Justia Utilities Law Opinion Summaries

The City of Reynoldsburg was a municipal corporation governed by a charter. Intervening appellee, Columbus Southern Power Company (CSP), was a public utility and provided electric power to the City and its residents. At issue in this case was whether the City or CSP bore the cost to relocate overhead power lines underground. Specifically, the City sought a ruling that its right-of-way ordinance requiring all overhead power lines to be relocated underground at the sole cost of the public utility took precedence over CSP's commission-approved tariff, which provided that municipalities shall pay the costs whenever they required CSP to relocate overhead electrical distribution lines underground, in this particular aspect. The City filed a complaint with the Public Utilities Commission, contending that its ordinance superseded CSP's tariff and that the tariff was unjust, unreasonable, and unlawful. The commission found in favor of CSP. The Supreme Court affirmed the commission's orders, holding that the commission correctly found that the City was required to pay CSP's entire costs for relocating the power lines underground. View "In re Complaint of Reynoldsburg " on Justia Law

Qwest Corporation and the Colorado Public Utilities Commission (PUC) appealed a district court's judgment in favor of the Colorado Office of Consumer Counsel (OCC) that reversed the PUC's decision setting the maximum rate for certain telephone services. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the PUC regularly pursued its authority because it considered all of the statutorily-mandated factors and its decision is supported by substantial evidence. The Court therefore reversed the judgment of the district court.View "Ofc. of Consumer Counsel v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Kansas One-Call System (One-Call) managed and operated a centralized notification center for diggers working on underground utility infrastructure to use before they started excavating pursuant to the Kansas Underground Utility Damage Prevention Act (KUUDPA). The Kansas Legislature later amended the KUUPDA, which financially affected One-Call. One-Call sued to enjoin enforcement of the amendments on the grounds that the amendments violated (1) the original purpose provision of the Kansas Constitution, (2) the one-subject rule, (3) the separation of powers doctrine, and (4) the Equal Protection Clause and the Taking Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the State. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the challenged amendments were valid. View "Kansas One-Call Sys. v. State" on Justia Law

Duke Energy Ohio, Inc. sought to recover over $30 million for the costs of restoring its system following the destruction caused by Hurricane Ike. The Public Utilities Commission allowed Duke to recover roughly half that amount, finding that several of Duke's requests lacked adequate supporting evidence. Duke appealed, raising five propositions of law, all variations on the theme that the Commission's order lacked record support. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission's finding reducing the amount that Duke could recover because it found substantial problems with the supporting evidence was confirmed by the record; and (2) each of Duke's arguments lacked merit. View "In re Application of Duke Energy Ohio, Inc." on Justia Law

One of Summit Water Distribution Company's (SWDC) minority shareholders, Bear Hollow Restoration, filed a complaint requesting a review and investigation of SWDC's exemption from public regulation under the now-repealed Utah Admin. R. 746-331-1. The Public Service Commission dismissed the complaint on the basis that SWDC was not a public utility, and therefore, the Commission did not have jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's dismissal, holding (1) the allegations in Bear Hollow's complaint were insufficient to establish that SWDC served the public generally or that the Commission had jurisdiction; (2) Bear Hollow was not prejudiced by repeal of Rule 746-331-1 because the rule applied only to internal agency decisions and the underlying substantive law remained in place; and (3) the Commission did not abuse its discretion when it refused Bear Hollow's amended complaint after the original complaint had been dismissed.View "Bear Hollow Restoration, LLC v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Petitioner suffered injuries when he was struck by a power line belonging to Entergy. Petitioner filed a negligence per se claim against Entergy based on petitioner's claim that the power line was less than 22 feet above the surface of the traffic lane as allegedly required by Section 181.045 of the Texas Utilities Code. After a jury verdict favorable to petitioner, the trial court rendered a judgment for him. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Entergy was not required to maintain the line at the height petitioner claimed was required by statute. Because the court agreed with petitioner's construction of the relevant statutes, the court reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings.View "Traxler v. Entergy Gulf State, Inc." on Justia Law

Casey's Marketing Company was a convenience store engaged in the retail sale of gas, grocery items, nonfood items, and prepared foods. Aquila Foreign Qualifications Corporation was a utility that sold electricity to Casey's. Casey's filed a refund claim with the director of revenue for one month's tax paid for a portion of electricity Aquila sold to two Casey's locations. The director denied the claim. At Casey's request, Aquila challenged the director's final decision. The administrative hearing commission reversed, holding that Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.054.2, which provides a tax exemption for the "processing" of products," exempted Casey's food preparation operations. The Supreme Court reversed the commission, holding (1) the preparation of food for retail consumption is not "processing" within the meaning of section 144.054.2; and (2) therefore, Casey was not entitled to a sales and use tax exemption on electricity it purchased to power its food preparation operations. View "Aquila Foreign Qualifications Corp. v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

This case was remanded to the district court for determination of whether a class should be certified and for determination of what, if any, part of the City's franchise fees for gas and electricity services are related to its administrative expenses in exercising its police power. The district court certified a class, found the franchise fees cannot exceed $1,575,194 per year for the electric utility and $1,574,046 for the gas utility, entered judgment in favor of the certified class against the City in the amount by which such fees exceeded that amount for an approximately ten-year period, and retained jurisdiction to determine the amount of money to be refunded to members of the class. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment as modified, concluding that certain amounts allocated or not allocated by the district court as proper components of the franchise fees should be modified. Remanded.View "Kragnes v. City of Des Moines" on Justia Law

Ohio Edison Company owned a transmission-line easement running over property owned by Kurt Wimmer and the Wimmer Family Trust (the Wimmers). When the company sought to remove the trees in the easement on the Wimmers' property, the family objected. The court of common pleas found in favor of Ohio Edison, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated that judgment on the authority of Corrigan v. Illum. Co., which held that the Public Utilities Commission, not a court, was required to decide whether tree removal was reasonable. The Wimmers then took their complaint to the Commission, which ruled in Ohio Edison's favor and permitted it to remove the trees. The Supreme Court affirmed where the Wimmers did not show any error in the Commission's order.View "Wimmer v. Pub. Util. Comm." on Justia Law

An accountant and the company he owned (collectively, MBS), filed suit against Defendants, telecommunications companies, asserting claims for damages under Wis. Stat. 100.207 and other statutes, arguing that Defendants' telephone bills contained unauthorized charges. The circuit court dismissed MBS's claims for relief, determining that although the complaint properly alleged violations of section 100.207, the voluntary payment doctrine barred any entitlement to monetary relief. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) the Supreme Court had not decided whether the legislature intended the voluntary payment doctrine to be a viable defense against any cause of action created by a statute; and (2) under the circumstances, the conflict between the manifest purpose of section 100.207 and the common law defense left no doubt that the legislature intended that the common law defense should not be applied to bar claims under the statute. Remanded.View "MBS-Certified Pub. Accountants, LLC v. Wis. Bell Inc." on Justia Law