Justia Utilities Law Opinion Summaries

The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment upholding the Commission's nondisclosure decisions in this Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) case brought by Niskanen, seeking the names and addresses of property owners along the route of a proposed pipeline. In this case, although the Commission concluded that the property owners' privacy interests outweighed the public interest in this identifying information, and it agreed to a more limited disclosure—the property owners' initials and street names. The court agreed with the district court's finding that the Commission's proposal struck the proper balance between these competing interests. The court explained that Niskanen identifies a weighty public interest in understanding the Commission's compliance with its notice obligations, but it articulates no reason it needs the full names and addresses of landowners along a pipeline route to do so. View "Niskanen Center v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit granted CPUC's petition for review of the Commission's approval of CAISO's proposal for revising the compensation structure for its Capacity Procurement Mechanism (CPM), a voluntary program designed to provide electric capacity necessary to maintain grid reliability within CAISO's network. Here, as in Delaware Division of Public Advocate v. FERC, 3 F.4th 461 (D.C. Cir. 2021), the Commission failed to grapple with the distinction between bids submitted below or above the soft-offer cap, resulting in the Commission's reliance on precedent without recognition of the substantial differences between the two cases. The court wrote that, apart from the Commission's misplaced reliance on its 2015 CPM Order, the record contains no evidence or findings to support its decision. Accordingly, the court vacated the order and remanded for further proceedings. View "California Public Utilities Commission v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court concluding that compliance with Utah Code 10-2-421 was the only precondition to three cities' taking over service to electric customers in annexed areas of the South Utah Valley Electric Service District (District), holding that the plain text of section 10-2-421 supported the district court's interpretation.Payson City, Spanish Fork City, and Salem City (collectively, Cities) sought to provide electricity to customers in areas that they annexed within the District. The dispute between the Cities and the District was over which statutory provisions governed the requirements the Cities must satisfy in order to take over service to electric customers in annexed portions of the District. The district court ruled in favor of the Cities. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the plain language of Utah Code sections 10-2-421 and 10-8-21 sets forth that the Cities may provide electric service to customers inside the district as long as they pay the required reimbursements. View "South Utah Valley Electric v. Payson City" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit denied a petition for review challenging FERC's two orders regarding a utility company, Entergy Services, and a subset of sales at issue called the Grand Gulf Sales. The Louisiana Commission alleges that FERC's exclusion of the Grand Gulf Sales from the damage calculation was an irrational change of position. The court found no merit in this contention, explaining that the allegations regarding the Grand Gulf Sales do not concern Section 30.03 of the System Agreement because those sales were always treated as Joint Account Sales and therefore never treated as part of Entergy Arkansas's native load.The Louisiana Commission also alleged that the Grand Gulf Sales—despite being accounted for as Joint Account Sales—still violated the System Agreement. The court concluded that FERC reasonably concluded that the two complaints at issue alleged different violations of the System Agreement and therefore that the 2009 Complaint did not preserve the allegations in the 2019 Complaint for purposes of the 2015 Settlement Agreement waiver provisions. In this case, neither Section G(1) or G(2) saves the allegations in the 2019 Complaint from being barred by the 2015 Settlement Agreement. Finally, even if the Louisiana Commission's mutual mistake argument was not waived, FERC reasonably determined on the merits that the Louisiana Commission presented no evidence that any initial shared impression about the Grand Gulf Sales was a material fact that formed the basis of the 2015 Settlement Agreement. View "Louisiana Public Service Commission v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged a surcharge that Long Beach imposes on its water and sewer customers by embedding the surcharge in the rates the Water Department charges for service. The surcharge funds are transferred from the Water Department to the city’s general fund, to be used for unrestricted general revenue purposes. The surcharge was approved by a majority of the city’s voters under California Constitution article XIII C. The plaintiffs argued that notwithstanding majority voter approval, the surcharge violates article XIII D, which prohibits a local agency from assessing a fee or charge “upon any parcel of property or upon any person as an incident of property ownership” unless the fee or charge satisfies enumerated requirements the city acknowledges were not met.The trial court found the surcharge unconstitutional and invalid. The court of appeal affirmed the judgment and an award of attorney fees. Because the surcharge qualifies as a “levy other than an ad valorem tax, a special tax, or an assessment, imposed by an agency upon a parcel or upon a person as an incident of property ownership, including a user fee or charge for a property related service,” it satisfies the definition of “fee” or “charge” in article XIII D and must comply with article XIII D, section 6(b)’s requirements regardless of voter approval. View "Lejins v. City of Long Beach" on Justia Law

In this case involving the method for determining an apartment tenant's utility bill, the Court of Appeals held that the approval requirements stated in Md. Code Pub. Util. (PU) 7-304 are applicable to all energy allocation systems in apartment houses, regardless of the construction date of the building.A federal district court issued a certified question of law in the context of a putative class action lawsuit brought by Plaintiff, on behalf of residential apartment tenants, against a residential utility billing services company working on behalf of Maryland landlords. The federal district court asked the Court of Appeals to determine whether, for apartment houses built prior to 1978, methods of energy allocation determining the billable amount of electricity or gas by means other that by the actual measurement of consumption of the individual unit are subject to the approval of the Public Service Commission, as set forth in PU 7-304. The Court of Appeals held that allocation of energy costs solely computed on the basis of square footage computations and pro rata assessments, as well as added rental components, are exempt from the approval requirements set forth PU 7-304. View "Moore v. RealPage Utility Management" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Public Service Commission of West Virginia (PSC) approving the application of one of Ambassador Limousine and Taxi Service (Ambassador) to transfer the common motor carrier certificate held by Classic Limousine Service, Inc. (Classic) to Ambassador, holding that there was no error.SRC Holdings, LLC, doing business as Williams Transport (Williams), appealed the PSC's order approving Ambassador's application to transfer its common motor carrier certificate to Ambassador, arguing that Classic's motor carrier certificate was nontransferable and that Ambassador's proposed use of the certificate would create new competition in the same territory that Williams serviced. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the PSC's reasoning in reaching its decision was legally sound and supported by the evidence. View "SRC Holdings, LLC v. Public Service Commission of W. Va." on Justia Law

The issue presented for the South Carolina Supreme Court in this case involved two consolidated cross-appeals from the Public Service Commission's (PSC) determinations regarding ratemaking applications filed by Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (DEC) and Duke Energy Progress, LLC (DEP) (collectively, Duke). Each Duke entity owned one coal-fired power plant in South Carolina and seven coal-fired power plants in North Carolina, for a total of sixteen affected plants. In their ratemaking applications, the two Duke entities sought recovery for expenses related to their plants in both states, with those costs shared proportionately between their North and South Carolina customers. The PSC allowed in part and disallowed in part the requested expenses. On appeal, Duke contended the PSC erred in disallowing: (1) environmental compliance costs associated with North Carolina law; (2) litigation costs incurred by Duke in defending itself from various lawsuits; and (3) carrying costs on specified deferred accounts. In the cross-appeal, the South Carolina Energy Users Committee (SCEUC) contended the PSC erred in allowing DEC recovery of costs associated with a now-abandoned nuclear project in Cherokee County because of the South Carolina General Assembly's repeal of the Base Load Review Act (BLRA). After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the PSC's decisions in full because its decisions were supported by substantial evidence in the record, were not arbitrary or capricious, and were not controlled by an error of law. View "Duke Energy Carolinas v. SC Office of Regulatory Staff" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) granting certification to FirstEnergy Advisors, a competitive retail electric service provider, holding that the order in this case fell short of the requirement set forth in Ohio Rev. Code 4903.09 that PUCO file "findings of fact and written opinions setting forth the reasons prompting the decisions arrived at."Two organizations in this case intervened in the PUCO proceedings and objected to the certification. Despite the objections, PUCO granted the certification request and issued a "barebones" order offering no explanation as to how FirstEnergy Advisors met the applicable legal requirements. The Supreme Court reversed PUCO's certification decision and remanded the matter to PUCO for further proceedings, holding that PUCO's order violated action 4903.09 because it failed to explain the reasoning and factual grounds for granting FirstEnergy Advisors' application. View "In re Application of FirstEnergy Advisors for Certification as a Competitive Retail Electric Service Power Broker & Aggregator" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the Public Utilities Commission dismissing Appellants' complaint alleging that Central Maine Power Company (CMP) committed unreasonable practices by delivering notices threatening disconnection during the November 2020 to April 2021 winter season during the COVID-19 pandemic, holding that there was no error.Appellants filed a complaint with the Commission alleging that they were threatened with disconnection notices because they were behind in payments to CMP. Appellants alleged that by sending notices threatening disconnection, when COVID-19 case numbers were rising, amounted to an "unreasonable" practice by CMP. The Commission dismissed the complaint as being "without merit." The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not err or abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint based on its previous determination that Appellants' allegations were without merit. View "Gamage v. Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law