Justia Utilities Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant participated in a program called the Percentage of Income Payment Plan (“PIPP”) that provided assistance to low-income residential customers. Most PIPP customers pay a fixed percentage of their monthly income rather than the actual cost of service. Appellant later left PIPP but continued to receive gas service from Vectren Energy Delivery of Ohio, Inc. at the standard rate. Appellant was reinstated in PIPP seven months after her departure. Vectren subsequently informed Appellant that she had to pay the difference between the charges she paid during the time she was not in the program and the monthly PIPP installment payments that would have been due had she remained in PIPP. Appellant filed a complaint with the Public Utilities Commission alleging that Vectren’s attempt to charge her for the missed PIPP installments was unlawful and unreasonable. The Commission found in favor of Vectren. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to demonstrate that the Commission’s orders were unreasonable or unlawful. View "Toliver v. Vectren Energy Delivery of Ohio, Inc." on Justia Law

Davis Construction filed suit against the Authority seeking a refund of the impact fees it had paid to the Water and Sewer District. At issue was whether the County acted ultra vires in collecting fees on behalf of the District from Davis Construction for water and sewer services that the District did not provide and had no concrete plans or immediate ability to provide. The court affirmed the district court's ruling that the County acted ultra vires in collecting the fees on behalf of the District and ordered both the County and the successor to the District, the Authority, to refund the fees in the amount of $34,268.96, together with prejudgment interest. The court also affirmed the district court's award of attorneys fees and costs to Davis Construction. View "Tommy Davis Construction, Inc. v. Cape Fear Public Utility" on Justia Law

Pilkington North America, Inc. entered into a social contract with Toledo Edison Company under which Toledo provided one of Pilkington’s facilities with discounted electric service. The Public Utilities Commission approved the special contract. Pilkington later filed a complaint alleging that Toledo Edison had unlawfully terminated the special contract. Five other companies that also had special contracts with the utility also filed complaints against Toledo Edison. The Commission consolidated the six complaints and dismissed them. With the exception of Pilkington, each of the industrial customers appealed the Commission’s decision. The Supreme Court reversed the Commission’s order, concluding that Toledo Edison had prematurely terminated the special contracts. Pilkington subsequently filed a Ohio R. Civ. P. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment with the Commission seeking relief from the Commission’s order dismissing its complaint and its order denying the application for rehearing that the other five complainants filed. The Commission denied Pilkington’s motion, concluding that Pilkington may not use Rule 60(B) as a substitute for appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Pilkington did not appeal the Commission’s adverse judgment, that judgment is final, and res judicata precludes the use of Rule 60(B) to obtain relief from that final judgment. View "In re Complaint of Pilkington N. Am., Inc." on Justia Law

Western Minnesota and intervenors petitioned for review of FERC's award of a permit for a hydroelectric project in Polk County, Iowa. The Commission concluded that the municipal preference under Section 7(a) of the Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 U.S.C. 800(a), applies only to municipalities “located in the[] vicinity” of the water resources to be developed. Petitioners claimed that the Commission’s geographic proximity test is an impermissible interpretation of the plain text of the statute. The court agreed that Congress has spoken directly to the question in defining “municipality” in Section 3(7) of the FPA. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review, vacated the permit order and rehearing order, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Western Minnesota Municipal v. FERC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Commissioner, alleging that the Commissioner's actions, which were taken pursuant to section 6 of Connecticut Public Act 13‐303 and include his awarding two power purchase agreements to Intervenors, are preempted by the Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 U.S.C. 791-828, and the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), 16 U.S.C. 824a-3. The court held that plaintiff cannot bring claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988 to vindicate any rights conferred by PURPA because PURPA’s private right of action forecloses these remedies; plaintiff failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, a prerequisite for any qualified facility to bring an equitable action seeking to vindicate specific rights conferred by PURPA; and plaintiff lacks standing to bring a preemption action seeking solely to void the contracts awarded to Intervenors Fusion Solar and Number Nine. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint on alternative grounds. View "ALLCO v. Klee" on Justia Law

Montana Dakota Utilities Co. and Otter Tail Power Company (together, Applicants) applied to the South Dakota Public Utilities Commission (Commission) for a permit to construct a high-voltage electrical transmission line. Applicant’s project would cross one part of Gerald Pesall’s farm. Pesall intervened and was granted party status. Pesall objected to the project, arguing that excavating and moving soil to construct the project could unearth and spread a crop parasite. The Commission granted the permit subject to conditions, including a condition to identify and mitigate the potential parasite problem. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no abuse of discretion in the Commission’s decision to grant a conditional permit rather than requiring reapplication; (2) the permit condition relating to the parasites did not constitute an improper delegation of the Commission’s authority to a private party; and (3) the Commission timely rendered complete findings on the permit application. View "Pesall v. Montana Dakota Utils., Co." on Justia Law

Kleen Energy Systems, LLC, an electric generating facility, entered into a contract with Connecticut Light and Power Company, an electric distribution company. A dispute subsequently arose concerning the proper interpretation of the contract’s pricing provision. At the request of Waterside Power, LLC, which had entered into a similar contract with Connecticut Light and Power, the Commissioner of Energy and Environmental Protection, acting through the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (the Authority), conducted proceedings to resolve the dispute. Kleen Energy was a participant in, but not a party to, those proceedings. Waterside subsequently filed a petition for a declaratory ruling challenging the decision. The Authority issued a declaratory ruling denying Waterside relief. Kleen Energy filed an administrative appeal from the Authority’s ruling, claiming that it had a contractual right to submit the dispute to arbitration and that the Authority lacked jurisdiction to issue a declaratory ruling to resolve the dispute. The trial court ultimately concluded (1) the Authority had jurisdiction to issue a declaratory ruling to resolve the dispute, (2) Kleen Energy had waived its contractual right to arbitration, and (3) the Authority had properly resolved the dispute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in determining that the Authority had jurisdiction to resolve the pricing dispute. View "Kleen Energy Sys., LLC v. Comm’r of Energy & Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

The Lakes Water System (LWS), created in the late 1800s-early 1900s, provides Vallejo with potable water. After completing a diversion dam and the Green Line for transmission, the city created two reservoirs, Lake Frey and Lake Madigan, which were soon insufficient to meet demand. The city began storing water in hills above Napa County’s Gordon Valley and constructed the Gordon transmission line. The city acquired easements from some property owners by agreeing to provide “free water.” The city also agreed to provide potable water to other nonresident customers. In the 1950s, the city obtained water rights from the Sacramento River Delta and contracted for water from the Solano Project. In 1992, water quality from Lake Curry ceased to meet standards and the city closed the Gordon Line. In 1992 the city passed an ordinance shifting the entire cost of LWS to 809 nonresident customers, so that their rates increased by 230 percent. The city passed additional rate increases in 1995 and 2009. Plaintiff, representing a purported class of nonresident LWS customers, alleges the city has grossly mismanaged and neglected LWS, placing the burden on the Class to fund a deteriorating, inefficient, and costly system, spread over an “incoherent service area” and plaintiff did not become aware of unfunded liabilities until 2013 The court of appeal affirmed dismissal; plaintiff cannot state any viable claims alleging misconduct by the city. View "Green Valley Landowners Ass'n v. City of Vallejo" on Justia Law

The Swecker farm in Iowa has a wind generator and is a qualifying power production facility certified by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). The Sweckers sell surplus electric energy to Midland Power Cooperative at a rate established by the Iowa Utilities Board (IUB), implementing FERC rules and regulations, 16 U.S.C. 824a-3(f). For many years, the Sweckers and Midland have litigated rate disputes. The district court dismissed their current suit against Midland and its primary supplier, Central Iowa Power Cooperative (CIPCO), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief requiring Midland “to purchase available energy from plaintiffs . . . at Midland’s full avoided cost, rather than CIPCO’s avoided cost.” The Eighth Circuit affirmed. FERC’s interpretation is controlling and forecloses the contrary interpretation of 18 C.F.R. 292.303(d) urged by the Sweckers. View "Swecker v. Midland Power Coop." on Justia Law

Brian Wade, in the course of servicing a well situated under a high voltage line owned by Flowell Electric Association and Dixie Escalante Rural Electric Association, Inc. (collectively, Flowell), came into contact with the line, resulting in serious injuries to Wade. Wade was acting on behalf of Rhodes Pump II, LLC, his employer, at the time of the accident. Wade received workers’ compensation benefits from Rhodes and also filed a tort action against Flowell. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Wade and awarded both compensatory and punitive damages. Flowell subsequently brought this action for High Voltage Overhead Lines Act (HVOLA) indemnification against Rhodes. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Flowell, concluding that Rhodes had failed to give Flowell adequate notice of its “intended activity.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Flowell timely filed its HVOLA indemnification action; (2) the Workers’ Compensation Act’s exclusive remedy provision does not preclude liability under the HVOLA; (3) HVOLA does not violate due process or equal protection as applied to Rhodes; and (4) a genuine issue of material fact remains regarding whether Rhodes adequately notified Flowell of its intended activity. View "Flowell Elec. Ass’n v. Rhodes Pump, LLC" on Justia Law