Articles Posted in U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

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DTE's Monroe plaint is the largest coal-fired power plant in Michigan; in 2010, DTE undertook a $65 million overhaul. The day before construction began, DTE submitted notice to the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality stating that DTE predicted an increase in post-construction emissions 100 times greater than the minimum necessary to constitute a “major modification” and require a preconstruction permit. DTE characterized the projects as routine maintenance,exempt from New Source Review (NSR) under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7475, 7503, and stated that it had excluded the entire predicted emissions increase from its projections of post-construction emissions based on “demand growth.” DTE began construction without an NSR permit. The EPA filed suit. In 2013, the Sixth Circuit held that a utility seeking to modify a source of air pollutants must “make a preconstruction projection of whether and to what extent emissions from the source will increase following construction,” which “determines whether the project constitutes a ‘major modification’ and thus requires a permit.” On remand, the district court again entered summary judgment for DTE, concluding that the EPA had to accept DTE’s projections at face value. The Sixth Circuit reversed. DTE was not required to secure the EPA’s approval of the projections, or the project, before construction, but in proceeding without a permit, DTE acted at its own risk. The EPA can challenge DTE’s preconstruction projections and there are genuine disputes of material fact that preclude summary judgment regarding compliance with NSR’s preconstruction requirements. The court noted that construction is complete and that actual post-construction emissions are irrelevant o whether DTE’s preconstruction projections complied with the regulations. View "United States v. DTE Energy Co." on Justia Law

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In 2013, the City of Detroit filed for chapter 9 bankruptcy protection, facing problems “run[ning] wide and deep”—including the affordable provision of basic utilities. In 2014, plaintiffs, customers, and the purported representatives of customers, of the Detroit Water and Sewerage Department (DWSD), filed an adversary proceeding, based on DWSD’s termination of water service to thousands of residential customers. Citing 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Supreme Court holding in Monell v. Department of Social Services, plaintiffs sought injunctive relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal. Section 904 of the Bankruptcy Code explicitly prohibits this relief. Whether grounded in state law or federal constitutional law, a bankruptcy court order requiring DWSD to provide water service at a specific price, or refrain from terminating service would interfere with the City’s “political [and] governmental powers,” its “property [and] revenues,” and its “use [and] enjoyment of . . . income-producing property,” 11 U.S.C. 904. Plaintiffs’ due process and equal protection claims were inadequately pled. View "Lyda v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

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Columbia stores natural gas in Medina Field, a naturally-occurring system of porous underground rock, pumping gas into the Field during summer, during low demand, and withdrawing it during winter. Medina is among 14 Ohio gas storage fields used by Columbia. Columbia received a federal Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity, 15 U.S.C. 717f, and was required to compensate those who own part of the Field by contractual agreement or eminent domain. The owners allege that Columbia stored gas for an indeterminate time without offering compensation and then offered $250 per lot. Each Medina owner rejected this offer. Columbia did not bring eminent domain proceedings. Other Ohio landowners accused Columbia of similar behavior and filed the Wilson class action in the Southern District of Ohio, including the Medina owners within the putative class. The Medina owners filed suit in the Northern District. Both actions claim trespass and unjust enrichment under Ohio law, and inverse condemnation under the Natural Gas Act. The Wilson suit also seeks damages for “native” natural gas Columbia takes when it withdraws its own gas. Columbia filed a counterclaim in Wilson, seeking to exercise eminent domain over every member of the putative class and join the Medina owners. The Northern District applied the first-to-file rule and dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The rule does apply, but dismissal was an abuse of discretion given jurisdictional and procedural hurdles to having the Medina claims heard in Wilson. View "Baatz v. Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC" on Justia Law

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Trumbull County has provided sewer service to General Motors’ Lordstown Assembly Plant since 1964. In the mid-2000s, the County borrowed $3.4 million from the U.S. Department of Agriculture to maintain and improve its sewer lines. That loan obligation triggered the protections of 7 U.S.C. 1926(b), under which sewer providers that owe money to the Department are protected from competition with other sewer providers. The County claims that the Village of Lordstown violated section 1926(b) when the Village built sewer lines that could one day serve GM’s Plant. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, holding on the merits that the Village’s mere construction of sewer lines did not curtail or limit the County’s service. The Sixth Circuit vacated, reaching the same result on grounds of lack of standing. While the County still owes a balance, section 1926(b) affords it a legally protected interest in freedom from competition, but it has shown not any actual or imminent invasion of that interest. Sewer lines can last for decades, so the mere fact of their construction does not show that the Village intends to compete with the County anytime soon. View "Trumbull Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Village of Lordstown" on Justia Law