Justia Utilities Law Opinion Summaries

In assessing the value of electric power plants for purposes of property taxation, assessors may not include the value of intangible assets and rights in the value of taxable property. An electric company purchased "emission reduction credits" (ERCs), which the company had to purchase to obtain authorization to construct an electric power plant and to operate it at certain air-pollutant emission levels. These ERCs constituted intangible rights for property taxation purposes. In assessing the value of the power plant using the replacement cost method, the State Board of Equalization (Board) estimated the cost of replacing the ERCs. In also using an income approach in assessing the plant, the Board failed to attribute a portion or the plant's income stream to the ERCs and to deduct that value from the plant's projected income stream prior to taxation. In analyzing the Board's valuation of the power plant, the Supreme Court held (1) the Board improperly taxed the power company's ERCs when it added their replacement cost to the power plant's taxable value; and (2) the Board was not required to deduct a value attributable to the ERCs under an income approach. Remanded. View "Elk Hills Power, LLC v. Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law

Atmos Energy Corporation, a local distributing company, contracted with independent gas marketing companies to purchase natural gas then delivered gas to customers through local pipelines. Following an audit, Missouri Public Service Commission (PSC) staff indicated that Atmos had failed to comply with affiliate transaction rules by failing to document properly the fair market value and fully distributed cost of its transactions with its affiliate, Atmos Energy Marketing LLC (AEM). The staff then proposed a disallowance regarding Atmos' transactions with AEM. After an evidentiary hearing, the PSC found compliance with the affiliate transaction rules and rejected the proposed disallowances. The Office of Public Counsel (OPC) appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the PSC erred in relying upon a presumption of prudence in rejecting staff and OPC's proposed disallowance regarding Atmos's transactions with AEM. Remanded. View "Office of Pub. Counsel v. Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Portland General Electric Company (PGE) appealed a Court of Appeals decision that reversed and remanded a trial court order that denied Lexington Insurance Company's motion to set aside a default judgment entered in PGE's favor. Specifically, the issues were: (1) whether a default judgment awarding monetary relief violated ORCP 67C if the complaint did not specify amount of damages sought; and (2) if so, whether that omission rendered the judgment voidable or void. The Supreme Court held the judgment in question here did not violate ORCP 67C and that the judgment was not void. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. View "PGE v. Ebasco Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant condemned a pair of easements on the residential property of Plaintiffs to facilitate the placement of high-voltage transmission lines. Plaintiffs filed a right-to-take action, arguing that because the proposed easements would cover more than half of their property and render their residential improvements obsolete, they would be left with an "uneconomic remnant" under Wis. Stat. 32.06(3m). The circuit court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, concluding that Plaintiffs' property, after the taking of the easements, was an uneconomic remnant, and ordered Defendant to acquire the entire property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that after Defendant took two easements for transmission lines, Plaintiffs' property was an uneconomic remnant because its condition was such that it was of substantially impaired economic viability as either a residential or an industrial parcel. View "Waller v. Am. Transmission Co." on Justia Law

In 2005, a limited liability company and its owners (plaintiffs), on behalf of other similarly situated telephone customers, filed a complaint seeking to certify a class action lawsuit against United Telephone Company of Ohio (UTO), which provided Plaintiffs with telephone service. Plaintiffs claimed that their phone bills from UTO contained unauthorized charges from third parties. The trial court ultimately denied Plaintiffs' amended motion for class certification. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the order of the trial court, holding (1) a trial court must conduct a rigorous analysis to ensure the prerequisites of Ohio R. Civ. P. 23, under which plaintiffs must establish seven prerequisites in order to certify a class action, are satisfied; and (2) even though the trial court's consideration of the merits in this case was improper, its order denying certification of the class was correct because Plaintiffs' proposed amended class did not satisfy the prerequisites of Rule 23. View "Stammco, LLC v. United Tel. Co. of Ohio" on Justia Law

Portland Generating Station is a 427-megawatt, coal-fired, electricity generating plant in Northampton County, Pennsylvania, directly across the Delaware River within 500 feet of Warren County, New Jersey. The EPA found that Portland emits sulfur dioxide in amounts that significantly interfere with control of air pollution across state borders. In response to a petition under the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7408, 7409)), the EPA imposed direct limits on Portland‘s emissions and restrictions to reduce its contribution to air pollution within three years. The Third Circuit upheld the EPA actions. It was reasonable for the EPA to interpret Section 126(b) as an independent mechanism for enforcing interstate pollution control, giving it authority to promulgate the Portland Rule. The contents of the Portland Rule are not arbitrary, capricious, or abusive of the EPA‘s discretion. View "GenOn REMA LLC v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency" on Justia Law

Between 1994 and 1999 Commonwealth Edison modified five Illinois coal-fired power plants that had been operating on August 7, 1977, and were, therefore, grandfathered against a permitting requirement applicable to any “major emitting facility” built or substantially modified after that date in parts of the country subject to the rules about prevention of significant deterioration, 42 U.S.C. 7475(a), until the modification. The permit requires installation of “the best available control technology for each pollutant subject to regulation.” Commonwealth Edison did not obtain permits. There was no challenge until 2009, a decade after completion of the modifications. The district court dismissed a challenge as untimely. After finishing the modifications, Commonwealth Edison sold the plants to Midwest. The federal government and Illinois (plaintiffs) argued that the district court allowed corporate restructuring to wipe out liability for ongoing pollution. Midwest and its corporate parent (Edison Mission) filed bankruptcy petitions after the appeal was argued. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Midwest cannot be liable because its predecessor would not have been liable had it owned the plants continuously. Commonwealth Edison needed permits before undertaking the modifications. The court rejected arguments of continuing-violation and continuing-injury. View "United States v. Midwest Generation, LLC" on Justia Law

The Canal Authority appealed the district court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Interior, Bureau, San Luis, and Wetlands, in a suit to establish priority water rights under Central Valley Project (CVP) water service contracts. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants, holding that all claims arising before February 11, 2004 were time-barred and that Canal Authority was not entitled to priority water allocation under the CVP contracts. The court affirmed the district court's decision on the alternative basis that California Water Code 11460 did not require the Bureau to provide CVP contractors priority water rights, because contracts between the Canal Authority and Bureau contained provisions that specifically address allocation of water during shortage periods. View "Tehama-Colusa Canal Auth. v. U.S. Dept. of Interior" on Justia Law

The 1987 Public Utilities Act, 220 ILCS 5/8-403.1, was intended to encourage development of power plants that convert solid waste to electricity. Local electric utilities were required to enter into 10-year agreements to purchase power from such plants designated as “qualified” by the Illinois Commerce Commission, at a rate exceeding that established by federal law. The state compensated electric utilities with a tax credit. A qualified facility was obliged to reimburse the state for tax credits its customers had claimed after it had repaid all of its capital costs for development and implementation. Many qualified facilities failed before they repaid their capital costs, so that Illinois never got its tax credit money back. The Act was amended in 2006, to establish a moratorium on new Qualified Facilities, provide additional grounds for disqualifying facilities from the subsidy, and expand the conditions that trigger a facility’s liability to repay electric utilities’ tax credits. The district court held that the amendment cannot be applied retroactively. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The amendment does not clearly indicate that the new repayment conditions apply to monies received prior to the amendment and must be construed prospectively. View "Illinois v. Chiplease, Inc." on Justia Law

The Utilities Board of the City of Opp appealed a circuit court's order that denied its motion to dismiss a third-party complaint filed by Shuler Brothers, Inc. The Alabama Electric Company (AEC) had filed suit against Shuler Brothers seeking recovery for services performed and for breach of contract when Shuler Brothers refused to pay an invoice for repairs AEC made to some equipment. Shuler Brothers argued that the repairs did not solve its equipment issue. Shuler Brothers alleged the Utilities Board was negligent in maintaining power lines going to its facility that was part of its equipment troubles. In its motion to dismiss, the Utilities Board argued that a two-year statute of limitations applied to Shuler Brothers' claim, and that the alleged negligence was not discovered until AEC served Shuler Brothers with its complaint. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment to deny the Utilities Board's motion to dismiss; reversed the circuit court's decision denying Shuler Brothers' breach-of-contract claim; and reversed the circuit court's denial of the Board's motion to dismiss Shuler Brothers' negligence claim. View "Utilities Board of the City of Opp v. Shuler Brothers, Inc. " on Justia Law