Justia Utilities Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Utilities Law
Sunnyside Park Utilities, LLC v. Sorrells
Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc. (SPU) provides water and sewer services to commercial properties in Bonneville County, Idaho. Donald Sorrells, the owner of a lot in the Sunnyside Industrial & Professional Park, received a "Will Serve" letter from SPU in 2018, agreeing to provide water and sewer services based on his representation that he would install only two restrooms. However, Sorrells installed additional unauthorized water and sewer connections, leading to repeated excessive discharges into SPU's septic system. Despite multiple notices and requests for remediation from SPU, Sorrells failed to address the issues adequately, resulting in SPU seeking a declaratory judgment against him.The District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of Idaho found that Sorrells was a persistent violator of SPU's Sewer Rules and Regulations but determined that the Idaho Public Utilities Commission (IPUC) retained original jurisdiction over SPU's water system. The court denied SPU's requests for costs and attorney fees, leading to appeals from both parties.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that the district court did not err in granting a declaratory judgment to SPU regarding Sorrells' violations of the sewer rules. However, it also upheld the district court's determination that the IPUC initially had jurisdiction over SPU's water system, as SPU had not established its nonprofit status at the time of filing. The court further affirmed the denial of attorney fees and costs to SPU, concluding that the Rules and Regulations did not expressly provide for such fees.On appeal, the Supreme Court declined to consider the merits of Sorrells' arguments due to his failure to comply with the Idaho Appellate Rules. The court also denied SPU's request for attorney fees and costs on appeal, as SPU did not prevail on its cross-appeal. View "Sunnyside Park Utilities, LLC v. Sorrells" on Justia Law
Great Oaks Water Co. v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist.
Great Oaks Water Company, a private water retailer, sued the Santa Clara Valley Water District, alleging that the district’s groundwater pumping charges were unlawful taxes levied without voter approval, violating Proposition 26. Great Oaks argued that the charges exceeded the reasonable costs of the governmental activity and were unfairly allocated, benefiting other water users to which Great Oaks had no access. Additionally, Great Oaks contended that the district’s use of ad valorem property taxes to subsidize agricultural groundwater pumping charges was unconstitutional.The trial court ruled in favor of the water district, finding that the groundwater charges did not exceed the costs of the district’s overall water management program. The court held that it was reasonable to use these charges to pay for the program because non-agricultural groundwater pumpers, like Great Oaks, received significant benefits from it. The charges were deemed reasonably allocated on a volumetric basis, and the agricultural discount was found constitutionally valid as it was funded by ad valorem property taxes, not by non-agricultural pumpers.The California Court of Appeal for the Sixth Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court concluded that the groundwater charges were not “taxes” under Proposition 26 because they fell under exceptions for specific benefits conferred or government services provided directly to the payor. The court found that the water district proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the charges were no more than necessary to cover the reasonable costs of the governmental activity and that the costs were fairly allocated to Great Oaks. The court also upheld the use of ad valorem taxes to fund the agricultural discount, finding no violation of the California Constitution or the Water Code. View "Great Oaks Water Co. v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist." on Justia Law
Various Insurers, Reinsurers and Retrocessionaires v. General Electric International, Inc.
A catastrophic turbine failure occurred at the Hadjret En Nouss Power Plant in Tipaza, Algeria. The plant is owned by Shariket Kahraba Hadjret En Nouss (SKH), which is jointly owned by the Algerian government and Algerian Utilities International Ltd. SNC-Lavalin Contructeurs International Inc. (SNC) operated the plant on behalf of SKH. SNC entered into multiple contracts with various General Electric entities, including a Services Contract with General Electric International, which contained an arbitration clause.The insurers, reinsurers, and retrocessionaires (collectively the "Insurers") initiated litigation as subrogees of SKH against General Electric International, General Electric Company, GE Power, and GE Power Services Engineering (collectively the "GE Entities") in Georgia's state-wide business court. The GE Entities removed the case to federal court and moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration provision in the Services Contract. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia granted the motion, concluding that SKH was a third-party beneficiary of the Services Contract.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that SKH, as the plant's owner, was a third-party beneficiary of the Services Contract. Consequently, the Insurers, as subrogees of SKH, were bound by the arbitration clause. The court also affirmed that any questions regarding the arbitrability of specific claims should be resolved by the arbitrator, as the Services Contract incorporated the Conciliation and Arbitration Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce, which delegate such decisions to the arbitrator. View "Various Insurers, Reinsurers and Retrocessionaires v. General Electric International, Inc." on Justia Law
Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. County of Merced
The case involves five public utilities operating in California, including Pacific Bell Telephone Company and AT&T Mobility LLC, which challenged the property tax rates imposed by Merced County for the fiscal years 2017-2018 and 2018-2019. The utilities argued that the tax rates applied to their properties exceeded the permissible rates under Section 19 of Article XIII of the California Constitution, which they interpreted as requiring utility property to be taxed at the same rate as non-utility property.In the Superior Court of Merced County, the utilities sought partial refunds of the property taxes paid, claiming that the tax rates levied on them were higher than the average tax rates in the county. The County demurred, relying on the precedent set by the Sixth District in County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, which held that Section 19 does not mandate the same tax rate for utility property as for locally assessed property. The utilities conceded that Santa Clara was binding but sought to challenge its holding on appeal. The Superior Court dismissed the case, and the utilities filed a timely notice of appeal.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court's judgment. The court held that Section 19 of Article XIII of the California Constitution does not require utility property to be taxed at the same rate as non-utility property. Instead, the court interpreted the relevant language as an enabling clause, allowing utility property to be subject to taxation, rather than a limiting clause mandating equal tax rates. The court found that the historical context, language, and structure of Section 19 supported this interpretation, and thus, Merced County's application of the tax rates did not violate the constitutional provision. View "Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. County of Merced" on Justia Law
Cole v. Idaho Public Utilities Commission
Sherry Cole filed a formal complaint against Rocky Mountain Power (RMP) alleging she had been overbilled due to her power meter being cross-connected with her neighbor’s. Initially, an RMP employee confirmed the cross-connection and credited her account with $1,256.45. However, subsequent tests revealed no cross-connection, leading RMP to remove the credit and instead apply a $450 credit for the inconvenience. Cole then filed a formal complaint with the Idaho Public Utilities Commission, which dismissed her complaint due to lack of evidence of overcharging. Cole's motion for reconsideration was also denied.The Idaho Public Utilities Commission reviewed Cole’s complaint and RMP’s response, which included calculations of her energy usage and an affidavit from an investigator who found no cross-connection. The Commission dismissed Cole’s complaint, finding no evidence of overcharging, and denied her petition for reconsideration, stating she failed to demonstrate the dismissal was unreasonable or unlawful. Cole appealed to the Supreme Court of Idaho, asserting multiple errors.The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the Commission’s decisions. The Court found that the Commission’s findings were supported by substantial and competent evidence, including the investigator’s analysis and the results of two breaker tests. The Court also held that Cole’s constitutional arguments were waived as they were raised for the first time on appeal and were not supported by sufficient legal authority. Additionally, the Court ruled that pro se litigants are not entitled to attorney fees, and since Cole appeared pro se and did not prevail, she was not awarded attorney fees. View "Cole v. Idaho Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law
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Idaho Supreme Court - Civil, Utilities Law
Volcano Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission
Volcano Telephone Company, a rural telephone service provider, receives subsidies from the California High-Cost Fund-A (A-Fund) administered by the Public Utilities Commission (PUC). Volcano Vision, Inc., an affiliate, uses Volcano Telephone’s broadband-capable facilities, subsidized by the A-Fund, to deliver broadband services without contributing to the underlying costs. The PUC considered Volcano Vision’s net revenues in setting Volcano Telephone’s A-Fund subsidy and future rates. The PUC also required Volcano Telephone to submit broadband service quality metrics related to Volcano Vision’s services.The PUC issued Decision No. 23-02-008, calculating Volcano Telephone’s A-Fund subsidy and approving rates for 2023. Volcano Telephone and Volcano Vision challenged this decision, arguing that the PUC’s implementation of broadband imputation constituted an unconstitutional taking and conflicted with federal law. They also contended that the order to submit broadband service quality metrics was outside the scope of the proceedings and the PUC’s jurisdiction. The PUC denied rehearing and modified the decision to clarify the reporting requirements.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court rejected the petitioners’ claims, affirming Decision Nos. 23-02-008 and 23-08-051. The court held that the PUC’s implementation of broadband imputation did not constitute an unconstitutional taking, as the A-Fund program is voluntary, and the petitioners failed to demonstrate that the rate of return was confiscatory. The court also found that the order to submit broadband service quality metrics was within the scope of the proceedings and the PUC’s jurisdiction. The court concluded that the PUC’s decisions were supported by substantial evidence and did not violate any constitutional rights. View "Volcano Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law
LSP Transmission Holdings II, LLC v Commonwealth Edison Company of Indiana, Inc.
Plaintiffs, LSP Transmission Holdings II, LLC, and affiliates, sought to build and operate interstate electricity transmission lines in Indiana. An Indiana statute granted incumbent electric companies the right of first refusal to build and operate new interstate transmission facilities connecting to their existing facilities. Plaintiffs argued that this statute violated the dormant commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution. The district court issued a preliminary injunction preventing the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission (IURC) Commissioners from enforcing the statute.The IURC Commissioners and several intervening defendants appealed the injunction. They argued that the IURC did not enforce the rights of first refusal and that the injunction would not redress plaintiffs' injuries. The district court had found that plaintiffs had standing because it believed the IURC enforced the rights of first refusal and that an injunction would prevent MISO from recognizing the statute.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction, finding that plaintiffs lacked standing. The court concluded that the IURC had no relevant responsibilities for enforcing the challenged statute and that any genuine redress would have to operate against MISO, a non-governmental entity not party to the lawsuit. The court noted that MISO had made clear it would not respond to the preliminary injunction as plaintiffs and the district court expected. The court also rejected a dissenting opinion's novel theory of standing, which was not presented by plaintiffs or adopted by the district court. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "LSP Transmission Holdings II, LLC v Commonwealth Edison Company of Indiana, Inc." on Justia Law
OKLAHOMA GAS AND ELECTRIC CO. v. STATE
In the spring of 2018, People's Electric Cooperative and Oklahoma Gas and Electric Company (OG&E) submitted competing bids to provide retail electric service to the Tall Oak Woodford Cryo Plant in Coal County, Oklahoma. The Plant is located in People's certified territory, which grants them exclusive rights to provide electricity under the Retail Electric Supplier Certified Territory Act (RESCTA). OG&E's proposal relied on the Large Load exception to RESCTA, which allows a supplier to extend its service into another supplier's territory for large-load customers. OG&E used third-party transmission facilities to provide service to the Plant without extending its own distribution lines.The Oklahoma Corporation Commission enjoined OG&E from serving the Plant, finding that OG&E was not "extending its service" as authorized by RESCTA. The Commission determined that a retail electric supplier may not use third-party transmission lines to extend its service into another supplier's certified territory under the Large Load exception. OG&E appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case and upheld the Commission's determination. The Court held that Article 9, Section 20 of the Oklahoma Constitution requires a limited review of the Commission's order. The Court affirmed the Commission's interpretation that the Large Load exception does not permit a supplier to use third-party transmission lines to extend its service into another supplier's certified territory. The Court's decision applies prospectively only and does not affect existing retail electric services and facilities established under the Large Load exception. View "OKLAHOMA GAS AND ELECTRIC CO. v. STATE" on Justia Law
Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Coachella Valley Water Dist.
The Coachella Valley Water District (Water District) appealed a judgment finding that the rates it charged for Coachella Canal water violated Article XIII C of the California Constitution. The Water District argued that the rates were lawful and that no refund remedy was authorized. The court rejected both arguments, finding the rates unlawful and that a refund remedy was constitutionally mandated.In the lower court, the Superior Court of Riverside County ruled that the Water District's Canal Water rates and the Irrigation Water Availability Assessment (IWAA) violated Proposition 218. The court found that the Water District's historical priority argument was not persuasive and that the Water District had made no attempt to show that the rates complied with the California Constitution. The court deferred ruling on remedies and later awarded Class 2 customers approximately $17.5 million in refunds and interest for invalid charges from March 2018 through June 2022.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association (Howard Jarvis) had standing to challenge the Class 2 rates because domestic customers paid the rates indirectly. The court found that the Class 2 rates were taxes under Article XIII C and did not fall under any exceptions. The court rejected the Water District's arguments that the rates were justified based on historical priority and that they were expenditures of funds. The court also found that the IWAA was an assessment under Proposition 218 and that the Water District failed to show it was proportional to the benefits conferred on the properties.The court affirmed the lower court's ruling on liability and the amount of refund relief awarded. However, the court found that the injunction in the judgment was overbroad and modified the judgment to strike the paragraph enjoining the Water District from imposing any future Canal Water rates and charges that did not comply with Proposition 218. As modified, the judgment was affirmed, and Howard Jarvis was awarded its costs on appeal. View "Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Coachella Valley Water Dist." on Justia Law
San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Arizona Department of Revenue
San Diego Gas & Electric Company (SDG&E) owns an interstate electric transmission line running from Arizona to California. The Arizona Department of Revenue (ADOR) is responsible for valuing SDG&E's property in Arizona for tax purposes. In 2020, SDG&E reported a net "original plant in service" valuation of $48,817,396 and a net "related accumulated provision for depreciation" amount of $51,446,397, resulting in a negative valuation of $2,629,001. ADOR disagreed with this calculation and determined a different accumulated depreciation amount, resulting in a positive valuation.The Arizona Tax Court granted summary judgment in favor of SDG&E, finding that their valuation correctly followed the statutory requirements. ADOR appealed, and the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed the Tax Court's decision, holding that the statute did not permit a negative valuation for a plant in service and that accumulated depreciation could not reduce the full cash value to a negative number. The Court of Appeals remanded the case for further proceedings.The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the calculation prescribed by the statute for determining a reduced plant in service cost does not preclude a negative valuation. The Court found that the statutory language did not limit the reduction of the original plant in service cost by accumulated depreciation to a non-negative number. Additionally, the Court clarified that a negative valuation for one component, when summed with other component valuations, reduces the overall full cash value but does not "offset" the valuation of other components. The Supreme Court vacated the relevant portions of the Court of Appeals' opinion and affirmed the Tax Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of SDG&E. View "San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Arizona Department of Revenue" on Justia Law