Justia Utilities Law Opinion Summaries

Columbia stores natural gas in Medina Field, a naturally-occurring system of porous underground rock, pumping gas into the Field during summer, during low demand, and withdrawing it during winter. Medina is among 14 Ohio gas storage fields used by Columbia. Columbia received a federal Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity, 15 U.S.C. 717f, and was required to compensate those who own part of the Field by contractual agreement or eminent domain. The owners allege that Columbia stored gas for an indeterminate time without offering compensation and then offered $250 per lot. Each Medina owner rejected this offer. Columbia did not bring eminent domain proceedings. Other Ohio landowners accused Columbia of similar behavior and filed the Wilson class action in the Southern District of Ohio, including the Medina owners within the putative class. The Medina owners filed suit in the Northern District. Both actions claim trespass and unjust enrichment under Ohio law, and inverse condemnation under the Natural Gas Act. The Wilson suit also seeks damages for “native” natural gas Columbia takes when it withdraws its own gas. Columbia filed a counterclaim in Wilson, seeking to exercise eminent domain over every member of the putative class and join the Medina owners. The Northern District applied the first-to-file rule and dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The rule does apply, but dismissal was an abuse of discretion given jurisdictional and procedural hurdles to having the Medina claims heard in Wilson. View "Baatz v. Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC" on Justia Law

The Lakes Water System (LWS), created in the late 1800s-early 1900s, provides Vallejo with potable water. After completing a diversion dam and the Green Line for transmission, the city created two reservoirs, Lake Frey and Lake Madigan, which were soon insufficient to meet demand. The city began storing water in hills above Napa County’s Gordon Valley and constructed the Gordon transmission line. The city acquired easements from some property owners by agreeing to provide “free water.” The city also agreed to provide potable water to other nonresident customers. In the 1950s, the city obtained water rights from the Sacramento River Delta and contracted for water from the Solano Project. In 1992, water quality from Lake Curry ceased to meet standards and the city closed the Gordon Line. In 1992 the city passed an ordinance shifting the entire cost of LWS to 809 nonresident customers, so that their rates increased by 230 percent. The city passed additional rate increases in 1995 and 2009. Plaintiff, representing a purported class of nonresident LWS customers, alleges the city has grossly mismanaged and neglected LWS, placing the burden on the Class to fund a deteriorating, inefficient, and costly system, spread over an “incoherent service area” and plaintiff did not become aware of unfunded liabilities until 2013 The court of appeal affirmed dismissal; plaintiff cannot state any viable claims alleging misconduct by the city. View "Green Valley Landowners Ass'n v. City of Vallejo" on Justia Law

The Northeast Ohio Regional Sewer District (the “Sewer District”) filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment that it had the authority to implement a regional stormwater-management program and to impose fees to be charged to landowners within the Sewer District. The trial court declared that the Sewer District had authority under Ohio Rev. Code 6119 and its charter to enact a regional stormwater-management program. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Sewer District has authority to implement a regional stormwater-management program and to charge fees for that program. View "Northeast Ohio Reg’l Sewer Dist. v. Bath Twp." on Justia Law

Great Oaks, a water retailer, challenged a groundwater extraction fee imposed on water it draws from wells on its property. The power to impose such a fee is statutorily vested in the Santa Clara Valley Water Management District. The trial court awarded a refund of charges paid by Great Oaks, finding that the charge violated the provisions of both the District Act and Article XIII D of the California Constitution, which imposes procedural and substantive constraints on fees and charges imposed by local public entities. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the fee is a property-related charge for purposes of Article 13D, subject to some constraints, but is also a charge for water service, exempt from the requirement of voter ratification. A pre-suit claim submitted by Great Oaks did not preserve any monetary remedy against the District for violations of Article 13D and, because the matter was treated as a simple action for damages when it should have been treated as a petition for a writ of mandate, the trial court failed to apply a properly deferential standard of review to the question whether the District’s setting of the fee, or its use of the resulting proceeds, complied with the District Act. View "Great Oaks Water Co. v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist." on Justia Law

In 2005, former owners subdivided a Hayward lot into three residential lots. Alameda County approved a tentative map with a condition requiring connection to the District water system at the expense of the subdivider “in accordance with the requirements of said District.” A service assessment was prepared by the District, stating: “THIS IS NOT A PROPOSAL TO PROVIDE WATER SERVICES.” An Approved Parcel Map was recorded, providing the District a utility easement in the form of a water main extension. Plaintiff purchased a lot in 2009; it did not yet have water service. The District provided an estimate that required a 15-foot-long easement beyond plaintiff’s lot line for installation and maintenance of the pipeline and blowoff assembly. The District rejected alterations requested by plaintiff because his layout would have made it impossible to reach his meter from the proposed water main at a right angle. Plaintiff sought to compel the District “to provide water service to Plaintiff consistent with the laws and regulations.” The trial court rejected his claims. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting claims under the Subdivision Map Act and stating that even if the District has granted waivers for other properties, there is nothing that prohibits it from exercising its discretion to deny plaintiff a waiver. View "Tarbet v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist." on Justia Law

Casitas is a publicly owned water utility in western Ventura County. Its territory includes Ojai. Most of Ojai receives water from Golden State, which charges rates that are more than double those charged by Casitas. After failed attempts to obtain relief from the Public Utilities Commission, residents formed Ojai FLOW, which, supported by Ojai's city council, petitioned Casitas to take over water service in Ojai. Casitas is subject to the Brown Act and the California Public Records Act, Under Proposition 218, Casitas's rates can be reduced by a majority of voters in its service area. Using the Mello-Roos Act (Gov. Code, 53311) to finance the transaction, placing the financial burden on Ojai residents rather than on its existing customers, Casitas formed a community facilities district; passed resolutions; and submitted the matter to voters. A special tax would be levied to pay for bonds. Golden State sought to invalidate Casitas's resolutions. The trial court stayed the case. At the single-issue special election that drew more than half of eligible voters, 87 percent of the electorate approved the measure. The trial court then rejected claims that the Mello-Roos Act cannot be used to finance eminent domain or the acquisition of intangible property rights and cannot be used by one service provider to supplant another. The court of appeal affirmed. The Act applies regardless of whether the seller consents to the sale or is compelled under force of law. Financing the acquisition of intangible property incidental to tangible property is consistent with the Act's purpose. View "Golden State Water Co. v. Casitas Mun. Water Dist." on Justia Law

The United Water Conservation District manages groundwater resources in central Ventura County. San Buenaventura (City) pumps groundwater from District territory and sells it to residential customers. The District collects a fee from groundwater pumpers, including the City, based on volume. The Water Code authorizes this fee (Wat. Code, 74508, 75522) and requires the District to set different rates for different uses. Groundwater extracted for non-agricultural purposes must be charged at three to five times the rate applicable to water used for agricultural purposes. The California Constitution (article XIIID) governs fees "upon a parcel or upon a person as an incident of property ownership, including a user fee or charge for a property related service." The City claimed that the fees violate article XIII D because they "exceed the proportional cost of the service attributable to the parcel[s]" from which the City pumps its water. The trial court found that the pumping charges violated article XIII D and ordered refunds. The court of appeal reversed: pumping fees are not property related taxes subject to the requirements of article XIII C. The charges are valid regulatory fees because they are fair and reasonable, and do not exceed the District's resource management costs. View "City of San Buenaventura v. United Water Conserv. Dist." on Justia Law

After Appellants, several public utilities, sought to condemn a permanent easement across the property of Landowners for a high-voltage transmission line, Landowners elected to compel Appellants to purchase their entire parcel of land pursuant to the Buy-the-Farm statute, Minn. Stat. 216E.12(4). Appellants challenged Landowners’ election, arguing that it was not reasonable because the land subject to the election was much larger than the land needed for the easement and that the district court must consider several factors in addition to the statute’s requirements, including the size of the election. The district court approved the election, concluding that it was not required to analyze factors outside the provisions of the Buy-the-Farm statute. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the language of the statute forecloses Appellants’ assertion that the district court must engage in a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis of the reasonableness of Landowners’ election; (2) case law does not require an extra-statutory analysis; and (3) because Landowners’ election meets the statutory requires, the district court did not err in approving the compelled purchase of the parcel. View "Great River Energy v. Swedzinski" on Justia Law

This case arose from a longstanding issue between Public Utility District No. 1 of Okanogan County (PUD) and the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) over the installation of an electrical transmission line through school lands managed by DNR in the Methow Valley. At issue was whether PUD was statutorily authorized to condemn a right of way through school trust lands for the construction of a transmission corridor and, if so, whether the particular school lands were nonetheless exempt from condemnation as a result of their trust status as school lands or their then-present use for cattle grazing. The trial court and Court of Appeals concluded that PUD is statutorily authorized to condemn school lands and that the particular school lands at issue are subject to condemnation. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Okanogan County v. Washington" on Justia Law

On Friday, January 9, 2009, after business hours, an unidentified motor vehicle crashed into and felled a utility pole carrying electric lines owned and operated by Duquesne Light. Several wires were connected to Burton L. Hirsh’s Funeral Home, and at least one was stripped from the attachment point to the building’s electrical system located on the structure. In addition to the funeral home, a number of other local buildings lost power as a result of the incident, although no structure other than Hirsh’s was connected directly to the downed pole. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review, as framed by appellant, was “[w]hether the Superior Court erred in imposing upon electric utilities a burdensome and unprecedented duty to enter customers’ premises and inspect customers’ electrical facilities before restoring power after an outage” The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court, finding that Duquesne Light failed to adequately confront the common-law duties invoked by Hirsh or the warnings dynamic tempering the Superior Court’s ruling. The Superior Court did not err to the extent that it recognized a duty, on the part of an electric service provider, to take reasonable measures to avert harm in a scenario in which the utility has actual or constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition impacting a customer’s electrical system, occasioned by fallen and intermixed electrical lines proximate to the customer’s premises. The Court offered no opinion as to whether Duquesne Light had actual or constructive knowledge of an unreasonable risk in this scenario, since the electric company’s summary judgment effort was not staged in a manner which would have elicited an informed determination on such point. View "Alderwoods (PA), Inc. v. Duquesne Light" on Justia Law