Justia Utilities Law Opinion Summaries

Aqua North Carolina (Aqua), a public utility providing water and utility service, requested authority from the North Carolina Utilities Commission to implement a rate adjustment mechanism of the type described in N.C. Gen. Stat. 62-133.12. After a hearing, the Commission approved Aqua’s request, finding that the request to implement a rate adjustment mechanism was in the public interest. The Attorney General appealed the Commission’s order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission provided sufficient findings, reasoning, and conclusions to support its finding that the mechanism is in the public interest and that the Commission’s determination is supported by substantial evidence in view of the record as a whole. View "State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Cooper" on Justia Law

MISO, an organization of independent transmission-owning utilities, has linked the transmission lines of its members into a single interconnected grid across 11 states. The Generators, which operate 150-megawatt wind-powered electric generation facilities in Illinois, wish to connect to the system run by MISO. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), acting under 16 U.S.C. 824(a), has standardized the process: the Generators submitted requests to MISO, which then produced studies (paid for by the Generators) to assess potential impact on the grid and calculate the cost of necessary upgrades. After the studies were complete and agreements signed, MISO notified the Generators of a “significant error” that failed to include certain upgrades and that the Generators would either have to agree to fewer megawatts or pay for additional upgrades estimated to cost $11.5 million. MISO presented superseding Agreements to both Generators. The companies refused to sign. FERC found that the Generators should pay for the additional network upgrades. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. The record failed to show that the Generators relied on the original, mistaken studies or that reducing the output would have made their farms economically unsustainable. They also had an exit option. The court noted that the Generators apparently built their wind farms despite the dispute. View "Pioneer Trail Wind Farm, LLC v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n" on Justia Law

Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, local exchange carriers such as Windstream must connect calls made to their customers by the customers of national telecommunications companies such as Sprint. Until 2009, Sprint paid Windstream state access charges for connecting non-nomadic intrastate long-distance VoIP calls-- made by cable telephone customers over the Internet in Iowa, delivered to Sprint for format conversion, and transferred to Windstream for delivery to its Iowa telephone customers. Beginning in 2009, Sprint withheld state access charges for these calls, claiming that VoIP calls were “information services” and that payment should be governed by a reciprocal compensation agreement, not by state access charges. In 2011, the Iowa Utilities Board found that the calls were telecommunications services subject to state regulation, not information services. Sprint sought state court review and filed a federal action, seeking to enjoin the Board’s decision. The district court abstained because of the parallel state proceedings. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, but the Supreme Court reversed. By the time the case returned to the district court, the state court had upheld the Board’s decision. The district court dismissed Sprint’s complaint, holding that issue preclusion barred Sprint from raising the same arguments in federal court. The Eighth Circuit reversed, reasoning that Congress did not intend that issue-preclusion principles bar federal-court review of the issue of whether the non-nomadic intrastate long-distance VoIP calls at issue are information services, payment for which should be governed by a reciprocal compensation agreement, or telecommunications services subject to state access charges. View "Sprint Commc'ns Co. v. Jacobs" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was an order of the Maine Public Utilities Commission approving an alternative rate plan (ARP) for Bangor Gas Company, LLC. The Maine Office of the Public Advocate (OPA) and Bucksport Mill, LLC appealed from the Commission’s order. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission did not abuse its discretion or exceed its statutory authority in calculating the APR initial rate base by utilizing an unimpaired, “original cost” valuation of Bangor Gas’s assets rather than the impaired “acquisition cost” incurred by Bangor Gas’s parent company; and (2) the OPA’s argument that the Commission abused its discretion by including in its revenue requirement calculation a portion of the Bangor Gas’s regulatory proceeding expenses amortized over five years need not be addressed because the Commission’s decision to include the regulatory proceeding expenses in its revenue requirement analysis had no impact on its decision to approve the ARP. View "Office of Pub. Advocate v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n" on Justia Law

Great Oaks, a water retailer, challenged a groundwater extraction fee imposed on water it draws from wells on its property. The power to impose such a fee is statutorily vested in the Santa Clara Valley Water Management District. The trial court awarded a refund of charges paid by Great Oaks, finding that the charge violated the provisions of both the District Act and Article XIII D of the California Constitution, which imposes procedural and substantive constraints on fees and charges imposed by local public entities. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the fee is a property-related charge for purposes of Article 13D, subject to some constraints, but is also a charge for water service, exempt from the requirement of voter ratification. A pre-suit claim submitted by Great Oaks did not preserve any monetary remedy against the District for violations of Article 13D and, because the matter was treated as a simple action for damages when it should have been treated as a petition for a writ of mandate, the trial court failed to apply a properly deferential standard of review to the question whether the District’s setting of the fee, or its use of the resulting proceeds, complied with the District Act. View "Great Oaks Water Co. v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist." on Justia Law

Bay County Utilities provides water and sewer services. The County Commissioners establish rates. In 1966, the U.S. Air Force contracted with the County for water services at Tyndall Air Force Base. The parties entered into a sewer services contract in 1985. Both required the parties to renegotiate any new rates. In 1994, Federal Acquisition Regulations were amended to require standardized clauses in utility service contracts. When the government is contracting with an unregulated utility or the utility is subject to non-independent oversight, the parties must negotiate new rates. If the utility is overseen by an independent regulatory body, no further negotiations are required. In 2007 and 2009, Bay County increased water rates. The Air Force ignored those increases, but, in 2009 and 2010, unilaterally modified the water contract, with new rates, lower than the rates set by Bay County. In 2009 Bay County increased sewer rates. The Air Force refused to pay those higher rates, and instituted a unilateral contract modification to moderately increase sewer rates. Bay County submitted unsuccessful Contract Disputes Act claims to recover the unpaid balance of approximately $850,000. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Court of Federal Claims, holding that Bay County is an independent regulatory body and may revise rates in utility contracts without resorting to negotiations with the Air Force. View "Bay Cnty., Fla. v. United States" on Justia Law

Petitioners, wholesale electricity customers, challenged FERC's orders requiring the Bonneville Power Administration to provide transmission services on terms "not unduly discriminatory or preferential." Petitioners are wholesale electricity customers of Bonneville. The court concluded that petitioners have Article III standing by demonstrating that they have an injury in fact, causation, and redressability. The court concluded, however, that petitioners failed to demonstrate statutory standing, which requires them to be "aggrieved" within the meaning of the Federal Power Act section 313(b) (FPA), 16 U.S.C. 8251(b), and the Administrative Procedure Act section 10, 5 U.S.C. 702. In this case, the zone-of-interests test was not satisfied where petitioners' interests are not arguably protected by section 211A of the FPA. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review. View "NRU V. FERC" on Justia Law

Petitioners, wholesale electricity customers, challenged FERC's orders requiring the Bonneville Power Administration to provide transmission services on terms "not unduly discriminatory or preferential." Petitioners are wholesale electricity customers of Bonneville. The court concluded that petitioners have Article III standing by demonstrating that they have an injury in fact, causation, and redressability. The court concluded, however, that petitioners failed to demonstrate statutory standing, which requires them to be "aggrieved" within the meaning of the Federal Power Act section 313(b) (FPA), 16 U.S.C. 8251(b), and the Administrative Procedure Act section 10, 5 U.S.C. 702. In this case, the zone-of-interests test was not satisfied where petitioners' interests are not arguably protected by section 211A of the FPA. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review. View "NRU V. FERC" on Justia Law

Colorado law required electricity generators to ensure that 20% of the electricity they sell to Colorado consumers comes from renewable sources. Colorado's scheme may require Coloradans to pay more for electricity, but voters overwhelmingly approved the ballot initiative proposing the renewable energy mandate. The issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit's review centered on whether "Colorado's renewable energy mandate survive an encounter with the most dormant doctrine in dormant commerce clause jurisprudence." The Energy and Environment Legal Institute (EELI) argued that Colorado consumers receive their electricity from an interconnected grid serving eleven states and portions of Canada and Mexico. Because electricity could go anywhere on the grid and come from anywhere on the grid, and because Colorado was a net importer of electricity, Colorado's renewable energy mandate effectively meant some out-of-state coal producers, like an EELI member, would lose business with out-of-state utilities who fed their power onto the grid. And this harm to out-of-state coal producers, EELI argued, amounted to a violation of one of the three branches of dormant commerce clause jurisprudence. Therefore, EELI sought to have the mandate declared unconstitutional. In the end, the district court disagreed with EELI's assessment and after review, the Tenth Circuit disagreed too, and affirmed that court's judgment. View "Energy & Environment Legal v. Epel" on Justia Law

The City of Azusa, its municipal utility (Azusa Light and Water) and the successor agency to its redevelopment agency (collectively, City except as noted), appealed a judgment denying their amended mandamus petition. The petition sought to compel the director of the Department of Finance to recognize as enforceable certain obligations between the City and the Utility. These consisted of loans from the Utility to the City’s former redevelopment agency (RDA). The City argued the invalidation of these loans in effect harmed the Utility’s ratepayers and therefore was unlawful. The trial court rejected the City’s view, and the City appealed. Upon review, the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court that once Utility money was loaned to the RDA, it ceased to be “ratepayer money.” Because the City’s legal claims hinged on a contrary view (whether or not explicitly acknowledged in its briefing)--each of the City’s claims failed. View "City of Azusa v. Cohen" on Justia Law