Justia Utilities Law Opinion Summaries

The TMP is a 5.6-mile stretch of pipeline, connecting Missouri with Illinois beneath the Mississippi River. Under the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. 717f, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission issued MoGas a certificate of public convenience and necessity for a project that included using the TMP for natural gas service for the first time. On remand, the Commission approved inclusion of the acquisition cost in MoGas’s rate base because the TMP had been devoted to a new use, transporting natural gas instead of oil, and the cost of new construction would have been greater. Objectors challenged the Commission’s determination that the company had shown that the acquisition of pipeline facilities provided specific benefits in accordance with Commission precedent. Although acknowledging that a lower acquisition cost can produce benefits to customers in some cases, they argued the Commission failed to examine whether there were actual quantifiable dollar benefits for Missouri customers. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, deferring to the Commission’s benefits exception, which allows an acquisition premium to be included in a pipeline’s rate base when the purchase price is less than the cost of constructing comparable facilities, the facility is converted to a new use, and the transacting parties are unaffiliated. View "Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n" on Justia Law

Southwestern Bell Telephone, LP, doing business as AT&T Texas, was a public utility company with facilities attached to a city bridge designated for destruction. AT&T sued the City of Houston and the Harris County Commissioners seeking an injunction preventing the removal of its facilities from the bridge and a declaratory judgment that Tex. Water Code Ann. 49.223 required the Harris County Flood Control District to bear any relocation costs. The trial court granted summary judgment to the City and the Commissioners’ pleas to the jurisdiction. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the relocation costs sought by AT&T were not clearly within the statute’s purview. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that AT&T was entitled to declaratory relief that payment of its relocation expenses by the District was required by section 49.223. View "Southwestern Bell Telephone, LP v. Emmett" on Justia Law

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) orders issued in 2013 and 2014 approved the New York Independent System Operator’s (NYISO) creation of a new wholesale electric power “capacity zone” comprising areas of Southeastern New York, including the lower Hudson Valley. The orders followed NYISO’s identification of areas in which customers received power from suppliers located on the other side of a “transmission constraint” in the electrical grid. Because of the way New York’s capacity markets work, NYISO concluded that financial incentives for capacity resources in the transmission‐constrained area that became the Valley Zone were inadequate, jeopardizing the reliability of the grid. FERC’s approval of the Zone, with a new “demand curve” to set capacity prices, were designed to address the reliability problem by providing more accurate price signals to in‐zone resources, but were expected to result in higher prices to customers. Utilities, the state, and the New York Public Service Commission alleged that FERC failed adequately to justify the expected higher prices, particularly without a “phase‐in” of the new zone and its demand curve, in violation of FERC’s statutory mandate to ensure that rates are “just and reasonable,” 16 U.S.C. 824d(a). The Second Circuit rejected the challenge. FERC adequately justified its decisions. View "Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n" on Justia Law

Great Oaks, a water retailer, challenged a fee imposed on water it draws from wells on its property. The power to impose such a fee is vested in the Santa Clara Valley Water Management District under the Santa Clara County Water District Act, to prevent depletion of the acquifers from which Great Oaks extracts water. The trial court awarded a refund of charges paid by Great Oaks, finding that the charge violated the provisions of the District Act and Article XIII D of the California Constitution, which imposes procedural and substantive constraints on fees and charges imposed by local public entities. The court of appeal reversed, finding that: the fee is a property-related charge for purposes of Article 13D and subject to some of the constraints of that enactment; it is also a charge for water service, and, therefore, exempt from the requirement of voter ratification; pre-suit claims submitted by Great Oaks did not preserve any monetary remedy against the District for violations of Article 13D; and the court failed to apply a properly deferential standard of review to the question whether the District’s setting of the fee, or its use of the resulting proceeds, complied with the District Act. View "Great Oaks Water Co. v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist." on Justia Law

The United Water Conservation District manages groundwater resources in central Ventura County. San Buenaventura (City) pumps groundwater from District territory and sells it to residential customers. The District collects a fee from groundwater pumpers, including the City, based on volume. The Water Code authorizes this fee (Wat. Code, 74508, 75522) and requires the District to set different rates for different uses. Groundwater extracted for non-agricultural purposes must be charged at three to five times the rate applicable to water used for agricultural purposes. The California Constitution (article XIIID) governs fees "upon a parcel or upon a person as an incident of property ownership, including a user fee or charge for a property related service." The City claimed that the fees violate article XIII D because they "exceed the proportional cost of the service attributable to the parcel[s]" from which the City pumps its water. The trial court found that the pumping charges violated article XIII D and ordered refunds. The court of appeal reversed: pumping fees are not property related taxes subject to the requirements of article XIII C. The charges are valid regulatory fees because they are fair and reasonable, and do not exceed the District's resource management costs. View "City of San Buenaventura v. United Water Conserv. Dist." on Justia Law

After Appellants, several public utilities, sought to condemn a permanent easement across the property of Landowners for a high-voltage transmission line, Landowners elected to compel Appellants to purchase their entire parcel of land pursuant to the Buy-the-Farm statute, Minn. Stat. 216E.12(4). Appellants challenged Landowners’ election, arguing that it was not reasonable because the land subject to the election was much larger than the land needed for the easement and that the district court must consider several factors in addition to the statute’s requirements, including the size of the election. The district court approved the election, concluding that it was not required to analyze factors outside the provisions of the Buy-the-Farm statute. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the language of the statute forecloses Appellants’ assertion that the district court must engage in a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis of the reasonableness of Landowners’ election; (2) case law does not require an extra-statutory analysis; and (3) because Landowners’ election meets the statutory requires, the district court did not err in approving the compelled purchase of the parcel. View "Great River Energy v. Swedzinski" on Justia Law

Thomas Blanton sought judicial review of certain rate increases approved by the Public Service Commission for Mississippi Power Company (“MPC”). An examination of controlling law and statutes, the Constitutions of the United States and Mississippi, and a comprehensive review of Commission proceedings revealed that Commission failed to comply with the language of the Base Load Act, inter alia, and exceeded its authority granted by the Act. The increased rates were achieved by including “mirror CWIP” in the rate base and rates. Following the inclusion of “mirror CWIP,” the Commission “approve[d] the retail revenue adjustment over 2013 and 2014 . . . allow[ing] the Company an annual rate designed to collect $125,000,000 for 2013, escalating to $156,000,000 in 2014. This represented a 15% and 3% increase, respectively.” The Supreme Court found that the increased rates on 186,000 South Mississippi ratepayers failed to comport with the Act or, otherwise, with Mississippi law. Accordingly, the order granting rate increases was reversed, and the matter remanded to the Commission for further proceedings. View "Mississippi Power Company, Inc. v. Mississippi Public Service Comm'n" on Justia Law

The gas company found stray voltage on Wilson’s gas meter the year after she moved into her house, and again two years later. Edison paid for measures that virtually eliminated the voltage on the meter. After Wilson remodeled her bathroom, she began felt low levels of electricity in her shower, which had metal pipes and a drain connected to the ground. Edison offered to replace the metal pipes with plastic, to eliminate the voltage in her shower, but Wilson refused and insisted that Edison eliminate all stray voltage on her property. A jury found in favor of Wilson on claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and nuisance, and awarded $1,050,000 in compensatory damages and $3 million in punitive damages. The court of appeal held that the Public Utilities Commission has not exercised its authority to adopt a policy regarding the issues in the lawsuit, and, therefore, does not have exclusive jurisdiction over Wilson’s claims. Wilson, however, failed to present sufficient evidence to support her IIED and negligence claims, or to support an award of punitive damages. The verdict on the nuisance claim cannot stand because the court refused to give Edison’s proffered instruction regarding causation of Wilson’s physical symptoms. The jury relied upon irrelevant evidence. View "Wilson v. Southern Cal. Edison Co." on Justia Law

This case arose from a longstanding issue between Public Utility District No. 1 of Okanogan County (PUD) and the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) over the installation of an electrical transmission line through school lands managed by DNR in the Methow Valley. At issue was whether PUD was statutorily authorized to condemn a right of way through school trust lands for the construction of a transmission corridor and, if so, whether the particular school lands were nonetheless exempt from condemnation as a result of their trust status as school lands or their then-present use for cattle grazing. The trial court and Court of Appeals concluded that PUD is statutorily authorized to condemn school lands and that the particular school lands at issue are subject to condemnation. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Okanogan County v. Washington" on Justia Law

In 2009, Central Arkansas Water, which owns and operates Lake Maumelle as a public water supply, authorized the collection of a “watershed fee” imposed on wholesale customers, including Appellants. That same year, Pulaski County and Central Arkansas Water (collectively, Appellees) entered into a watershed protection agreement. Appellants filed suit on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated taxpayers, arguing that the watershed fee constituted an illegal exaction and that the the watershed protection agreement necessitated Central Arkansas Water to expend public funds illegally. The circuit court entered summary judgment for Appellees, concluding that the agreement was a proper contract for administrative services. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court correctly ruled that the watershed protection agreement was a valid agreement under Arkansas law. View "Sullins v. Cent. Ark. Water" on Justia Law