Justia Utilities Law Opinion Summaries

Lafarge North America, Inc., the operator of a ready-mix concrete plant, sought a refund from the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission (WSSC) for allegedly improperly assessed and paid water and sewer service charges for operation of the plant. Large’s claim was deemed denied because of the WSSC’s failure to render a timely decision. The circuit court reversed the WSSC’s deemed denial of Lafarge’s claim and remanded the matter to the WSSC with directions to determine and issue an appropriate refund, concluding that the deemed denial was not supported by substantial evidence in the record and was arbitrary and capricious. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, given the legislative intent to provide for refunds when charges are erroneously assessed, it is appropriate to remand the case to the WSSC for calculation of the amount of the refund due. View "Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm’n v. Lafarge N.A., Inc." on Justia Law

Liberty Energy (Midstates) Corp. (Liberty), a public utility and a gas corporation, requested an increase to its Infrastructure System Replacement Surcharge (ISRS). After an evidentiary hearing, the Missouri Public Service Commission (PSC) approved the ISRS increase for Liberty. Accordingly, Liberty filed new ISRS tariffs in compliance with the PSC’s order, and the PSC approved the tariffs. The Office of Public Counsel, which is appointed by the director of the department of economic development and may represent the public interest in appeals from the PSC’s orders, appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the PSC failed to follow the plain language of its statutory mandates, and therefore, its order was unlawful. Remanded. View "Missouri Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Office of Pub. Counsel" on Justia Law

Under Pub. Util. Code 1701(a)1, the Public Utilities Commission (PUC ) promulgated Rule 1.1, stating: Any person who . . . transacts business with the Commission . . . agrees . . . never to mislead the Commission or its staff by an artifice or false statement of fact or law. After a massive 2010 explosion of an underground gas pipeline owned and operated by Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E), the PUC imposed reforms, including requiring that PG&E improve its recordkeeping and information technology capabilities. PG&E was directed to keep the PUC informed of any reported pipeline leaks and any discovered information regarding the safety of pipeline operations. Following discovery of a pipeline leak, PG&E also discovered that some information it had provided to the PUC concerning the internal pressure at which certain pipelines could be safely operated might not be correct. About seven months after internally verifying the information, PG&E, communicated to the PUC via a written “Errata”‖ to a previous filing. Following extensive hearings, the PUC deemed this filing both a substantive and a procedural violation and imposed civil penalties totaling $14,350,000. The court of appeal affirmed, finding that the penalties were not grossly disproportional to the gravity of PG&E‘s tardiness. View "Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) approved a mechanism called a phase-in recovery rider (PIRR) for Ohio Power Company to recover fuel costs that were incurred under Ohio Power’s first electric-security plan (ESP) but were deferred for future collection. In approving Ohio Power’s PIRR application, PUCO modified part of the portion of its order approving Ohio Power’s first ESP that established the carrying-charge rate. The end result was the reduction of Ohio Power’s recovery of carrying charges by more than $130 million. The Supreme Court reversed PUCO’s order insofar as it reduced the carrying-charge rate, holding that the order violated Ohio Rev. Code 4928.143(C)(2)(a) by depriving Ohio Power of its right to withdraw the modified ESP. Remanded. View "In re Application of Ohio Power Co." on Justia Law

The Districts and the Trust petitioned for review of FERC's order determining that the La Grange Hydroelectric Project fell within the mandatory licensing provisions of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 817(1). Because the Trust has failed to establish standing either for itself or on behalf of its members, the court dismissed its petition for lack of jurisdiction. As to the merits of the Districts' arguments, the court concluded that FERC’s evidence of actual use in the past, together with current use of the Tuolumne River by California DFG crews, constitutes substantial evidence supporting FERC’s finding that La Grange is located on a navigable water of the United States; FERC properly relied on the results of its backwater analysis to conclude that the La Grange reservoir extends onto federal lands; and the Districts' challenges to FERC's finding that the La Grange Project is subject to FERC's mandatory licensing jurisdiction based on Congress's "authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States" are without merit. Accordingly, the court denied the petition, concluding that FERC's jurisdictional determinations were supported by substantial evidence and reached by reasoned decisionmaking. View "Turlock Irrigation Dist. v. FERC" on Justia Law

When a fire caused by NSTAR Electric and Gas Company employees damaged a building owned by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), two insurers paid the claims of the building’s tenants. The insurers then brought this complaint against NSTAR Electric Company and NSTAR Electric & Gas Company (collectively, NSTAR) seeking to recover for the claims paid. NSTAR moved for partial summary judgment, contending that, to the extent to which the insurers sought recovery for business interruption losses, the claims were barred by Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications and Energy Tariff No. 200A, filed with and approved by the Department of Public Utilities, and in effect when the explosion occurred. The tariff contained a limitation of liability clause that limited NSTAR from liability to nonresidential customers for special, indirect, or consequential damages resulting from the utility’s gross negligence. A judge of the superior court allowed NSTAR’s motion for partial summary judgment, concluding that a tariff filed with and approved by a regulatory agency may limit a public utility’s liability. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the limitation of liability clause in the tariff precluded Plaintiffs’ claims to recover for business interruption and other consequential or economic damages. View "Maryland Cas. Co. v. NSTAR Elec. Co." on Justia Law

Coppage Construction Company, Inc. filed a third-party complaint raising a number of contract, tort, and statutory claims against Sanitation District No. 1 (SD1), a public sewer utility serving three Northern Kentucky counties. SD1 moved to dismiss the third-party complaint on the grounds that it was entitled to sovereign immunity. The circuit court converted the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and granted the motion, concluding that SD1 was entitled to sovereign immunity because SD1’s “parent” entities - the three counties - were immune entities, and SD1 performed a function integral to state government. The Court of Appeals affirmed, describing SD1 as an “arm” of the three counties. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and vacated the summary judgment order of the circuit court, holding that SD1 was not entitled to sovereign immunity because it was not created by the state or a county and does not carry out a function integral to state government. View "Coppage Constr. Co., Inc. v. Sanitation Dist. No. 1" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from plaintiff's applications to SCE to interconnect solar generating systems to the SCE electricity grid to generate electricity for use on plaintiff's properties and to sell to SCE. At issue is the potential conflict between Public Utilities Code section 1759,2 which limits jurisdiction to review an order of the PUC to the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, and section 2106, which grants jurisdiction to the superior court to hear actions for damages against a public utility that violates California law. The court concluded that the trial court correctly held that the PUC had exclusive jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims under its Supreme Court’s holding in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court because adjudication of plaintiff’s claims would “‘hinder or frustrate the commission’s declared supervisory and regulatory policies’” with respect to interconnection of solar generating facilities under Rule 21, Rule 16 and the California Renewable Energy Small Tariff (CREST) and Net Energy Metering (NEM) programs. To the extent plaintiff has viable damage claims following the PUC’s adjudication of his administrative complaints currently pending before the PUC, those claims will only become ripe for filing in the trial court once the PUC reaches a final decision. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Davis v. Southern Cal. Edison" on Justia Law

The Montana Public Service Commission determined that Whitehall Wind, LLC had not established a legally enforceable obligation during contract negotiations with NorthWestern Energy for the sale and purchase of electric energy generated by a proposed wind facility. The district court reversed, determining that NorthWestern’s refusal to negotiate created a legally enforceable obligation entitling Whitehall to a long-term avoided cost rate. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision and order and remanded for reinstatement of the Commission’s order, holding that the Commission did not exceed its statutory authority in concluding that evidence of a utility’s refusal to negotiate, without more, is insufficient to establish that a qualifying facility has committed itself to the proposed project. View "Whitehall Wind, LLC v. Mont. Pub. Serv. Comm’n" on Justia Law

In 2004, the Ninth Circuit decided California ex rel. Lockyer v. FERC, which held that FERC may authorize market-based energy tariffs so long as that regulatory framework incorporates both an ex ante market power analysis and enforceable post-approval transaction reporting. In the instant case, Petitioners, the people of the state of California and related parties, sought review of a series of orders issued by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) on remand following the Court’s decision in Lockyer, arguing that FERC failed to follow Lockyer and violated the Federal Power Act by requiring proof of excessive market share as a necessary condition for relief for transaction reporting violations. The Ninth Circuit granted the petition for judicial review, holding that FERC structured the remand proceedings in a manner contrary to the terms of the Lockyer decision. Remanded to FERC for further proceedings. View "People of State of Cal. v. FERC" on Justia Law