Justia Utilities Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed a class action suit on behalf of approximately 1.5 million Puerto Rican residents who are customers of Autoridad de Energia Electrica de Puerto Rico (PREPA), alleging that PREPA used a portion of its overall revenue to subsidize municipalities’ energy use. Plaintiffs claimed violations of the Takings Clause and their procedural due process rights because PREPA deprived them of their property interest in electricity and/or the funds they paid for electricity. The district court granted summary judgment for PREPA,concluding that Plaintiffs had not identified a valid property interest, that no taking had occurred, and that no valid procedural due process claim existed. The First Circuit affirmed on other grounds, holding that because Plaintiffs did not identify a valid property interest, they did not have standing to bring the takings and due process claims. View "Santiago-Ramos v. Autoridad de Energia Electrica de P.R." on Justia Law

The Department of Public Utilities issued an order determining that the plain language of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 164, 94A provides the Department with the statutory authority to review and approve ratepayer-backed, long-term contracts entered into by electric distribution companies for additional natural gas pipeline capacity in the Commonwealth. Plaintiffs filed separate petitions asking that the order be set aside on the ground that it was based on an erroneous interpretation of law. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the Department’s order, holding (1) the order of the Department is a properly promulgated rule or regulation; but (2) the order is invalid in light of the statutory language and purpose of section 94A, as amended by the 1997 Restructuring Act, because it would undermine the main objectives of the Act. View "ENGIE Gas & LNG LLC v. Dep’t of Pub. Utils." on Justia Law

This case concerns a scheme of planning, cost allocation, and regulation imposed by FERC on EP Electric and the Intervenor electricity providers. EP Electric appealed from three decisions in which the Commission reviewed and required revisions to certain compliance filing that EP Electric and other utilities filed with FERC pursuant to Order No. 1000. Order No. 1000 is FERC’s rule regulating regional transmission planning and cost allocation by public utilities, also known as “jurisdictional utilities.” The court concluded that the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously in its mandates regarding the role of non-jurisdictional utilities in cost allocation and regional planning in the WestConnect region. Therefore, the court granted the petitions for review in part. The court vacated the Commission's Compliance Orders on these issues for further explanation and proceedings. The court denied review or dismissed in all other respects because EP Electric's remaining challenges to FERC's actions fail. View "El Paso Electric Co. v. FERC" on Justia Law

Arizona Water Company (AWC), a utility company, sought a rate increase and proposed a step-increase mechanism that would allow the Arizona Corporation Commission to adjust rates between full rate cases. The rate increase mechanism, called the system improvements benefit (SIB), would allow AWC to petition for a rate increase between rate cases to help AWC recoup the cost of newly-completed infrastructure projects. The Commission approved the SIB mechanism with some modifications. The court of appeals vacated the Commission’s approval of the SIB mechanism, concluding that the SIB mechanism did not comply with the state Constitution’s mandate that “the Commission determine a public service corporation’s fair value when setting rates[.]” The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion and affirmed the Commission’s orders approving the SIB mechanism, holding that the SIB mechanism complied with the Constitution’s mandate that the Commission determine the fair value of a utility’s property when setting rates. View "Residential Util. Consumer Office v. Arizona Corp. Comm’n" on Justia Law

Pike County's Sny Island Levee Drainage District was organized in 1880 to protect from Mississippi River flooding and runoff. The Kansas City Southern and the Norfolk Southern operate main line railways over the District's flood plain. Illinois law permits the District to assess properties within its territory in order to maintain the levees. A new method, ​adopted in 2009, purported to calculate assessments based on the benefits the District conferred on each property, rather than based on acreage. After the Seventh Circuit enjoined use of the methodology, the District discontinued collecting annual assessments and implemented a one-time additional assessment, 70 ILCS 605/5. The District filed an assessment roll based on new benefit calculations, identifying the tax on KC as $91,084.59 and on Norfolk as $102,976.18, if paid in one installment..The Railroads again filed suit, alleging that the District used a formula that discriminated against them in violation of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act, 49 U.S.C. 11501. The Seventh Circuit affirmed judgment in favor of the District. The court rejected an argument that the comparison class against which their assessment should be measured is all other District properties, instead of the narrower class of commercial and industrial properties used by the district court. There was no clear error in the court’s assessment of a “battle of the experts.” View "Kansas City S. Ry. v. Sny Island Levee Drainage Dist" on Justia Law

Rocky Mountain Power is required by governing regulations to provide “indicative pricing” to a producer seeking to pursue a power purchase agreement. In 2012, Ellis-Hall Consultants, which is involved in the development of wind power projects and sought to sell power to PacifiCorp through its Rocky Mountain Power division, received an indicative pricing proposal. Rocky Mountain Power later rescinded that proposal and refused to proceed with negotiations on a power purchase agreement under its earlier indicative pricing because the Utah Public Service Commission had since adopted new pricing methodology. The Commission concluded that Ellis-Hall was not entitled to continue to rely on the methodology used in Rocky Mountain Power’s indicative pricing proposal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Ellis-Hall was entitled to proceed in reliance on the methodology set forth in the indicative pricing proposal it received from Rocky Mountain Power. View "Ellis-Hall v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs lost electric power during a major winter ice storm in 2008. Plaintiffs sued Fitchburg Gas and Electric Light Company (FG&E) and sought class certification for themselves and other residential and business customers of FG&E who were injured by FG&E’s allegedly inadequate preparation for and response to the storm. The superior court judge denied Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the denial of class certification, concluding that the asserted injuries suffered by the class members were too dissimilar. Plaintiffs then filed a renewed motion for class certification premised on an alternate theory of injury. Specifically, Plaintiffs contended that they suffered economic injury by overpaying for a level of emergency preparedness that FG&E deceptively failed to provide. The superior court judge certified two classes of FG&E customers and reported the class certification order. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order certifying the class, holding that, under the circumstances, Plaintiffs’ assertion of overpayment for FG&E’s services did not set forth a cognizable injury under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, 9(1) and 11 and therefore did not support class certification pursuant to the statute. View "Bellermann v. Fitchburg Gas & Elec. Light Co." on Justia Law

SCOPE filed suit alleging that the trial court erred in denying its writ of mandate claim because the Agency’s acquisition of Valencia Water Company is unlawful. The court concluded that the court does not have to dismiss the appeal as untimely under the streamlined procedures available for validating certain acts of public agencies, Code Civ. Proc., 860 et seq., because the validation procedures invoke a court’s in rem jurisdiction, and that subject matter jurisdiction attaches only if there is a statutory basis for invoking those procedures and proper notice. Because that basis is absent here and because estoppel does not apply to subject matter jurisdiction, the validation procedures’ accelerated timeline for appeal is inapplicable. The court also concluded that there is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s factual finding that the purveyor did not become the agency’s alter ego in this case. The agency did not violate article XVI, section 17 of the California Constitution for two reasons - namely, the provision reaches only stock acquisitions that extend credit and the provision’s exception for stock ownership applies to any “mutual water company” and any other “corporation” (whether or not it is a mutual water company). Thus, the fact that the corporate purveyor in this case was not a mutual water company is of no significance. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Santa Clarita Org. v. Castaic Lake Water Agency" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sustained injuries as a result of a motorcycle accident involving a Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (CEI) utility pole. Plaintiff and his wife sued CEI, FirstEnergy Service Company (First Energy), and their parent company (collectively, Defendants), asserting, inter alia, claims for negligence and qualified nuisance. The jury returned a verdict for Plaintiffs on their qualified nuisance and loss of consortium claims but returned a verdict for CEI and FirstEnergy on the negligence claim. Defendants appealed, arguing that Turner v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. provided an absolute bar to liability. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, as a matter of law, CEI and FirstEnergy could not be held liable under any theory of liability asserted by Plaintiffs. View "Link v. FirstEnergy Corp." on Justia Law

Panoche, a producer of electricity, and Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E), a utility that purchases its electricity, disputed which of them should bear the costs of complying with a legislatively-mandated program to reduce greenhouse gas emissions pursuant to the Global Warming Solutions Act (Assem. Bill 32 (2005–2006 Reg. Sess.). PG&E invoked the arbitration clause in its agreement with Panoche. Panoche resisted arbitration, arguing that the controversy was not ripe for resolution because ongoing regulatory proceedings at the California Air Resources Board and the California Public Utilities Commission would at least provide guidance in the arbitration and could render the proceeding unnecessary. The arbitration panel denied Panoche’s motion, and after a hearing determined that Panoche had assumed the cost of implementing AB 32 under the agreement and understood that at the time of signing. The arbitrators also concluded that the parties “provide[ed] for recovery of GHG costs” by Panoche through a “payment mechanism” in the agreement. The trial court agreed with Panoche, ruled that the arbitration was premature, and vacated the award. The court of appeal reversed and ordered confirmation of the award. Panoche identified no procedural disadvantage it suffered in going forward with the arbitration as scheduled and failed to meet the “sufficient cause” prong under Code of Civil Procedure 1286.2(a)(5). View "Panoche Energy Ctr. v. Pac. Gas & Elec." on Justia Law