the case for a new significantly excessive earnings test analysis. The court rejected OCC’s challenge to the rate-stabilization charge, finding its legality was not at issue in this appeal, and also rejected DP&L’s alternative grounds for affirmance. View "In re Application of Dayton Power & Light Co." on Justia Law

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Two electric utility companies merged in 1998, with federal approval conditioned on their participation in a regional grid operator to prevent customers from paying multiple, overlapping transmission fees (“pancaked” rates). Several years later, the merged company was allowed to leave the grid operator, but only if it continued to protect certain customers from redundant fees through a special rate schedule. In 2019, the company sought to end this obligation, arguing that continued protection was no longer necessary. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) granted this request, but the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated that order, finding FERC had failed to consider the impact on customer rates.On remand, FERC issued a new order denying the company’s request to end the fee protection, concluding that removing the protection would adversely affect rates for certain customers and that the benefits of removal did not outweigh these harms. FERC also denied rehearing, maintaining that the company had not shown sufficient alternative protections for affected customers. The company then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review, arguing that FERC’s orders were arbitrary, capricious, and inconsistent with law and precedent.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that FERC did not violate its statutory mandate or precedent in its general approach. However, the court found that FERC failed to adequately consider whether alternative customer protections, such as transition agreements, could mitigate the adverse rate impacts. The court therefore granted the petitions for review, vacated FERC’s orders, and remanded the matter for further consideration of whether such protections would suffice to offset the adverse effects on rates. View "Louisville Gas and Electric Company v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

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This case involves a dispute over the compensation structure for utility customers who generate their own electricity, such as through rooftop solar panels, and export excess energy to the power grid. The California Legislature has required utilities to compensate these “customer-generators” since 1995, but concerns arose that the original compensation method overpaid such customers and shifted costs to those without solar systems. In 2013, the Legislature directed the Public Utilities Commission to reassess the compensation framework, resulting in a 2022 tariff that significantly reduced payments for customer-generated power. Environmental groups challenged the new tariff, arguing it failed to account for all societal benefits of renewable energy and did not adequately promote growth among disadvantaged communities.The First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the challenge after the petitioners sought a writ of review. The Court of Appeal affirmed the Commission’s decision, applying a highly deferential standard from Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Public Utilities Com., which upheld Commission interpretations unless they lacked a reasonable relation to statutory purposes and language. The appellate court concluded that the Commission’s approach met this deferential standard and declined to engage in further inquiry.The Supreme Court of California granted review to determine whether the deferential Greyhound standard remains appropriate following legislative amendments to the Public Utilities Code. The Supreme Court held that, due to statutory changes in the 1990s and 2000s, the Greyhound standard no longer applies to most Commission decisions, including those involving energy. Instead, courts must now independently review the Commission’s statutory interpretations, consistent with the approach outlined in Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings under the correct standard of review. View "Center for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. Public Utilities Com." on Justia Law

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The case involves Delta Air Lines, Inc. and PacifiCorp, both of which are centrally assessed businesses in Oregon. Under Oregon law, centrally assessed businesses are taxed on their intangible property, unlike locally assessed businesses. Delta and PacifiCorp challenged this tax, arguing it violated the state and federal constitutions by not being uniform and by violating equal protection and privileges clauses.The Oregon Tax Court addressed both cases in a single opinion, ruling in favor of Delta by finding the tax on intangible property unconstitutional for air transportation businesses. However, it ruled against PacifiCorp, upholding the tax for utilities. The Tax Court concluded that there were no genuine differences between the intangible property of centrally assessed air transportation businesses and locally assessed businesses, but found differences for utilities.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on whether the tax classifications were rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. The court reversed the Tax Court's decision regarding Delta, holding that the tax on intangible property for centrally assessed businesses is constitutional. The court found that the legislature's decision to tax intangible property of centrally assessed businesses, but not locally assessed ones, was rationally related to legitimate purposes such as administrative efficiency, expertise in valuation, and balancing revenue against resources. The court also affirmed the Tax Court's decision regarding PacifiCorp in a separate opinion, maintaining the tax's constitutionality for utilities. The case was remanded to the Tax Court for further proceedings. View "Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

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Florida Power & Light Company (FPL) entered into a multi-party settlement agreement to establish base rates, which was approved by the Florida Public Service Commission (Commission). The settlement allowed FPL to increase rates annually for four years, generating significant additional revenue and permitting incremental rate increases for solar projects. It also included provisions for an equity-to-debt ratio, return on equity, and a minimum base bill for customers. The settlement aimed to support investments in power generation, transmission, distribution systems, and renewable energy programs.The Commission's initial approval of the settlement was challenged, leading to a remand by the Supreme Court of Florida in Floridians Against Increased Rates, Inc. v. Clark (FAIR). The Court required the Commission to provide a more detailed explanation of its reasoning and to consider FPL's performance under the Florida Energy Efficiency and Conservation Act (FEECA). On remand, the Commission denied a motion to reopen the evidentiary record and issued a Supplemental Final Order, reaffirming that the settlement was in the public interest.The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the case again. The Court upheld the Commission's approval of the settlement, finding that the Commission's factual findings were supported by competent, substantial evidence and that its policy decisions were within its discretion. The Court concluded that the Commission had adequately considered the mandatory and discretionary factors, including FPL's FEECA performance, and provided a reasoned explanation for its decision. The Court affirmed the Commission's Final and Supplemental Final Orders, determining that the settlement established fair, just, and reasonable rates. View "Florida Rising, Inc. v. Florida Public Service Commission" on Justia Law

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Aquarion Water Company of Connecticut (Aquarion) filed a rate application with the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA) in August 2022, seeking to increase its rates to cover approximately $700 million in capital improvements made since 2013. Aquarion also sought to recover $3 million in deferred water conservation expenses and $2.2 million for its employee incentive compensation program. PURA reviewed the application and allowed Aquarion to include $650 million in plant additions completed before August 31, 2022, in its rate base but excluded $48 million in post-application plant additions. PURA also denied Aquarion’s request for the full amount of deferred conservation expenses and employee incentive compensation, reducing the approved revenue requirement to $195 million and the return on equity (ROE) to 8.7%.The trial court dismissed Aquarion’s appeal, finding substantial evidence supporting PURA’s decisions. Aquarion then appealed to the Connecticut Supreme Court, arguing that PURA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in its prudence determinations and that the rate order was confiscatory.The Connecticut Supreme Court upheld PURA’s exclusion of the $42 million in post-application plant additions, finding a discernible difference in the quality of evidence submitted for pre- and post-application additions. The court also upheld the denial of $2.2 million for the employee incentive compensation program, agreeing that PURA did not use hindsight but rather assessed the program’s future efficacy based on historical data.However, the court found that PURA improperly used hindsight to evaluate the prudence of $1.5 million in deferred conservation expenses, focusing on after-the-fact economic savings rather than the prudence of the decision at the time the expenses were incurred. The court reversed this part of the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.The court also rejected Aquarion’s claim that the rate order was confiscatory, affirming that the approved ROE of 8.7% was not effectively reduced by the disallowance of certain costs and was sufficient to maintain Aquarion’s financial integrity and ability to attract capital. View "Aquarion Water Co. of Connecticut v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority" on Justia Law

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Snakeroot Solar, LLC, sought a good-cause exemption from the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) to extend the deadline for its photovoltaic generating facility in Pittsfield to reach commercial operation and participate in Maine’s net energy billing (NEB) program. The facility needed to be operational by December 31, 2024, but delays in the interconnection process and the time required for grid upgrades made this deadline unachievable. Snakeroot argued that these delays were outside its control and warranted an exemption.The PUC denied Snakeroot’s petition, finding that the delays were inherent to the interconnection process and not external. The PUC noted that the cluster study process, which took slightly longer than average, and the time required for grid upgrades were typical and did not constitute external delays. Snakeroot appealed, arguing that the PUC misinterpreted the statute and that the delays were indeed external and beyond its control.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and upheld the PUC’s decision. The Court found that the PUC’s interpretation of the statute was reasonable and aligned with the legislative intent to limit the number of projects eligible for the NEB program to control electricity rates. The Court also determined that the PUC’s findings were supported by substantial evidence, including the typical duration of cluster studies and the standard lead times for equipment procurement. The Court concluded that the PUC did not abuse its discretion in denying the exemption, as the delays experienced by Snakeroot were part of the normal interconnection process and not extraordinary. View "Snakeroot Solar, LLC v. Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

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Summit Carbon Solutions, LLC plans to build an interstate pipeline through Iowa, passing through Shelby and Story Counties. Both counties enacted ordinances regulating pipelines, including setback, emergency response plan, and local permit requirements. Summit challenged these ordinances, claiming they were preempted by the federal Pipeline Safety Act (PSA) and Iowa law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Summit, permanently enjoining the ordinances.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa reviewed the case and ruled in favor of Summit, finding that the PSA preempted the counties' ordinances. The court held that the ordinances imposed safety standards, which are under the exclusive regulatory authority of the federal government. The court also found that the ordinances were inconsistent with Iowa state law, which grants the Iowa Utilities Commission (IUC) the authority to regulate pipeline routes and safety standards.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the PSA preempts the Shelby and Story ordinances' setback, emergency response, and abandonment provisions. The court found that the ordinances' primary motivation was safety, which falls under the exclusive regulatory authority of the federal government. The court also held that the ordinances were inconsistent with Iowa state law, as they imposed additional requirements that could prohibit pipeline construction even if the IUC had granted a permit.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in both cases, but vacated and remanded the judgment in the Story County case to the extent it addressed a repealed ordinance. View "McNair v. Johnson" on Justia Law