Justia Utilities Law Opinion Summaries

This dispute arose under the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117. At issue is whether the district court abused its discretion when it entered an order indefinitely staying this proceeding to allow the Commission to act on an administrative complaint filed by Occidental against a non-party to this action, which largely concerns the same issues. The court concluded that, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, a district court with subject matter jurisdiction may, under appropriate circumstances, defer to another forum, such as an administrative agency, which also has non-exclusive jurisdiction, based on its determination that the benefits of obtaining aid from that other forum outweigh the need for expeditious litigation. The court concluded that it has appellate jurisdiction under Hines v. D'Artois because Hines remains good law and this case is sufficiently close to the facts of Hines to give the court appellate jurisdiction under the “effectively out of court” rule. The court also concluded that, given that all parties agree it could take years for FERC to resolve the Integration Complaint, a deadline will give FERC a reasonable opportunity to act without the costs inherent in an indefinite delay. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's stay order and remanded with instructions. View "Occidental Chemical Corp. v. Louisiana Public Service Comm'n" on Justia Law

On September 16, 2013, the Commission issued an Order Conditionally Accepting Tariff Revisions filed by ISO New England. In the same order, the Commission rejected the tariff proposal to allocate costs to transmission owners as inconsistent with cost-causation principles and directed ISO New England to submit a compliance filing that would allocate the costs of the Program to Real-Time Load Obligation. On April 8, 2014, FERC issued orders denying requests for rehearing of the Orders issued in Docket ER13-1851 and Docket ER13-2266. TransCanada and the Retail Energy Supply Association filed petitions for review challenging the Orders issued by FERC approving the Winter 2013-14 Reliability Program. The court declined to assess FERC’s conditional approval of the Program in Docket ER13-1851 because FERC made it clear that its decision was only tentative. The court concluded that the Commission’s decision regarding the allocation of the costs of the Program to Load-Serving Entities was a final action in Docket ER13-1851 and is ripe for review; the court found no merit in petitioners' challenges to the cost-allocation decision; and therefore, the court denied the petitions for review of the cost-allocation decision in Docket ER13-1851. The court granted in part the petition for review of Docket ER13-2266 because FERC could not properly assess whether the Program’s rates were just and reasonable. View "TransCanada Power Marketing v. FERC" on Justia Law

In San Pablo Bay Pipeline Co. LLC v. Public Utilities Com., this court confirmed a decision of the Commission that certain truck racks and storage tanks were part of a pipeline subject to its jurisdiction as a public utility. The Pipeline Company filed this writ proceeding to challenge the refund of approximately $104.3 million. The court concluded that in the peculiar facts of this case, which was processed in a jurisdictional phase followed by a ratemaking and reparations phase, the Commission had the authority to bifurcate the matter into two phases and to conclude the limitations period did not run during the first phase. The court also concluded that the Pipeline Company has failed to clearly establish the unreasonableness of the Commission’s method of valuation in regards to the Commission’s decision to treat line fill as a capital asset valued at its original cost. Accordingly, the court affirmed the Commission's decision. View "San Pablo Bay Pipeline Co. v. PUC" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged several FERC orders that were issued following the court's remand in Port of Seattle v. FERC. The key issue on appeal is the applicability of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine, which requires FERC to “presume that the rate set out in a freely negotiated wholesale-energy contract meets the ‘just and reasonable’ requirement” imposed by law. The court concluded that it has jurisdiction only as to the issue of whether FERC erred by invoking the Mobile-Sierra doctrine and that it lacks jurisdiction to review FERC’s evidentiary orders. The court held that FERC reasonably applied Mobile-Sierra to the class of contracts at issue and that FERC's interpretation is reasonable. In this case, FERC’s baseline assumption that the presumption applies to the contracts at issue is not unreasonable in light of Morgan Stanley Capital Grp., Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1. Accordingly, the court denied the petition with respect to petitioners' claim that the Mobile-Sierra presumption cannot apply to the spot sales at issue and dismissed the evidentiary challenges for lack of jurisdiction. View "State of California v. FERC" on Justia Law

Kenyghatta Davis brought a class action complaint against the City of Blytheville and its Water Department, arguing that the Water Department’s charging of late fees on overdue accounts was an ultra vires act because there was no statutory authority allowing the City to impose late fees and that she was entitled to a declaratory judgment finding that the charging of the late fees was usurious and an unreasonable and unconscionable penalty. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the City, concluding (1) the City had expressed, implied, and incidental authority to establish and assess fees for late payments; and (2) Davis failed to offer any legal support for the claim that allowing the Water Department to collect these charges violated the law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the City can impose a late fee when there is a violation of the ordinance relating to the payment of a bill; and (2) these late fees are not usurious or an unreasonable or unconscionable penalty. View "Davis v. City of Blytheville" on Justia Law

The Santa Clara Valley Water District Act vests the Santa Clara Valley Water Management District with the power to impose groundwater extraction fees. Great Oaks Water Company, a water retailer, brought this action challenging such a fee imposed on water it draws from wells on its property. The trial court awarded Great Oaks a complete refund on the groundwater charges paid and, in the alternative, a partial refund, finding that the charge violated the Act and Article 13D of the California Constitution. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding (1) the disputed fee is a property-related charge for purposes of Article 13D and thus is subject to some of the constraints of that enactment, but the fee is also a charge for water service and, as such, is exempt from the requirement of voter ratification; (2) Plaintiff’s pre-suit claim did not preserve any monetary remedy against the District for the violations of Article 13D found by the trial court; and (3) the trial court erred in treating the matter as a simple action for damages rather than a petition for a writ of mandate and thus failed to apply a properly deferential standard of review to the question of whether the District’s setting of the fee, or its use of the resulting proceeds, complied with the Act. View "Great Oaks Water Co. v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist." on Justia Law

Appellant participated in a program called the Percentage of Income Payment Plan (“PIPP”) that provided assistance to low-income residential customers. Most PIPP customers pay a fixed percentage of their monthly income rather than the actual cost of service. Appellant later left PIPP but continued to receive gas service from Vectren Energy Delivery of Ohio, Inc. at the standard rate. Appellant was reinstated in PIPP seven months after her departure. Vectren subsequently informed Appellant that she had to pay the difference between the charges she paid during the time she was not in the program and the monthly PIPP installment payments that would have been due had she remained in PIPP. Appellant filed a complaint with the Public Utilities Commission alleging that Vectren’s attempt to charge her for the missed PIPP installments was unlawful and unreasonable. The Commission found in favor of Vectren. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to demonstrate that the Commission’s orders were unreasonable or unlawful. View "Toliver v. Vectren Energy Delivery of Ohio, Inc." on Justia Law

Davis Construction filed suit against the Authority seeking a refund of the impact fees it had paid to the Water and Sewer District. At issue was whether the County acted ultra vires in collecting fees on behalf of the District from Davis Construction for water and sewer services that the District did not provide and had no concrete plans or immediate ability to provide. The court affirmed the district court's ruling that the County acted ultra vires in collecting the fees on behalf of the District and ordered both the County and the successor to the District, the Authority, to refund the fees in the amount of $34,268.96, together with prejudgment interest. The court also affirmed the district court's award of attorneys fees and costs to Davis Construction. View "Tommy Davis Construction, Inc. v. Cape Fear Public Utility" on Justia Law

Pilkington North America, Inc. entered into a social contract with Toledo Edison Company under which Toledo provided one of Pilkington’s facilities with discounted electric service. The Public Utilities Commission approved the special contract. Pilkington later filed a complaint alleging that Toledo Edison had unlawfully terminated the special contract. Five other companies that also had special contracts with the utility also filed complaints against Toledo Edison. The Commission consolidated the six complaints and dismissed them. With the exception of Pilkington, each of the industrial customers appealed the Commission’s decision. The Supreme Court reversed the Commission’s order, concluding that Toledo Edison had prematurely terminated the special contracts. Pilkington subsequently filed a Ohio R. Civ. P. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment with the Commission seeking relief from the Commission’s order dismissing its complaint and its order denying the application for rehearing that the other five complainants filed. The Commission denied Pilkington’s motion, concluding that Pilkington may not use Rule 60(B) as a substitute for appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Pilkington did not appeal the Commission’s adverse judgment, that judgment is final, and res judicata precludes the use of Rule 60(B) to obtain relief from that final judgment. View "In re Complaint of Pilkington N. Am., Inc." on Justia Law

Western Minnesota and intervenors petitioned for review of FERC's award of a permit for a hydroelectric project in Polk County, Iowa. The Commission concluded that the municipal preference under Section 7(a) of the Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 U.S.C. 800(a), applies only to municipalities “located in the[] vicinity” of the water resources to be developed. Petitioners claimed that the Commission’s geographic proximity test is an impermissible interpretation of the plain text of the statute. The court agreed that Congress has spoken directly to the question in defining “municipality” in Section 3(7) of the FPA. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review, vacated the permit order and rehearing order, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Western Minnesota Municipal v. FERC" on Justia Law