Justia Utilities Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner filed a complaint against West Virginia-American Water Company (Respondent) seeking damages and penalties for alleged violations of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act (WVCCPA) regarding Respondent’s business policies and practices regarding leaks in Petitioner’s water line. The circuit court granted Respondent’s motion to dismiss, finding that Petitioner's claims arose from transactions encompassed by W. Va. Code 46A-1-105(a)(3) and thus were statutorily excluded from the WVCCPA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 46A-1-105(a)(3) applied to exclude Petitioner's WVCCPA claims, and therefore, the circuit court did not err in dismissing Petitioner's complaint. View "Holt v. W. Va. Am. Water Co." on Justia Law

Power Survey Company sought a writ of certiorari before the Supreme Court contending that the Public Utilities Commission improperly interpreted and applied the Contact Voltage Statute when it approved the portion of the Narragansett Electric Company’s (NEC) contact voltage program providing for the issuance of a request for proposal for the purpose of choosing a vendor to provide the technology for the NEC’s contact voltage testing. The Supreme Court issued the writ. Respondents, the NEC and the Division of Public Utilities and Carriers, moved to quash the writ on the grounds that it was not timely filed. The Supreme Court granted Respondents’ motions, holding that, under the facts of this case, Power Survey’s petition was untimely. View "In re Proceedings to Establish a Contact Voltage Detection & Repair Program" on Justia Law

The Iowa Utilities Board (IUB) allowed an independent transmission company, ITC Midwest, to use the pay-and-go procedure of Iowa Code 476.27, the railroad-crossing statute, to run electrical power lines across a railroad at three locations, at the objection of the Hawkeye Land Company. Hawkeye Land owned the railroad-crossing easement but did not own or operate a railroad. An administrative law judge (ALJ) upheld the use of the pay-and-go procedure and denied compensation beyond the $750 standard per crossing fee the utility pays to the owner of the railroad right-of-way under the crossing statute. After concluding that it had interpretive authority over the crossing statute, the IUB issued a final order that reached the same conclusions as the ALJ. The district court affirmed on judicial review. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the IUB lacked interpretive authority over the terms of the crossing statute; and (2) the crossing statute applied to Hawkeye Land, but because ITC Midwest was not a public utility, it was not allowed to use the pay-and-go procedure. View "Hawkeye Land Co. v. Iowa Utils. Bd." on Justia Law

Prairie Land Electric Cooperative, Inc. (Prairie Land), which purchases wholesale electricity from various suppliers and distributes that electricity to retail customers, entered into temporally overlapping, long-term all-requirements contracts with two different wholesale electricity suppliers, Sunflower Electric Power Corporation (Sunflower) and Kansas Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. (KEPCo). After a dispute arose regarding which supplier had the right to serve a certain pumping station delivery point, Prairie Land filed a petition for declaratory judgment asking the district court to determine which supplier was entitled to serve the new delivery point. The district court ruled in favor of Sunflower, which entered into the first all-requirements contract with Prairie Land. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ decision and affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that under the facts of this case, Prairie Land must meet its obligations under its contract with Sunflower, the first supplier, before it may comply with any obligations under its contract with KEPCo, the second supplier. View "Prairie Land Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Kan. Elec. Power Coop., Inc." on Justia Law

Buckeye Energy Brokers, a certified provider of competitive retail electric service a competitive retail natural-gas service, filed an amended complaint with the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio against Palmer Energy Company, an energy-management and consulting firm. Buckeye claimed that Palmer, one of its alleged competitors, violated Ohio Rev. Code 4928.08 and 4929.20 by acting without a certificate as a broker in arranging for the supply of competitive retail electric and natural-gas services in Ohio. The Commission held that Buckeye failed to prove its allegations, concluding that Palmer had provided services to clients as a consultant, not as a broker. The Supreme Court dismissed Buckeye’s appeal without reaching the merits, holding that Buckeye failed to show that it suffered prejudice or harm from the Commission’s orders. View "In re Complaint of Buckeye Energy Brokers v. Palmer Energy Co." on Justia Law

The Department of Public Utilities imposed on Petitioners, electric companies, monetary assessments for the Storm Trust Fund (“assessment”) pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 25, 12P, 18, which specifically prohibited Petitioners from seeking recovery of the assessment in any rate proceeding. Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the recovery prohibition, both as required by the statute and impose by the Department’s order, claiming it was an unconstitutional taking. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the Department’s order, holding (1) the mere obligation to pay the assessment, regardless of whether recovery was permitted or precluded, did not rise to the level of a compensable per se taking; (2) Petitioner’s claim that the assessment constituted a taking by way of a confiscatory rate was inadequate on the facts as presented to the Court; and (3) the Department’s order imposing the assessment and articulating the recovery prohibition did not constitute a regulatory taking because the order simply required Petitioners to pay an assessment that served a legitimate public purpose and did not interfere with Petitioners’ overall property rights. View "Fitchburg Gas & Elec. Light Co. v. Dep’t of Pub. Utils." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellee Randy Howard sought to bring a class action suit against Ferrellgas Partners, LP in federal district court for allegedly overcharging him and other customers. Ferrellgas moved to force plaintiff to pursue his individual claim alone, in arbitration, arguing that arbitration was the procedure the parties had agreed to. The district court was unable to conclude that the parties agreed to arbitrate. Rather than proceed to trial as the Federal Arbitation Act required, the district court entered an order denying arbitration outright. The Tenth Circuit concluded that denial was error: "When it's apparent from a quick look at the case that no material disputes of fact exist, it may be permissible and efficient for a district court to decide the arbitration question as a matter of law through motions practice and viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing arbitration. . . . Parties should not have to endure years of waiting and exhaust legions of photocopiers in discovery and motions practice merely to learn where their dispute will be heard. The Act requires courts process the venue question quickly so the parties can get on with the merits of their dispute in the right forum. It calls for a summary trial — not death by discovery." View "Howard v. Ferrellgas Partners, et al" on Justia Law

The Public Utilities Commission found that, from 2008 to 2010, Central Maine Power Company (CMP) had applied approximately $2.6 million worth of customer deposits to debts owed on its own transmission-and-distribution services when that portion of the deposits should have been applied to debts owed for standard-offer service. Accordingly, the Commission ordered CMP to remedy its misallocation of deposits between its separate receivables accounts. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s decision, holding (1) the Commission correctly interpreted the governing statutes and regulations; (2) under the circumstances of this case, the Commission’s retroactive application of its new interpretation did not offend concepts of due process or reasonable notice; and (3) the Commission’s decision did not constitute improper retroactive ratemaking. View "Cent. Me. Power Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n" on Justia Law

Jon Hopkins submitted multiple requests to Brinkley Water & Sewer Department (“BW&S”) for the home address and payment history of Kathryn Harris, a municipal-utility ratepayer and resident of the City of Brinkley. BW&S provided a redacted history of Harris’s account history but did not disclose her home address. The circuit court found that BW&S was not required to provide Hopkins with Harris’s home address, a “public record” as defined by the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the circuit court erred in finding that the ratepayer’s home address was exempt from disclosure, as (1) the Federal Trade Commission’s Red Flags Rule does not preempt the FOIA’s disclosure requirements; (2) BW&S failed to offer proof that any customer’s home address qualifies as a “personal matter” and thus was “constitutionally protectable” under McCambridge v. City of Little Rock; and (3) Harris’s home address was available for inspection by Hopkins, irrespective of his purpose in seeking access. View "Hopkins v. City of Brinkley" on Justia Law

The Connecticut Siting Council approved a proposed project of the Connecticut Light and Power Company. Plaintiffs appealed the siting counsel’s decision while the power company’s motion for reconsideration of the decision, with regard to the denial of a second project, was still pending. The siting council subsequently granted the motion for reconsideration and approved the second project. The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs’ appeal. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiffs had not appealed from a final decision of the siting council. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court did not err in its judgment. View "Citizens Against Overhead Power Line Constr. v. Conn. Siting Council" on Justia Law