Justia Utilities Law Opinion Summaries

LPSC sought review of FERC's orders relating to the allocation of production costs among Entergy's six operating companies. LPSC argued that certain revenues and expenses should be removed from the bandwidth calculation for 2008 because they were not incurred in that test year and that the production cost formula should account for the mid-year acquisition of generation facilities by Entergy Gulf States Louisiana and Entergy Arkansas on a partial-year basis. The court concluded that FERC reasonably excluded challenges to the "justness and reasonableness" of formula inputs from annual bandwidth implementation proceedings where FERC reasonably interpreted the System Agreement and correctly applied the filed rate doctrine, and FERC's reversal of its initial interpretation of the scope of bandwidth implementation proceedings was not arbitrary. The court also concluded that FERC reasonably required Entergy to include casualty loss Net Accumulated Deferred Income Taxes (ADIT) in its third bandwidth calculation where LPSC had notice of the casualty loss ADIT issue, and FERC's decision to include casualty loss ADIT in the bandwidth formula was rational. Accordingly, the court denied LPSC's petition for review. View "Louisiana Public Svc. Cmsn. v. FERC" on Justia Law

In 2010, a PG&E natural gas pipeline exploded in San Bruno, CA, causing death, great physical injuries, and extensive property damage. Governmental entities investigated the incident and PG&E’s business practices. The Public Utilities Commission retained an independent firm, Overland, to review PG&E’s gas transmission safety-related activities from a financial and regulatory audit prospective. Plaintiffs sued, seeking redress for PG&E’s alleged misappropriation of over $100 million in authorized rates that it should have used for safety-related projects. According to the complaint, PG&E misrepresented and concealed material facts when it used money collected from ratepayers to pay shareholders and provide bonuses to its executives instead of spending the money on infrastructure and safety measures. The complaint alleged that PG&E’s negligent handling of the pipe that exploded in San Bruno was unlawful and arose from PG&E’s corporate culture that valued profits over safety and that PG&E’s actions constituted an unlawful business practice under California Business and Professions Code section 17200. The superior court dismissed without leave to amend, finding the action barred by Public Utility Code section 1759 because it would interfere with the California Public Utilities Commission’s jurisdiction.” The appeals court affirmed. View "Guerrero v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was an order of the Public Utility Commission (PUC) that addressed Portland General Electric's (PGE) recovery of its capital investment in the Trojan nuclear generating facility after that facility was retired from service. To determine whether a legal error that the PUC had made in an earlier rate case had affected rates that the PUC had authorized PGE to charge, the PUC reexamined those earlier rates. In that reexamination, the PUC determined that PGE had been required to recover its capital investment over time, and that the rates therefore should have included interest to account for the time value of money. Despite the legal error, the rates that the PUC authorized for 1995 to 2000 were just and reasonable, but that to make the post-2000 rates just and reasonable, it was required to order a refund to the post-2000 ratepayers. In affirming the PUC order, the Court of Appeals concluded the PUC had not erred in making those three determinations. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed both the Court of Appeals and the PUC's order. View "Gearhart v. PUC" on Justia Law

Smith Lake filed suit against FERC and others, alleging claims related to the Commission's issuance of a license order. Alabama Power intervened and moved to dismiss the petition for review based on lack of jurisdiction. The court granted the motion because the appeal was untimely, concluding that Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. FERC and Clifton Power Corp. v. FERC stand for the proposition that the court will not hear a case if the petitioner has a rehearing petition pending before the Commission at the time of filing in this court, whether it was required or not. Consequently, a party must choose whether to seek an optional petition for rehearing before the Commission, or a petition for review to the court; it cannot proceed simultaneously. View "Smith Lake Improvement v. FERC" on Justia Law

Columbia, an interstate natural gas company subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), seeks to replace a portion of a natural gas pipeline that runs in and around York County, Pennsylvania. Because the original location of the pipeline has become heavily populated, the replacement will not track the original line but will be outside the existing right of way. To obtain easements necessary to complete construction of the replacement, in 2013, Columbia filed Complaints in Condemnation against four Landowners in federal court. The district court held that Columbia did not have the right of eminent domain required to condemn the easements, reasoning that 18 C.F.R. 157.202(b)(2)(i), was ambiguous. The Third Circuit reversed, finding that the regulation clearly anticipates replacement outside the existing right of way and contains no adjacency requirement. The district court erroneously adopted its own definition of “replace” and concluded that a “notice” of “proposed rulemaking” for “Emergency Reconstruction of Interstate Natural Gas Facilities” promulgated by FERC after 9/11 was relevant.View "Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. 1.01 Acres in Penn Twp" on Justia Law

The primary question this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether a municipal authority could exercise its eminent domain powers to condemn an easement over privately-owned land, where the sole purpose of the easement is to supply a private developer with land to install sewer drainage facilities needed for a proposed private residential subdivision. "While this determination may seem to interfere with the ability of municipal water and/or sewer authorities to expand their operations under circumstances where, as here, there is an overarching nexus between the taking and private development, it is not this Court’s function to ameliorate such difficulties by departing from the statutory text. [. . .] The Legislature’s decision to exempt regulated public utilities, but not municipal authorities, from the preclusive rule set forth in Section 204(a) demonstrates that it intended to allow – within constitutional limitations – the continued use of eminent domain for the provision of public services such as water and sewer access in tandem with private development for a limited, defined class of condemnors. As RAWA is not within that class, its condemnation of the drainage easement is in violation of PRPA." View "Reading Area Wat Auth v. Schuyl River Grwy, et al" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, two groups challenged the BPA's decision to forgo refunds after the court invalidated three sets of contractual arrangements in which BPA agreed to subsidize certain longtime industrial customers rather than sell them power directly. The court held that these subsidy arrangements were unreasonable and were contrary to BPA's authority. The court remanded to BPA regarding whether it could or should seek refunds of the improper subsidies. BPA concluded that it was contractually barred from seeking refunds as to some of the invalidated contracts; it had no legal or equitable basis for seeking refunds as to the others; and if it did pursue recovery of the subsidies, it might become mired in counterproductive, protracted litigation. Petitioners' core argument is that their power costs have been impermissibly raised by BPA's decision because, if BPA did seek refunds of the subsidies, it could pass the recovered funds to its customers as lower rates. The court rejected petitioners' contention that BPA has a duty, under either the Constitution's Appropriations Clause or BPA's governing statutes, to seek all refunds to which it may be entitled. The court concluded that BPA's decisions in most respects sufficiently and reasonably balanced its competing obligations to merit the court's deference, except in one respect. The court denied the petition for review with regard to the decision not to seek refunds with respect to the 2007 Block Contracts and the Port Townsend Contract. The court granted the petition and remanded to BPA for further proceedings with regard to recovery of subsidies paid under the Alcoa Amendment. View "ICNU v. BPA" on Justia Law

The Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 791a., authorizes federal regulation of transmitting and selling electric power in interstate commerce and grants the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) jurisdiction over transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and sale of such energy at wholesale in interstate commerce. The “filed rate doctrine” requires that interstate power rates filed with or fixed by FERC be given binding effect by state utility commissions determining intrastate rates. The electric companies suffered $250 million in “line losses,” energy lost when electricity travels over power lines, and interest related to those costs. Their line losses had increased under a mandate by FERC relating to calculation. The companies attempted to recover those costs on their customers’ utility bills. The Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (PUC) rejected their proposal to classify line-loss costs as a cost of transmission (as opposed to a cost of electricity generation), preventing them from passing those costs through to their customers. The companies lost in Pennsylvania state courts; the U.S. Supreme Court denied review. The companies then sought declaratory judgment and injunctive relief in federal court against the PUC. The district court held that their unsuccessful state efforts precluded relief in federal court under the doctrine of issue preclusion. The Third Circuit affirmed.View "Metro. Edison Co. v. PA Pub. Util. Co." on Justia Law

In 2012, Dominion Virginia Power filed an application with the State Corporation Commission seeking approval of a power station and transmission interconnection facilities associated with the generation plant. Dominion’s application also sought approval of a rate adjustment clause (RAC) to recover the costs of the power station and the associated transmission infrastructure. As part of the RAC, Dominion sought an enhancement on its general rate of return on common equity (ROE) for a certain period and proposed applying the enhanced ROE to the costs of the power station and associated transmission infrastructure. The Commission approved the power station and associated transmission infrastructure and allowed Dominion to recover an enhanced ROE for the transmission infrastructure. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission properly interpreted Va. Code 56-585.1(A)(6) to allow Dominion to recover an enhanced ROE for the transmission infrastructure associated with the power station and included in the subsection (A)(6) RAC for that facility. View "Attorney Gen. v. State Corp. Comm'n" on Justia Law

In 2001 Millview County Water District began diverting water from the Russian River under the authority of a pre-1914 appropriative water right assigned to Millview by plaintiffs Hill and Gomes. Following a citizen complaint, the State Water Resources Control Board issued a cease and desist order substantially restricting Millview’s diversion of water under the right, finding it had been largely forfeited by a period of diminished use from 1967 through 1987. Millview argued that the Board lacked jurisdiction to limit appropriation under a pre-1914 water right and that the evidence did not support the Board’s finding of forfeiture because there was no evidence of a timely adverse claim of use. The trial court accepted Millview’s arguments. The appeals court affirmed. While the Board did have jurisdiction under Water Code section 1831 to issue a an order precluding excessive diversion under a pre-1914 right to appropriate and the Board properly determined the original perfected scope of the claim, it applied an incorrect legal standard in evaluating the forfeiture of Millview’s claimed water right. Applying the proper legal standard, the evidence before the Board was insufficient to support a finding of forfeiture. View "Millview Cnty. Water Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd." on Justia Law