Justia Utilities Law Opinion Summaries

The United Water Conservation District manages groundwater resources in central Ventura County. San Buenaventura (City) pumps groundwater from District territory and sells it to residential customers. The District collects a fee from groundwater pumpers, including the City, based on volume. The Water Code authorizes this fee (Wat. Code, 74508, 75522) and requires the District to set different rates for different uses. Groundwater extracted for non-agricultural purposes must be charged at three to five times the rate applicable to water used for agricultural purposes. The California Constitution (article XIIID) governs fees "upon a parcel or upon a person as an incident of property ownership, including a user fee or charge for a property related service." The City claimed that the fees violate article XIII D because they "exceed the proportional cost of the service attributable to the parcel[s]" from which the City pumps its water. The trial court found that the pumping charges violated article XIII D and ordered refunds. The court of appeal reversed: pumping fees are not property related taxes subject to the requirements of article XIII C. The charges are valid regulatory fees because they are fair and reasonable, and do not exceed the District's resource management costs. View "City of San Buenaventura v. United Water Conserv. Dist." on Justia Law

After Appellants, several public utilities, sought to condemn a permanent easement across the property of Landowners for a high-voltage transmission line, Landowners elected to compel Appellants to purchase their entire parcel of land pursuant to the Buy-the-Farm statute, Minn. Stat. 216E.12(4). Appellants challenged Landowners’ election, arguing that it was not reasonable because the land subject to the election was much larger than the land needed for the easement and that the district court must consider several factors in addition to the statute’s requirements, including the size of the election. The district court approved the election, concluding that it was not required to analyze factors outside the provisions of the Buy-the-Farm statute. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the language of the statute forecloses Appellants’ assertion that the district court must engage in a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis of the reasonableness of Landowners’ election; (2) case law does not require an extra-statutory analysis; and (3) because Landowners’ election meets the statutory requires, the district court did not err in approving the compelled purchase of the parcel. View "Great River Energy v. Swedzinski" on Justia Law

Thomas Blanton sought judicial review of certain rate increases approved by the Public Service Commission for Mississippi Power Company (“MPC”). An examination of controlling law and statutes, the Constitutions of the United States and Mississippi, and a comprehensive review of Commission proceedings revealed that Commission failed to comply with the language of the Base Load Act, inter alia, and exceeded its authority granted by the Act. The increased rates were achieved by including “mirror CWIP” in the rate base and rates. Following the inclusion of “mirror CWIP,” the Commission “approve[d] the retail revenue adjustment over 2013 and 2014 . . . allow[ing] the Company an annual rate designed to collect $125,000,000 for 2013, escalating to $156,000,000 in 2014. This represented a 15% and 3% increase, respectively.” The Supreme Court found that the increased rates on 186,000 South Mississippi ratepayers failed to comport with the Act or, otherwise, with Mississippi law. Accordingly, the order granting rate increases was reversed, and the matter remanded to the Commission for further proceedings. View "Mississippi Power Company, Inc. v. Mississippi Public Service Comm'n" on Justia Law

The gas company found stray voltage on Wilson’s gas meter the year after she moved into her house, and again two years later. Edison paid for measures that virtually eliminated the voltage on the meter. After Wilson remodeled her bathroom, she began felt low levels of electricity in her shower, which had metal pipes and a drain connected to the ground. Edison offered to replace the metal pipes with plastic, to eliminate the voltage in her shower, but Wilson refused and insisted that Edison eliminate all stray voltage on her property. A jury found in favor of Wilson on claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and nuisance, and awarded $1,050,000 in compensatory damages and $3 million in punitive damages. The court of appeal held that the Public Utilities Commission has not exercised its authority to adopt a policy regarding the issues in the lawsuit, and, therefore, does not have exclusive jurisdiction over Wilson’s claims. Wilson, however, failed to present sufficient evidence to support her IIED and negligence claims, or to support an award of punitive damages. The verdict on the nuisance claim cannot stand because the court refused to give Edison’s proffered instruction regarding causation of Wilson’s physical symptoms. The jury relied upon irrelevant evidence. View "Wilson v. Southern Cal. Edison Co." on Justia Law

This case arose from a longstanding issue between Public Utility District No. 1 of Okanogan County (PUD) and the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) over the installation of an electrical transmission line through school lands managed by DNR in the Methow Valley. At issue was whether PUD was statutorily authorized to condemn a right of way through school trust lands for the construction of a transmission corridor and, if so, whether the particular school lands were nonetheless exempt from condemnation as a result of their trust status as school lands or their then-present use for cattle grazing. The trial court and Court of Appeals concluded that PUD is statutorily authorized to condemn school lands and that the particular school lands at issue are subject to condemnation. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Okanogan County v. Washington" on Justia Law

In 2009, Central Arkansas Water, which owns and operates Lake Maumelle as a public water supply, authorized the collection of a “watershed fee” imposed on wholesale customers, including Appellants. That same year, Pulaski County and Central Arkansas Water (collectively, Appellees) entered into a watershed protection agreement. Appellants filed suit on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated taxpayers, arguing that the watershed fee constituted an illegal exaction and that the the watershed protection agreement necessitated Central Arkansas Water to expend public funds illegally. The circuit court entered summary judgment for Appellees, concluding that the agreement was a proper contract for administrative services. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court correctly ruled that the watershed protection agreement was a valid agreement under Arkansas law. View "Sullins v. Cent. Ark. Water" on Justia Law

Peoples Gas and North Shore Gas sell and deliver natural gas to millions of residential and commercial Chicago area customers through their lines. Their operating costs include the costs of the gas itself and the costs of distribution. The Illinois Commerce Commission approved a volume-balancing-adjustment rider, or Rider VBA, which imposed so-called “revenue decoupling” on the companies’ customers. Rider VBA prevents under-recovery and over-recovery of fixed distribution costs by “decoupling” the revenue for those costs from the volume of gas delivered. If actual revenues dip below a level set by the Commission due to decreased delivery volume, the company issues customers a surcharge for the difference. If revenues tick above that level due to increased volume, the company issues customers a credit. In 2012, the Commission approved the rider on a permanent basis. The Attorney General and the Citizens Utility Board challenged that decision. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting arguments that Rider VBA departed from “principles of rate-of-return regulation,” that a just and reasonable rate under the Act provides only an opportunity for, and not a guarantee of, a profit; that Rider VBA constituted impermissible single-issue rate-making; and that Rider VBA constitutes impermissible retroactive rate-making. View "People v. Ill. Commerce Comm'n" on Justia Law

California voters adopted Proposition 13 in 1978 to require, among other constitutionally implemented tax relief measures, that any “special taxes” for cities, counties, and special districts be approved by two-thirds of voters. In 1996, voters adopted Proposition 218 with one of its aims being “to tighten the two-thirds voter approval requirement for „special taxes‟ and assessments imposed by Proposition 13.” To this end, Proposition 218 added article XIII C to require that new taxes imposed by a local government be subject to two-thirds vote by the electorate. Article XIII C was amended by the voters in 2010 when they passed Proposition 26. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on whether Proposition 26 applied to a practice by the City of Redding of making an annual budget transfer from the Redding Electrical Utility to Redding's general fund. Because the Utility was municipally owned, it was not subject to a one percent ad valorem tax imposed on privately owned utilities in California. However, the amount transferred between the Utility's funds and the Redding general fund was designed to be equivalent to the ad valorem tax the Utility would have to pay if privately owned. Redding described the annual transfer as a payment in lieu of taxes (PILOT). The PILOT was not set by ordinance, but was part of the Redding biennial budget. Plaintiffs in this case (Citizens for Fair REU Rates, Michael Schmitz, Shirlyn Pappas, and Fee Fighter LLC) challenged the PILOT on grounds it constituted a tax for which article XIII C required approval by two-thirds of voters. Redding argued the PILOT was not a tax, and if it was, it was grandfathered-in because it precedesd the adoption of Proposition 26. Upon review, the Court of Appeal concluded the PILOT was a tax under Proposition 26 for which Redding needed to secure two-thirds voter approval unless it proved the amount collected was necessary to cover the reasonable costs to the city to provide electric service. The Court rejected Redding's assertion the PILOT is grandfathered-in by preceding Proposition 26's adoption: "[t]he PILOT does not escape the purview of Proposition 26 because it is a long-standing practice." Because the trial court concluded the PILOT was reasonable as a matter of law, that judgment was reversed and the case remanded for an evidentiary hearing in which Redding would have the opportunity to prove the PILOT did not exceed reasonable costs under article XIII C, section 1, subdivision (e)(2). View "Citizens for Fair REU Rates v. City of Redding" on Justia Law

Sanitary and Improvement District No. 1, Butler County, Nebraska (SID #1) filed two class action lawsuits in Cass County, Nebraska, alleging that various county treasurers unlawfully deducted an incorrect percentage of assessments of municipal improvements collected on behalf of SID #1 and other sanitary and improvement districts. The county treasurers filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted those motions, concluding that the sanitary and improvement districts are not municipal corporations and therefore do not create municipal improvements. SID #1 appealed. The Supreme Court consolidated the appeals and reversed, holding that SID #1 stated a cause of action because a sanitary and improvement district can levy municipal taxes and make municipal improvements. Remanded. View "Sanitary & Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. Adamy" on Justia Law

On Friday, January 9, 2009, after business hours, an unidentified motor vehicle crashed into and felled a utility pole carrying electric lines owned and operated by Duquesne Light. Several wires were connected to Burton L. Hirsh’s Funeral Home, and at least one was stripped from the attachment point to the building’s electrical system located on the structure. In addition to the funeral home, a number of other local buildings lost power as a result of the incident, although no structure other than Hirsh’s was connected directly to the downed pole. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review, as framed by appellant, was “[w]hether the Superior Court erred in imposing upon electric utilities a burdensome and unprecedented duty to enter customers’ premises and inspect customers’ electrical facilities before restoring power after an outage” The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court, finding that Duquesne Light failed to adequately confront the common-law duties invoked by Hirsh or the warnings dynamic tempering the Superior Court’s ruling. The Superior Court did not err to the extent that it recognized a duty, on the part of an electric service provider, to take reasonable measures to avert harm in a scenario in which the utility has actual or constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition impacting a customer’s electrical system, occasioned by fallen and intermixed electrical lines proximate to the customer’s premises. The Court offered no opinion as to whether Duquesne Light had actual or constructive knowledge of an unreasonable risk in this scenario, since the electric company’s summary judgment effort was not staged in a manner which would have elicited an informed determination on such point. View "Alderwoods (PA), Inc. v. Duquesne Light" on Justia Law