Justia Utilities Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Kathleen Langlois owned a building with commercial space on the first floor and an apartment on the second. She failed to pay the water bill for the property. Plaintiff alleged that she arranged with a representative of the Town of Proctor to disconnect the water service so she would not incur further water expenses, but that the Town failed to do so. In reliance on the Town's promised undertaking, plaintiff discontinued heating the building, causing the pipes containing water to freeze and split under the first floor of the building, which, in turn, flooded the first floor and basement, causing extensive damage to the building. Plaintiff brought this action with four counts: negligence, breach of contract, consumer fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. With respect to the negligence count, the Town argued that it had no duty to disconnect the water service or to disconnect the service with reasonable care or, alternatively, that any duty was based on its contractual obligations and could not give rise to tort liability. With respect to the contract claim, the Town argued that it had no contractual obligation to disconnect the water service and that it was exercising its right under a statutory delinquency collection procedure. It further argued that the contractual relationship between plaintiff and the Town was terminated when plaintiff failed to pay her water bill. The case was then tried before a jury, which rendered a verdict for plaintiff. In answering the special interrogatories, the jury found that there was a contract between plaintiff and the Town "regarding the turning off of her water service," but that the Town had not breached that contract. It found that the Town was negligent, that its negligence was a proximate cause of harm to plaintiff, and that plaintiff's damages were $64,918.44. Among the things the Town argued on appeal, it argued that the court should have instructed the jury to apply comparative negligence, and that the instructions on damages were erroneous because the proper measure of damages was the diminution in value of the building and, in any event, there was no evidence of that diminution. Plaintiff cross-appealed, arguing that the jury instructions improperly failed to allow the jury to find that the Town breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing. The Supreme Court rejected the Town's argument on appeal that it had no tort duty to properly turn off plaintiff's water. However, the Court found that the trial court erred in instructing the jury: "the instructions as a whole did not contain the spirit of the law. If we could determine from the damages award or the interrogatories that the jury found that plaintiff was not negligent and was not obligated to mitigate damages, we could find an absence of prejudice. We cannot do so here; the damages awarded by the jury were less than plaintiff claimed." On remand, the trial court was ordered to instruct the jury on comparative negligence. Because of the defect in the jury instructions, the Court did not address the remaining issues on appeal. The case was reversed and remanded for a new trial. View "Langlois v. Town of Proctor" on Justia Law

LaPSC sought review of FERC's order denying refunds to certain Louisiana-based utility companies for payments they made pursuant to a cost classification later found to be unjust and unreasonable. In denying LaPSC's refund request, the Commission relied on precedent it characterized as a policy to deny refunds in cost allocation cases, yet the precedent on which it relied is based largely on considerations the Commission did not find applicable. The Commission otherwise relied on the holding company's inability to revisit past decisions, a universally true circumstance. Because the line of precedent on which the Commission relied involved rationales that it concluded were not present in LaPSC's case, and because the existence of the identified equitable factor is unclear and its relevance inadequately explained, the court granted the petition and remanded for the Commission to consider the relevant factors and weigh them against one another. View "Louisiana Public Service Comm'n v. FERC" on Justia Law

Petitioners sought review of an order issued by FERC directing Midland, an Iowa electric utility, to reconnect to a wind generator within its territory. Because FERC never purported to adopt a general rule on disconnections by utilities whose customers refused to pay their bills, and because prior decisions addressing jurisdiction to review FERC's orders under section 210 of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act , 16 U.S.C. 824a-3, have repeatedly emphasized Congress's decision to leave section 210's enforcement to the district court, the court lacked jurisdiction to review the orders. View "Midland Power Cooperative v. FERC" on Justia Law

In 2009, IAWC petitioned the Illinois Commerce Commission under the Public Utilities Act (220 ILCS 5/1-101) for approval of its annual reconciliation of purchased water and purchased sewage treatment surcharges. The state was granted leave to intervene. In 2012, the Commission approved the reconciliation with modifications and denied the state’s request for rehearing. Under the Public Utilities Act, the state had 35 days to appeal, placing the deadline for filing the notice of appeal at October 16. Notice of appeal was filed on that date. The record and briefs were filed. The appellate court entered a summary order, dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction on grounds that the notice had not been timely filed, reasoning that under Supreme Court Rule 335(i)(1), the notice should have been filed within the 30-day deadline specified in Rule 303(a). The Illinois Supreme Court reversed; the appellate court erred in concluding that separation of powers principles required the timeliness of the notice to be judged by Supreme Court Rule 303(a) rather than the period specified by the legislature in the Public Utilities Act. View "Madigan v. IL Commerce Comm'n" on Justia Law

Pusateri, a former employee of Peoples Gas Light and Coke Company (PG) filed a complaint under the False Claims Act, 740 ILCS 175/1, alleging that PG used falsified gas leak response records to justify a fraudulently inflated natural gas rate before the Illinois Commerce Commission. As a customer, the State of Illinois would have paid such fraudulently inflated rates,. The Cook County circuit court dismissed with prejudice, finding that as a matter of law, there was no causal connection between the allegedly false reports and the Commission-approved rates. The appellate court reversed, construing the complaint’s allegations liberally to find PG could have submitted the safety reports in support of a request for a rate increase, despite not being required to do so under the Administrative Code. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the dismissal, reasoning that the court lacked jurisdiction to order relief. The legislature did not intend the False Claims Act to apply to a Commission-set rate. The Commission has the duty to ensure regulated utilities obey the Public Utilities Act and other statutes, except where enforcement duties are “specifically vested in some other officer or tribunal.” View "Pusateri v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co." on Justia Law

LPSC sought review of FERC's orders relating to the allocation of production costs among Entergy's six operating companies. LPSC argued that certain revenues and expenses should be removed from the bandwidth calculation for 2008 because they were not incurred in that test year and that the production cost formula should account for the mid-year acquisition of generation facilities by Entergy Gulf States Louisiana and Entergy Arkansas on a partial-year basis. The court concluded that FERC reasonably excluded challenges to the "justness and reasonableness" of formula inputs from annual bandwidth implementation proceedings where FERC reasonably interpreted the System Agreement and correctly applied the filed rate doctrine, and FERC's reversal of its initial interpretation of the scope of bandwidth implementation proceedings was not arbitrary. The court also concluded that FERC reasonably required Entergy to include casualty loss Net Accumulated Deferred Income Taxes (ADIT) in its third bandwidth calculation where LPSC had notice of the casualty loss ADIT issue, and FERC's decision to include casualty loss ADIT in the bandwidth formula was rational. Accordingly, the court denied LPSC's petition for review. View "Louisiana Public Svc. Cmsn. v. FERC" on Justia Law

In 2010, a PG&E natural gas pipeline exploded in San Bruno, CA, causing death, great physical injuries, and extensive property damage. Governmental entities investigated the incident and PG&E’s business practices. The Public Utilities Commission retained an independent firm, Overland, to review PG&E’s gas transmission safety-related activities from a financial and regulatory audit prospective. Plaintiffs sued, seeking redress for PG&E’s alleged misappropriation of over $100 million in authorized rates that it should have used for safety-related projects. According to the complaint, PG&E misrepresented and concealed material facts when it used money collected from ratepayers to pay shareholders and provide bonuses to its executives instead of spending the money on infrastructure and safety measures. The complaint alleged that PG&E’s negligent handling of the pipe that exploded in San Bruno was unlawful and arose from PG&E’s corporate culture that valued profits over safety and that PG&E’s actions constituted an unlawful business practice under California Business and Professions Code section 17200. The superior court dismissed without leave to amend, finding the action barred by Public Utility Code section 1759 because it would interfere with the California Public Utilities Commission’s jurisdiction.” The appeals court affirmed. View "Guerrero v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was an order of the Public Utility Commission (PUC) that addressed Portland General Electric's (PGE) recovery of its capital investment in the Trojan nuclear generating facility after that facility was retired from service. To determine whether a legal error that the PUC had made in an earlier rate case had affected rates that the PUC had authorized PGE to charge, the PUC reexamined those earlier rates. In that reexamination, the PUC determined that PGE had been required to recover its capital investment over time, and that the rates therefore should have included interest to account for the time value of money. Despite the legal error, the rates that the PUC authorized for 1995 to 2000 were just and reasonable, but that to make the post-2000 rates just and reasonable, it was required to order a refund to the post-2000 ratepayers. In affirming the PUC order, the Court of Appeals concluded the PUC had not erred in making those three determinations. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed both the Court of Appeals and the PUC's order. View "Gearhart v. PUC" on Justia Law

Smith Lake filed suit against FERC and others, alleging claims related to the Commission's issuance of a license order. Alabama Power intervened and moved to dismiss the petition for review based on lack of jurisdiction. The court granted the motion because the appeal was untimely, concluding that Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. FERC and Clifton Power Corp. v. FERC stand for the proposition that the court will not hear a case if the petitioner has a rehearing petition pending before the Commission at the time of filing in this court, whether it was required or not. Consequently, a party must choose whether to seek an optional petition for rehearing before the Commission, or a petition for review to the court; it cannot proceed simultaneously. View "Smith Lake Improvement v. FERC" on Justia Law

Columbia, an interstate natural gas company subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), seeks to replace a portion of a natural gas pipeline that runs in and around York County, Pennsylvania. Because the original location of the pipeline has become heavily populated, the replacement will not track the original line but will be outside the existing right of way. To obtain easements necessary to complete construction of the replacement, in 2013, Columbia filed Complaints in Condemnation against four Landowners in federal court. The district court held that Columbia did not have the right of eminent domain required to condemn the easements, reasoning that 18 C.F.R. 157.202(b)(2)(i), was ambiguous. The Third Circuit reversed, finding that the regulation clearly anticipates replacement outside the existing right of way and contains no adjacency requirement. The district court erroneously adopted its own definition of “replace” and concluded that a “notice” of “proposed rulemaking” for “Emergency Reconstruction of Interstate Natural Gas Facilities” promulgated by FERC after 9/11 was relevant.View "Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. 1.01 Acres in Penn Twp" on Justia Law