Justia Utilities Law Opinion Summaries

Florida Public Utilities Company (FPUC), an electric utility that relies solely on wholesale purchase power agreements with other electric utilities, entered into a settlement agreement with the Office of Public Counsel (OPC) in resolution of its then-pending petition for an increase in base rates. The Florida Public Service Commission unanimously approved the settlement agreement. FPUC subsequently petitioned the Commission for approval of its fuel adjustment and purchased power cost recovery factors for the year 2016. Contrary to the terms of the settlement agreement, FPUC’s petition sought to recover costs associated with constructing a new interconnection with Florida Power & Light Company (FPL). The Commission ultimately approved the recovery of the entire FPL interconnection costs. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Commission departed from the requirements of law by failing to properly consider and apply the terms of the settlement agreement with regard to FPUC’s petition; (2) the Commission erred in concluding that such construction capital expenditures are capable of recovery through fuel clause proceedings; and (3) the settlement agreement prohibited FPUC from petitioning the Commission for recovery of costs associated with the transmission interconnection project through fuel clause proceedings. View "Citizens of the State of Florida v. Graham" on Justia Law

This action arose out of the construction of a facility by United Plant Services (UPS), in Trout, to which Entergy Louisiana, LLC (Entergy) provided electric services. Entergy’s competitor, Concordia Electric Cooperative, Inc., filed a complaint with the Louisiana Public Service Commission (LPSC) asserting that Entergy’s service to the UPS facility violated La.R.S. 45:123 and LPSC General Order No. R-28269, collectively referred to as the 300 Foot Rule, by providing service to UPS at a point of connection Concordia presumed to be within 300 feet of its existing electrical lines. An ALJ recommended the LPSC dismiss Concordia's claims because the judge found Concordia failed to show UPS or Entergy had intentionally placed the building and meter in circumvention of the 300 Foot Rule (enabling UPS to select Entergy as opposed to Concordia as its electric service provider). Concordia appealed, and a district court reversed the LPSC order. Because the Supreme Court found the LPSC did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in reaching its decision, it reversed. View "Entergy Louisiana, LLC v. Louisiana Public Svc. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Missouri American Water Company (MAWC) filed a petition to charge an infrastructure system replacement surcharge to its St. Louis County customers. The Public Service Commission (PSC) approved the petition. The Office of the Public Counsel appealed, arguing that the PSC lacked the authority to grant the petition because St. Louis County did not meet Mo. Rev. Stat. 393.1000-393.1006’s threshold population requirement at the time PSC approved the surcharge. The Office of the Public Counsel appealed. While the appeal was pending, MAWC and PSC reached an agreement establishing a new rate base that incorporated the costs of the MAWC projects for all then-existing surcharges. The Supreme Court dismissed this case as moot, holding (1) because the surcharge is no longer in effect and no effective relief may be granted, the issue as to whether MAWC can utilize the surcharge provisions of section 393.1003 is moot; and (2) the issues presented on appeal did not meet the requirements for an exception to the mootness doctrine. View "In re Petition of Missouri-American Water Company for Approval to Change its Infrastructure System Replacement Surcharge" on Justia Law

This was the third appeal of this case arising from the efforts of appellee Southern LNG, Inc. (“Southern”) to compel State Revenue Commissioner Lynnette Riley (“the Commissioner”) to recognize Southern as a “public utility” under OCGA 48-5-511 and to accept Southern’s ad valorem property tax returns. On remand, the trial court granted summary judgment to the Commissioner on a mandamus claim, holding that Southern had an adequate alternative remedy. In a prior appeal, the Supreme Court laid out for the parties in considerable detail the potential legal and procedural issues bearing on the question of whether the Commissioner could become a party or be bound by a judgment rendered in the tax appeals. On remand, Southern and the Commissioner filed renewed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Southern, holding that it had no “equally convenient, complete and beneficial” remedy other than mandamus, and denied the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment, and directed the Commissioner “to accept [Southern’s] ad valorem property tax returns pursuant to OCGA 48-5-511(a) instanter.” The Commissioner appealed, and the Supreme Court this time reversed, finding Southern did not show the Commissioner, in refusing to accept Southern’s ad valorem tax returns, violated a “clear legal duty,” that she failed to act, or that her actions were arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable, amounting to a gross abuse of discretion, so as to entitle Southern to a writ of mandamus. View "Riley v. Southern LNG, Inc." on Justia Law

In February 2006, BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., and BellSouth MNS, Inc., filed an ex parte motion for a protective order in the Chancery Court, seeking to protect certain documents. The documents fell into the following four categories: (1) an August 2005 proposal submitted by BellSouth to the Mississippi Department of Information Technology Services in response to the Department’s request for telecommunications products and services; (2) the Telecommunications Products and Service Agreement between BellSouth and the Department dated November 2005; (3) correspondence between BellSouth and the Department related to the first two documents; and (4) related BellSouth marketing materials. Following legislative amendments in 2015 to the Mississippi Public Records Act of 1983 and to Mississippi Code Section 25-1-100, CellularSouth sought production of the proposal and the contract between the Department and BellSouth. After review, the Supreme Court found the chancery court erred in its interpretation of the amended Mississippi Code Section 25-61-11 when it entered an order continuing to protect the contract from production. Furthermore, the Court held that, because the rights in question in the case sub judice were created by statute, the Public Records Act, as amended, governed this dispute. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Cellular South, Inc. v. BellSouth Telecommunications, LLC" on Justia Law

Until 1997, Illinois residents could only purchase power from a public utility, with rates regulated by the ICC. The Electric Service Customer Choice and Rate Relief Law allows residents to buy electricity from their local public utility, another utility, or an Alternative Retail Electric Supplier (ARES). The ICC was not given rate-making authority over ARESs, but was given oversight responsibilities. The Law did not explicitly provide a mechanism for recovering damages from an ARES related to rates. Zahn purchased electricity from NAPG, after receiving an offer of a “New Customer Rate” of $.0499 per kilowatt hour in her first month, followed by a “market-based variable rate.” Zahn never received NAPG’s “New Customer Rate.” NAPG charged her $.0599 per kilowatt hour for the first two months, followed by a rate higher than Zahn’s local public utility charged. Zahn filed a class-action complaint, claiming violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment. The court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, or for failure to state a claim. After the Illinois Supreme Court answered a certified question, stating that the ICC does not have exclusive jurisdiction to hear Zahn’s claims, the Seventh Circuit reversed. The district court had jurisdiction and Zahn alleged facts that, if true, could constitute a breach of contract or a deceptive business practice. View "Zahn v. North American Power & Gas, LLC" on Justia Law

MID, an irrigation district, petitioned for a writ of mandate, challenging the trial court's conclusion that MID was not a "municipal corporation" for purposes of Public Utilities Code section 10251. The court concluded that the term "municipal corporation" is ambiguous, and the court resolved the ambiguity by adopting the meaning in its strict or proper sense because it is the common and thus best indicator of statutory intent. Therefore, the court concluded that the term "municipal corporation" used in section 10251 does not include irrigation districts. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted summary adjudication of MID's fourth cause of action under section 10251. The court denied the petition for writ of mandate. View "Merced Irrigation District v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and others filed a putative class action in state court on behalf of members of CAEC, alleging that CAEC wrongfully had refused to pay out “excess revenues” in cash to its members. After removal to federal court, the district court granted CAEC's motion to dismiss. The court affirmed the district court's ruling that when CAEC’s revenues exceed its operating costs and other expenses, CAEC does credit each members’ capital account with the cooperative, and the district court's holding that CAEC’s distribution of excess revenues to its members by making credits to their capital accounts, as opposed to making cash payments, complied with Alabama state law. View "Caver v. Central Alabama Electric Cooperative" on Justia Law

DTE's Monroe plaint is the largest coal-fired power plant in Michigan; in 2010, DTE undertook a $65 million overhaul. The day before construction began, DTE submitted notice to the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality stating that DTE predicted an increase in post-construction emissions 100 times greater than the minimum necessary to constitute a “major modification” and require a preconstruction permit. DTE characterized the projects as routine maintenance,exempt from New Source Review (NSR) under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7475, 7503, and stated that it had excluded the entire predicted emissions increase from its projections of post-construction emissions based on “demand growth.” DTE began construction without an NSR permit. The EPA filed suit. In 2013, the Sixth Circuit held that a utility seeking to modify a source of air pollutants must “make a preconstruction projection of whether and to what extent emissions from the source will increase following construction,” which “determines whether the project constitutes a ‘major modification’ and thus requires a permit.” On remand, the district court again entered summary judgment for DTE, concluding that the EPA had to accept DTE’s projections at face value. The Sixth Circuit reversed. DTE was not required to secure the EPA’s approval of the projections, or the project, before construction, but in proceeding without a permit, DTE acted at its own risk. The EPA can challenge DTE’s preconstruction projections and there are genuine disputes of material fact that preclude summary judgment regarding compliance with NSR’s preconstruction requirements. The court noted that construction is complete and that actual post-construction emissions are irrelevant o whether DTE’s preconstruction projections complied with the regulations. View "United States v. DTE Energy Co." on Justia Law

In 2002, the Public Utilities Regulatory Act (PURA) implemented a competitive retail market for electricity in the Electric Reliability Council of Texas. Each incumbent, vertically integrated electric utility within the market was required to unbundle its business activities into separate units, including a transmission and distribution utility (TDU). Of the units, only TDUs continued to be regulated by the Public Utilities Commission (PUC). Here, several parties to a TDU ratemaking proceeding sought judicial review of the PUC’s order. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals, holding (1) PURA section 36.351, which requires electric electric utilities to discount charges for service provided to state college and university facilities, does not apply to TDUs; (2) former PURA section 36.060(a), which required an electric utility’s income taxes to be computed as though it had filed a consolidated return with a group of its affiliates eligible to do so under federal tax law, did not require a utility to adopt a corporate structure so as to be part of the group; and (3) the evidence in this matter established that franchise charges negotiated by the TDU with various municipalities were reasonable and necessary operating expenses under PURA section 33.008. View "Oncor Electric Delivery Co. v. Public Utility Commission of Texas" on Justia Law