Justia Utilities Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court held that the Town of Westlake, a general-law municipality in which Builder Recovery Services, LLC (BRS), which hauled trash away from construction sites, operated, lacked the authority to impose a percentage-of-revenue license fee on companies like BRS.The Town enacted an ordinance that required trash haulers like BRS to obtain a license to operate in the Town. After the ordinance was adopted the Town cited BRS for operating without a lawsuit in violation of the ordinance. BRS brought this suitm, arguing that BRS lacked statutory authority to require BRS to obtain the license. The district court rejected most of BRS's arguments, and the court of appeals affirmed the portions of the judgment in favor of the Town. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Town of Westlake lacked authority as a general-law municipality to impose a percentage-of-revenue licensing fee on construction trash-hauling companies like BRS. View "Builder Recovery Services, LLC v. Town of Westlake" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court against Landlord and in favor of the City of Baytown in this dispute over unpaid utility bills, holding that Landlord's challenge to the City's enforcement action failed to show the intentional taking or damage for public use necessary to establish a constitutional right to compensation.In this action, Landlord alleging that the City's withholding of utility service to collect payment resulted in the loss of a tenant and the disrepair of his property and was a taking in violation of the state or federal constitution. The trial court concluded that Landlord did not establish an intentional taking of private property for public use. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the City's utility enforcement actions did not establish a regulatory taking of private property as a matter of law. View "City of Baytown v. Schrock" on Justia Law

Consumers Energy Company filed an action against Brian and Erin Storm, and Lake Michigan Credit Union, seeking to condemn a portion of the Storms’ property for a power-line easement. The Storms challenged the necessity of the easement under the Uniform Condemnation Procedures Act (UCPA). The trial court concluded that Consumers had failed to establish the public necessity of the easement on the Storms’ property and entered an order dismissing Consumers’ action and awarding attorney fees to the Storms. Consumers appealed that order as of right to the Court of Appeals. The Storms moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that under MCL 213.56(6), Consumers could only appeal the trial court’s public-necessity determination by leave granted. The Court of Appeals initially denied the motion by order, but the order was entered without prejudice to further consideration of the jurisdictional issue by the case -call panel. The Court of Appeals case-call panel issued an opinion in which it agreed with the Storms that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction; the Court of Appeals therefore dismissed the portion of Consumers’ appeal challenging the trial court’s determination of public necessity. Despite dismissing the public-necessity portion of Consumers’ appeal, the Court of Appeals addressed Consumers’ challenge to the trial court’s award of attorney fees and vacated the attorney-fee award. The Michigan Supreme Court determined the Court of Appeals should have considered the condemning agency’s appeal as of right and reached the ultimate question of whether the trial court erred by holding that there was no public necessity for the proposed acquisition. “Therefore, it is not yet apparent that the proposed acquisition was improper such that the property owners would be entitled to reimbursement so as to avoid being ‘forced to suffer because of an action that they did not initiate and that endangered, through condemnation proceedings, their right to private property.’” Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the analysis construing MCL 213.66(2) in Part III of the Court of Appeals’ opinion, and remanded to that court for further proceedings. View "Consumers Energy Company v. Storm" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the rulings of the Public Service Commission of West Virginia's (PSC) final order and its order denying the City of Wheeling's (Wheeling) petition for reconsideration and motion to stay, holding that the PSC had jurisdiction over the dispute when it issued its final order and that there was no error in the PSC's decision.After the City of Benwood brought an action challenging Wheeling's revised rate for sewer treatment services the PSC began an investigation. In its final order, the PSC recalculated the revised rate for Wheeling's sewer treatment services. Wheeling then filed a petition for reconsideration and a motion to stay, arguing that the PSC lacked subject matter jurisdiction when it issued the final order. The PSC denied Wheeling's petition and motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below. View "City of Wheeling v. Public Service Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order entered by the district court granting Big Foot Dumpsters & Containers, LLC's motion to dismiss this action as moot following Big Foot's withdrawal of its application for a garbage hauling certificate from the Montana Public Service Commission (PSC), holding that there was no error.Big Foot filed an application for a Class D carrier certificate of public convenience or necessity to haul garbage in Flathead County. Ultimately, Big Foot requested an order allowing the withdrawal of its application and sought dismissal of the action. The district court granted dismissal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err by concluding that the case was mooted; and (2) the district court did not err by failing to apply any exception to the mootness doctrine. View "In re Class D Application of Big Foot" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed this appeal from an order of the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) declining to open a formal investigation into a water bill issued to General Marine Construction Corp. by the Portland Water District (PWD), holding that General Marine's appeal was not taken from a final decision of the Commission pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 35-A, 1320(1).At issue was a $15,804 "make-up bill" that the PWD issued to General Marine for unauthorized and unmilled water usage. General Marine filed a complaint challenging the bill. The Commission's Consumer Assistance and Safety Division (CASD) concluded that the PWD had complied with PUC rules in issuing the make-up bill. The Commission upheld CASD's decision. General Marine appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed the appeal, holding (1) the PUC did not issue a "final decision" at the conclusion of the statutorily-authorized informal process; and (2) therefore, section 1320(1) did not authorize General Marine's appeal. View "General Marine Construction Corp. v. Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court affirming the decision of the South Dakota Public Utilities Commission (PUC) approving the application filed by Crowned Ridge Wind II, LLC for a permit to construct a large-scale wind energy farm in northeast South Dakota, holding that there was no error.Several individual intervened in this case and objected to Crowned Ridge's application. After an evidentiary hearing, the PUC voted unanimously to approve Crowned Ridge's permit. The circuit court affirmed the issuance of the permit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the intervenors failed to raise any meritorious issues upon which the PUC's final decision and order may be reversed or modified. View "Ehlebracht v. Crowned Ridge Wind II, LLC" on Justia Law

LSP, an independent electric transmission developer, bids on proposals to build transmission projects throughout the U.S. LSP sought judicial review of a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) decision under 16 U.S.C. 824e concerning ISO New England’s compliance with Commission Order 1000, which required “the removal from Commission-jurisdictional tariffs and agreements” of rights of first refusal to construct transmission facilities and directed incumbent transmission providers to engage in competitive selection of developers. FERC recognized an exception if the time needed to solicit and conduct competitive bidding would delay the project and thereby threaten system “reliability.” FERC found “insufficient evidence” that ISO was incorrectly implementing Order 1000.The D.C. Circuit denied LSP’s petition for judicial review, first holding that FERC’s ruling bears all the indicia of a substantive decision produced after a contested proceeding involving ISO and numerous intervenors and is subject to judicial review. The court found nothing irrational in FERC’s response to LSP’s general criticism of ISO’s use of more conservative assumptions regarding its system capacity and future management in determining when to apply the exception. Although the number of reliability projects exempted from competitive bidding exceeded those open to competition, the appropriate balance between competitive procurement and quick redress of reliability needs is a policy judgment for FERC. View "LSP Transmission Holdings II, LLC v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court that sovereign immunity bars the ratepayers' claims against the Mississippi Public Service Commissioners. The court also agreed that the Johnson Act does not preclude federal jurisdiction over the claims against the utility. However, the court disagreed with the accrual date the district court used in dismissing the case on limitations grounds. The court explained that the ratepayers' claims did not accrue on August 6, 2015, when the Commission approved the refund plan, or on August 16, 2016, when an economist concluded that Mississippi Power shorted them. The court affirmed the dismissal of the claims against the Commissioners but vacated the district court's dismissal of the claims against Mississippi Power on imitations grounds. Given the uncertainties in the record and the possible benefit of limited discovery on the limitations issue, the court remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Turnage v. Britton" on Justia Law

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) awarded “incentive adders,” upward adjustments to utilities’ rate of return on equity, to three California-based public utilities. FERC regulations allow for incentive adders to induce voluntary membership in independent system operators. The Ninth Circuit previously concluded that FERC improperly awarded incentive adders to PG&E without considering the California Public Utilities Commission’s (CPUC) assertion that PG&E’s membership in the California independent system operator (CAISO) is mandated. The court directed FERC to “inquire into PG&E’s specific circumstances, i.e., whether it could unilaterally leave the C[AISO].” On remand, FERC concluded that membership in CAISO is voluntary.The Ninth Circuit upheld the decision, holding that its previous decision did not resolve whether California law prevented the utilities from leaving CAISO without approval. FERC did not deviate from the mandate on remand. There was no error in FERC’s conclusion that membership in CAISO was voluntary despite a contrary suggestion in a CPUC 1998 Decision. FERC was not required to apply the Erie doctrine and defer to California’s interpretation. The incentive adder and its requirements arose from federal law. The California Supreme Court has not decided whether membership in CAISO is voluntary; no California Code provision mandates CAISO membership, and no case law discusses whether CAISO members must remain such. California courts would not defer to the CPUC’s 1998 Decision because it was inconsistent with the statute. View "California Public Utilities Commission v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law