Justia Utilities Law Opinion Summaries

High Plains Power, a cooperatively owned utility in central Wyoming, proposed a tariff revision to the Wyoming Public Service Commission (PSC) in August 2022. The revision aimed to change the compensation rate for customer-generators—members who generate electricity through small net metering systems—from a retail rate credit to an avoided cost rate, which is lower. Powder River Basin Resource Council and Wyoming Outdoor Council opposed this change, arguing it would unfairly reduce compensation for customer-generators.The PSC held a hearing in May 2023, where both parties presented evidence and testimony. The PSC approved the tariff revision on a two-to-one vote, with Chairman Throne dissenting. The appellants then petitioned the district court for review, which certified the case to the Wyoming Supreme Court.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and found that the PSC misinterpreted the relevant statute and failed to perform its ratemaking function. The court held that the PSC erred in presuming that the avoided cost rate was a just and reasonable rate for monthly compensation under Wyoming Statute § 37-16-103(a)(iii). The court emphasized that the statute does not specify the value of monthly credits or compensation, leaving it to the PSC to determine through its ratemaking process. The court concluded that the PSC did not evaluate the evidence or consider whether the proposed change served the public interest. Consequently, the Wyoming Supreme Court reversed the PSC's decision. View "Powder River Basin Resource Council v. Wyoming Public Service Commission" on Justia Law

Moraine Wind, L.L.C. and other out-of-state wind farms applied to the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) for certification as eligible Ohio renewable-energy-resource-generating facilities. Carbon Solutions Group, L.L.C. (CSG), whose clients include Ohio-based renewable-energy suppliers, opposed the applications. PUCO approved the applications in September 2023. CSG filed an application for rehearing, which PUCO purported to grant for the limited purpose of further consideration, effectively extending the statutory deadline for a decision.CSG appealed PUCO's decision to the Supreme Court of Ohio, arguing that PUCO's failure to grant or deny the rehearing application within 30 days resulted in a denial by operation of law, as per R.C. 4903.10. PUCO moved to dismiss the appeal, claiming the court lacked jurisdiction because the rehearing application was still pending.The Supreme Court of Ohio held that PUCO's order granting rehearing for further consideration did not constitute a substantive grant of rehearing. The court emphasized that R.C. 4903.10 requires PUCO to grant or deny an application for rehearing within 30 days, and failure to do so results in a denial by operation of law. The court found that PUCO's practice of extending the deadline was not supported by statute and undermined the legislative intent for timely judicial review. Consequently, the court denied PUCO's motion to dismiss, affirming that CSG's application for rehearing was denied by operation of law, and the appeal was timely filed. View "In re Application of Moraine Wind, L.L.C." on Justia Law

The Industrial Energy Consumer Group (IECG) appealed an order from the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) regarding the recovery of costs related to power supply obligations and state energy programs. The PUC decided that these costs should be recovered volumetrically from all ratepayer classes, except for one category, which should be recovered using a fixed customer charge. IECG argued that the order was preempted by the Federal Power Act and that the allocation and design violated cost-causation principles and state statutes.The Office of the Public Advocate contended that IECG’s appeal was untimely and should be dismissed. The PUC argued that the appeal was an improper collateral attack on a prior rate order. Both the Public Advocate and the PUC maintained that if the merits were considered, the order should be affirmed as rational and supported.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the appeal was timely and not barred by collateral estoppel. The court did not address the preemption argument, finding it unpreserved for appellate review. The court rejected IECG’s arguments on the merits, noting the deferential standard of review for the PUC’s expert judgment in ratemaking. The court found that the PUC’s decision to treat NEB costs separately from traditional T&D service costs was rational and supported by the record. The court also determined that the PUC’s allocation and rate design did not violate state statutes.The court affirmed the PUC’s order, holding that the PUC’s approach to NEB cost recovery was within its broad discretion and sufficiently justified. The court noted that the PUC might refine its approach in the future based on further data collection and party input. View "Industrial Energy Consumer Group v. Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the interpretation of the Efficient Use of Energy Act (EUEA) regarding whether it mandates the New Mexico Public Regulation Commission (the Commission) to approve a full revenue decoupling mechanism for utilities. The Public Service Company of New Mexico (PNM) and other appellants argue that the EUEA requires full revenue decoupling, which allows utilities to recover approved revenue without regard to the quantity of energy sold. The Commission and several intervenors contend that the EUEA permits partial decoupling, which would only allow utilities to recover a portion of the approved revenue.The Commission initially reviewed the case through declaratory proceedings. The Hearing Examiner recommended that the EUEA does not mandate full revenue decoupling, suggesting instead that partial decoupling aligns with the statute's intent. The Commission adopted this recommendation, concluding that full decoupling would eliminate ordinary business risks for utilities and contradict the balancing of interests required by the EUEA and the Public Utility Act (PUA).The New Mexico Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that Section 62-17-5(F)(2) of the EUEA clearly describes a full revenue decoupling mechanism. The Court found that the statute mandates the Commission to approve a rate adjustment mechanism ensuring that utilities recover approved revenue without regard to actual sales, which can only be achieved through full decoupling. The Court emphasized that the Commission must still ensure that any proposed mechanism results in just and reasonable rates, balancing the interests of the public, consumers, and investors. The Court vacated and annulled the Commission's order, deeming its interpretation of the statute unlawful and unreasonable. View "Coalition for Clean and Affordable Energy v. New Mexico Public Regulation Commission" on Justia Law

The case involves the Ohio Power Company’s application for an increase in electric distribution rates. The key issue is whether the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) allowed Ohio Power to recover costs for providing generation services through its distribution rates, which is prohibited by state law. Ohio Power’s distribution rates should only cover noncompetitive services, while generation services are competitive and should be billed separately.In the proceedings before the PUCO, Ohio Power submitted an analysis to identify costs associated with providing Standard Service Offer (SSO) and customer-choice program services, which were potentially being recovered through distribution rates. However, the PUCO found the analysis insufficient and continued to set the rates for the retail-reconciliation rider and the SSO-credit rider at zero, meaning no costs were reallocated. The PUCO’s staff and other parties, including Interstate Gas Supply (IGS), contested Ohio Power’s analysis, arguing it did not provide a detailed cost-of-service study differentiating costs between shopping and nonshopping customers.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and affirmed the PUCO’s decision. The court held that the PUCO’s findings were supported by evidence and that the commission complied with the statutory requirements. The court found that IGS failed to demonstrate that the PUCO’s decision was unlawful or unreasonable. The court also noted that the PUCO provided sufficient detail in its orders to explain its decision-making process, thus complying with R.C. 4903.09. The court rejected IGS’s arguments that the PUCO ignored uncontroverted evidence and failed to address material issues, concluding that the PUCO’s orders were based on a thorough review of the evidence presented. View "In re Application of Ohio Power Co." on Justia Law

In February 2021, a severe cold snap hit the central United States, causing widespread power outages and fatalities. This event highlighted the need for improved grid reliability. The Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO), which manages the electrical grid in the region, proposed changes to its capacity market to address these issues. MISO's new system includes seasonal capacity markets, a revised method for calculating generator capacity, and new rules for generator outages. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved these changes.Entergy Arkansas, LLC, along with other companies, petitioned for review of FERC's approval, arguing that FERC acted arbitrarily and capriciously. Entergy challenged three main aspects: the new method for calculating generator capacity, the requirement for generator owners to replace capacity if offline for more than 31 days in a season, and the 120-day notice requirement for planned outages. Entergy was supported by several intervenors, including public utilities commissions and the East Texas Electric Cooperative.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that FERC had adequately explained its approval of MISO's changes. FERC's reliance on a study showing the new methodology's accuracy was deemed reasonable. The court also upheld the 31-day capacity replacement rule and the 120-day notice requirement, finding that FERC had provided sufficient rationale for these rules. The court denied Entergy's petitions for review and did not address issues raised solely by the intervenors. The court concluded that FERC's decisions were not arbitrary or capricious and were supported by substantial evidence. View "Entergy Arkansas, LLC v. FERC" on Justia Law

The case involves the California Community Choice Association (the Association), which represents Community Choice Aggregators (CCAs) that purchase electricity on behalf of residents and businesses. The Association challenged a resolution by the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) that set the effective dates for the expansion of two CCAs, Central Coast Community Energy (CCCE) and East Bay Community Energy (EBCE), to January 2025. The Association argued that the PUC exceeded its jurisdiction and failed to follow legal procedures in setting these dates.The PUC had issued Draft Resolution E-5258, setting January 1, 2025, as the earliest possible effective date for the expansions of CCCE and EBCE. The Association, CCCE, and EBCE opposed this, claiming the PUC overstepped its authority. The PUC adopted the resolution and later denied rehearing requests, modifying some factual findings but maintaining the 2025 effective date. The PUC justified the delay by citing past failures of CCCE and EBCE to meet resource adequacy requirements, which led to cost shifting to customers of investor-owned utilities.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the PUC acted within its jurisdiction under Public Utilities Code section 366.2, subdivision (a)(4), which mandates preventing cost shifting between CCA and non-CCA customers. The court held that the PUC's decision to delay the expansions was not arbitrary or capricious and was supported by evidence of past resource adequacy deficiencies by CCCE and EBCE. The court affirmed the PUC's decision and resolution, concluding that the Association's arguments did not demonstrate that the PUC had abused its discretion. View "Cal. Community Choice Assn. v. Public Utilities Com." on Justia Law

This case involves five large water utilities and an association representing investor-owned water utilities' interests, collectively referred to as the Water Companies. The Water Companies sought to overturn an order by the Public Utilities Commission (Commission) that eliminated a conservation-focused ratesetting mechanism known as the Water Revenue Adjustment Mechanism (WRAM). The WRAM was designed to encourage water conservation by decoupling a water company's revenue from the amount of water sold. The Commission's order to eliminate the WRAM was not based on the merits of the mechanism but on procedural issues.The Commission's decision to eliminate the WRAM was made in a proceeding that was ostensibly focused on improving the accuracy of water sales forecasts. The Water Companies argued that the Commission did not provide adequate notice that the elimination of the WRAM was one of the issues to be considered in the proceeding.The Supreme Court of California agreed with the Water Companies. The court found that the Commission's scoping memos, which are supposed to outline the issues to be considered in a proceeding, did not provide adequate notice that the WRAM's elimination was on the table. The court concluded that the Commission's failure to give adequate notice required the order to be set aside. The court did not rule on the merits of the WRAM itself. View "Golden State Water Co. v. Public Utilities Com." on Justia Law

The case revolves around the Public Utility Commission of Texas (PUC) and two market participants, RWE Renewables Americas, LLC and TX Hereford Wind, LLC. Following Winter Storm Uri, the Legislature amended the Public Utility Regulatory Act (PURA) to require that protocols adopted by the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) must be approved by the PUC before they take effect. ERCOT then adopted a revision to its protocols, which was approved by the PUC, setting the price of electricity at the regulatory maximum under Energy Emergency Alert Level 3 conditions. RWE challenged the PUC's approval order in the Third Court of Appeals, arguing that the order was both substantively and procedurally invalid.The Third Court of Appeals held that the PUC's order was both substantively invalid—because the PUC exceeded its statutory authority by setting the price of electricity—and procedurally invalid—because the PUC failed to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act’s rulemaking procedures in issuing the order.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the PUC’s approval order is not a “competition rule[] adopted by the commission” subject to the judicial-review process for PUC rules. The court found that PURA envisions a separate process for ERCOT-adopted protocols, and the statutory requirement that the PUC approve those adopted protocols does not transform PUC approval orders into PUC rules eligible for direct review by a court of appeals. Therefore, the Third Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction over this proceeding. The Supreme Court of Texas vacated the court of appeals’ judgment and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. View "Public Utility Commission v. RWE Renewables Americas, LLC" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the actions of the Public Utility Commission of Texas (Commission) during Winter Storm Uri, when the Texas electric grid was on the brink of collapse. The Commission issued two orders that effectively raised the market price of electricity to the regulatory ceiling of $9,000/MWh to incentivize generators to add supply and large industrial users to reduce their demand. This led to some market participants going bankrupt and subsequent litigation.The court of appeals held that the Commission’s orders exceeded its authority under Chapter 39 of the Public Utility Regulatory Act (PURA) because the statute prohibits price-setting. The court of appeals did not address whether the Commission complied with the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) procedural rulemaking requirements.The Supreme Court of Texas disagreed with the court of appeals' decision. It held that the Commission’s orders did not exceed its authority under PURA. The court also found that the Commission substantially complied with the APA’s procedural rulemaking requirements, an issue the court of appeals did not address. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and rendered judgment affirming the orders. View "Public Utility Commission v. Luminant Energy Co. LLC" on Justia Law