Justia Utilities Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in remanded in part the order of the Public Utilities Commission ordering First Energy companies (collectively, FirstEnergy) to refund more than $43 million to ratepayers and granting several motions for protective orders granting trade-secret protection to certain information related to FirstEnergy’s purchase of renewable-energy-credits (REC). The court held (1) the Commission engaged in unlawful retroactive ratemaking when it ordered FirstEnergy to refund more than $43 million in previously recovered REC costs to ratepayers; and (2) the Commission’s decision to grant trade-secret status to certain information related to FirstEnergy’s in-state REC purchases lacked record support. View "In re Review of Alternative Energy Rider Contained in Tariffs of Ohio Edison Co." on Justia Law

The DC Circuit denied petitions for review challenging FERC's orders approving PJM's tariff that determined the rates paid to energy providers for providing electric capacity in the broad mid-Atlantic region. Petitioners argued that FERC lacked substantial evidence to approve the estimates of labor costs that formed part of the calculation of the cost of new entry; FERC should have accepted the labor-cost calculations of petitioners' expert; and FERC erred in approving another input to the estimated cost of new entry. The court held that petitioners' objections failed to undermine the substantial evidence supporting FERC's figure for the cost of new entry and failed to overcome the court's deferential standard of review. View "PJM Power Providers Group v. FERC" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit denied petitions for review challenging FERC's orders approving PJM's tariff that determined the rates paid to energy providers for providing electric capacity in the broad mid-Atlantic region. Petitioners argued that FERC lacked substantial evidence to approve the estimates of labor costs that formed part of the calculation of the cost of new entry; FERC should have accepted the labor-cost calculations of petitioners' expert; and FERC erred in approving another input to the estimated cost of new entry. The court held that petitioners' objections failed to undermine the substantial evidence supporting FERC's figure for the cost of new entry and failed to overcome the court's deferential standard of review. View "PJM Power Providers Group v. FERC" on Justia Law

FERC issued a series of orders empowering incoming generators within the Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO) region to elect to self-fund this new construction, or to seek financing from third parties, regardless of whether the current grid owners wish to fund the construction themselves. The DC Circuit vacated the orders, holding that there was neither evidence nor economic logic supporting FERC's discriminatory theory as applied to transmission owners without affiliated generation assets. The court also held that FERC did not adequately respond to petitioners' argument that involuntary generator funding compelled them to construct, own, and operate facilities without compensatory network upgrade charges – thus forcing them to accept additional risk without corresponding return as essentially non-profit managers of these upgrade facilities. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Ameren Services Co. v. FERC" on Justia Law

FERC issued a series of orders empowering incoming generators within the Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO) region to elect to self-fund this new construction, or to seek financing from third parties, regardless of whether the current grid owners wish to fund the construction themselves. The DC Circuit vacated the orders, holding that there was neither evidence nor economic logic supporting FERC's discriminatory theory as applied to transmission owners without affiliated generation assets. The court also held that FERC did not adequately respond to petitioners' argument that involuntary generator funding compelled them to construct, own, and operate facilities without compensatory network upgrade charges – thus forcing them to accept additional risk without corresponding return as essentially non-profit managers of these upgrade facilities. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Ameren Services Co. v. FERC" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged two sets of orders issued by the Commission regarding a scarcity pricing mechanism in the New England power market. The DC Circuit held that the exhaustion requirements of the Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 U.S.C. 824d, deprived it of jurisdiction over the petition to review the Tariff Order. Therefore, the court dismissed the petition in Case No. 16-1023. The court held, on the merits, that the Commission was not arbitrary or capricious in denying petitioners' complaint and thus denied the petition in Case No. 16-1024 seeking review of the Complaint Order. View "New England Power Generators Association v. FERC" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted CPUC's petition for review of FERC's determination that PG&E was eligible for an incentive adder for remaining a member of the California Independent System Operator Corporation (Cal-ISO) when state law prevented PG&E's departure without authorization. The panel held that FERC's determination that PG&E was entitled to incentive adders for remaining in the Cal-ISO was arbitrary and capricious, because FERC did not reasonably interpret Order 679 as justifying summary grants of adders for remaining in a transmission organization. The panel explained that, because FERC's interpretation was unreasonable, FERC's grants of adders to PG&E were an unexplained departure from longstanding policy. Furthermore, FERC created a generic adder in violation of the order. View "CPUC V. FERC" on Justia Law

Before the DC Circuit's decision in Albany Engineering Corp. v. FERC, 548 F.3d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 2008), parallel federal and New York state regulatory regimes required downstream hydroelectric facilities to reimburse their headwater counterparts for certain costs. Albany changed that dual-track regulatory scheme by holding that the New York State assessment regime was preempted by section 10(f) of the Federal Power Act (FPA), which entitled the District to recover only "interest, maintenance, and depreciation" costs. In the wake of Albany, Erie petitioned FERC to credit it for costs the District had assessed it in excess of the federally mandated costs. The Commission denied Erie's request and denied a rehearing, based on its determining that Erie and the District had formally settled their state law dispute over headwater charges in 2006. The DC Circuit denied Erie's petition to vacate the Commission's orders, rejecting Erie's contention that the Commission's two 2015 orders ran contrary to section 10(f) of the FPA; the 2006 Settlement; the Commission's regulations; and a "legion of prior, unchallenged Commission orders." View "Erie Boulevard Hydropower, LP v. FERC" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Appellate Court affirming the judgment of Supreme Court granting Petitioners’ petition asserting that the decision of the New York City Water Board and the New York City Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) adopting a resolution approving a rate increase and bill credit and publishing a rate schedule was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion.Petitioners commenced this N.Y. C.P.L.R. article 78 proceeding against the Water Board and DEP challenging the resolution and rate schedule. Supreme Court granted the petition, ruling that the resolution and rate schedule were ultra vires, exceeded the Water Board’s statutory authority, and were unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Respondents’ actions were not utterly arbitrary or unsupported by economic or public policy goals and that Respondents did not act ultra vires or levy a tax. View "Prometheus Realty Corp. v. New York City Water Board" on Justia Law

PG&E filed suit against HART for negligently servicing a large transformer at a hydroelectric power plant and for damages under Public Utilities Code section 7952. The trial court concluded that because PG&E did not own the transformer, PG&E could not prove essential elements of its causes of action for negligence and damages under section 7952. In the published portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal held that the transformer was necessary or useful equipment as that phrase was used in section 7952; PG&E was an electrical corporation for purposes of section 7952; the preposition "of" in the phrase "equipment of any...electrical...corporation" was used in the proprietary sense; the ownership of property interests in the equipment need not be complete ownership because the phrase "equipment of any...electrical...corporation" also encompassed equipment in which the corporation was a partial owner; the evidence presented showed that PG&E held multiple property interests in the transformer and thus it might be regarded as a partial owner of the transformer entitled to recover the measure of damages set forth in section 7952; and therefore HART has not carried its burden of demonstrating PG&E's cause of action for damages under section 7952 lacked merit. View "Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. Hart High-Voltage Apparatus Repair and Testing Co." on Justia Law