Justia Utilities Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against defendants alleging that defendants violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq., and New York statutory and common law. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants obtained unauthorized attorneys' fees and costs in connection with actions to foreclose liens on plaintiffs' properties arising out of unpaid municipal property taxes and water and sewer charges. The court held that liens for mandatory water and sewer charges imposed by New York City as an incident to property ownership, which are treated as akin to property tax liens, are not subject to the FDCPA because they do not involve a "debt" as that term is defined in the statute. The court also held that the district court properly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Boyd v. J.E. Robert Co., Inc." on Justia Law

The Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 824d(c), requires regulated utilities to file with the Commission, as a matter of open and accessible public record, any rates and charges they intend to impose for sales of electrical energy that are subject to the Commission's jurisdiction. Consequently, utilities are forbidden to charge any rate other than the one on file with the Commission, a prohibition known as the "filed rate doctrine." At issue on appeal was, when a utility filed more than one rate with the Commission during the time it was negotiating an agreement with a prospective customer, which of the two filed rates governs: the rate at the time negotiations commenced or the rate at the time the agreement was completed? The Commission is of the view that it can pick and choose which rate applies on a case-by-case basis. Because the Commission has provided no reasoned explanation for how its decision comports with statutory direction, prior agency practice, or the purposes of the filed rate doctrine, the court vacated the Commission's orders in part and remanded. View "West Deptford Energy, LLC v. FERC" on Justia Law

The Corporation, asserting its power under section 215(e) of the Federal Power Act, 16U.S.C. 824o, assessed a monetary fine against Southwestern, a federal government entity that markets hydroelectric power. The Commission upheld the penalty. The court held that section 215(b)(1) generally subjects federal government entities to the Commission's jurisdiction to enforce compliance. But to authorize a monetary award against the federal government, the statute must do more than generally bring the government within the Commission's enforcement jurisdiction - it must unequivocally subject the government to monetary liability. Neither section 215(b) nor section 215(e), nor the two consolidated in combination, speaks with the requisite clarity to waive the federal government's sovereign immunity from monetary penalties. Therefore, the court vacated the Commission's order. View "Southwestern Power Admin., et al. v. FERC" on Justia Law

Duke Energy Progress filed an application with the North Carolina Utilities Commission requesting authority to increase its retail electric service rates and that rates be established using a return on equity (ROE) of 11.25 percent. The Commission entered an order approving an ROE of 10.2 percent. The Attorney General, who had intervened in the proceedings, appealed the Commission’s order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission made sufficient findings of fact regarding the impact of changing economic conditions upon customers and that these findings were supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in view of the entire record. View "State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Cooper" on Justia Law

Montana-Dakota Utilities Company (MDU) was ordered by the Wyoming Public Service Commission to make refunds of the amounts MDU had overcharged its customers because of improper calculations and adjustments to its commodity balancing account. MDU filed a petition for review, challenging the legal authority of the Commission to order refunds. The district court affirmed the Commission’s decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the rule against retroactive ratemaking did not preclude the Commission from ordering the refund; (2) the Commission’s refund order did not violate the file rate doctrine; (3) the Commission was not subject to a statute of limitations in this case; (4) MDU failed to show that the Commission was equitably estopped from ordering a refund; and (5) the Commission’s action was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or unlawful. View "Montana-Dakota Utils., Co. v. Wyo. Pub. Serv. Comm’n" on Justia Law

This case involves challenges to the most recent forms of electric transmission planning and cost allocation adopted by the Commission under the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 791 et seq. In Order No. 1000, as reaffirmed and clarified in Order Nos. 1000-A and 1000-B (together, the Final Rule), the Commission required each transmission owning and operating public utility to participate in regional transmission planning that satisfies the specific planning principles designed to prevent undue discrimination and preference in transmission service, and that produces a regional transmission plan. The court held that the Commission had authority under Section 206 of the Act to require transmission providers to provide in a regional planning process; there was substantial evidence of a theoretical threat to support adoption of the reforms in the Final Rule; the Commission had authority under Section 206 to require removal of federal rights of first refusal provisions upon determining they were unjust and unreasonable practices affecting rates, and that determination was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary and capricious; the Mobile-Sierra objection to the removal is not ripe; the Commission had authority under Section 206 to require the ex ante allocation of the costs of new transmission facilities among beneficiaries, and that its decision regarding scope was not arbitrary or capricious; the Commission reasonably determined that regional planning must include consideration of transmission needs driven by public policy requirements; and the Commission reasonably relied upon the reciprocity condition to encourage non-public utility transmission providers to participate in a regional planning process. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review of the Final Rule. View "South Carolina Public Service v. FERC" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged the Commission's approval of a proposal for the construction of a natural gas compressor station in the Town of Minisink, New York. Petitioners argued, among other things, that the Commission's approval of the project was arbitrary and capricious, particularly given the existence of a nearby alternative site (the Wagoner Alternative) they insist is better than the Minisink locale. The court concluded that the Commission's consideration of the Wagoner Alternative falls within the bounds of its discretion and the court had no basis to upset the Commission's application of its Section 7 of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. 717-717z, authority on this point; the court was satisfied that the Commission properly considered cumulative impacts of the Minisink Project; the court reject petitioners' argument that the Minisink Project violates the siting guidelines; and the court rejected petitioners' claims of procedural errors. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review. View "Minisink Residents for Enviro., et al. v. FERC" on Justia Law

Upon its implementation of an automated-meter-reading (“AMR”) program, the East Ohio Gas Company, d/b/a Dominion East Ohio (“Dominion”), sought to recover costs associated with its AMR program. The Public Utilities Commission (“Commission”) reduced Dominion’s proposed customer charge from $0.54 per customer per month to $0.42 per customer per month because Dominion had allegedly failed to timely implement the AMR program. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding that the Commission’s order was substantively unreasonable because its reduction of Dominion’s AMR charge was not rationally tied to Dominion’s alleged failure to meet certain deadlines. Remanded. View "In re Application of E. Ohio Gas Co." on Justia Law

Eagle Point Solar proposed to enter into a long term financing agreement with the City of Dubuque that would provide the City with renewable energy. Under the agreement, Eagle Point would construct a solar energy system, and the City would purchase all of the electricity generated by the system. However, if Eagle Point was a “public utility” under Iowa Code 476.1 or an “electric utility” under Iowa Code 476.22 it would be prohibited from serving customers, such as the City, who were located within the exclusive service territory of Interstate Power and Light Company, another electric utility. The Iowa Public Utilities Board (IUB) concluded that Eagle Point would be a public utility under the proposed business arrangement. The district court reversed, concluding that Eagle Point’s proposed arrangement with the City did not make it an electric utility for purposes of the statutes. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Eagle Point was not a public utility under section 476.1 or section 476.22. View "SZ Enters., LLC v. Iowa Utils. Bd." on Justia Law

A Regional Transmission Organization is a voluntary association primarily of utilities that either own electrical transmission lines that comprise a regional electrical grid or generate electricity that is transmitted to the customers in the region. Members of a Regional Transmission Organization and the Illinois Commerce Commission, on behalf of the largest electrical utility in Illinois, (collectively PJM) obtained a remand of an order of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in 2009. That order allocated costs for certain new high‐voltage network transmission lines that are part of a regional grid that includes the western utilities, but are all located in PJM’s eastern region and primarily benefit that region. Unhappy with the order issued on remand, PJM returned to court. The Seventh Circuit again remanded, acknowledging that the benefits of new facilities to the utilities may be unquantifiable because they depend on the likelihood and magnitude of outages and other contingencies. The order should not shift a grossly disproportionate share of costs to western utilities, given that the projects will confer only future, speculative, and limited benefits to those utilities.View "IL Commerce Comm'n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n" on Justia Law