Justia Utilities Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Supreme Court of Indiana
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Duke Energy Indiana, a regulated electric utility, planned to build new facilities in Noblesville, Indiana, to meet increased customer demand. The project involved demolishing an abandoned house and garage and constructing a new substation, transmission lines, and a garage. The City of Noblesville insisted that Duke comply with its unified development ordinance before proceeding with the demolition, requiring Duke to obtain multiple permits. Duke declined, arguing that the city had no power to regulate a public utility's service-related projects through local permitting requirements. Despite not obtaining the permits, Duke began demolition.In response, Noblesville issued a stop-work order and sued Duke in the Hamilton Circuit Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to enforce its ordinance. Duke counterclaimed, arguing that Noblesville lacked jurisdiction and authority to regulate its activities. The trial court found in favor of Noblesville, ordering Duke to comply with the ordinance and obtain the permits. The court also imposed a $150,000 penalty against Duke for starting demolition without the required permits and awarded Noblesville $115,679.10 in attorneys’ fees, expert fees, and costs. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' decisions, holding that while the trial court had jurisdiction over Noblesville’s enforcement action against Duke, only the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission could decide whether Noblesville’s ordinance interfered unreasonably with Duke’s utility functions. The court reasoned that the commission had both the fact-finding expertise and the broader non-local focus necessary to balance the competing interests of public utilities and municipalities in deciding such disputes. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court's opinion. View "Duke Energy Indiana LLC v. City of Noblesville" on Justia Law

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The City of Carmel, Indiana, enacted two ordinances in 2019, one prohibiting the construction of above-ground utility lines unless authorized by the city, and another outlining procedures for relocating utility facilities due to city projects. The ordinances placed all costs on the utilities unless the city agreed otherwise. When the city began two improvement projects requiring Duke Energy to relocate its facilities underground, a dispute arose over who should bear the costs, estimated to exceed $500,000. The city filed a complaint with the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission, asking it to uphold the ordinances as reasonable and order Duke to pay the relocation costs.The Commission, after a hearing, found the ordinances unreasonable and void. The city appealed this decision. The Court of Appeals reversed the Commission's order, dismissing the Commission as a party to the appeal. Both the Commission and Duke sought transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court.The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's decision, finding that the Commission was a proper party on appeal and that its findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence. The court concluded that the ordinances were unreasonable because they threatened to impose unreasonable expenses on Duke, which would in turn impact all Duke customers throughout Indiana. The court also found that the Commission's order declaring the ordinances void was within its statutory power. View "City of Carmel v. Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission approving Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Company's (Vectren) petition for approval of its new instantaneous netting method determining the amount of credit its customers receive for their excess distributed generation of electricity, holding that there was no error.Acting within its expertise and authority, the Commission approved Vectren's petition seeking approval of a tariff (Rider EDG) rate for the procurement of excess distributed generation. The Commission approved the Rider EDG, finding that the instantaneous netting method was consistent with Ind. Code 8-1-40-5. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commission properly held that Vectren's instantaneous netting method was not contrary to law and satisfied the requirements in Ind. Code Ann. 8-1-40-5. View "Ind. Office of Utility Consumer Counselor v. Southern Indiana Gas & Electric Co." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed a portion of the utility regulatory commission's order that approved in part Duke Energy's request to increase its rates for retail consumers, holding that, absent specific statutory authorization, a utility cannot recoup its past costs adjudicated under a prior rate case by treating the costs as a capitalized asset.In 2020, the commission granted Duke's petition for a rate increase in part permitting Duke to recover about $212 million for coal-ash site closures, remediation, and financing costs, with the bulk of the costs having been incurred from 2015 to 2018. At issue was whether the commission could approve reimbursement for a deferred asset without violating the statutory bar against retroactive ratemaking. The Supreme Court answered in the negative, holding that the commission acted without statutory authority in re-adjudicating expenses already governed by a prior rate order. View "Indiana Office of Utility Consumer Counselor v. Duke Energy Indiana, LLC" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission approving two complex, multi-year settlements regarding rates and infrastructure investments under the TDSIC Statute, Ind. Code ch. 8-1-39, holding that Appellant, a party to and proponent of the settlement agreements, was estopped from raising this challenge and that the Commission's order contained sufficient findings.The agreements in this case specified how, in the utility's period petitions to the Commission, rate increases should be calculated and allocated among the utility's various rate classes. Despite being a party to the underlying agreements, Appellant, a group of some of the utility's largest industrial customers, opposed the utility's second periodic petition. Specifically, Appellant argued that the utility's rate calculation and allocation based on the underlying agreements was contrary to the TDSIC Statute. The Commission largely approved the utility's petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant was estopped from challenging the terms of the settlement; and (2) the Commission's conclusion was reasonable and properly supported by specific findings. View "NIPSCO Industrial Group v. Northern Indiana Public Service Co." on Justia Law

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Under traditional rate regulation, an energy utility must first make improvements to its infrastructure before it can recover their cost through regulator-approved rate increases to customers. The process is an expensive, onerous rate-making case, which involves a comprehensive review of the utility’s entire business operations. In 2013 the legislature authorized utilities to obtain regulatory preapproval for “designated” improvements to their infrastructure. Under the “TDSIC” Statute, a utility can seek regulatory approval of a seven-year plan that designates eligible improvements, followed by periodic petitions to adjust rates automatically as approved investments are completed. The Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission preapproved approximately $20 million in infrastructure investments and authorized increases to NIPSCO’s natural-gas rates under the TDSIC mechanism. The approval referred to categories of improvements that describe broad parameters for future improvements but did not designate those improvements with specificity. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed, in part, concluding that the TDSIC Statute permits periodic rate increases only for specific projects a utility designates, and the Commission approves, in the threshold proceeding and not for multiple-unit projects using ascertainable planning criteria. A utility must specifically identify the projects or improvements at the outset in its seven-year plan and not in later proceedings involving periodic updates. Commission approval of “broad categories of unspecified projects defeats the purpose of having a plan.” View "NIPSCO Industrial Group v. Northern Indiana Public Service Co." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing the Indiana Utility and Regulatory Commission (the Commission) in this appeal from the Commission’s decision authorizing a rate and charges increase lower than Hamilton Southeastern Utilities, Inc. (HSE) requested.HSE petitioned the Commission to approve an 8.42 percent increase in its charges. The Commission issued an order authorizing only a 1.17 percent increase in HSE’s rates and charges. HSE appealed, arguing that the Commission erred in excluding some expenses from its rates. The court of appeals granted HSE’s motion to dismiss the Commission, concluding that it was not a proper party to the appeal and then found that the Commission erred in excluding some expenses from HSE’s rates. The Supreme Court held (1) the Commission should not have been dismissed; (2) because the court of appeals found that the Commission acted arbitrarily in excluding SAMCO-related expenses from HSE’s rate calculation without giving the Commission an opportunity to defend its order, this issue must be reversed and remanded to the court of appeals with instructions to permit the Commission an opportunity to brief the issue; and (3) the remainder of the court of appeals’ opinion is summarily affirmed. View "Hamilton Southeastern Utilities, Inc. v. Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

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At issue was the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission’s preapproval of approximately $20 million in infrastructure investments, for which the Commission authorized increases to NIPSCO Industrial Group’s natural-gas rates under the mechanism implemented by the so-called “TDSIC” statute.Under the TDSIC statute, a utility can seek regulatory approval of a seven-year plan that designates eligible improvements followed by periodic petitions to adjust rates automatically as approved investments are completed. Some of the largest customers of NIPSCO, an energy utility with more than 800,000 customers in northern Indiana, opposed NIPSCO’s entitlement to favorable rate treatment under the TDSIC statute on the grounds that the disputed projects did not comply with the statute’s requirements. The Commission approved various categories of improvements but did not designate those improvements with specificity. The Supreme Court reversed the Commission’s order in part, holding (1) the TDSIC statute permits periodic rate increases only for specific projects a utility designates, and the Commission approves, at the outset in a utility’s seven-year-plan and not in later proceedings involving periodic updates; and (2) the Commission’s approval of “broad categories of unspecific projects defeats the purpose of having a ‘plan.’” View "NIPSCO Industrial Group v. Northern Public Service Co." on Justia Law