Justia Utilities Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sustained injuries as a result of a motorcycle accident involving a Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (CEI) utility pole. Plaintiff and his wife sued CEI, FirstEnergy Service Company (First Energy), and their parent company (collectively, Defendants), asserting, inter alia, claims for negligence and qualified nuisance. The jury returned a verdict for Plaintiffs on their qualified nuisance and loss of consortium claims but returned a verdict for CEI and FirstEnergy on the negligence claim. Defendants appealed, arguing that Turner v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. provided an absolute bar to liability. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, as a matter of law, CEI and FirstEnergy could not be held liable under any theory of liability asserted by Plaintiffs. View "Link v. FirstEnergy Corp." on Justia Law

When a fire caused by NSTAR Electric and Gas Company employees damaged a building owned by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), two insurers paid the claims of the building’s tenants. The insurers then brought this complaint against NSTAR Electric Company and NSTAR Electric & Gas Company (collectively, NSTAR) seeking to recover for the claims paid. NSTAR moved for partial summary judgment, contending that, to the extent to which the insurers sought recovery for business interruption losses, the claims were barred by Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications and Energy Tariff No. 200A, filed with and approved by the Department of Public Utilities, and in effect when the explosion occurred. The tariff contained a limitation of liability clause that limited NSTAR from liability to nonresidential customers for special, indirect, or consequential damages resulting from the utility’s gross negligence. A judge of the superior court allowed NSTAR’s motion for partial summary judgment, concluding that a tariff filed with and approved by a regulatory agency may limit a public utility’s liability. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the limitation of liability clause in the tariff precluded Plaintiffs’ claims to recover for business interruption and other consequential or economic damages. View "Maryland Cas. Co. v. NSTAR Elec. Co." on Justia Law

Coppage Construction Company, Inc. filed a third-party complaint raising a number of contract, tort, and statutory claims against Sanitation District No. 1 (SD1), a public sewer utility serving three Northern Kentucky counties. SD1 moved to dismiss the third-party complaint on the grounds that it was entitled to sovereign immunity. The circuit court converted the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and granted the motion, concluding that SD1 was entitled to sovereign immunity because SD1’s “parent” entities - the three counties - were immune entities, and SD1 performed a function integral to state government. The Court of Appeals affirmed, describing SD1 as an “arm” of the three counties. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and vacated the summary judgment order of the circuit court, holding that SD1 was not entitled to sovereign immunity because it was not created by the state or a county and does not carry out a function integral to state government. View "Coppage Constr. Co., Inc. v. Sanitation Dist. No. 1" on Justia Law

The gas company found stray voltage on Wilson’s gas meter the year after she moved into her house, and again two years later. Edison paid for measures that virtually eliminated the voltage on the meter. After Wilson remodeled her bathroom, she began felt low levels of electricity in her shower, which had metal pipes and a drain connected to the ground. Edison offered to replace the metal pipes with plastic, to eliminate the voltage in her shower, but Wilson refused and insisted that Edison eliminate all stray voltage on her property. A jury found in favor of Wilson on claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and nuisance, and awarded $1,050,000 in compensatory damages and $3 million in punitive damages. The court of appeal held that the Public Utilities Commission has not exercised its authority to adopt a policy regarding the issues in the lawsuit, and, therefore, does not have exclusive jurisdiction over Wilson’s claims. Wilson, however, failed to present sufficient evidence to support her IIED and negligence claims, or to support an award of punitive damages. The verdict on the nuisance claim cannot stand because the court refused to give Edison’s proffered instruction regarding causation of Wilson’s physical symptoms. The jury relied upon irrelevant evidence. View "Wilson v. Southern Cal. Edison Co." on Justia Law

NorthWestern Energy (NWE) disconnected electric service to Plaintiff's residence based on an outstanding balance on Plaintiff's utility bill. Plaintiff filed an action alleging property damage due to NWE's negligence and negligence per se, claiming that the termination of his electric service caused his furnace to fail, which led to water pipes freezing and bursting. NWE filed a motion to dismiss based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction for Plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies before the Public Service Commission (PSC). The district court granted NWE's motion and dismissed the action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the PSC had no authority to adjudicate Plaintiff's damage claim, and a negligence action seeking damages could be maintained against the power company in district court. View "Schuster v. NorthWestern Energy Co." on Justia Law

A fire destroyed a hydroponic tomato facility belonging to a new business, Sunnyland Farms, Inc. The day before the fire, Sunnyland's electricity had been shut off by its local utility, the Central New Mexico Electrical Cooperative (CNMEC), for nonpayment. Sunnyland's water pumps were powered by electricity, and without power, Sunnyland's facility had no water. Sunnyland sued CNMEC, alleging both that CNMEC had wrongfully suspended service, and if its electrical service had been in place, firefighters and Sunnyland employees would have been able to stop the fire from consuming the facility. After a bench trial, the court found CNMEC liable for negligence and breach of contract. The trial court awarded damages, including lost profits, of over $21 million in contract and tort, but reduced the tort damages by 80% for Sunnyland's comparative fault. It also awarded $100,000 in punitive damages. The parties cross-appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the contract judgment, vacated the punitive damages, held that the lost profit damages were not supported by sufficient evidence, affirmed the trial court's offset of damages based on CNMEC's purchase of a subrogation lien, and affirmed the trial court's rulings on pre- and post-judgment interest. Sunnyland appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals regarding the contract judgment, punitive damages, and interest, and reversed on the lost profit damages and the offset. The Court also took the opportunity of this case to re-examine the standard for consequential contract damages in New Mexico. View "Sunnyland Farms, Inc. v. Central N.M. Electric Cooperative, Inc." on Justia Law

Two public utilities (the companies) were wholly owned subsidiaries of appellant FirstEnergy Corporation. Appellees were residential customers of the companies. The customers filed a class-action complaint against FirstEnergy and the companies in the county court of common pleas. The complaint raised four causes of action: declaratory judgment, breach of contract, fraud, and injunctive relief. The trial court granted FirstEnergy's motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) had exclusive jurisdiction over the allegations in the complaint. The court of appeals affirmed in all respects except with regard to the customers' fraud claim. The appellate court determined on two separate grounds that the trial court had jurisdiction over the fraud claim and remanded that claim to the trial court. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, holding (1) the customers' fraud claim was not a pure tort action, but rather, was a claim that the companies were overcharging the customers for electric service; and (2) because the complaint was challenging the rates charged for utility service, it fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the PUCO. View "DiFranco v. FirstEnergy Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, several states, the city of New York, and three private land trusts, sued defendants, four private power companies and the federal Tennessee Valley Authority, alleging that defendants' emissions substantially and unreasonably interfered with public rights in violation of the federal common law of interstate nuisance, or in the alternative, of state tort law. Plaintiffs sought a decree setting carbon-dioxide emissions for each defendant at an initial cap to be further reduced annually. At issue was whether plaintiffs could maintain federal common law public nuisance claims against carbon-dioxide emitters. As a preliminary matter, the Court affirmed, by an equally divided Court, the Second Circuit's exercise of jurisdiction and proceeded to the merits. The Court held that the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401, and the Environmental Protection Act ("Act"), 42 U.S.C. 7411, action the Act authorized displaced any federal common-law right to seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel fired power plants. The Court also held that the availability vel non of a state lawsuit depended, inter alia, on the preemptive effect of the federal Act. Because none of the parties have briefed preemption or otherwise addressed the availability of a claim under state nuisance law, the matter was left for consideration on remand. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "American Elec. Power Co., et al. v. Connecticut, et al." on Justia Law

In this diversity suit, a landowner sought injunctive and compensatory relief from a telephone company for a trespass and for slandering its title to certain property. The district court granted summary judgment to the telephone company. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings, holding (1) the district court erred in concluding that the telephone company had a constructive license across the property; (2) the district court incorrectly dismissed the landowner's claim for compensatory damages; and (3) summary judgment against the landowner's claims for slander of title and punitive damages was appropriate. View "Marlow, LLC v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, several states, the city of New York, and three private land trusts, sued defendants, four private power companies and the federal Tennessee Valley Authority, alleging that defendants' emissions substantially and unreasonably interfered with public rights in violation of the federal common law of interstate nuisance, or in the alternative, of state tort law. Plaintiffs sought a decree setting carbon-dioxide emissions for each defendant at an initial cap to be further reduced annually. At issue was whether plaintiffs could maintain federal common law public nuisance claims against carbon-dioxide emitters. As a preliminary matter, the Court affirmed, by an equally divided Court, the Second Circuit's exercise of jurisdiction and proceeded to the merits. The Court held that the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401, and the Environmental Protection Act ("Act"), 42 U.S.C. 7411, action the Act authorized displaced any federal common-law right to seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel fired power plants. The Court also held that the availability vel non of a state lawsuit depended, inter alia, on the preemptive effect of the federal Act. Because none of the parties have briefed preemption or otherwise addressed the availability of a claim under state nuisance law, the matter was left for consideration on remand. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "American Elec. Power Co., et al. v. Connecticut, et al." on Justia Law