Justia Utilities Law Opinion Summaries

This was the third appeal of this case arising from the efforts of appellee Southern LNG, Inc. (“Southern”) to compel State Revenue Commissioner Lynnette Riley (“the Commissioner”) to recognize Southern as a “public utility” under OCGA 48-5-511 and to accept Southern’s ad valorem property tax returns. On remand, the trial court granted summary judgment to the Commissioner on a mandamus claim, holding that Southern had an adequate alternative remedy. In a prior appeal, the Supreme Court laid out for the parties in considerable detail the potential legal and procedural issues bearing on the question of whether the Commissioner could become a party or be bound by a judgment rendered in the tax appeals. On remand, Southern and the Commissioner filed renewed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Southern, holding that it had no “equally convenient, complete and beneficial” remedy other than mandamus, and denied the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment, and directed the Commissioner “to accept [Southern’s] ad valorem property tax returns pursuant to OCGA 48-5-511(a) instanter.” The Commissioner appealed, and the Supreme Court this time reversed, finding Southern did not show the Commissioner, in refusing to accept Southern’s ad valorem tax returns, violated a “clear legal duty,” that she failed to act, or that her actions were arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable, amounting to a gross abuse of discretion, so as to entitle Southern to a writ of mandamus. View "Riley v. Southern LNG, Inc." on Justia Law

In February 2006, BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., and BellSouth MNS, Inc., filed an ex parte motion for a protective order in the Chancery Court, seeking to protect certain documents. The documents fell into the following four categories: (1) an August 2005 proposal submitted by BellSouth to the Mississippi Department of Information Technology Services in response to the Department’s request for telecommunications products and services; (2) the Telecommunications Products and Service Agreement between BellSouth and the Department dated November 2005; (3) correspondence between BellSouth and the Department related to the first two documents; and (4) related BellSouth marketing materials. Following legislative amendments in 2015 to the Mississippi Public Records Act of 1983 and to Mississippi Code Section 25-1-100, CellularSouth sought production of the proposal and the contract between the Department and BellSouth. After review, the Supreme Court found the chancery court erred in its interpretation of the amended Mississippi Code Section 25-61-11 when it entered an order continuing to protect the contract from production. Furthermore, the Court held that, because the rights in question in the case sub judice were created by statute, the Public Records Act, as amended, governed this dispute. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Cellular South, Inc. v. BellSouth Telecommunications, LLC" on Justia Law

Until 1997, Illinois residents could only purchase power from a public utility, with rates regulated by the ICC. The Electric Service Customer Choice and Rate Relief Law allows residents to buy electricity from their local public utility, another utility, or an Alternative Retail Electric Supplier (ARES). The ICC was not given rate-making authority over ARESs, but was given oversight responsibilities. The Law did not explicitly provide a mechanism for recovering damages from an ARES related to rates. Zahn purchased electricity from NAPG, after receiving an offer of a “New Customer Rate” of $.0499 per kilowatt hour in her first month, followed by a “market-based variable rate.” Zahn never received NAPG’s “New Customer Rate.” NAPG charged her $.0599 per kilowatt hour for the first two months, followed by a rate higher than Zahn’s local public utility charged. Zahn filed a class-action complaint, claiming violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment. The court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, or for failure to state a claim. After the Illinois Supreme Court answered a certified question, stating that the ICC does not have exclusive jurisdiction to hear Zahn’s claims, the Seventh Circuit reversed. The district court had jurisdiction and Zahn alleged facts that, if true, could constitute a breach of contract or a deceptive business practice. View "Zahn v. North American Power & Gas, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2002, the Public Utilities Regulatory Act (PURA) implemented a competitive retail market for electricity in the Electric Reliability Council of Texas. Each incumbent, vertically integrated electric utility within the market was required to unbundle its business activities into separate units, including a transmission and distribution utility (TDU). Of the units, only TDUs continued to be regulated by the Public Utilities Commission (PUC). Here, several parties to a TDU ratemaking proceeding sought judicial review of the PUC’s order. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals, holding (1) PURA section 36.351, which requires electric electric utilities to discount charges for service provided to state college and university facilities, does not apply to TDUs; (2) former PURA section 36.060(a), which required an electric utility’s income taxes to be computed as though it had filed a consolidated return with a group of its affiliates eligible to do so under federal tax law, did not require a utility to adopt a corporate structure so as to be part of the group; and (3) the evidence in this matter established that franchise charges negotiated by the TDU with various municipalities were reasonable and necessary operating expenses under PURA section 33.008. View "Oncor Electric Delivery Co. v. Public Utility Commission of Texas" on Justia Law

The City of Torrington brought this action seeking judgment declaring that it was authorized to set rates for electrical services it provided to customers outside the City limits and that it had discretion to utilize revenues from the provision of electricity for other City expenses. The district court (1) determined that the Public Service Commission (PSC) has the exclusive jurisdiction over the rates of the City’s electric utility service provided to customers outside the City’s corporate limits; and (2) declined to rule on the question of whether the City was properly utilizing revenues from the sale of electricity, holding that there was no justiciable controversy regarding that issue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the applicable statutes clearly and unambiguously grant the PSC the exclusive power to set rates for electricity provided to customers outside the City corporate limits; and (2) the district court properly declined to rule on the question of the City’s expenditure of electricity revenues. View "City of Torrington v. Smith" on Justia Law

Black Hills Power, Inc. (BHP), a public utility in South Dakota, filed an application to increase electric rates with the South Dakota Public Utility Commission. Black Hills Industrial Intervenors (BHII) filed a motion to intervene in BHP’s rate-increase application, which the Commission granted. The parties agreed to a settlement stipulation regarding the increase in December 2014. BHP, however, sought to amend the stipulation in February 2015. The Commission granted the amended settlement stipulation and approved the rate increase. BHII appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission properly ruled that BHP could submit adjustments to the settlement stipulation after the filing of the initial application; (2) the Commission did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in its consideration of pension expenses; and (3) the evidence was sufficient to support the Commission’s inclusion of portions of BHP’s incentive-compensation plan. View "In re Application of Black Hills Power, Inc." on Justia Law

The City of Newport’s Utility Department, Water Division (Newport Water) filed a rate application with the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) requesting a revenue increase. The PUC issued an order in docket No. 3818 ordering that money Newport Water owed to the City be paid back to the City under certain conditions. Newport Water subsequently filed another application for a rate increase - docket No. 4025. The PUC issued an order concluding that Newport Water had commenced the required repayment of its debt owed to the City. Portsmouth Water and Fire District (Portsmouth) petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court vacated the PUC’s order, concluding that the PUC order failed to enforce the order in docket No. 3818, and remanded to the PUC with directions to make more specific findings of fact to support the PUC’s conclusion that Newport Water complied with the order in docket No. 3818. This appeal concerned the PUC’s order on remand. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the PUC’s order in regard to its definition, identification, and quantification of “efficiencies” as it relates to the order in docket No. 3818; and (2) vacated the PUC’s order to the extent it allowed Newport Water to use $191,997 in excess revenues to pay down its debt to the City. View "Portsmouth Water and Fire District v. Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

Zahn is a residential consumer, decided to purchase electricity from North American Power & Gas (NAPG), an alternative retail electric supplier (ARES) under the Electric Service Customer Choice and Rate Relief Law , 220 ILCS 5/16-102. NAPG sent Zahn a letter stating that she would receive its “New Customer Rate” of $0.0499 per kilowatt-hour during her first month of service and a “market based variable rate” thereafter. NAPG's “Customer Disclosure Statement” indicated a month-to-month term and that “[o]ther than fixed and/or introductory/promotional rates, all rates shall be calculated in response to market pricing, transportation, profit and other market price factors” and that its prices were “variable” based on “market prices for commodity, transportation, balancing fees, storage charges, [NAPG] fees, profit, [and] line losses ... may be higher or lower than your [local public utility].” Zahn never received the $0.0499 per kilowatt-hour rate. During her first two months of service, NAPG charged her $0.0599 per kilowatt-hour. Thereafter, the rate it charged her was always higher than what she would have paid her local public utility. Zahn filed a class action, alleging Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act violations (815 ILCS 505/1), breach of contract, and unjust enrichment. Zahn appealed dismissal of the case to the Seventh Circuit, which certified a question of Illinois law: Does the Illinois Commerce Commission (ICC) have exclusive jurisdiction over a reparation claim, as defined in precedent in Sheffler v. Commonwealth Edison, brought by a residential consumer against an ARES? The Illinois Supreme Court responded that the ICC does not have exclusive original jurisdiction over such claims. The claims may be pursued through the courts. View "Zahn v. North American Power & Gas, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2013, the City of Detroit filed for chapter 9 bankruptcy protection, facing problems “run[ning] wide and deep”—including the affordable provision of basic utilities. In 2014, plaintiffs, customers, and the purported representatives of customers, of the Detroit Water and Sewerage Department (DWSD), filed an adversary proceeding, based on DWSD’s termination of water service to thousands of residential customers. Citing 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Supreme Court holding in Monell v. Department of Social Services, plaintiffs sought injunctive relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal. Section 904 of the Bankruptcy Code explicitly prohibits this relief. Whether grounded in state law or federal constitutional law, a bankruptcy court order requiring DWSD to provide water service at a specific price, or refrain from terminating service would interfere with the City’s “political [and] governmental powers,” its “property [and] revenues,” and its “use [and] enjoyment of . . . income-producing property,” 11 U.S.C. 904. Plaintiffs’ due process and equal protection claims were inadequately pled. View "Lyda v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

Cbeyond provides telecommunications service to small businesses using telephone lines. AT&T Illinois provides similar service on a larger scale. Their networks are interconnected; a new entrant (Cbeyond) may connect with existing local exchange carriers, 47 U.S.C. 251; if the parties are unable to agree on terms the issue is referred to arbitration. In 2004, the Illinois Commerce Commission (ICC) approved the agreement between Cbeyond and AT&T. In 2012 Cbeyond complained to the ICC: when Cbeyond leases new digital signal level loop circuits, AT&T charges a separate price for “Clear Channel Capability” (CCC) for the loops. CCC codes the electrical pulses in a line to improve data streaming. Cbeyond argued that there was no extra work involved. The Seventh Circuit affirmed rejection of Cbeyond’s claims, noting that the parties’ agreement designates CCC as an “optional feature” available “at an additional cost” and that some of the loops did not have CCC built in. The court noted the lack of information about how AT&T charges others for CCC or whether AT&T’s charges are inconsistent with 47 C.F.R. 51.505, which constrains incumbent carriers to lease network elements to newcomers at a price slightly higher than the incumbent’s marginal cost. Finding no violation of federal law, the court called the claim “a dispute over a price term in a contract,” a matter of state law. “Cbeyond has imposed an excessive and unnecessary burden on the district court by bringing this sloppy lawsuit.” View "Cbeyond Communications, LLC v. Sheahan" on Justia Law