Justia Utilities Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioners, wholesale electricity customers, challenged FERC's orders requiring the Bonneville Power Administration to provide transmission services on terms "not unduly discriminatory or preferential." Petitioners are wholesale electricity customers of Bonneville. The court concluded that petitioners have Article III standing by demonstrating that they have an injury in fact, causation, and redressability. The court concluded, however, that petitioners failed to demonstrate statutory standing, which requires them to be "aggrieved" within the meaning of the Federal Power Act section 313(b) (FPA), 16 U.S.C. 8251(b), and the Administrative Procedure Act section 10, 5 U.S.C. 702. In this case, the zone-of-interests test was not satisfied where petitioners' interests are not arguably protected by section 211A of the FPA. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review. View "NRU V. FERC" on Justia Law

Petitioners, wholesale electricity customers, challenged FERC's orders requiring the Bonneville Power Administration to provide transmission services on terms "not unduly discriminatory or preferential." Petitioners are wholesale electricity customers of Bonneville. The court concluded that petitioners have Article III standing by demonstrating that they have an injury in fact, causation, and redressability. The court concluded, however, that petitioners failed to demonstrate statutory standing, which requires them to be "aggrieved" within the meaning of the Federal Power Act section 313(b) (FPA), 16 U.S.C. 8251(b), and the Administrative Procedure Act section 10, 5 U.S.C. 702. In this case, the zone-of-interests test was not satisfied where petitioners' interests are not arguably protected by section 211A of the FPA. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review. View "NRU V. FERC" on Justia Law

Colorado law required electricity generators to ensure that 20% of the electricity they sell to Colorado consumers comes from renewable sources. Colorado's scheme may require Coloradans to pay more for electricity, but voters overwhelmingly approved the ballot initiative proposing the renewable energy mandate. The issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit's review centered on whether "Colorado's renewable energy mandate survive an encounter with the most dormant doctrine in dormant commerce clause jurisprudence." The Energy and Environment Legal Institute (EELI) argued that Colorado consumers receive their electricity from an interconnected grid serving eleven states and portions of Canada and Mexico. Because electricity could go anywhere on the grid and come from anywhere on the grid, and because Colorado was a net importer of electricity, Colorado's renewable energy mandate effectively meant some out-of-state coal producers, like an EELI member, would lose business with out-of-state utilities who fed their power onto the grid. And this harm to out-of-state coal producers, EELI argued, amounted to a violation of one of the three branches of dormant commerce clause jurisprudence. Therefore, EELI sought to have the mandate declared unconstitutional. In the end, the district court disagreed with EELI's assessment and after review, the Tenth Circuit disagreed too, and affirmed that court's judgment. View "Energy & Environment Legal v. Epel" on Justia Law

The City of Azusa, its municipal utility (Azusa Light and Water) and the successor agency to its redevelopment agency (collectively, City except as noted), appealed a judgment denying their amended mandamus petition. The petition sought to compel the director of the Department of Finance to recognize as enforceable certain obligations between the City and the Utility. These consisted of loans from the Utility to the City’s former redevelopment agency (RDA). The City argued the invalidation of these loans in effect harmed the Utility’s ratepayers and therefore was unlawful. The trial court rejected the City’s view, and the City appealed. Upon review, the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court that once Utility money was loaned to the RDA, it ceased to be “ratepayer money.” Because the City’s legal claims hinged on a contrary view (whether or not explicitly acknowledged in its briefing)--each of the City’s claims failed. View "City of Azusa v. Cohen" on Justia Law

Lafarge North America, Inc., the operator of a ready-mix concrete plant, sought a refund from the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission (WSSC) for allegedly improperly assessed and paid water and sewer service charges for operation of the plant. Large’s claim was deemed denied because of the WSSC’s failure to render a timely decision. The circuit court reversed the WSSC’s deemed denial of Lafarge’s claim and remanded the matter to the WSSC with directions to determine and issue an appropriate refund, concluding that the deemed denial was not supported by substantial evidence in the record and was arbitrary and capricious. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, given the legislative intent to provide for refunds when charges are erroneously assessed, it is appropriate to remand the case to the WSSC for calculation of the amount of the refund due. View "Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm’n v. Lafarge N.A., Inc." on Justia Law

Liberty Energy (Midstates) Corp. (Liberty), a public utility and a gas corporation, requested an increase to its Infrastructure System Replacement Surcharge (ISRS). After an evidentiary hearing, the Missouri Public Service Commission (PSC) approved the ISRS increase for Liberty. Accordingly, Liberty filed new ISRS tariffs in compliance with the PSC’s order, and the PSC approved the tariffs. The Office of Public Counsel, which is appointed by the director of the department of economic development and may represent the public interest in appeals from the PSC’s orders, appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the PSC failed to follow the plain language of its statutory mandates, and therefore, its order was unlawful. Remanded. View "Missouri Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Office of Pub. Counsel" on Justia Law

Under Pub. Util. Code 1701(a)1, the Public Utilities Commission (PUC ) promulgated Rule 1.1, stating: Any person who . . . transacts business with the Commission . . . agrees . . . never to mislead the Commission or its staff by an artifice or false statement of fact or law. After a massive 2010 explosion of an underground gas pipeline owned and operated by Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E), the PUC imposed reforms, including requiring that PG&E improve its recordkeeping and information technology capabilities. PG&E was directed to keep the PUC informed of any reported pipeline leaks and any discovered information regarding the safety of pipeline operations. Following discovery of a pipeline leak, PG&E also discovered that some information it had provided to the PUC concerning the internal pressure at which certain pipelines could be safely operated might not be correct. About seven months after internally verifying the information, PG&E, communicated to the PUC via a written “Errata”‖ to a previous filing. Following extensive hearings, the PUC deemed this filing both a substantive and a procedural violation and imposed civil penalties totaling $14,350,000. The court of appeal affirmed, finding that the penalties were not grossly disproportional to the gravity of PG&E‘s tardiness. View "Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) approved a mechanism called a phase-in recovery rider (PIRR) for Ohio Power Company to recover fuel costs that were incurred under Ohio Power’s first electric-security plan (ESP) but were deferred for future collection. In approving Ohio Power’s PIRR application, PUCO modified part of the portion of its order approving Ohio Power’s first ESP that established the carrying-charge rate. The end result was the reduction of Ohio Power’s recovery of carrying charges by more than $130 million. The Supreme Court reversed PUCO’s order insofar as it reduced the carrying-charge rate, holding that the order violated Ohio Rev. Code 4928.143(C)(2)(a) by depriving Ohio Power of its right to withdraw the modified ESP. Remanded. View "In re Application of Ohio Power Co." on Justia Law

The Districts and the Trust petitioned for review of FERC's order determining that the La Grange Hydroelectric Project fell within the mandatory licensing provisions of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 817(1). Because the Trust has failed to establish standing either for itself or on behalf of its members, the court dismissed its petition for lack of jurisdiction. As to the merits of the Districts' arguments, the court concluded that FERC’s evidence of actual use in the past, together with current use of the Tuolumne River by California DFG crews, constitutes substantial evidence supporting FERC’s finding that La Grange is located on a navigable water of the United States; FERC properly relied on the results of its backwater analysis to conclude that the La Grange reservoir extends onto federal lands; and the Districts' challenges to FERC's finding that the La Grange Project is subject to FERC's mandatory licensing jurisdiction based on Congress's "authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States" are without merit. Accordingly, the court denied the petition, concluding that FERC's jurisdictional determinations were supported by substantial evidence and reached by reasoned decisionmaking. View "Turlock Irrigation Dist. v. FERC" on Justia Law

When a fire caused by NSTAR Electric and Gas Company employees damaged a building owned by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), two insurers paid the claims of the building’s tenants. The insurers then brought this complaint against NSTAR Electric Company and NSTAR Electric & Gas Company (collectively, NSTAR) seeking to recover for the claims paid. NSTAR moved for partial summary judgment, contending that, to the extent to which the insurers sought recovery for business interruption losses, the claims were barred by Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications and Energy Tariff No. 200A, filed with and approved by the Department of Public Utilities, and in effect when the explosion occurred. The tariff contained a limitation of liability clause that limited NSTAR from liability to nonresidential customers for special, indirect, or consequential damages resulting from the utility’s gross negligence. A judge of the superior court allowed NSTAR’s motion for partial summary judgment, concluding that a tariff filed with and approved by a regulatory agency may limit a public utility’s liability. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the limitation of liability clause in the tariff precluded Plaintiffs’ claims to recover for business interruption and other consequential or economic damages. View "Maryland Cas. Co. v. NSTAR Elec. Co." on Justia Law