Justia Utilities Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Utilities Law
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The case involves the Huntington Sanitary Board (HSB) challenging an order by the Public Service Commission of West Virginia (PSC) that designated HSB as the most suitable capable proximate utility (CPU) to acquire and operate the failing sewer system of the Hubbard Heights subdivision in Wayne County. The sewer system, originally servicing 27 customers, had fallen into disrepair and ceased operations, posing health and environmental risks. The PSC's order was issued under the Distressed and Failing Utilities Act, which aims to remediate struggling utilities.The PSC initiated proceedings after a petition was filed by a former president of the Hubbard Heights Homeowners Association (HOA). The PSC found that the sewer system met the statutory definition of a failing utility and considered various alternatives to acquisition, ultimately determining that acquisition by a CPU was necessary. HSB, along with other utilities, was identified as a potential CPU. The PSC held public and evidentiary hearings, during which no utility expressed willingness to acquire Hubbard Heights. The PSC designated HSB as the most suitable CPU based on its size, financial capacity, and proximity.HSB appealed, arguing that the PSC lacked jurisdiction because the customer count had fallen below the statutory threshold of 25 and that the PSC failed to consider alternatives to acquisition adequately. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case, affirming the PSC's order. The court held that the PSC had continuing jurisdiction over Hubbard Heights despite the reduced customer count, as the utility had not sought to be divested of its status, and the PSC had not relinquished jurisdiction. The court also found that the PSC had considered alternatives and provided a reasoned analysis in designating HSB as the most suitable CPU, complying with the statutory requirements. View "Huntington Sanitary Board v. Public Service Commission" on Justia Law

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Gauley River Public Service District (Gauley River) experienced multiple interruptions in water service to the Mount Olive Correctional Complex (Mt. Olive) over a three-month period. This led the Public Service Commission of West Virginia (Commission) to investigate whether Gauley River was a distressed or failing utility under the Distressed and Failing Utilities Improvement Act. The Commission found Gauley River to be a distressed utility due to its prolonged lack of adequate management and operational deficiencies.The Commission ordered Gauley River to negotiate an operation and maintenance agreement with West Virginia-American Water Company (WVAWC) to provide oversight and managerial control. Gauley River and WVAWC submitted a proposed agreement, but the Commission rejected it, finding it did not meet the required terms. The Commission then ordered the parties to execute a standard operation and maintenance agreement structured by the Commission.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case. The court held that the Commission acted within its statutory authority under West Virginia Code § 24-2H-7(b) in ordering Gauley River and WVAWC to implement an alternative to acquisition. The court found that the ordered agreement did not amount to an acquisition of Gauley River by WVAWC but was designed to remediate the utility's deficiencies. The court affirmed the Commission's order, concluding that the terms of the agreement were lawful and necessary to address Gauley River's operational issues. View "Gauley River Public Service District v. Public Service Commission" on Justia Law

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Norfolk Southern Railway Company challenged the constitutionality of Code § 56-16.3, which allows broadband service providers to install fiber optic cables across railroad property. The statute, enacted in 2023, aims to promote broadband expansion in Virginia. Cox Communications filed applications to install fiber optic cables under Norfolk Southern’s tracks, which Norfolk Southern did not initially oppose. However, a dispute arose over the license fees, leading Cox to proceed without a licensing agreement, prompting Norfolk Southern to seek relief from the State Corporation Commission (the “Commission”).The Commission rejected Norfolk Southern’s arguments without a hearing, finding the claims insufficient to establish undue hardship. Norfolk Southern appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia, which stayed the Commission’s judgment during the appeal.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case de novo, focusing on whether Code § 56-16.3 violated Article I, Section 11 of the Virginia Constitution. The court emphasized that eminent domain statutes must be strictly construed and that the burden of proving public use lies with the condemnor. The court found that Code § 56-16.3 did not reference public use and allowed a private company to take property for financial gain, which is not a public use under the Virginia Constitution.The court held that the application of Code § 56-16.3 in this case constituted a taking of Norfolk Southern’s property for a nonpublic use, violating the Virginia Constitution. Consequently, the court reversed the Commission’s judgment and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of Norfolk Southern. View "Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. SCC" on Justia Law

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Samuel and Peggy Edwards, residents of Rexburg, Idaho, refused to allow PacifiCorp, doing business as Rocky Mountain Power Company, to install a smart electrical meter on their property due to health concerns. Rocky Mountain considered this refusal a violation of its terms of service, which required access to electrical meter bases. After negotiations failed, Rocky Mountain informed the Edwards that their electrical service would be terminated unless they allowed the installation. The Edwards filed a formal complaint with the Idaho Public Utilities Commission (PUC), arguing they had not denied access and should be allowed to opt-out of the smart meter installation.The PUC consolidated the Edwards' complaint with similar complaints from other customers and granted Rocky Mountain's motion to dismiss, concluding that the Edwards had not provided evidence that smart meters presented a legitimate safety concern and that Rocky Mountain had the authority to access and replace meters. The Edwards' motion for reconsideration was also dismissed by the PUC, leading them to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court.The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed whether the PUC properly determined that Rocky Mountain had the authority to access the Edwards' property to replace the existing meter with a smart meter. The Court affirmed the PUC's decision, concluding that the tariff provisions allowed Rocky Mountain to access and replace meters. The Court also found that the Edwards' constitutional arguments were waived due to insufficient support and authority. The PUC's orders dismissing the Edwards' complaint and denying reconsideration were affirmed. View "Edwards v. IPUC" on Justia Law

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Dongkuk S&C Co., Ltd., a Korean producer of utility scale wind towers, challenged the United States Department of Commerce's final determination that its wind towers were being sold in the United States at less than fair value, resulting in an antidumping duty order. Commerce's investigation covered sales from July 1, 2018, to June 30, 2019, and found that Dongkuk's sales were below normal value, leading to the imposition of antidumping duties.The Court of International Trade (CIT) initially remanded Commerce's decision to adjust Dongkuk's steel plate costs, questioning the analytical support for Commerce's determination. Commerce provided additional analysis on remand, demonstrating that the cost variations were due to the timing of steel plate purchases rather than the physical characteristics of the wind towers. The CIT subsequently sustained Commerce's remand redetermination and upheld the choice of surrogate financial data for calculating constructed value profit and selling expenses.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the CIT's decision. The court held that Commerce's determination to adjust Dongkuk's steel plate costs was supported by substantial evidence, as the cost variations were unrelated to the physical characteristics of the wind towers. Additionally, the court upheld Commerce's use of SeAH Steel Holdings Corporation's consolidated financial statement as a reasonable source of surrogate data for calculating constructed value profit and selling expenses, despite Dongkuk's preference for SeAH Steel Corporation's standalone financial data. The court found that Commerce's decision was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. View "DONGKUK S&C CO., LTD. v. US" on Justia Law

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The case involves the City of Jackson, Mississippi's water-related utilities, which faced significant failures. The United States and the State of Mississippi brought enforcement actions under the Clean Water Act (CWA) and the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) against the City for violations, including allowing raw sewage to be discharged into waterways and failing to comply with the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) orders. The district court appointed a federal receiver, Edward Henefin, as interim third-party manager (ITPM) to manage the City's water and sewer systems. Henefin, operating through JXN Water, Inc., developed new utility rates, including a discount for residents receiving Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi ruled that the ITPM's rate-setting activities constituted a federal assistance program under the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 (FNA), thereby allowing access to SNAP recipient data. The United States and Mississippi opposed this, arguing that such disclosure violated the FNA's privacy protections for SNAP recipients.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the ITPM's rate-setting activities did not qualify as a federal assistance program under the FNA. The court emphasized that the term "federal assistance program" implies administration by a federal entity, and the ITPM's authority derived from municipal law, not federal law. The court also noted that the statutory history and context supported a narrow interpretation of "federal assistance program." Consequently, the court reversed the district court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Mississippi v. JXN Water" on Justia Law

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Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc. (SPU) provides water and sewer services to commercial properties in Bonneville County, Idaho. Donald Sorrells, the owner of a lot in the Sunnyside Industrial & Professional Park, received a "Will Serve" letter from SPU in 2018, agreeing to provide water and sewer services based on his representation that he would install only two restrooms. However, Sorrells installed additional unauthorized water and sewer connections, leading to repeated excessive discharges into SPU's septic system. Despite multiple notices and requests for remediation from SPU, Sorrells failed to address the issues adequately, resulting in SPU seeking a declaratory judgment against him.The District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of Idaho found that Sorrells was a persistent violator of SPU's Sewer Rules and Regulations but determined that the Idaho Public Utilities Commission (IPUC) retained original jurisdiction over SPU's water system. The court denied SPU's requests for costs and attorney fees, leading to appeals from both parties.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that the district court did not err in granting a declaratory judgment to SPU regarding Sorrells' violations of the sewer rules. However, it also upheld the district court's determination that the IPUC initially had jurisdiction over SPU's water system, as SPU had not established its nonprofit status at the time of filing. The court further affirmed the denial of attorney fees and costs to SPU, concluding that the Rules and Regulations did not expressly provide for such fees.On appeal, the Supreme Court declined to consider the merits of Sorrells' arguments due to his failure to comply with the Idaho Appellate Rules. The court also denied SPU's request for attorney fees and costs on appeal, as SPU did not prevail on its cross-appeal. View "Sunnyside Park Utilities, LLC v. Sorrells" on Justia Law

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Great Oaks Water Company, a private water retailer, sued the Santa Clara Valley Water District, alleging that the district’s groundwater pumping charges were unlawful taxes levied without voter approval, violating Proposition 26. Great Oaks argued that the charges exceeded the reasonable costs of the governmental activity and were unfairly allocated, benefiting other water users to which Great Oaks had no access. Additionally, Great Oaks contended that the district’s use of ad valorem property taxes to subsidize agricultural groundwater pumping charges was unconstitutional.The trial court ruled in favor of the water district, finding that the groundwater charges did not exceed the costs of the district’s overall water management program. The court held that it was reasonable to use these charges to pay for the program because non-agricultural groundwater pumpers, like Great Oaks, received significant benefits from it. The charges were deemed reasonably allocated on a volumetric basis, and the agricultural discount was found constitutionally valid as it was funded by ad valorem property taxes, not by non-agricultural pumpers.The California Court of Appeal for the Sixth Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court concluded that the groundwater charges were not “taxes” under Proposition 26 because they fell under exceptions for specific benefits conferred or government services provided directly to the payor. The court found that the water district proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the charges were no more than necessary to cover the reasonable costs of the governmental activity and that the costs were fairly allocated to Great Oaks. The court also upheld the use of ad valorem taxes to fund the agricultural discount, finding no violation of the California Constitution or the Water Code. View "Great Oaks Water Co. v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist." on Justia Law

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A catastrophic turbine failure occurred at the Hadjret En Nouss Power Plant in Tipaza, Algeria. The plant is owned by Shariket Kahraba Hadjret En Nouss (SKH), which is jointly owned by the Algerian government and Algerian Utilities International Ltd. SNC-Lavalin Contructeurs International Inc. (SNC) operated the plant on behalf of SKH. SNC entered into multiple contracts with various General Electric entities, including a Services Contract with General Electric International, which contained an arbitration clause.The insurers, reinsurers, and retrocessionaires (collectively the "Insurers") initiated litigation as subrogees of SKH against General Electric International, General Electric Company, GE Power, and GE Power Services Engineering (collectively the "GE Entities") in Georgia's state-wide business court. The GE Entities removed the case to federal court and moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration provision in the Services Contract. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia granted the motion, concluding that SKH was a third-party beneficiary of the Services Contract.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that SKH, as the plant's owner, was a third-party beneficiary of the Services Contract. Consequently, the Insurers, as subrogees of SKH, were bound by the arbitration clause. The court also affirmed that any questions regarding the arbitrability of specific claims should be resolved by the arbitrator, as the Services Contract incorporated the Conciliation and Arbitration Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce, which delegate such decisions to the arbitrator. View "Various Insurers, Reinsurers and Retrocessionaires v. General Electric International, Inc." on Justia Law

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The case involves five public utilities operating in California, including Pacific Bell Telephone Company and AT&T Mobility LLC, which challenged the property tax rates imposed by Merced County for the fiscal years 2017-2018 and 2018-2019. The utilities argued that the tax rates applied to their properties exceeded the permissible rates under Section 19 of Article XIII of the California Constitution, which they interpreted as requiring utility property to be taxed at the same rate as non-utility property.In the Superior Court of Merced County, the utilities sought partial refunds of the property taxes paid, claiming that the tax rates levied on them were higher than the average tax rates in the county. The County demurred, relying on the precedent set by the Sixth District in County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, which held that Section 19 does not mandate the same tax rate for utility property as for locally assessed property. The utilities conceded that Santa Clara was binding but sought to challenge its holding on appeal. The Superior Court dismissed the case, and the utilities filed a timely notice of appeal.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court's judgment. The court held that Section 19 of Article XIII of the California Constitution does not require utility property to be taxed at the same rate as non-utility property. Instead, the court interpreted the relevant language as an enabling clause, allowing utility property to be subject to taxation, rather than a limiting clause mandating equal tax rates. The court found that the historical context, language, and structure of Section 19 supported this interpretation, and thus, Merced County's application of the tax rates did not violate the constitutional provision. View "Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. County of Merced" on Justia Law