Justia Utilities Law Opinion Summaries

The Public Utilities Commission (Commission) approved, with multiple conditions, two petitions for reorganization filed by two regulated electrical utilities in Maine. The reorganization would allow changes in the corporate ownership of specific entities that transmit and distribute electricity in Maine such that they would be held in common ownership with generators of electricity in Maine, primarily, generators of electricity from wind power. Several intervenors appealed the Commission's approval of the petitions, arguing that the proposed union under a single ownership of transmission-and-distribution utilities and electricity generators was prohibited by the Electric Industry Restructuring Act. The Supreme Court vacated the order of the Commission, holding that the Commission incorrectly interpreted the Act in making its determination. Remanded for reexamination of the proposals to determine whether the Act permits the reorganization proposed in this case. View "Houlton Water Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n " on Justia Law

Metropolitan Utilities District (MUD) distributes water and natural gas to businesses and residents in the Omaha metropolitan area. MUD contracts with Northern Natural Gas Company (Northern) to provide natural gas pipelines transportation services. In November 2012, MUD and Northern entered into an amendment to a contract providing that Northern would provide interstate natural gas transportation service to MUD for twenty years. Jason Bruno, an Omaha ratepayer and taxpayer who obtained gas and water services from MUD, sought a declaratory judgment that the 2012 amendment to the contract between MUD and Northern was void or voidable on the grounds that Neb. Rev. Stat. 14-2121 requires MUD to seek competitive bids for all contracts for work not performed by MUD employees. The district court determined that the statute does not require competitive bidding, but rather, grants MUD the discretion whether or not to go through the bidding process. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly determined that there was no statutory competitive bidding requirement with respect to the contract at issue. View "Bruno v. Metro. Utils. Dist." on Justia Law

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is a federal agency that, under the Federal Power Act, regulates rates charged by public utilities for transmission and sale of energy in interstate commerce, and rules pertaining to such rates, 16 U.S.C. 824d. In 2006, FERC approved a new tariff (rules governing interstate sale of electricity and electric capacity) for the PJM market, covering 13 states and the District of Columbia, as a result of an extensively negotiated settlement between power providers, utility companies, government authorities and others. The order required that load serving entities (LSEs) in the market procure a certain amount of energy capacity for access during peak load; included a rule that offers for the sale of capacity in the markets at artificially low prices would, with some exceptions, be required to be raised to a competitive level (mitigation). In 2011, FERC altered the 2006 Order: eliminating a mitigation exemption for resources built under state mandate; eliminating a provision that guaranteed that LSEs would be able to use “self-supply” to satisfy capacity obligations; and changing factors used in determining whether an offer was subject to mitigation. Objectors argued that the changes amounted to direct regulation of power facilities in violation of the FPA, and that FERC arbitrarily eliminated the mitigation exemption for state-mandated resources. Electric utilities challenged elimination of self-supply assurances for LSEs. Others challenged new rules governing calculation of a resource’s net cost of new entry (for determining whether an offer for sale of capacity will be mitigated) and FERC’s determination that a new generation resource must clear only one capacity auction to avoid further mitigation. The Third Circuit rejected all of the challenges. View "NJ Bd. of Pub. Utils. v. Fed Energy Regulatory Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Public Utilities Commission ("PUCO") approved of the first electric security plan of American Electric Power operating companies (collectively, “AEP”). The Supreme Court held that the Commission committed reversible error on three issues, including (1) approving the recovery of carrying costs associated with environmental investments without proper statutory authority, and (2) authorizing the provider-of-last-resort (“POLR”) charge without sufficient evidence. On remand, the Commission determined that the environmental-investment carrying costs were lawful but determined that the AEP had not presented evidence of its actual POLR costs and directed the company to deduct that charge from its tariff schedules. Following rehearing, the Office of Consumers’ Counsel (OCC) and Industrial Energy Users-Ohio (IEU) filed an appeal raising several challenges to the Commission’s remand orders. The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the Commission, holding that OCC and IEU did not carry their burden of showing reversible error in the Commission’s remand orders. View "In re Application of Columbus S. Power Co." on Justia Law

CenterPoint Energy Resources Corporation, a gas utility that distributes natural gas, sought to raise its rates. CenterPoint’s proposed rate schedule included a “cost of service adjustment” (COSA) clause. The Railroad Commission of Texas approved a rate increase, including a revised COSA clause that provided for automatic annual adjustments based on increases or decreases in CenterPoint’s cost of service. On judicial review, the district court held that the Commission lacked the statutory authority to adopt the COSA clause as part of CenterPoint’s rate schedule. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission had the authority to enter the final order in this case, including the COSA clause. Remanded. View "Tex. Coast Utils. Coal. v. R.R. Comm’n of Tex." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a territorial dispute between two utilities, Choctawhatchee Electric Cooperative, Inc. and Gulf Power Company, both of which sought the right to serve Freedom Walk, a proposed multi-purpose development. The Florida Public Service Commission resolved the dispute in favor of Gulf Power, concluding that because the multiple factors it considered were substantially equal, customer preference, which favored Gulf Power, would determine the outcome of the dispute. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s order granting Gulf Power the right to serve the Freedom Walk development, holding that the Commission’s findings and conclusions were supported by competent substantial evidence and were not clearly erroneous. View "Choctawhatchee Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Graham" on Justia Law

The Idaho Power Company appealed an order of the Idaho Public Utilities Commission that denied approval of contracts between the utility and two wind farms on the ground that the contract rate for purchasing the power was contrary to public policy because it exceeded the utility's avoided costs. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Idaho Power v. Grouse Creek" on Justia Law

Pacific Lightnet, Inc. (PLNI) brought claims against Time Warner, asserting that it had been wrongfully billed by Time Warner for services that it had never received and that it was owed credits to its account from Time Warner based on assets PNLI had purchased, called Feature Group D claims. The circuit court entered judgment for Time Warner on all claims, notwithstanding a jury verdict in favor of PLNI on certain claims. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of the Feature Group D claims based on the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and vacated the jury verdict on those same claims. PLNI appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the ICA erred in vacating the jury's verdict because it violated the filed-rate doctrine. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded, holding (1) the circuit court erred in invoking the primary jurisdiction doctrine to dismiss this case; and (2) inasmuch as the filed-rate doctrine applied, the circuit court erred in failing to instruct the jury that Appellant could not recover for any claims involving charges not filed within 120 days of receipt of billing in accordance with the Hawaii Public Utilities Commission and Federal Communications Commission filed tariffs. View "Pacific Lightnet, Inc. v. Time Warner Telecom, Inc." on Justia Law

NorthWestern Energy (NWE) disconnected electric service to Plaintiff's residence based on an outstanding balance on Plaintiff's utility bill. Plaintiff filed an action alleging property damage due to NWE's negligence and negligence per se, claiming that the termination of his electric service caused his furnace to fail, which led to water pipes freezing and bursting. NWE filed a motion to dismiss based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction for Plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies before the Public Service Commission (PSC). The district court granted NWE's motion and dismissed the action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the PSC had no authority to adjudicate Plaintiff's damage claim, and a negligence action seeking damages could be maintained against the power company in district court. View "Schuster v. NorthWestern Energy Co." on Justia Law

The Village of Bement, Piatt County, has a five-year contract, under which E.R.H. Enterprises operates and maintains the Village’s potable water facility and parts of its water delivery infrastructure. The Department of Labor issued a subpoena to E.R.H.’s attorney seeing employment records as part of an investigation under the Prevailing Wage Act, 820 ILCS 130/0.01. E.R.H. asserted that it was exempt from the Act as a public utility. The trial court ruled in favor of the Department and ordered E.R.H. to provide the requested documents, noting that the company was not regulated by the Illinois Commerce Commission. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, finding that E.R.H. is simply an outside contractor. View "People v. IL Dep't of Labor" on Justia Law