Justia Utilities Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
by
In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Brandenburg Telephone Company and Sprint Communications were in disagreement over the interest rate on an award that Sprint Communications conceded it owed to Brandenburg Telephone Company. The $2.2 million award was for unpaid fees that Sprint Communications owed for connecting local telephone calls. The dispute centered on Brandenburg's filed utility tariff which set the interest rate. Sprint argued that the tariff set the rate at 8%, and thus owed $4.3 million in interest, while Brandenburg claimed the tariff imposed a rate of 10.66%, which would result in $7.1 million in interest. The district court ruled in favor of Sprint, and the appeals court affirmed this decision.The court reasoned that the 8% rate set by the Kentucky usury statute was applicable. The court noted that while Brandenburg's tariff offered two alternatives for late payment penalty: (1) the highest interest rate (in decimal value) which may be levied by law for commercial transactions, or (2) a rate of .000292 per day (which works out to an annualized rate of 10.66%); the court interpreted the phrase "levied by law for commercial transactions" to refer to the default rate that Kentucky permits to be collected by law, which is 8%.The court rejected Brandenburg's argument that the 10.66% rate was applicable because the tariff could be viewed as an agreement between the parties and Kentucky law allows for parties to agree on higher interest rates. The court pointed out that tariffs are not freely negotiated contracts, but represent the judgment of regulators about what rates and conditions will prove reasonable and uniform for utility customers. Once regulators approve a tariff, the filed-rate doctrine prevents utilities and their customers from contracting around its terms. In this context, the court determined that the tariff's reference to the maximum rate levied by the General Assembly for general commercial transactions aligned with the filed-rate doctrine, and thus, the 8% default rule of interest applied. View "Brandenburg Telephone Co. v. Sprint Comm'ns Co." on Justia Law

by
In a dispute involving a power grid operator, PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled that the Chairman of FERC exceeded his authority by seeking a remand of a ratemaking challenge without the support of other Commission members.The case originated when PJM filed a request to modify its existing rates for electricity reserves, arguing that the existing rates were unjust and unreasonable. Initially, FERC agreed and approved the new rates. However, after a change in FERC's composition and a unilateral decision by the Chairman to request a voluntary remand from the D.C. Circuit for reconsideration, FERC reversed its decision and found PJM's evidence insufficient.The Sixth Circuit's ruling focused on the procedural irregularity, specifically the Chairman's unilateral decision to seek a remand, which it deemed exceeded his administrative authority. The court stated that a quorum majority must decide the Commission’s policy and dealings with the outside world, and the Chairman acting alone does not meet this requirement. As such, the court vacated the part of FERC's rehearing order that claimed the Chairman had this unilateral authority and remanded the matter back to FERC to address this issue.The court did not address the substantive issue of whether FERC's reversal on the ratemaking decisions was arbitrary and capricious. It noted that any interested party may renew a petition to challenge that decision after FERC resolves the procedural issue. View "PJM Power Providers Grp. v. FERC" on Justia Law

by
In a case involving the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the Electric Power Supply Association and PJM Power Providers Group (collectively, PJM), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had to address two questions. The first was whether the Chairman of FERC exceeded his authority when he moved for a remand of a ratemaking challenge without the support of any other members of the Commission, and the second was whether FERC's underlying ratemaking decisions were arbitrary and capricious.The case arose from PJM's request to FERC to raise the reserve price cap for electricity from $850 to $2,000 per megawatt hour and to replace the flat $300 per megawatt hour cap after Step 1 with a downward sloping price schedule. Initially, FERC agreed with PJM that the existing price cap and stepwise demand curve were unjust and unreasonable. However, after a change in the composition of the FERC, the Commission sought a voluntary remand from the D.C. Circuit to reconsider its prior decisions. The D.C. Circuit granted the unopposed motion for remand. On remand, the Commission reversed its previous decision and found PJM's evidence insufficient to show that the price caps for reserves and stepwise demand curve were unjust and unreasonable.PJM and others sought rehearing before the Commission, citing a procedural irregularity - the Chairman had directed FERC's Solicitor to seek remand without first informing the other Commissioners - and challenging the substance of the agency’s shift in views. The Commission rejected the request for rehearing but issued a modified order, reaching the same result, and reasoning that Chairman Glick had the unilateral authority to make the remand motion.The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the Chairman of FERC exceeded his legal authority when he requested a remand in the name of the Commission on his own. The court vacated part of the Commission’s order claiming the Chairman had this unilateral authority and remanded the case back to the Commission to decide what, if anything, it could or would have done differently in response to this legal mistake. The court did not rule on whether FERC's underlying ratemaking decisions were arbitrary and capricious, leaving it to the Commission to first resolve the legal mistake. View "Electric Power Supply Ass'n v. FERC" on Justia Law

by
The 1954 Atomic Energy Act allowed private construction, ownership, and operation of commercial nuclear power reactors for energy production. The 1957 Price-Anderson Act created a system of private insurance, government indemnification, and limited liability for federal licensees, 42 U.S.C. 2012(i). In 1988, in response to the Three Mile Island accident, federal district courts were given original and removal jurisdiction over both “extraordinary nuclear occurrences” and any public liability action arising out of or resulting from a nuclear incident; any suit asserting public liability was deemed to arise under 42 U.S.C. 2210, with the substantive rules for decision derived from state law, unless inconsistent with section 2210.The Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant enriched uranium for the nuclear weapons program and later to fuel commercial nuclear reactors. Plaintiffs lived near the plant, and claim that the plant was portrayed as safe while it discharged radioactive material that caused (and continues to cause) them harm.Plaintiffs, seeking to represent a class, filed suit in state court asserting claims under Ohio law. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the removal of the case on the grounds that the complaint, although it did not assert a federal claim, nonetheless raised a federal question under the Price-Anderson Act, and affirmed the subsequent dismissal. The Act preempted plaintiffs’ state law claims and the plaintiffs did not assert a claim under the Act but asserted that their “claims do not fall within the scope of the Price-Anderson Act.” View "Matthews v. Centrus Energy Corp." on Justia Law

by
The companies (Louisville) own and operate electric generation, transmission, and distribution facilities in Kentucky and Virginia; about 20 years ago, they joined MISO, which operates across 15 states (including Kentucky). Customers pay a single rate for access to transmission lines throughout the MISO service territory even if those lines are owned by multiple utilities. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission approved a merger between the companies.The Commission later approved Louisville's withdrawal from MISO, requiring Louisville to provide its wholesale customers protections like those they enjoyed through MISO so that a transmission of energy from a within-MISO generator to the customer’s facilities would incur only one charge. Once Louisville withdrew, its wholesale customers could face two charges (pancaking): one from MISO for the trip from the power plant to the MISO/Louisville border, then another from Louisville for the trip to the final destination. Louisville contracted with its wholesale customers accordingly, including Owensboro’s municipally-owned utility. To secure backup service in case its coal-fired plant suffered outages, Owensboro bought reservations of transmission rights from MISO and another within-MISO generator and asked Louisville to absorb the costs, citing Louisville’s promise to “shield” wholesale customers from pancaking of transmission charges for certain transactions in which they purchased electricity from a within-MISO source for delivery in Louisville’s territory. Louisville refused,Owensboro brought a complaint before the Commission, 16 U.S.C. 825e. The Commission agreed that the contract required Louisville to absorb all the costs. The Sixth Circuit vacated. In "a straightforward case of contract interpretation," the Commission did not address the operative text but treated the matter as an invitation to make complex policy choices. View "Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiffs were employed by Just Energy, a group of affiliated energy supply companies, as door-to-door solicitors. Just Energy paid them exclusively on a commission basis. Plaintiffs signed independent contractor agreements with confidentiality, non-disparagement, non-exclusive, and non-compete clauses; used a verbatim script with customers; were typically required to attend daily meetings; and were driven to the field in teams led by supervisors. Any work breaks were controlled by supervisors. Some Plaintiffs testified they were required to work on specific days and hours. They had to adhere to a dress code, wearing a shirt that prominently displays the company’s name. Just Energy could reject any customer’s application and commissions would not be paid. Of the 3,840 Plaintiffs with compensation data available, 214 made no money; 69% of the individuals made under $1,000 in total compensation.Plaintiffs sued, alleging that Just Energy misclassified them as outside salespeople in order to qualify for an exemption from the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act (OMFWSA). The court granted conditional class certification and instructed the jury “to consider the extent to which the employee has the authority to bind the company” and whether “the employer retains and/or exercises discretion to accept or reject any transactions for reasons that are unrelated to regulatory requirements.”The jury found Just Energy liable for minimum wage and overtime pay under the FLSA and the OMFWSA. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that Just Energy retained discretion to reject the sale. Plaintiffs did not benefit from minimal supervision; their jobs did not comport with the purpose of the outside sales exemption. The court upheld the admission of compensation evidence and the jury instruction. View "Hurt v. Commerce Energy, Inc." on Justia Law

by
FES distributes electricity, buying it from its fossil-fuel and nuclear electricity-generating subsidiaries. FES and a subsidiary filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court enjoined the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) from interfering with its plan to reject certain electricity-purchase contracts that FERC had previously approved under the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 791a or the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act, 16 U.S.C. 2601, applying the ordinary business-judgment rule and finding that the contracts were financially burdensome to FES. The counterparties were rendered unsecured creditors to the bankruptcy estate. The Sixth Circuit agreed that the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to decide whether FES may reject the contracts, but held that the injunction was overly broad (beyond its jurisdiction) and that its standard for deciding rejection was too limited. The public necessity of available and functional bankruptcy relief is generally superior to the necessity of FERC’s having complete or exclusive authority to regulate energy contracts and markets. The bankruptcy court exceeded its authority by enjoining FERC from “initiating or continuing any proceeding” or “interfer[ing] with [its] exclusive jurisdiction,” given that it did not have exclusive jurisdiction. On remand, the bankruptcy court must reconsider and decide the impact of the rejection of these contracts on the public interest—including the consequential impact on consumers and any tangential contract provisions concerning such things as decommissioning, environmental management, and future pension obligations—to ensure that the “equities balance in favor of rejecting the contracts.” View "In re: FirstEnergy Solutions Corp." on Justia Law

by
Kentucky Utilities (KU) burns coal to produce energy, then stores the leftover coal ash in two man-made ponds. Environmental groups contend that the chemicals in the coal ash are contaminating the surrounding groundwater, which in turn contaminates a nearby lake, in violation of the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1251(a), and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6902(a). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, in part, the dismissal of their suit. The CWA does not extend liability to pollution that reaches surface waters via groundwater. A “point source,” of pollution under the CWA is a “discernible, confined and discrete conveyance.” Groundwater is not a point source. RCRA does, however govern this conduct, and the plaintiffs have met the statutory rigors needed to bring such a claim. They have alleged (and supported) an imminent and substantial threat to the environment; they have provided the EPA and Kentucky ninety days to respond to those allegations, and neither the EPA nor Kentucky has filed one of the three types of actions that would preclude the citizen groups from proceeding with their federal lawsuit, so the district court had jurisdiction. View "Kentucky Waterways Alliance v. Kentucky Utilities Co." on Justia Law

by
Flint, which previously obtained water from DWSD, decided to join the Karegnondi Water Authority (KWA). The DWSD contract terminated in 2014. Because KWA would take years to construct, Flint chose the Flint River as an interim source. A 2011 Report had determined that river water would need to be treated to meet safety regulations; the cost of treatment was less than continuing with DWSD. Genesee County also decided to switch to KWA but continued to purchase DWSD water during construction. Flint did not upgrade its treatment plants or provide additional safety measures before switching. Residents immediately complained that the water “smelled rotten, looked foul, and tasted terrible.” Tests detected coliform and E. coli bacteria; the water was linked to Legionnaire’s disease. General Motors discontinued its water service, which was corroding its parts. Eventually, the city issued a notice that the drinking water violated standards, but was safe to drink. Subsequent testing indicated high levels of lead and trihalomethane that did not exceed the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) Lead and Copper Rule’s “action level.” The tests indicated that corrosion control treatment was needed to counteract lead levels. The City Council voted to reconnect with DWSD; the vote was overruled by the state-appointed Emergency Manager. The EPA warned of high lead levels; officials distributed filters. Genesee County declared a public health emergency in Flint, advising residents not to drink the water. The Emergency Manager ordered reconnection to DWSD but the supply pipes' protective coating had been damaged by River water. Flint remains in a state of emergency but residents have been billed continuously for water. The Michigan Civil Rights Commission determined that the response to the crisis was “the result of systemic racism.” The Sixth Circuit reversed dismissal, as preempted by SDWA, of cases under 42 U.S.C. 1983. SDWA has no textual preemption of section 1983 claims and SDWA’s remedial scheme does not demonstrate such an intention. The rights and protections found in the constitutional claims diverge from those provided by SDWA. The court affirmed dismissal of claims against state defendants as barred by the Eleventh Amendment. View "Boler v. Earley" on Justia Law

by
Over the last 10 years, the Federal Communications Commission has established rules governing how local governments may regulate cable companies. In 2007, the FCC barred franchising authorities from imposing unreasonable demands on franchise applicants or requiring new cable operators to provide non-cable services. The FCC also read narrowly the phrase “requirements or charges incidental to the awarding . . . of [a] franchise” (47 U.S.C. 542(g)(2)(D)), with the effect of limiting the monetary fees that local franchising authorities can collect. A petition for review was denied. Meanwhile, the FCC sought comment on expanding the application of the First Order’s rules—which applied only to new applicants for a cable franchise—to incumbent providers. In its Second Order, the FCC expanded the First Order’s application as proposed. Local franchising authorities again objected. The FCC finally rejected objections after seven years; the FCC clarified that the Second Order applied to only local (rather than state) franchising processes and published a “Supplemental Final Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis.” Local governments sought review, arguing that the FCC misinterpreted the Communications Act, and failed to explain the bases for its decisions. The Sixth Circuit granted the petition in part; while “franchise fee” (section 542(g)(1)) can include noncash exactions, the orders were arbitrary to the extent they treat “in-kind” cable-related exactions as “franchise fees” under section 541(g)(1). The FCC’s orders offer no valid basis for its application of the mixed-use rule to bar local franchising authorities from regulating the provision of non-telecommunications services by incumbent cable providers. View "Montgomery County. v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law