Justia Utilities Law Opinion Summaries

In 2005, former owners subdivided a Hayward lot into three residential lots. Alameda County approved a tentative map with a condition requiring connection to the District water system at the expense of the subdivider “in accordance with the requirements of said District.” A service assessment was prepared by the District, stating: “THIS IS NOT A PROPOSAL TO PROVIDE WATER SERVICES.” An Approved Parcel Map was recorded, providing the District a utility easement in the form of a water main extension. Plaintiff purchased a lot in 2009; it did not yet have water service. The District provided an estimate that required a 15-foot-long easement beyond plaintiff’s lot line for installation and maintenance of the pipeline and blowoff assembly. The District rejected alterations requested by plaintiff because his layout would have made it impossible to reach his meter from the proposed water main at a right angle. Plaintiff sought to compel the District “to provide water service to Plaintiff consistent with the laws and regulations.” The trial court rejected his claims. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting claims under the Subdivision Map Act and stating that even if the District has granted waivers for other properties, there is nothing that prohibits it from exercising its discretion to deny plaintiff a waiver. View "Tarbet v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist." on Justia Law

Citizens of Myersville, in Frederick County, Maryland, oppose the construction of a natural gas facility called a compressor station in their town as part of a larger expansion of natural gas facilities in the northeastern United States proposed by Dominion, a regional natural gas company. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, over the objections of the citizens, conditionally approved it. Dominion fulfilled the Commission’s conditions, including obtaining a Clean Air Act permit from the Maryland Department of the Environment. Dominion built the station, and it has been operating for approximately six months. The D.C. Circuit denied a petition for review, rejecting arguments that the Commission lacked substantial evidence to conclude that there was a public need for the project; that the Commission unlawfully interfered with Maryland’s rights under the Clean Air Act; that environmental review of the project, including its consideration of potential alternatives, was inadequate; and that the Commission unlawfully withheld hydraulic flow diagrams from them in violation of their due process rights. View "Myersville Citizens for a Rural Community, Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has regulatory authority over interstate aspects of the nation’s electric power system, but not over “facilities used in local distribution or only for the transmission of electric energy in intrastate commerce,” 16 U.S.C. 824(a). FERC entered orders adopting standards and procedures for determining which power distribution facilities are subject to the agency’s regulatory jurisdiction and which facilities fall within the statutory exception for local distribution of electric energy. The state and the Public Service Commission of the State of New York challenged the standards and procedures as an unreasonable interpretation of the agency’s statutory grant of jurisdiction and as arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. The Second Circuit upheld the orders as reasonably interpreting the agency’s regulatory jurisdiction under the Federal Power Act as amended by the Electricity Modernization Act of 2005 and supported by sufficient explanation and substantial evidence as required by the Administrative Procedure Act. View "New York v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n" on Justia Law

The State Corporation Commission issued to Virginia Electric and Power Company certificates of public convenience and necessity authorizing the construction of electric transmission facilities. BASF Corporation appealed, challenging the approval of the transmission line’s route across an environmental remediation site on its property along the James River. James City County, Save the James Alliance Trust, and James River Association (collectively, JCC) also appealed, challenging the approval of an overhead transmission line that will cross the James River and a switching station that will be located in James City County. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the Commission did not err in its construction or application of Va. Code 56-46.1’s requirements that the power company reasonably minimize adverse environmental impacts on the area concerned, and the Commission’s findings were not contrary to the evidence or without evidentiary support; and (2) the Commission erred in concluding that the switching station was a “transmission line” under Va. Code 56-46.1(F) and therefore not subject to local zoning ordinances. Remanded as to the JCC appellants. View "BASF Corp. v. State Corp. Comm’n" on Justia Law

Casitas is a publicly owned water utility in western Ventura County. Its territory includes Ojai. Most of Ojai receives water from Golden State, which charges rates that are more than double those charged by Casitas. After failed attempts to obtain relief from the Public Utilities Commission, residents formed Ojai FLOW, which, supported by Ojai's city council, petitioned Casitas to take over water service in Ojai. Casitas is subject to the Brown Act and the California Public Records Act, Under Proposition 218, Casitas's rates can be reduced by a majority of voters in its service area. Using the Mello-Roos Act (Gov. Code, 53311) to finance the transaction, placing the financial burden on Ojai residents rather than on its existing customers, Casitas formed a community facilities district; passed resolutions; and submitted the matter to voters. A special tax would be levied to pay for bonds. Golden State sought to invalidate Casitas's resolutions. The trial court stayed the case. At the single-issue special election that drew more than half of eligible voters, 87 percent of the electorate approved the measure. The trial court then rejected claims that the Mello-Roos Act cannot be used to finance eminent domain or the acquisition of intangible property rights and cannot be used by one service provider to supplant another. The court of appeal affirmed. The Act applies regardless of whether the seller consents to the sale or is compelled under force of law. Financing the acquisition of intangible property incidental to tangible property is consistent with the Act's purpose. View "Golden State Water Co. v. Casitas Mun. Water Dist." on Justia Law

PJM is a regional transmission organization that combines multiple utility power grids into a single transmission system to “reduce technical inefficiencies caused when different utilities operate different portions of the grid independently.” PJM coordinates the movement of wholesale electricity in 13 mid-Atlantic states and the District of Columbia. To prevent interruptions to the delivery of electricity, PJM upgrades its system in accordance with its governing agreements: the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan, the Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement, and the PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff. The petitioners, incumbent owners, challenged orders in which the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) concluded that they had no right of first refusal for proposed expansions or upgrades and that PJM may designate third-party developers to construct transmission facilities within incumbent members’ zones. While their petition was pending, FERC directed PJM to remove or revise “any provision that could be read as supplying a federal right of first refusal for any type of transmission project that is selected in the regional transmission plan for purposes of cost allocation.” The D.C. Circuit dismissed the petition, concluding that there is no live controversy between adverse parties, so that any decision would constitute an impermissible advisory opinion.it View "Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n" on Justia Law

The TMP is a 5.6-mile stretch of pipeline, connecting Missouri with Illinois beneath the Mississippi River. Under the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. 717f, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission issued MoGas a certificate of public convenience and necessity for a project that included using the TMP for natural gas service for the first time. On remand, the Commission approved inclusion of the acquisition cost in MoGas’s rate base because the TMP had been devoted to a new use, transporting natural gas instead of oil, and the cost of new construction would have been greater. Objectors challenged the Commission’s determination that the company had shown that the acquisition of pipeline facilities provided specific benefits in accordance with Commission precedent. Although acknowledging that a lower acquisition cost can produce benefits to customers in some cases, they argued the Commission failed to examine whether there were actual quantifiable dollar benefits for Missouri customers. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, deferring to the Commission’s benefits exception, which allows an acquisition premium to be included in a pipeline’s rate base when the purchase price is less than the cost of constructing comparable facilities, the facility is converted to a new use, and the transacting parties are unaffiliated. View "Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n" on Justia Law

Southwestern Bell Telephone, LP, doing business as AT&T Texas, was a public utility company with facilities attached to a city bridge designated for destruction. AT&T sued the City of Houston and the Harris County Commissioners seeking an injunction preventing the removal of its facilities from the bridge and a declaratory judgment that Tex. Water Code Ann. 49.223 required the Harris County Flood Control District to bear any relocation costs. The trial court granted summary judgment to the City and the Commissioners’ pleas to the jurisdiction. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the relocation costs sought by AT&T were not clearly within the statute’s purview. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that AT&T was entitled to declaratory relief that payment of its relocation expenses by the District was required by section 49.223. View "Southwestern Bell Telephone, LP v. Emmett" on Justia Law

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) orders issued in 2013 and 2014 approved the New York Independent System Operator’s (NYISO) creation of a new wholesale electric power “capacity zone” comprising areas of Southeastern New York, including the lower Hudson Valley. The orders followed NYISO’s identification of areas in which customers received power from suppliers located on the other side of a “transmission constraint” in the electrical grid. Because of the way New York’s capacity markets work, NYISO concluded that financial incentives for capacity resources in the transmission‐constrained area that became the Valley Zone were inadequate, jeopardizing the reliability of the grid. FERC’s approval of the Zone, with a new “demand curve” to set capacity prices, were designed to address the reliability problem by providing more accurate price signals to in‐zone resources, but were expected to result in higher prices to customers. Utilities, the state, and the New York Public Service Commission alleged that FERC failed adequately to justify the expected higher prices, particularly without a “phase‐in” of the new zone and its demand curve, in violation of FERC’s statutory mandate to ensure that rates are “just and reasonable,” 16 U.S.C. 824d(a). The Second Circuit rejected the challenge. FERC adequately justified its decisions. View "Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n" on Justia Law

Great Oaks, a water retailer, challenged a fee imposed on water it draws from wells on its property. The power to impose such a fee is vested in the Santa Clara Valley Water Management District under the Santa Clara County Water District Act, to prevent depletion of the acquifers from which Great Oaks extracts water. The trial court awarded a refund of charges paid by Great Oaks, finding that the charge violated the provisions of the District Act and Article XIII D of the California Constitution, which imposes procedural and substantive constraints on fees and charges imposed by local public entities. The court of appeal reversed, finding that: the fee is a property-related charge for purposes of Article 13D and subject to some of the constraints of that enactment; it is also a charge for water service, and, therefore, exempt from the requirement of voter ratification; pre-suit claims submitted by Great Oaks did not preserve any monetary remedy against the District for violations of Article 13D; and the court failed to apply a properly deferential standard of review to the question whether the District’s setting of the fee, or its use of the resulting proceeds, complied with the District Act. View "Great Oaks Water Co. v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist." on Justia Law