Justia Utilities Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was a resident of the City of Logansport and a ratepayer to the municipal utility that supplied her electricity. Plaintiff filed a petition against the City of Logansport, including the City's mayor and common council, seeking a declaration that Ordinance 2013-07, which gave the mayor the authority to enter into a public-private partnership and to negotiate an agreement with an entity that could construct, operate, and maintain a public electric facility and transfer it back to the City, was invalid because the City lacked the authority to pass the ordinance. The trial court dismissed the petition for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Indiana's Public-Private Agreements Act, which authorizes and provides guidelines for the implementation of public-private partnerships, does not require a local legislative body to first adopt the statute before it may issue a request for proposals or begin contract negotiations as provided for under the statute; and (2) the City complied with the Act in every particular, and therefore, Plaintiff was not entitled to relief. View "Kitchell v. Franklin" on Justia Law

After the Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District (MSD) implemented a stormwater user charge without prior voter approval, William Zweig and other named plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and a class of similarly situated ratepayers (Ratepayers), filed a complaint against MSD, claiming MSD's action violated Mo. Const. art. X, 22(a), which prohibits political subdivisions from levying any new or increased tax, license or fees without prior voter approval. The trial court (1) declared MSD's action unconstitutional, enjoined future collection of the charge, and ordered MSD to pay the Ratepayers' attorneys' fees and expenses; and (2) refused to order MSD to pay damages or refund charges already collected. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment in all respects, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) concluding that MSD levied the stormwater usage charge without prior voter approval in violation of section 22(a) and in awarding Ratepayers' attorneys' fees and expenses; and (2) refusing to enter a money judgment against MSD for the amounts already collected. View "Zweig v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist." on Justia Law

Appellant purchased telephone and other telecommunications services from (intervening) Appellee at wholesale rates and resold the services to end-user consumers at retail rates. Appellant filed a complaint with the Public Utilities Commission (PUCO) alleging that Appellee had overcharged for its services and submitted inaccurate billing invoices to Appellant, among other things. PUCO denied the complaint, concluding that Appellant failed to submit sufficient credible evidence that Appellee had refused to issue credits for valid billing disputes. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to carry its burden on appeal of demonstrating that PUCO's orders were unreasonable or unlawful. View "OHIOTELNET.COM, INC. v. Windstream Ohio, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant owned and operated two mobile home parks. In 2000, Appellant changed its practice of including in the rent it charged tenants the cost of water it purchased from the City for the tenants' use. Instead, Appellant installed water meters on each trailer lot and began charging tenants for water usage separately from their rent. In 2008, the Public Service Commission (PSC) determined that Appellant was a public utility and therefore subject to regulation by the PSC. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Appellant metered a commodity utility to its tenants, it was a public utility under Wyoming law and therefore subject to PSC regulation; and (2) PSC's regulation of Appellant did not violate Appellant's equal protection rights. View "Gosar's Unlimited Inc. v. Wyo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in this case centered on the limits of the Public Utility Commission's (PUC) authority to allocate costs associated with a rail-highway crossing project. The Commonwealth Court held that the Commission could not allocate costs to a transportation utility that regularly uses a railroad-crossing site and does not own real estate or properties there. The Commission and Intervenors argued that the PUC has broad discretion not only to determine the allocation of costs to "concerned parties," but also to determine which parties are "concerned" in the first instance. Counterbalancing the Commission's and Intervenors' remarks about equities, Norfolk Southern Railway questioned why it should contribute to the remediation of deteriorating infrastructure over which it had no control. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that a transportation utility need not own facilities at a rail-highway crossing to be a concerned party for purposes of the PUC's cost-allocation jurisdiction and authority, at least where the utility conducts regular operations at the crossing and may enforce an easement-based right of way. View "Norfolk Southern Railway v. PUC" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a complaint and amended complaint against the Ohio Edison Company, a public utility, alleging that Ohio Edison had unlawfully removed the electric meter from his property and disconnected his electric service. The Public Utilities Commission found that Ohio Edison was justified in removing the meter and terminating electric service where (1) Appellant had never made an application for new service under Ohio Edison's tariff and therefore was not a customer of Ohio Edison, and (2) Ohio Edison properly removed the electric meter without prior notice because the meter had been tampered with and was a safety hazard. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to demonstrate that the Commission erred in finding that (1) Appellant was not a customer of Ohio Edison at the property in question; and (2) Ohio Edison had lawfully disconnected electric service to the property. View "Smith v. Ohio Edison Co." on Justia Law

In 2009, Minnesota Power sought an increase in service rates of approximately 18.9 percent. As part of its submission to the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, Minnesota Power also requested an interim rate increase of approximately $73.3 million. The Commission decided to set the interim rate increase at approximately $48.5 million after finding exigent circumstances existed. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the Commission did not err in finding exigent circumstances and did not abuse its discretion in setting interim rates. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that substantial evidence supported the Commission's decision to set Minnesota Power's interim rate increase at $48.5 million. View "In re Application of Minn. Power for Auth. to Increase Rates for Elec. Serv. in Minn." on Justia Law

Appellants, the New Mexico Attorney General and New Mexico Industrial Energy Consumers, asked the Supreme Court to vacate and annul the final order in PRC Case No. 11-00308-UT (Case 308 Final Order) because it permitted Public Service Company of New Mexico (PNM) to earn returns on the operating expenses incurred from energy efficiency programs. Appellants argue that such returns are inconsistent with New Mexico law. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Case 308 Final Order was consistent with the PRC’s ratemaking authority under the New Mexico Public Utility Act, the New Mexico Efficient Use of Energy Act, and with the Court's holding in "Attorney General v. New Mexico Public Regulation Commission" (258 P.3d 453). Furthermore, the Court held that Case 308 Final Order was supported by substantial evidence and was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Case 308 Final Order. View "NMAG v. NMPRC" on Justia Law

Appellant, a public utility (Utility), provided natural gas to intervening Appellee, an apartment complex. In 2008, Utility informed Appellee that it would disconnect gas service to the entire complex if Appellee did not bring all apartment units into compliance with the National Fire Protection Association's National Fuel Gas Code (NFG Code) within two months. Appellee subsequently filed a complaint against Utility with the Public Utilities Commission (Commission), alleging that Utility had unreasonably and unlawfully threatened to disconnect gas service to all units if Appellee refused to retrofit the ventilation system in each apartment to meet NFG Code requirements. The complaint requested that the Commission prohibit Utility from terminating service and requiring expensive remedial construction. The Commission found in favor of Appellee. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that none of Utility's six propositions of law had merit. View "Cameron Creek Apartments v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc." on Justia Law

Entergy, owner and operator of the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station, filed suit against Vermont, raising claims challenging Vermont statutes governing Vermont Yankee (Acts 74, 160, and 189) and other claims related to Vermont's attempt to condition its grant of permission to operate Vermont Yankee on the execution of a power purchase agreement that favored Vermont retail consumers. The court affirmed the district court's grant of declaratory judgment that Act 74 and Act 160 were facially preempted by the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. 2011-2281; reversed the district court's determination that Vermont's efforts to condition a new Certificate of Public Good for Vermont Yankee on the execution of a favorable power purchase agreement violated the dormant Commerce Clause; affirmed the district court's determination that Entergy's challenge under the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 791-828c, was unripe; affirmed the district court's grant of a permanent injunction enjoining defendants from enforcing sections 6522(c)(2) or 6522(c)(4) in title 10 of the Vermont Statutes, as enacted by Act 74, or sections 248(e)(2), 248(m), or 254 in title 30 of the Vermont Statutes, as enacted by Act 160; and vacated the district court's permanent injunction enjoining defendants from conditioning the issuance of a Certificate of Public Good on the execution of a below-wholesale-market power purchase agreement between Entergy and Vermont utilities or otherwise requiring Vermont Yankee to sell power to Vermont utilities at preferential rates.View "Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee v. Shumlin" on Justia Law