Justia Utilities Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Yellowstone Disposal, LLC's petition for writ of mandamus, holding that the district court did not err.Yellowstone Disposal filed a petition for writ of mandamus to compel the Montana Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) to issue a license or, in the alternative, issue a final decision approving or denying its application for a class II solid waste management systems (SWMS) license to operate a SWMS in Richland County. The district court granted DEQ's motion to dismiss the petition for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Yellowstone Disposal did not satisfy the requirements for issuance of a writ of mandamus. View "Yellowstone Disposal, LLC v. State, Department of Environmental Quality" on Justia Law

Appellants Raymond and Michelle Plata were property owners in the City of San Jose and customers of Muni Water. Muni Water’s annual budget was reflected each year in a document called a source and use of funds statement, which was part of the City’s annual operating budget. In 2013, the Platas filed with the City a claim pursuant to Government Code sections 910 and 910.2, accusing Muni Water of violating Proposition 218 ab initio by collecting money from customers and illegally transferring it to the City’s own general fund. The City rejected the claim, so in early 2014, the Platas brought a class action lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the City under Proposition 218, as well as recovery of the amounts overpaid. After a lengthy bench trial, the trial court issued a statement of decision finding: (1) the late fees charged by Muni Water were not a fee or charge covered by Proposition 218; (2) any claims accruing prior to November 4, 2012 were time-barred because of the statute of limitations provided under Government Code section 911.2, and there was no basis for applying any equitable tolling doctrine; (3) as for tiered water rates, the discussion of high rates in the Platas’ government claims adequate to gave notice to the City that its rate structure was being questioned; and (4) “[a] more significant complication” raised by the City in its class decertification motion. The tiered rate structure would impact different class members differently from month to month, thus making it potentially “impossible” to draw a “line between ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ based on monthly water consumption[.]” The court granted the City’s motion to decertify the class, and refused to grant the Platas any relief as to their tiered rate argument. The Platas appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed judgment only as to the trial court’s findings on the tiered rate structure. In all other respects, it was affirmed. View "Plata v. City of San Jose" on Justia Law

The district court dismissed a suit alleging that a price plan adopted by Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District (SRP) unlawfully discriminated against customers with solar-energy systems and was designed to stifle competition in the electricity market.The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, applying Arizona’s notice-of-claim statute, which provides that persons who have claims against a public entity, such as SRP, must file with the entity a claim containing a specific amount for which the claim can be settled.The district court erred in dismissing plaintiffs’ equal protection claim as barred by Arizona’s two-year statute of limitations. The claim did not accrue when SRP approved the price plan, but rather when plaintiffs received a bill under the new rate structure. The plaintiffs alleged a series of violations, each of which gave rise to a new claim and began a new limitations period.Monopolization and attempted monopolization claims under the Sherman Act were not barred by the filed-rate doctrine, which bars individuals from asserting civil antitrust challenges to an entity’s agency-approved rates. SRP was not entitled to state-action immunity because Arizona had not articulated a policy to displace competition.The Local Government Antitrust Act shielded SRP from federal antitrust damages because SRP is a special functioning governmental unit but the Act does not bar declaratory or injunctive relief. The district court erred in concluding that plaintiffs failed to adequately allege antitrust injury based on the court’s finding that the price plan actually encouraged competition in alternative energy investment. View "Ellis v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District" on Justia Law

The owners of New England electric generation facilities are paid through formula rates established by ISO New England’s (a regional transmission organization) open access transmission tariff. The owners challenged Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC) orders approving Schedule 17, an amendment to the ISO tariff, establishing a new recovery mechanism for costs incurred by certain electric generation and transmission facilities to comply with mandatory reliability standards FERC had approved.FERC ruled that the owners could use Schedule 17 to recover only costs incurred after they filed and FERC approved a cost-based rate under the Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 U.S.C. 824d. FERC reasoned that recovery was limited to prospective costs, citing the filed rate doctrine, which forbids utilities from charging rates other than those properly filed with FERC, and its corollary, the rule against retroactive rate-making, which prohibits FERC from adjusting current rates to make up for a utility’s over- or under-collection in prior periods.The D.C. Circuit denied the petition for review. FERC’s application of the filed rate doctrine and the rule against retroactive rate-making to Schedule 17 was not arbitrary or capricious. Schedule 17 does not expressly permit recovery of mandatory reliability costs incurred prior to a facility’s individual FPA filing. View "Cogentrix Energy Power Management, LLC v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

The San Francisco Public Utilities Commission owns a power supply system in the Hetch Hetchy Valley and transmission lines but does not own distribution lines and relies on PG&E’s distribution system. The Commission is both a customer and a competitor of PG&E. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved PG&E’s Tariff, which stated the generally applicable terms for “open-access” wholesale distribution service. In 2019, San Francisco filed a complaint under the Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 U.S.C. 824e, 825e, 825h, challenging PG&E’s refusal to offer secondary-voltage service in lieu of more burdensome primary-voltage service to certain San Francisco sites and provide service to delivery points that San Francisco maintains are eligible for service under the Tariff’s grandfathering provision. PG&E maintained that it had not given customers the right to dictate the level of service to be received and that any denials of secondary-voltage service were supported by “technical, safety, reliability, and operational reasons.”FERC denied San Francisco’s complaint, ruling that PG&E should retain discretion to determine what level of service is most appropriate for a customer because the provider “is ultimately responsible for the safety and reliability of its distribution system.” The D.C. Circuit vacated and remanded, citing FERC’s own precedent and noting a “troubling pattern of inattentiveness to potential anticompetitive effects of PG&E’s administration of its open-access Tariff.” View "City and County of San Francisco v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court dismissing Plaintiff's administrative appeal from the decision of the Connecticut Siting Council approving the application of NTE Connecticut, LLC (NTE) seeking a certificate of environmental compatibility and public need for the construction of an electric generating facility in the town of Killingly, holding that there was no error.Plaintiff, a nonprofit organization, appealed the council's decision to the trial court, arguing that the council improperly refused to consider the environmental impact of installing a gas pipeline to its proposed facility when weighing the public benefit of the facility against its probable environmental impact. The trial court dismissed the appeal, concluding that the council was not required to consider the impact of the gas pipeline. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court correctly determined that the council’s refusal to consider the potential environmental impact of the gas pipeline during the proceedings on NTE’s application for a certificate was not arbitrary or capricious. View "Not Another Power Plant v. Connecticut Siting Council" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit granted a petition for review of two FERC orders that raised petitioners' electricity rates. The FERC orders validated accounting by Potomac-Appalachian Transmission Highline, LLC (PATH) under its formula rate, allowing it to pass through to ratepayers more than $6 million PATH spent for public relations and advocacy activities. The activities related to PATH's pursuit of Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity (Certificates) to build its proposed electric power transmission line. Petitioners argue that the expenditures instead belong in a designated account which would exclude them from the formula rate. The court concluded that "Expenditures for Certain Civic, Political and Related Activities" include expenditures made for the purpose of indirect as well as direct influence. Accordingly, the court rejected PATH's assertion that account includes expenditures made for the purpose of directly influencing the decisions of public officials, but not the disputed expenditures, which were for indirect influence. View "Newman v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment upholding the Commission's nondisclosure decisions in this Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) case brought by Niskanen, seeking the names and addresses of property owners along the route of a proposed pipeline. In this case, although the Commission concluded that the property owners' privacy interests outweighed the public interest in this identifying information, and it agreed to a more limited disclosure—the property owners' initials and street names. The court agreed with the district court's finding that the Commission's proposal struck the proper balance between these competing interests. The court explained that Niskanen identifies a weighty public interest in understanding the Commission's compliance with its notice obligations, but it articulates no reason it needs the full names and addresses of landowners along a pipeline route to do so. View "Niskanen Center v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit granted CPUC's petition for review of the Commission's approval of CAISO's proposal for revising the compensation structure for its Capacity Procurement Mechanism (CPM), a voluntary program designed to provide electric capacity necessary to maintain grid reliability within CAISO's network. Here, as in Delaware Division of Public Advocate v. FERC, 3 F.4th 461 (D.C. Cir. 2021), the Commission failed to grapple with the distinction between bids submitted below or above the soft-offer cap, resulting in the Commission's reliance on precedent without recognition of the substantial differences between the two cases. The court wrote that, apart from the Commission's misplaced reliance on its 2015 CPM Order, the record contains no evidence or findings to support its decision. Accordingly, the court vacated the order and remanded for further proceedings. View "California Public Utilities Commission v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit denied a petition for review challenging FERC's two orders regarding a utility company, Entergy Services, and a subset of sales at issue called the Grand Gulf Sales. The Louisiana Commission alleges that FERC's exclusion of the Grand Gulf Sales from the damage calculation was an irrational change of position. The court found no merit in this contention, explaining that the allegations regarding the Grand Gulf Sales do not concern Section 30.03 of the System Agreement because those sales were always treated as Joint Account Sales and therefore never treated as part of Entergy Arkansas's native load.The Louisiana Commission also alleged that the Grand Gulf Sales—despite being accounted for as Joint Account Sales—still violated the System Agreement. The court concluded that FERC reasonably concluded that the two complaints at issue alleged different violations of the System Agreement and therefore that the 2009 Complaint did not preserve the allegations in the 2019 Complaint for purposes of the 2015 Settlement Agreement waiver provisions. In this case, neither Section G(1) or G(2) saves the allegations in the 2019 Complaint from being barred by the 2015 Settlement Agreement. Finally, even if the Louisiana Commission's mutual mistake argument was not waived, FERC reasonably determined on the merits that the Louisiana Commission presented no evidence that any initial shared impression about the Grand Gulf Sales was a material fact that formed the basis of the 2015 Settlement Agreement. View "Louisiana Public Service Commission v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law