Justia Utilities Law Opinion Summaries

The Northeast Ohio Regional Sewer District (the “Sewer District”) filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment that it had the authority to implement a regional stormwater-management program and to impose fees to be charged to landowners within the Sewer District. The trial court declared that the Sewer District had authority under Ohio Rev. Code 6119 and its charter to enact a regional stormwater-management program. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Sewer District has authority to implement a regional stormwater-management program and to charge fees for that program. View "Northeast Ohio Reg’l Sewer Dist. v. Bath Twp." on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from an order of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio authorizing the East Ohio Gas Company (“Dominion”) to discontinue the availability of the “standard choice offer” for its nonresidential customers. In so doing, the Commission took another step toward deregulation of the company’s “commodity-sales services.” To take this step, the Commission modified one of its previous orders. Ohio Partners for Affordable Energy (OPAE), an advocacy group representing its members who are nonresidential customers of Dominion, appealed, arguing that the Commission lacked statutory authority and an evidentiary basis to modify its previous order and also erred in adopting a stipulation that OPAE did not sign. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s order, holding (1) Dominion was entitled to a modification of an exemption order under Ohio Rev. Code 4929.08(A); and (2) the order did not violate Ohio Rev. Code 4903.09. View "In re Application to Modify the Exemption Granted to E. Ohio Gas Co." on Justia Law

IDACORP submitted proposed settlements to FERC involving the FERC proceeding related to electricity sales in the Pacific Northwest in 2000 and 2001. At issue was whether FERC abused its discretion in considering these proposed settlements. The court concluded that the agency departed from its rules and precedent without explanation when it treated the first proposed settlement as uncontested. In this case, FERC abused its discretion by foregoing the Trailblazer Pipeline Co. analysis and merits analysis dictated by FERC’s regulations. The court granted both petitions for review and remanded for further proceedings because the settlements and petitions are inextricably intertwined. View "Idaho Power Co. v. FERC" on Justia Law

PegaStaff is a temporary staffing agency. A large part of PegaStaff’s business was providing staffing to PG&E) The California Public Utilities Commission (PUC) adopted General Order 156 (GO 156) to implement Public Utilities Code Article 5, the purpose of which is to encourage and develop the use of women-, minority-, and disabled veteran-owned business enterprises within the public utility sector. PegaStaff is not a minority enterprise, and after PG&E adopted a program to increase the utilization of minority enterprises, PegaStaff’s provision of labor to PG&E was substantially reduced. PegaStaff attributes this reduction to the implementation of a tier system preferential to minority enterprises and the transfer of many of its contingent workers to minority enterprises. PegaStaff filed suit, alleging constitutional challenges to Article 5 and GO 156. The trial court determined that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider PegaStaff’s constitutional challenges and granted the PUC’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court of appeal affirmed. Remaining defendants also sought and obtained judgment on the pleadings. The court of appeal reversed, finding that the trial court erred in determining that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider its claims against PG&E and another staffing agency. The suit will not interfere with PUC’s regulatory authority. View "Pegastaff v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co." on Justia Law

Aqua North Carolina (Aqua), a public utility providing water and utility service, requested authority from the North Carolina Utilities Commission to implement a rate adjustment mechanism of the type described in N.C. Gen. Stat. 62-133.12. After a hearing, the Commission approved Aqua’s request, finding that the request to implement a rate adjustment mechanism was in the public interest. The Attorney General appealed the Commission’s order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission provided sufficient findings, reasoning, and conclusions to support its finding that the mechanism is in the public interest and that the Commission’s determination is supported by substantial evidence in view of the record as a whole. View "State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Cooper" on Justia Law

MISO, an organization of independent transmission-owning utilities, has linked the transmission lines of its members into a single interconnected grid across 11 states. The Generators, which operate 150-megawatt wind-powered electric generation facilities in Illinois, wish to connect to the system run by MISO. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), acting under 16 U.S.C. 824(a), has standardized the process: the Generators submitted requests to MISO, which then produced studies (paid for by the Generators) to assess potential impact on the grid and calculate the cost of necessary upgrades. After the studies were complete and agreements signed, MISO notified the Generators of a “significant error” that failed to include certain upgrades and that the Generators would either have to agree to fewer megawatts or pay for additional upgrades estimated to cost $11.5 million. MISO presented superseding Agreements to both Generators. The companies refused to sign. FERC found that the Generators should pay for the additional network upgrades. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. The record failed to show that the Generators relied on the original, mistaken studies or that reducing the output would have made their farms economically unsustainable. They also had an exit option. The court noted that the Generators apparently built their wind farms despite the dispute. View "Pioneer Trail Wind Farm, LLC v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n" on Justia Law

Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, local exchange carriers such as Windstream must connect calls made to their customers by the customers of national telecommunications companies such as Sprint. Until 2009, Sprint paid Windstream state access charges for connecting non-nomadic intrastate long-distance VoIP calls-- made by cable telephone customers over the Internet in Iowa, delivered to Sprint for format conversion, and transferred to Windstream for delivery to its Iowa telephone customers. Beginning in 2009, Sprint withheld state access charges for these calls, claiming that VoIP calls were “information services” and that payment should be governed by a reciprocal compensation agreement, not by state access charges. In 2011, the Iowa Utilities Board found that the calls were telecommunications services subject to state regulation, not information services. Sprint sought state court review and filed a federal action, seeking to enjoin the Board’s decision. The district court abstained because of the parallel state proceedings. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, but the Supreme Court reversed. By the time the case returned to the district court, the state court had upheld the Board’s decision. The district court dismissed Sprint’s complaint, holding that issue preclusion barred Sprint from raising the same arguments in federal court. The Eighth Circuit reversed, reasoning that Congress did not intend that issue-preclusion principles bar federal-court review of the issue of whether the non-nomadic intrastate long-distance VoIP calls at issue are information services, payment for which should be governed by a reciprocal compensation agreement, or telecommunications services subject to state access charges. View "Sprint Commc'ns Co. v. Jacobs" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was an order of the Maine Public Utilities Commission approving an alternative rate plan (ARP) for Bangor Gas Company, LLC. The Maine Office of the Public Advocate (OPA) and Bucksport Mill, LLC appealed from the Commission’s order. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission did not abuse its discretion or exceed its statutory authority in calculating the APR initial rate base by utilizing an unimpaired, “original cost” valuation of Bangor Gas’s assets rather than the impaired “acquisition cost” incurred by Bangor Gas’s parent company; and (2) the OPA’s argument that the Commission abused its discretion by including in its revenue requirement calculation a portion of the Bangor Gas’s regulatory proceeding expenses amortized over five years need not be addressed because the Commission’s decision to include the regulatory proceeding expenses in its revenue requirement analysis had no impact on its decision to approve the ARP. View "Office of Pub. Advocate v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n" on Justia Law

Great Oaks, a water retailer, challenged a groundwater extraction fee imposed on water it draws from wells on its property. The power to impose such a fee is statutorily vested in the Santa Clara Valley Water Management District. The trial court awarded a refund of charges paid by Great Oaks, finding that the charge violated the provisions of both the District Act and Article XIII D of the California Constitution, which imposes procedural and substantive constraints on fees and charges imposed by local public entities. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the fee is a property-related charge for purposes of Article 13D, subject to some constraints, but is also a charge for water service, exempt from the requirement of voter ratification. A pre-suit claim submitted by Great Oaks did not preserve any monetary remedy against the District for violations of Article 13D and, because the matter was treated as a simple action for damages when it should have been treated as a petition for a writ of mandate, the trial court failed to apply a properly deferential standard of review to the question whether the District’s setting of the fee, or its use of the resulting proceeds, complied with the District Act. View "Great Oaks Water Co. v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist." on Justia Law

Bay County Utilities provides water and sewer services. The County Commissioners establish rates. In 1966, the U.S. Air Force contracted with the County for water services at Tyndall Air Force Base. The parties entered into a sewer services contract in 1985. Both required the parties to renegotiate any new rates. In 1994, Federal Acquisition Regulations were amended to require standardized clauses in utility service contracts. When the government is contracting with an unregulated utility or the utility is subject to non-independent oversight, the parties must negotiate new rates. If the utility is overseen by an independent regulatory body, no further negotiations are required. In 2007 and 2009, Bay County increased water rates. The Air Force ignored those increases, but, in 2009 and 2010, unilaterally modified the water contract, with new rates, lower than the rates set by Bay County. In 2009 Bay County increased sewer rates. The Air Force refused to pay those higher rates, and instituted a unilateral contract modification to moderately increase sewer rates. Bay County submitted unsuccessful Contract Disputes Act claims to recover the unpaid balance of approximately $850,000. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Court of Federal Claims, holding that Bay County is an independent regulatory body and may revise rates in utility contracts without resorting to negotiations with the Air Force. View "Bay Cnty., Fla. v. United States" on Justia Law