Justia Utilities Law Opinion Summaries

A California corporation that manufactures medical devices sought to connect two of its properties separated by a public street using a privately owned microgrid, with supplemental power provided by Southern California Edison (SCE). The corporation alleged it would generate electricity solely for its own use and not sell or export power to others. After obtaining local approvals, it sought SCE’s cooperation to connect its properties, but SCE declined, citing concerns about safety, reliability, and loss of control over its distribution grid. The corporation proposed amendments to three SCE tariff rules to require SCE to accommodate such microgrid connections when compliant with state law.The California Public Utilities Commission (PUC) initiated a rulemaking process to facilitate microgrid commercialization under Senate Bill 1339, dividing the process into five tracks. In track five, SCE and other investor-owned utilities submitted proposed tariffs for multi-property microgrids, while the petitioner submitted its own proposed rule changes. The PUC adopted the utility tariffs but rejected the corporation’s proposals, finding they would allow unregulated entities to compel changes to regulated utilities’ infrastructure, violating Public Utilities Code section 218 and undermining safety and reliability. The PUC’s decision was based on statutory requirements and priority for safety. The petitioner’s application for rehearing was denied, with the PUC reiterating that the proposals would effectively circumvent regulation and create risks.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the PUC’s decisions under the standards set forth in Public Utilities Code section 1757.1, applicable to quasi-legislative rulemaking. The court held that the PUC’s decisions were consistent with statutory law, not arbitrary or capricious, adequately supported by findings, and aligned with legislative priorities for safety. The court affirmed the PUC’s decisions and denied relief to the petitioner. View "Applied Medical Resources Corp. v. Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

Several plaintiffs brought a class action lawsuit against a city, challenging the validity of recently adopted water rates. They alleged that the city’s new rates, implemented by a resolution passed in May 2023, violated Proposition 218 by including costs for public fire service, resulting in charges exceeding the actual cost of water service. Prior to filing suit, the plaintiffs submitted claims under the Government Claims Act, which were denied. The plaintiffs sought refunds, declaratory relief, equitable relief, and a writ of mandate.After the city litigated the case for more than a year, including discovery and other pretrial activities, it moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that plaintiffs failed to bring a reverse validation action as required by Government Code section 53759 and Code of Civil Procedure sections 860 et seq. The San Francisco County Superior Court granted the city’s motion, holding that the validation statutes applied, were both mandatory and jurisdictional, and that plaintiffs had not complied with them in two ways: their suit was time-barred and they failed to follow proper notice procedures, including service by publication.On appeal to the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, plaintiffs argued that the city had waived the validation requirements by litigating the case and that their action was timely. The appellate court reviewed the matter de novo and held that the validation statutes were mandatory and jurisdictional for challenges to water rates, and plaintiffs’ failure to comply with statutory procedures—including timely filing and notice by publication—was fatal to their claims. The court rejected arguments regarding waiver, good cause, and belated publication, ultimately affirming the trial court’s order and concluding that the procedural requirements for reverse validation actions must be strictly followed. View "Toy v. City and County of S.F." on Justia Law

Several townships, individuals, and entities challenged a decision related to the construction of an electric transmission line. In early 2024, two utility companies applied to the North Dakota Public Service Commission (PSC) for a certificate of public convenience and necessity (CPCN) to build an 85-mile, high-voltage transmission line. The PSC provided public notice in various newspapers and held hearings before granting the CPCN later that year. No party appealed this order at that time. Months after the order was issued, a group of petitioners—including the townships and individuals—sought to intervene, arguing that the PSC’s order was deficient and that the wrong statutory framework had been applied.The PSC denied the petitioners’ request to intervene, stating that the decision on the CPCN was final and that deadlines to appeal or seek reconsideration had already passed. The PSC also noted that further permitting and proceedings would occur before construction, where concerns could be raised. The petitioners then appealed to the District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial District. The district court dismissed as untimely the portion of the appeal challenging the CPCN order, affirmed the PSC’s denial of intervention, and concluded it lacked jurisdiction to address the validity of the CPCN order.On review, the Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the petitioners lacked standing to appeal the CPCN order because they did not participate in the original proceedings before the PSC. The Court further held that the PSC did not abuse its discretion in denying post-hoc intervention, finding that notice by publication was sufficient and that the petitioners had not shown good cause for their late intervention request. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Wano Township v. North Dakota Public Service Comm'n" on Justia Law

A company sought permission from the Vermont Public Utility Commission (PUC) to build and operate a solar facility. After the PUC denied this request, the company filed motions for reconsideration, arguing that the decision had been made on grounds different from the proposal for decision, and later sought to serve interrogatories on the PUC Commissioners to determine if they had read the record as required by Vermont law. The PUC denied both motions, stating it had complied with statutory requirements, that Commissioners had sufficient opportunity to review the record, and that discovery from Commissioners acting in a quasi-judicial capacity was not permitted.After these denials, the company appealed to the Vermont Supreme Court regarding the underlying certificate denial and, separately, filed a complaint in the Civil Division of the Chittenden Unit of the Superior Court under 3 V.S.A. § 809b, challenging the PUC's denial of discovery. The PUC moved to dismiss this complaint, asserting that § 809b did not cover orders denying discovery and that appeals of interlocutory PUC orders were governed by another, more specific statute. The Superior Court agreed, concluding it lacked jurisdiction, since § 809b only applies to orders compelling discovery, not those denying it, and that appeals from PUC orders must proceed directly to the Supreme Court under 30 V.S.A. § 12.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the Superior Court’s dismissal de novo. It held that 3 V.S.A. § 809b does not authorize challenges to agency orders denying discovery and is limited to orders compelling action. Because the PUC’s order at issue denied, rather than compelled, discovery, the Superior Court was correct to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal. View "Otter Creek Solar LLC v. Public Utility Commission" on Justia Law

In this case, a homeowner experienced property damage when sewage backed up into his residence after a sewer line was damaged during nearby excavation work. The excavation was initiated by a utility company, which hired an excavator to install a new underground electrical line following a neighbor’s complaint about electrical service. Before the excavation, the excavator notified MISS DIG Systems as required by law, which then informed local facility owners, including the township. The township responded that it did not have any facilities in the area and did not mark any sewer lines. The homeowner alleged that the township failed to comply with its duty under the MISS DIG Underground Facility Damage Prevention and Safety Act by not marking a township-owned sewer line, leading to his damages.The Oakland Circuit Court denied the township’s motion for summary disposition, concluding that governmental immunity did not shield the township from liability because the MISS DIG Act created an exception. The court also granted the homeowner leave to amend his complaint to assert a claim under the sewage disposal system event (SDSE) exception to governmental immunity, and set aside the notice issue for further briefing. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.Upon review, the Michigan Supreme Court held that a governmental agency cannot be held civilly liable for monetary damages for a violation of the MISS DIG Act in circuit court, as the statute provides that the exclusive remedy is to file a complaint with the Public Service Commission. The Court also found that the trial court erred in granting the homeowner leave to amend his complaint to assert the SDSE exception before he demonstrated compliance with the statutory notice requirement. The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the lower courts on these issues, vacated the grant of leave to amend, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Zezula v. Brown" on Justia Law

A privately owned water utility company provides water services to multiple customers in Raleigh and Fayette Counties, West Virginia. Near one of its service areas is an undeveloped tract of land known as the Appalachian Heights Site. The City of Mount Hope, a municipal water provider, received funding from the legislature, county commissions, and a developer to extend water service to this Site. After Mount Hope proposed annexing the Site, the utility company filed a complaint with the Public Service Commission (PSC), seeking to prevent Mount Hope from serving the Site, claiming exclusive rights to provide water there.Initially, the PSC’s chief administrative law judge found the Site to be within the utility company’s exclusive service territory, but no cease and desist order was issued. This recommended decision became final when no exceptions were filed. After Mount Hope annexed the Site, the utility company petitioned the PSC to reopen the case, seeking an order to enforce its exclusivity. The PSC reopened the matter, remanded for further proceedings, and eventually, after Mount Hope filed exceptions to a subsequent recommended decision re-affirming the utility’s exclusivity, the PSC found the Site to be in a “gray and overlapping” service area. This meant that future developers or customers at the Site could choose either provider. The utility company’s petition for reconsideration was denied.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed whether the PSC exceeded its statutory authority by reconsidering its prior decision and whether it properly found the Site to be in a gray and overlapping service territory. The court held that the PSC had authority to revisit its prior order and that, under applicable statutes and commission tests, the PSC’s finding that the Site was in a gray and overlapping service area was supported by the evidence. The court affirmed the PSC’s order. View "Beckley Water Company v. Public Service Commission of West Virginia" on Justia Law

A licensed California fisherman sought public access to fish at the Calaveras Reservoir, which is owned by the City and County of San Francisco and managed by the San Francisco Public Utilities Commission. The reservoir, a source of drinking water for millions, is governed by a watershed management plan that currently prohibits public access and fishing. After the City determined that, subject to environmental review and regulatory approval, shoreline fishing could potentially occur without compromising water quality, it began planning for a fishing program, which included infrastructure improvements and compliance with environmental laws.Previously, in a related proceeding, the Alameda County Superior Court ordered the City to determine whether fishing could occur without affecting water purity, but it did not require the City to immediately open the reservoir or apply for a permit. The City complied by starting the environmental review and planning process. Dissatisfied with the pace, the fisherman filed a new petition for a writ of mandate, seeking to compel the City to immediately apply for an amended water supply permit and open the reservoir for fishing. The Superior Court denied the petition, finding no ministerial duty requiring the City to proceed immediately and concluding that legal requirements, including environmental review and program planning, must be satisfied first.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the lower court's judgment. The appellate court held that the plaintiff had not established a clear ministerial duty requiring the City to immediately apply for a permit or open the reservoir for fishing. The court found that the governing statutes and regulations allow for the exercise of discretion and require compliance with environmental and permitting processes before fishing access can be provided. The judgment was affirmed. View "Dummer v. City and County of S.F." on Justia Law

During a seven-day period in February 2021, Winter Storm Uri caused severe cold weather across New Mexico, leading to surging natural gas and electricity prices. El Paso Electric Company (EPE) continued to provide uninterrupted power to its New Mexico customers throughout the storm, in part by utilizing capacity from Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 3 (PV3). EPE sought to recover extraordinary fuel and purchased power costs caused by the storm, specifically using a proxy price formula for PV3-related costs, which calculated recovery based on natural gas market index prices rather than actual nuclear generation costs.EPE sought a variance from the Fuel and Purchased Power Cost Adjustment Clause (FPPCAC) methodology through an administrative proceeding before the New Mexico Public Regulation Commission (the Commission). The City of Las Cruces, acting as an intervenor, challenged EPE’s use of the proxy price formula, arguing that prior Commission orders limited or precluded such use for PV3. The City highlighted language in a 2009 settlement agreement (the Credit Suisse Agreement) and subsequent Commission orders, contending that proxy pricing should not have applied during the storm. The Commission, however, had repeatedly reaffirmed the use of the proxy price formula for PV3 in later orders and found that this approach was still reasonable.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico addressed for the first time the standard of review for an agency’s interpretation of its own orders, adopting a highly deferential standard. Applying this standard, the Court held that the Commission reasonably interpreted its prior orders to permit continued use of the proxy price formula for PV3 energy costs. The Court also found the Commission’s findings were supported by substantial evidence and not arbitrary or capricious, and affirmed the Commission’s final orders in full. View "City of Las Cruces v. Public Regulation Commission" on Justia Law

A public utility company implemented a power-purchase-agreement rider connected to its contractual share in two coal-fired plants operated by a regional power corporation. This rider could result in either surcharges or credits to retail customers, depending on whether the market revenues from selling the plants’ output exceeded their costs. For the years 2018 and 2019, an independent auditor was hired to review the prudency of all costs and sales associated with this rider and to determine if the company’s actions served the best interests of retail ratepayers. The audit found that while the plants cost customers more than the market price for energy, the company's processes were generally consistent with good utility practice. The audit noted that the “must-run” strategy for plant operation might not always be optimal but considered other factors, such as employment and fuel diversity.The Public Utilities Commission of Ohio previously authorized the rider and allowed cost recovery, subject to annual prudency audits. After the independent audit, the Commission held hearings at which parties, including consumer advocacy groups, challenged the prudency of the must-run strategy and raised concerns about the independence of the audit process. They argued that commission staff improperly influenced the auditor and sought to subpoena a staff member for testimony. The Commission denied the subpoena, finding that testimony from other witnesses covered the relevant issues and that the auditor’s independence was not compromised.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the Commission’s findings and procedures. The Court held that the Commission did not commit reversible error in crediting evidence supporting the must-run strategy’s prudency, nor did it violate due process or its own rules by denying the subpoena, since the parties had ample opportunity to cross-examine other key witnesses. The Court also found the Commission was not required to apply an appearance-of-impropriety standard to assess the auditor’s independence. The Commission’s orders were affirmed. View "In re Rev. of the Power-Purchase-Agreement Rider of Ohio Power Co. for 2018 and 2019" on Justia Law

After a motor vehicle accident in Norfolk, Connecticut, downed electrical wires from a utility pole owned by an electric supplier trapped the vehicle’s occupants. First responders waited about an hour before the utility’s specialist confirmed the wires were de-energized, delaying rescue. The Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA) investigated the supplier’s response, conducted a hearing in which the supplier participated, and ultimately found the response imprudent. PURA ordered the supplier to adopt a thirty-minute target response time for certain life-threatening situations, among other directives.The electric supplier appealed PURA’s decision to the Superior Court, arguing that the investigation and hearing constituted a “contested case” under Connecticut’s Uniform Administrative Procedure Act, which would entitle it to judicial review. The Superior Court rejected this argument, finding that the statutes and regulations cited by the supplier did not require PURA to hold a hearing in these circumstances, and therefore the proceeding did not qualify as a contested case. The court dismissed the supplier’s administrative appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.On further appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s dismissal. The Supreme Court held that the proceeding was not a contested case because no state statute or regulation required PURA to determine the supplier’s legal rights, duties, or privileges after an opportunity for a hearing in this context. The Court explained that references to statutes requiring hearings in other circumstances did not convert the proceeding into a contested case when the relevant factual predicates were absent. The holding also clarified that PURA’s decision to hold a hearing voluntarily, or to follow contested case procedures, did not create contested case status where no such hearing was legally mandated. Thus, PURA’s determinations and orders in this investigation were not subject to judicial review under the contested case provisions. View "Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority" on Justia Law