Justia Utilities Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Real Estate & Property Law
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The Water Court is adjudicating the existing water right claims of all appropriators in the Teton River Basin and issued a temporary preliminary decree for Basin 41O. Eldorado, which distributes water to shareholders from the Teton River northwest of Choteau, owns water rights that historically have been administered under the 1908 Perry Decree by a water commissioner (MCA 85-5-101). In 2014, the Water Court addressed objections to Eldorado’s existing water right claims as established under the temporary preliminary decree. The Montana Supreme Court, in Eldorado I, upheld the Water Court’s determinations that Eldorado’s claims required a volume quantification and that Eldorado historically put to beneficial use 15,000 acre-feet of water under its existing rights. The Joint Objectors later informed the water commissioner that Eldorado was approaching the volumetric quantification established by that order and requested that he cap the distribution of Eldorado’s water. Eldorado petitioned the Water Court to stay the volume quantification order pending the Eldorado I appeal. The Water Court denied Eldorado’s request and the commissioner ceased delivering water to Eldorado. Eldorado filed a dissatisfied water user complaint (MCA 85-5-301). The Montana Supreme Court affirmed denial of that complaint. Eldorado participated in every step of the process that resulted in the establishment of its rights under the modified temporary preliminary decree. View "Eldorado Coop Canal Co. v. Hoge" on Justia Law

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The Board challenged two separate orders of the PSC. The first order is a declaratory statement that the PSC issued in response to a petition filed by the City of Vero Beach, in which the PSC declared that the City has the right and obligation under territorial orders issued by the PSC to continue to provide electric service in the territory described in the orders (which includes unincorporated portions of the County) upon the expiration of the City’s franchise agreement with the County. The court rejected the County's challenges and held that the City had standing to seek this declaration from the PSC concerning territorial orders to which the City is a party and which the County had taken the position would be voided by the Franchise Agreement’s expiration, thereby effectively evicting the City. The court also held that the PSC’s declaration is within the PSC’s authority as the entity with exclusive and superior statutory jurisdiction to determine utility service areas, and that the declaration does not impermissibly grant the County’s property rights to the City or violate the statutory prohibition against the PSC affecting a franchise fee. The second order on appeal denies the County’s petition for a declaratory statement on the ground that it failed to meet applicable statutory requirements. The court agreed and affirmed this order without further comment. View "Bd. of Cnty. Comm'r Indian River Cnty. v. Art Graham, etc." on Justia Law

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In 2013, the Kanis and Denny Roads Suburban Water Improvement District No. 349 of Pulaski County (the District) reassessed Southwest Power Pool, Inc.’s (SPP) commercial facility, an improvement on its property that is connected to the City of Little Rock’s waterworks system, which resulted in an annual levy of $60,653. The District’s board of equalization confirmed the reassessment. SPP then filed a complaint in circuit court, arguing that the reassessment was wrong as a matter of law and of fact. The circuit court largely granted the District’s motion for summary judgment, and, following a bench trial on the issue of the sufficiency of the 2013 notice of reassessment, the circuit court granted final judgment in favor of the District. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that SPP’s facility cannot be assessed, and accordingly, the 2013 reassessment, and the subsequent reassessments, are invalid. View "Sw. Power Pool Inc. v. Kanis & Denny Roads Suburban Water Improvement Dist. No. 34" on Justia Law

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Columbia stores natural gas in Medina Field, a naturally-occurring system of porous underground rock, pumping gas into the Field during summer, during low demand, and withdrawing it during winter. Medina is among 14 Ohio gas storage fields used by Columbia. Columbia received a federal Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity, 15 U.S.C. 717f, and was required to compensate those who own part of the Field by contractual agreement or eminent domain. The owners allege that Columbia stored gas for an indeterminate time without offering compensation and then offered $250 per lot. Each Medina owner rejected this offer. Columbia did not bring eminent domain proceedings. Other Ohio landowners accused Columbia of similar behavior and filed the Wilson class action in the Southern District of Ohio, including the Medina owners within the putative class. The Medina owners filed suit in the Northern District. Both actions claim trespass and unjust enrichment under Ohio law, and inverse condemnation under the Natural Gas Act. The Wilson suit also seeks damages for “native” natural gas Columbia takes when it withdraws its own gas. Columbia filed a counterclaim in Wilson, seeking to exercise eminent domain over every member of the putative class and join the Medina owners. The Northern District applied the first-to-file rule and dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The rule does apply, but dismissal was an abuse of discretion given jurisdictional and procedural hurdles to having the Medina claims heard in Wilson. View "Baatz v. Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC" on Justia Law

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The Lakes Water System (LWS), created in the late 1800s-early 1900s, provides Vallejo with potable water. After completing a diversion dam and the Green Line for transmission, the city created two reservoirs, Lake Frey and Lake Madigan, which were soon insufficient to meet demand. The city began storing water in hills above Napa County’s Gordon Valley and constructed the Gordon transmission line. The city acquired easements from some property owners by agreeing to provide “free water.” The city also agreed to provide potable water to other nonresident customers. In the 1950s, the city obtained water rights from the Sacramento River Delta and contracted for water from the Solano Project. In 1992, water quality from Lake Curry ceased to meet standards and the city closed the Gordon Line. In 1992 the city passed an ordinance shifting the entire cost of LWS to 809 nonresident customers, so that their rates increased by 230 percent. The city passed additional rate increases in 1995 and 2009. Plaintiff, representing a purported class of nonresident LWS customers, alleges the city has grossly mismanaged and neglected LWS, placing the burden on the Class to fund a deteriorating, inefficient, and costly system, spread over an “incoherent service area” and plaintiff did not become aware of unfunded liabilities until 2013 The court of appeal affirmed dismissal; plaintiff cannot state any viable claims alleging misconduct by the city. View "Green Valley Landowners Ass'n v. City of Vallejo" on Justia Law

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The Northeast Ohio Regional Sewer District (the “Sewer District”) filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment that it had the authority to implement a regional stormwater-management program and to impose fees to be charged to landowners within the Sewer District. The trial court declared that the Sewer District had authority under Ohio Rev. Code 6119 and its charter to enact a regional stormwater-management program. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Sewer District has authority to implement a regional stormwater-management program and to charge fees for that program. View "Northeast Ohio Reg’l Sewer Dist. v. Bath Twp." on Justia Law

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Great Oaks, a water retailer, challenged a groundwater extraction fee imposed on water it draws from wells on its property. The power to impose such a fee is statutorily vested in the Santa Clara Valley Water Management District. The trial court awarded a refund of charges paid by Great Oaks, finding that the charge violated the provisions of both the District Act and Article XIII D of the California Constitution, which imposes procedural and substantive constraints on fees and charges imposed by local public entities. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the fee is a property-related charge for purposes of Article 13D, subject to some constraints, but is also a charge for water service, exempt from the requirement of voter ratification. A pre-suit claim submitted by Great Oaks did not preserve any monetary remedy against the District for violations of Article 13D and, because the matter was treated as a simple action for damages when it should have been treated as a petition for a writ of mandate, the trial court failed to apply a properly deferential standard of review to the question whether the District’s setting of the fee, or its use of the resulting proceeds, complied with the District Act. View "Great Oaks Water Co. v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist." on Justia Law

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In 2005, former owners subdivided a Hayward lot into three residential lots. Alameda County approved a tentative map with a condition requiring connection to the District water system at the expense of the subdivider “in accordance with the requirements of said District.” A service assessment was prepared by the District, stating: “THIS IS NOT A PROPOSAL TO PROVIDE WATER SERVICES.” An Approved Parcel Map was recorded, providing the District a utility easement in the form of a water main extension. Plaintiff purchased a lot in 2009; it did not yet have water service. The District provided an estimate that required a 15-foot-long easement beyond plaintiff’s lot line for installation and maintenance of the pipeline and blowoff assembly. The District rejected alterations requested by plaintiff because his layout would have made it impossible to reach his meter from the proposed water main at a right angle. Plaintiff sought to compel the District “to provide water service to Plaintiff consistent with the laws and regulations.” The trial court rejected his claims. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting claims under the Subdivision Map Act and stating that even if the District has granted waivers for other properties, there is nothing that prohibits it from exercising its discretion to deny plaintiff a waiver. View "Tarbet v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist." on Justia Law

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Casitas is a publicly owned water utility in western Ventura County. Its territory includes Ojai. Most of Ojai receives water from Golden State, which charges rates that are more than double those charged by Casitas. After failed attempts to obtain relief from the Public Utilities Commission, residents formed Ojai FLOW, which, supported by Ojai's city council, petitioned Casitas to take over water service in Ojai. Casitas is subject to the Brown Act and the California Public Records Act, Under Proposition 218, Casitas's rates can be reduced by a majority of voters in its service area. Using the Mello-Roos Act (Gov. Code, 53311) to finance the transaction, placing the financial burden on Ojai residents rather than on its existing customers, Casitas formed a community facilities district; passed resolutions; and submitted the matter to voters. A special tax would be levied to pay for bonds. Golden State sought to invalidate Casitas's resolutions. The trial court stayed the case. At the single-issue special election that drew more than half of eligible voters, 87 percent of the electorate approved the measure. The trial court then rejected claims that the Mello-Roos Act cannot be used to finance eminent domain or the acquisition of intangible property rights and cannot be used by one service provider to supplant another. The court of appeal affirmed. The Act applies regardless of whether the seller consents to the sale or is compelled under force of law. Financing the acquisition of intangible property incidental to tangible property is consistent with the Act's purpose. View "Golden State Water Co. v. Casitas Mun. Water Dist." on Justia Law

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The United Water Conservation District manages groundwater resources in central Ventura County. San Buenaventura (City) pumps groundwater from District territory and sells it to residential customers. The District collects a fee from groundwater pumpers, including the City, based on volume. The Water Code authorizes this fee (Wat. Code, 74508, 75522) and requires the District to set different rates for different uses. Groundwater extracted for non-agricultural purposes must be charged at three to five times the rate applicable to water used for agricultural purposes. The California Constitution (article XIIID) governs fees "upon a parcel or upon a person as an incident of property ownership, including a user fee or charge for a property related service." The City claimed that the fees violate article XIII D because they "exceed the proportional cost of the service attributable to the parcel[s]" from which the City pumps its water. The trial court found that the pumping charges violated article XIII D and ordered refunds. The court of appeal reversed: pumping fees are not property related taxes subject to the requirements of article XIII C. The charges are valid regulatory fees because they are fair and reasonable, and do not exceed the District's resource management costs. View "City of San Buenaventura v. United Water Conserv. Dist." on Justia Law