Justia Utilities Law Opinion Summaries

A fire destroyed a hydroponic tomato facility belonging to a new business, Sunnyland Farms, Inc. The day before the fire, Sunnyland's electricity had been shut off by its local utility, the Central New Mexico Electrical Cooperative (CNMEC), for nonpayment. Sunnyland's water pumps were powered by electricity, and without power, Sunnyland's facility had no water. Sunnyland sued CNMEC, alleging both that CNMEC had wrongfully suspended service, and if its electrical service had been in place, firefighters and Sunnyland employees would have been able to stop the fire from consuming the facility. After a bench trial, the court found CNMEC liable for negligence and breach of contract. The trial court awarded damages, including lost profits, of over $21 million in contract and tort, but reduced the tort damages by 80% for Sunnyland's comparative fault. It also awarded $100,000 in punitive damages. The parties cross-appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the contract judgment, vacated the punitive damages, held that the lost profit damages were not supported by sufficient evidence, affirmed the trial court's offset of damages based on CNMEC's purchase of a subrogation lien, and affirmed the trial court's rulings on pre- and post-judgment interest. Sunnyland appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals regarding the contract judgment, punitive damages, and interest, and reversed on the lost profit damages and the offset. The Court also took the opportunity of this case to re-examine the standard for consequential contract damages in New Mexico. View "Sunnyland Farms, Inc. v. Central N.M. Electric Cooperative, Inc." on Justia Law

Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke) filed an application with the North Carolina Utilities Commission (Commission) to increase its state retail electric service rates approximately 15.2 percent over current revenues. The application requested that rates be established using a return on equity (ROE) of 11.5 percent. The Commission approved a 10.5 percent ROE for Duke. The attorney general appealed the Commission's order, arguing that the order was legally deficient because it was not supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence and did not include sufficient conclusions and reasoning. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commission failed to make the necessary findings of fact to support its ROE determination. Remanded to the Commission to enter sufficient findings of fact. View "State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Attorney Gen." on Justia Law

In these appeals the Supreme Court considered whether the Virginia Constitution provides for a cause of action by a landowner for inverse condemnation when the allegation of the complaint is that the landowner's property has been damaged by a diminution in value resulting from a public utility's construction and operation of an electrical transmission line for public use on nearby property. The trial court sustained the public utility's demurrers with prejudice, finding that because the complaints did not allege that the entire property had been rendered useless, and because the property had not lost all economic value, a damaging under the Constitution had not occurred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court applied the wrong standard in reviewing the pleadings; but (2) under the proper standard, the complainants could not state a cause of action for declaratory relief for inverse condemnation when the sole damage alleged was a diminution in value arising from the public use of proximately located property, and therefore, the circuit court's judgment sustaining the demurrers was correct under the proper standard.View "Byler v. Va. Elec. & Power Co." on Justia Law

TracFone provides prepaid wireless phone service primarily through third-party retailers. The Commercial Mobile Radio Service Emergency Telecommunications Board, created by the Kentucky General Assembly to develop an emergency 911 system for wireless customers, sued to collect unpaid fees from TracFone. KRS § 65.7635 requires wireless providers to collect a fee from their customers and remit the money to the CRMS for the cost of maintaining the 911 system. The district court ruled in favor of the Board with respect to the interpretation of the statute but declined to award prejudgment interest on TracFone’s unpaid fees. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument concerning ambiguity in the statute. TracFone was required to remit fees from the effective date of the statute, regardless of what method it chose. View "KY Commercial Mobile Radio Serv. Emergency Telecommunications Bd. v. Tracfone Wireless, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendants, PG&E and Pacific Bell, own and maintain utility poles throughout the San Francisco Bay Area. Plaintiff filed this action against both companies, alleging that the poles discharged wood preservative into the environment in violation of the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1251-1387, and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6901-6992k. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action under Rule 12(b)(6) where plaintiff failed to state a claim under the CWA because discharges of stormwater from the utility poles were neither a "point source discharge" nor "associated with industrial activity" and where plaintiff failed to state a claim under the RCRA because wood preservation that escaped from the utility poles was not a "solid waste." The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff leave to amend. View "Ecological Rights Foundation v. PG&E" on Justia Law

Robert Madrid worked for Petitioner Public Service Company of New Mexico (PNM) as a bill collector. "Angered by a particularly obstinate customer," and without permission, Madrid drove to the customer's home and disconnected the customer's gas service. It would later be determined that the customer was not a customer of PNM. PNM fired Madrid. Madrid responded by filing a grievance against PNM with his union, arguing that Madrid's termination violated its collective bargaining agreement with the Company. In making its argument, the union hypothesized that PNM treated Madrid more harshly than other employees guilty of similar conduct. The union sent PNM three discovery requests for documents to prove its hypothesis. Those requests became the subject of the appeal before the Tenth Circuit, as PNM refused to comply. An ALJ determined that PNM had engaged in an unfair labor practice, and ordered the Company to comply with the discovery requests. The National Labor Relations board adopted the ALJ's decision. PNM appealed the Board's order, and the Board cross-petitioned to have its order enforced. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit was unpersuaded by PNM's arguments on appeal, and affirmed the Board's decision.View "Public Service CO of NM v. NLRB" on Justia Law

AT&T and Intrado, rival telecommunications carriers, submitted to an arbitration conducted by the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio to determine how to interconnect their networks to service 9-1-1 calls. AT&T insisted that all points of interconnection be on its network, relying on the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C 251(c), a provision only applicable to incumbent carriers like AT&T. The Commission rejected this request, relied on the general provisions of Section 251(a), and ordered the carriers to establish interconnection points on both AT&T’s and Intrado’s networks. The district court and Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the Commission exceeded its arbitral authority by applying Section 251(a) because Intrado had petitioned for interconnection only under Section 251(c). The Commission properly interpreted an incumbent carrier’s interconnection duties under the Act. View "OH Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils Comm'n of OH" on Justia Law

The Clean Air Act New Source Review program forbids construction of new pollution sources without a permit, 42 U.S.C. 7475. Operators of major pollutant-emitting sources who plan construction must make a preconstruction projection of the increase in emissions following construction, to determine whether the project constitutes a “major modification,” requiring a permit. DTE planned on replacing 2,000 square feet of tubing, the economizer, and large sections of reheater piping; installing a new nine-ton device that provides voltage that creates the electromagnetic field needed for the rotor to produce electricity; and refurbishing boiler feedwater pumps at its power plant. The project required 83 days and $65 million. DTE performed required calculations and projected an emissions increase of 3,701 tons per year of sulfur dioxide and 4,096 tons per year of nitrogen oxides. Under the regulations, an increase of 40 tons per year of either substance is significant. DTE determined that the increase fell under the demand growth exclusion. The Michigan Department of Environmental Quality took no action and construction began. The U.S. EPA filed notice of violation. The district court granted DTE summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed. While the regulations allow operators to undertake projects without having EPA second-guess their projections, EPA is not categorically prevented from challenging blatant violations until after modifications are made. View "United States v. DTE Energy Co." on Justia Law

Petitioners, a group of municipal and federal government entities, which sold electricity in the affected markets at issue but who were outside of FERC's refund jurisdiction, appealed FERC's order of refunds for electricity rates that were above what FERC determined to be the just and reasonable rate. The court did not agree with FERC's assertion that it had broad authority under section 206 of the Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 U.S.C. 824e, to retroactively reset rates that were charged in the California electricity markets during the time in question. Nonetheless, the court concluded that the specific FERC Orders that were challenged in the current petitions for review did not exceed the limits on FERC's authority. Consequently, the court denied the petitions.View "Modesto Irrigation District, et al. v. FERC" on Justia Law

County filed a claim for reimbursement with City, alleging that City had overcharged County for sewer and water services. Following consideration at a city council meeting, City denied County's claim. County subsequently sued City in district court. City moved for summary judgment, asserting that review of its decision was limited to certiorari review under Minn. Stat. 606 and that County's failure to bring a timely certiorari petition deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) City's decision to deny the refund was a quasi-judicial decision, and therefore, the exclusive method for reviewing City's decision was through a writ of certiorari under chapter 606; and (2) accordingly, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear County's claim.View "County of Washington v. City of Oak Park Heights" on Justia Law