Justia Utilities Law Opinion Summaries

Appellee was injured by a falling tree located near, but outside, an easement maintained by Utility Company. Utility Company had hired Service Contractor to inspect trees along its power lines and to remedy any situation in which trees or vegetation might affect the lines. Appellee filed suit against Appellants, Utility Company and Service Contractor, alleging that they were liable for Appellee's injuries based upon their failure to inspect, maintain, and remove the tree or to warn the landowner and the public of the danger raised by the tree. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellants, concluding that they owed no duty to Appellee and that Appellee was not a third-party beneficiary under the Appellants' contract. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the contract was ambiguous regarding whether Appellee had enforceable rights as an intended third-party beneficiary. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) for an injured party to qualify as an intended third-party beneficiary under a written contract, the contract must indicate an intention to benefit that third party; and (2) because the contract between Appellants did not indicate an intent to benefit Appellee, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Appellants.View "Huff v. FirstEnergy Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an environmental organization, filed this administrative mandamus action to challenge the issuance of a federally required permit authorizing the Moss Landing Powerplant (MLPP) to draw cooling water from the adjacent Moss Landing Harbor and Elkhorn Slough. This case presented issues concerning the technological and environmental standards, and the procedures for administrative and judicial review, that apply when a thermal powerplant, while pursuing the issuance or renewal of a cooling water intake permit from a regional board, also sought necessary approval from the State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission (Energy Commission), of a plan to add additional generating units to the plant, with related modifications to the cooling intake system. The court held that the superior court had jurisdiction to entertain the administrative mandamus petition here under review. The court also held that the trial court erred when it deferred a final judgment, ordered an interlocutory remand to the board for further "comprehensive" examination of that issue, then denied mandamus after determining that the additional evidence and analysis considered by the board on remand supported the board's reaffirmed findings. The court further held that recent Supreme Court authority confirmed that, when applying federal Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1326(b), standards for the issuance of this permit, the Regional Water Board properly utilized cost-benefit analysis. The court declined to address several other issues discussed by the parties. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.View "Voices of the Wetlands v. CA State Water Resources Control Bd., et al." on Justia Law

Appellant TW Telecom of New Mexico (TW Telecom) appealed a final order issued by the New Mexico Public Regulation Commission (PRC) in "In the Matter of the Development of an Alternative Form of Regulation Plan for Qwest Corporation" (AFOR III Final Order). TW Telecom claimed that the PRC (1) adopted certain conclusions from a previous final order, lacking justification in the AFOR III record; (2) deregulated Qwest Corporation's (Qwest) rates in violation of the New Mexico Telecommunications Act and the separation of powers doctrine in the New Mexico Constitution; and (3) deprived TW Telecom of proper due process. The claims raised in this appeal involved three cases before the PRC that concerned the development of various alternative forms of regulation plans issued by the PRC, and Qwest's compliance with the terms and conditions therein.  The cases addressed various issues, including pricing provisions and detailed requirements for the filing of tariff changes, tariffs for new services, promotional offerings, packaged services, and individual contracts for services. Upon review, the Supreme Court annulled and vacated AFOR III Final Order and remanded the case back to the PRC for further proceedings. The Court concluded that the PRC indeed violated TW Telecom's due process because it adopted conclusions from a previous proceeding without affording the parties an opportunity to be heard. The Court did not address TW Telecom's second claim. View "TW Telecom of New Mexico v. New Mexico Public Regulation Comm'n" on Justia Law

This appeal challenged a final order of the Public Utility Commission (PUC) in a true-up proceeding under Chapter 39 of the Utilities Code. AEP Texas Central Co. (AEP), a transmission and distribution utility, and CPL Retail Energy, L.P., its affiliated retail electric provider, initiated a proceeding under section 39.262 to finalize stranded costs and other true-up amounts and the state, several municipalities, and several other parties who were consumers of electricity or represent consumer interests (collectively, consumers), intervened in the proceeding. The issues before the court concern market value, net book value (NBV), and the capacity auction true-up. The court held that where, as here, the utility managed to sell its stake in a nuclear plant, the court saw no error in using the sale of assets method, which was, if anything, the preferred method for valuing generation assets. The court also held that it saw no error in PUC's approach where the interest rate AEP received on its stranded costs was grossed up. The court further held that section 39.262 unambiguously specified that the statutory capacity auction price, not some other blended price the PUC found more appropriate, must be used in calculating the capacity auction true-up amount. On remand, the PUC must recalculate the capacity auction true-up in a manner consistent with the court's opinion in State v. PUC, rather than relying on the proxy price it selected in the true-up proceeding. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review, affirming in part and reversing in part.View "AEP Texas Central Co. v. Public Utility Comm'n of Texas, et al." on Justia Law

The state public utilities commission approved a power-purchase agreement (PPA) between National Grid and Deepwater Wind, the respondents. Under the PPA, Deepwater Wind agreed to construct an offshore wind farm in state waters and then sell the generated electricity to National Grid, a statewide power distributor. National Grid, in turn, pledged to purchase the generated electricity and apportion the cost of building the wind farm to in-state ratepayers over the course of the twenty-year contract. Dissatisfied with National Grid's cost-distribution plan, petitioners Toray Plastics and Polytop challenged the commission's assessment that the PPA met all statutory preconditions for approval. The Supreme Court affirmed the commission's decision, concluding that the commission accurately interpreted and applied the law by making findings that were lawful and reasonable, fairly and substantially supported by legal evidence, and sufficiently specific for the Court to ascertain that the evidence upon which the commission based its findings reasonably supported the result.View "In re Review of Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a company that processed perlite for horticultural and construction use, sued respondent alleging several counts for damages based on the claim that natural gas being supplied to petitioner was contaminated with debris that caused damage to petitioner's furnaces. Discovery and trial preparation were undertaken, during which time the parties engaged in numerous disagreements concerning discovery and other matters. Neither party filed a motion to have the case reset for trial and respondent subsequently filed a notice of lack of prosecution under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(e), alleging that there had been no record activity for the prior ten months. At issue was the proper interpretation of rule 1.420(e), which provided for involuntary dismissal of court actions for lack of prosecution. The court held that the filing made by petitioner during the sixty-day grace period set forth in rule 1.420(e) met the rule's requirement for record activity and therefore, precluded dismissal for lack of prosecution. Accordingly, the court quashed the decision of the First District and approved the conflict cases certified by the First District.View "Chemrock Corp. v. Tampa Elec. Co., etc. " on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendant seeking a declaratory injunction that defendant did not have an easement on their property, damages for trespass and conversion for a 2007 and 2008 incident, an injunction against further trespass, and attorney fees. Defendant asserted as a defense that the lawsuit was filed after the one-year statute of limitations under OCGA 46-3-204. At issue was whether summary judgment against plaintiffs was proper. The court affirmed the trial court's rejection of plaintiffs' constitutional challenges to the one-year statute of limitations. The court then affirmed in part and reversed in part the grant of summary judgment because issues of material fact remained regarding the existence of a valid prescriptive easement and plaintiffs' trespass and conversion claims based on defendant's 2008 actions were not barred by OCGA 46-3-204.View "Daniel, et al. v. Amicalola Elec. Membership Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, several states, the city of New York, and three private land trusts, sued defendants, four private power companies and the federal Tennessee Valley Authority, alleging that defendants' emissions substantially and unreasonably interfered with public rights in violation of the federal common law of interstate nuisance, or in the alternative, of state tort law. Plaintiffs sought a decree setting carbon-dioxide emissions for each defendant at an initial cap to be further reduced annually. At issue was whether plaintiffs could maintain federal common law public nuisance claims against carbon-dioxide emitters. As a preliminary matter, the Court affirmed, by an equally divided Court, the Second Circuit's exercise of jurisdiction and proceeded to the merits. The Court held that the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401, and the Environmental Protection Act ("Act"), 42 U.S.C. 7411, action the Act authorized displaced any federal common-law right to seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel fired power plants. The Court also held that the availability vel non of a state lawsuit depended, inter alia, on the preemptive effect of the federal Act. Because none of the parties have briefed preemption or otherwise addressed the availability of a claim under state nuisance law, the matter was left for consideration on remand. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "American Elec. Power Co., et al. v. Connecticut, et al." on Justia Law

The Minnesota Public Utilities Commission entered an order requiring Qwest Corporation, a successor Bell operating company, to submit for review and approval a price list and supporting rationale for certain telecommunication network facilities Qwest was required to provide to its Minnesota competitors under 47 U.S.C. 271. Qwest sought judicial review and declaratory relief in the district court, arguing the Commission's order was preempted by the Telecommunications Act of 1996. The district court concluded federal law and regulations did not preempt the Commission's order. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the Commission's order impermissibly intruded on federal authority to regulate rates for elements required under section 271 and interfered with the purpose and objectives of Congress and the FCC; and (2) therefore, the order was preempted by the Act and the FCC's implementing regulations and rulings. View "Qwest Corp. v. Minn. Pub. Util. Comm'n" on Justia Law

In this diversity suit, a landowner sought injunctive and compensatory relief from a telephone company for a trespass and for slandering its title to certain property. The district court granted summary judgment to the telephone company. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings, holding (1) the district court erred in concluding that the telephone company had a constructive license across the property; (2) the district court incorrectly dismissed the landowner's claim for compensatory damages; and (3) summary judgment against the landowner's claims for slander of title and punitive damages was appropriate. View "Marlow, LLC v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc." on Justia Law