Justia Utilities Law Opinion Summaries

A public utility company implemented a power-purchase-agreement rider connected to its contractual share in two coal-fired plants operated by a regional power corporation. This rider could result in either surcharges or credits to retail customers, depending on whether the market revenues from selling the plants’ output exceeded their costs. For the years 2018 and 2019, an independent auditor was hired to review the prudency of all costs and sales associated with this rider and to determine if the company’s actions served the best interests of retail ratepayers. The audit found that while the plants cost customers more than the market price for energy, the company's processes were generally consistent with good utility practice. The audit noted that the “must-run” strategy for plant operation might not always be optimal but considered other factors, such as employment and fuel diversity.The Public Utilities Commission of Ohio previously authorized the rider and allowed cost recovery, subject to annual prudency audits. After the independent audit, the Commission held hearings at which parties, including consumer advocacy groups, challenged the prudency of the must-run strategy and raised concerns about the independence of the audit process. They argued that commission staff improperly influenced the auditor and sought to subpoena a staff member for testimony. The Commission denied the subpoena, finding that testimony from other witnesses covered the relevant issues and that the auditor’s independence was not compromised.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the Commission’s findings and procedures. The Court held that the Commission did not commit reversible error in crediting evidence supporting the must-run strategy’s prudency, nor did it violate due process or its own rules by denying the subpoena, since the parties had ample opportunity to cross-examine other key witnesses. The Court also found the Commission was not required to apply an appearance-of-impropriety standard to assess the auditor’s independence. The Commission’s orders were affirmed. View "In re Rev. of the Power-Purchase-Agreement Rider of Ohio Power Co. for 2018 and 2019" on Justia Law

After a motor vehicle accident in Norfolk, Connecticut, downed electrical wires from a utility pole owned by an electric supplier trapped the vehicle’s occupants. First responders waited about an hour before the utility’s specialist confirmed the wires were de-energized, delaying rescue. The Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA) investigated the supplier’s response, conducted a hearing in which the supplier participated, and ultimately found the response imprudent. PURA ordered the supplier to adopt a thirty-minute target response time for certain life-threatening situations, among other directives.The electric supplier appealed PURA’s decision to the Superior Court, arguing that the investigation and hearing constituted a “contested case” under Connecticut’s Uniform Administrative Procedure Act, which would entitle it to judicial review. The Superior Court rejected this argument, finding that the statutes and regulations cited by the supplier did not require PURA to hold a hearing in these circumstances, and therefore the proceeding did not qualify as a contested case. The court dismissed the supplier’s administrative appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.On further appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s dismissal. The Supreme Court held that the proceeding was not a contested case because no state statute or regulation required PURA to determine the supplier’s legal rights, duties, or privileges after an opportunity for a hearing in this context. The Court explained that references to statutes requiring hearings in other circumstances did not convert the proceeding into a contested case when the relevant factual predicates were absent. The holding also clarified that PURA’s decision to hold a hearing voluntarily, or to follow contested case procedures, did not create contested case status where no such hearing was legally mandated. Thus, PURA’s determinations and orders in this investigation were not subject to judicial review under the contested case provisions. View "Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority" on Justia Law

A longtime Speaker of the Illinois House of Representatives was prosecuted in federal court for engaging in extensive bribery schemes. The first involved a major utility company, Commonwealth Edison (ComEd), which, facing financial difficulties, funneled more than $3 million to the defendant’s political associates through intermediaries and sham contracts in exchange for the defendant’s legislative support of ComEd’s agenda over several years. The government presented evidence that these payments resulted in concrete legislative actions by the defendant that benefitted ComEd, including support for specific bills and regulatory changes. The second scheme involved the defendant’s agreement to recommend a Chicago alderman for a state board appointment in exchange for business referrals and benefits to the defendant’s family.Following a lengthy trial in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the jury convicted the defendant on several counts, including conspiracy, federal-program bribery, honest-services wire fraud, and Travel Act violations. The jury acquitted him on some counts and was deadlocked on others. The district court denied the defendant’s motions for acquittal and for a new trial, then imposed a sentence of imprisonment and a substantial fine.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and the adequacy of the jury instructions. The Court of Appeals held that sufficient evidence supported each conviction and found no prejudicial error in the jury instructions, including those related to the definition of “official act,” “corruptly,” and the intent elements of bribery. The court also concluded that any potential instructional error regarding state law bribery under the Travel Act was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The convictions and sentence were affirmed. View "USA v. Madigan" on Justia Law

An electric supplier was granted a license to operate in Connecticut in 2007. In 2014, the state’s utility authority began a proceeding to redesign the standard billing format for residential customers, ultimately deciding in 2023 to allocate the costs of this redesign among all licensed electric suppliers, including this supplier. Meanwhile, in 2021, the supplier entered into a settlement agreement with the authority’s enforcement office and other state entities, agreeing to leave the Connecticut market for six years in order to resolve various alleged violations. After the cost allocation decision was issued, the supplier moved to withdraw its license, asserting it had no further obligations to the state.The Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA) denied the motion to withdraw the license without prejudice, instructing the supplier to pay the allocated assessment before the license could be relinquished. The supplier appealed to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Britain, arguing that the denial was a final agency decision in a contested case or a declaratory ruling subject to judicial review. The Superior Court granted PURA’s motion to dismiss the appeal, finding that the denial was not a final decision in a contested case and that no declaratory ruling had been issued.On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal. The Court held that the supplier had waived its argument that PURA’s denial was a declaratory ruling, since it had argued the opposite in the Superior Court. The Supreme Court further held that PURA’s denial of the motion to withdraw was not a final decision in a contested case because no statute required PURA to hold a hearing on such a motion. The Court also found that the assessment was not a civil penalty, so statutes requiring hearings before penalties did not apply. Thus, the trial court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was affirmed. View "Clearview Electric, Inc. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority" on Justia Law

A ratepayer challenged a final order issued by the Oklahoma Corporation Commission that modified the rates charged by a public utility, the Public Service Company of Oklahoma. The utility had previously been authorized to add a charge to customer bills to pay ratepayer-backed bonds issued in response to high costs from a 2021 extreme weather event, pursuant to the February 2021 Regulated Utility Consumer Protection Act. During the rate proceeding, the utility and several other parties presented evidence and entered into a settlement agreement, which was approved by the Commission. The appellant, who did not participate in the Commission proceedings, sought reversal of the final order on the grounds that the utility did not provide sufficient evidence of a required audit, and that a Commissioner should have been disqualified. The appellant also attempted a collateral attack on orders from earlier proceedings related to the winter storm charges.The Oklahoma Corporation Commission reviewed and approved the proposed settlement and the stipulated rates after testimony and public comment. The appellant did not object at any stage of the Commission’s process, nor did he submit evidence or raise the issues he later brought on appeal. After the final order was entered, the appellant filed an appeal directly with the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, as permitted by the state constitution.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma held that while the appellant had standing as a ratepayer to appeal, the issues raised were not exhausted before the Corporation Commission and could not be considered for the first time on appeal. The Court further held that the appellant’s collateral attack on prior Commission orders was both procedurally barred and statutorily prohibited. The Supreme Court affirmed the final order of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission. View "GANN v. STATE OF OKLAHOMA." on Justia Law

This case involves a challenge to the District of Columbia Public Service Commission’s approval of Potomac Electric Power Company’s (Pepco) 2024–2026 multi-year electric rate plan. The petitioners, the Office of the People’s Counsel and the Apartment and Office Building Association, objected to the Commission’s decision to approve a $123.4 million rate increase following a “legislative-style” hearing that did not permit the presentation or cross-examination of witnesses. The petitioners argued that the process failed to address significant factual disputes, particularly concerning the Effective Rate Adjustment (ERA) and Bill Stabilization Adjustment (BSA), mechanisms affecting rates for large commercial customers. They maintained that an evidentiary hearing was required to resolve these factual disagreements.The Public Service Commission, after receiving written testimony and briefs, denied requests for an evidentiary hearing and approved Pepco’s rate plan with modifications. It concluded that there were no material factual disputes necessitating cross-examination or oral testimony, and thus a legislative-style hearing was sufficient. The Commission also rejected applications for reconsideration, reiterating its view that the contested issues were either legal or policy-based rather than factual. However, there were substantial discrepancies between the parties’ calculations regarding the BSA deferral balances and concerns about the ERA’s impact on certain customer classes.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and determined that this proceeding was a “contested case” under the D.C. Administrative Procedure Act and that the Commission was required to hold an evidentiary, trial-type hearing because there were genuine disputes over material facts. The court held that the Commission’s failure to provide such a hearing rendered its orders unsustainable. Accordingly, the court vacated the Commission’s orders and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the Commission to hold an evidentiary hearing. View "Office of the People's Counsel v. District of Columbia Public Service Commission" on Justia Law

A licensed electric supplier in Connecticut sought to withdraw its electric supplier license after previously entering into a settlement agreement with the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA) to resolve various regulatory allegations. This agreement required the supplier to voluntarily stop serving customers in Connecticut for six years but did not expressly require the withdrawal of the license itself. Around the same period, PURA completed a cost-allocation proceeding related to the redesign of residential billing formats, and ordered the supplier to pay an allocated assessment of approximately $179,000. The supplier then moved to withdraw its license, asserting it had no further obligations, but PURA denied the motion without prejudice and directed payment of the assessment before considering license relinquishment.The supplier filed an administrative appeal in the Superior Court for the judicial district of New Britain, challenging PURA’s denial of its withdrawal motion. The supplier argued that the ruling was an appealable final decision in a contested case, or in the alternative, a declaratory ruling. The Superior Court granted PURA’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the denial was not a final decision in a contested case because no statute or regulation required PURA to provide a hearing on motions to withdraw a license. The court also declined to treat the supplier's complaint as a declaratory judgment action.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed whether the denial of the motion to withdraw was appealable as either a final decision in a contested case or a declaratory ruling. The court held that the supplier had waived its declaratory ruling argument by taking the opposite position in the trial court. The court further held that PURA was not statutorily required to provide a hearing on a motion to withdraw a license, so the matter was not a contested case. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Clearview Electric, Inc. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority" on Justia Law

After Hurricane Ida struck Louisiana in August 2021, Terrebonne Parish, which operates Houma’s electric system, requested help from Lafayette Utilities Systems (LUS) to restore power. LUS, in turn, sought assistance from the City of Wilson, North Carolina, leading to mutual aid agreements signed by Terrebonne Parish, LUS, and the City of Wilson. As a result, thirteen City of Wilson employees, including Kevin Ray Worrell, traveled to Louisiana to assist with power restoration. These workers stayed in Lafayette and commuted daily to Houma. On September 10, 2021, while driving a City of Wilson vehicle back to the hotel after work, Worrell was involved in an accident, injuring the plaintiffs.The plaintiffs initially filed tort actions in the St. Mary Parish district court, which were consolidated and removed to the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana based on diversity jurisdiction. The defendants moved for dismissal or summary judgment, arguing that Mr. Worrell was entitled to immunity under the Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act (LHSEADA). The district court agreed, finding that Worrell acted as a “representative” of Terrebonne Parish under the statute and thus was immune from liability. The district court also determined that commuting from the work site fell within emergency preparedness activities covered by the Act.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit certified questions to the Supreme Court of Louisiana regarding the definition of “representative” under the LHSEADA. The Supreme Court of Louisiana held that Worrell, as an employee of the City of Wilson, North Carolina, working pursuant to mutual aid agreements that explicitly preserved his status as a City of Wilson employee and independent contractor, was not a “representative” of the State of Louisiana or its subdivisions for purposes of LHSEADA immunity. Therefore, he was not entitled to statutory immunity. The Court found it unnecessary to reach the second certified question. View "BREAUX VS. WORRELL" on Justia Law

A municipally owned utility in San Antonio owns power poles used for distributing electricity. Since 1984, a telecommunications provider (and its predecessor) has attached its equipment to these poles under a written agreement. The contract set a per-pole attachment fee, allowed for annual rate increases, and included a clause requiring both parties to comply with all applicable laws affecting their rights and obligations under the agreement. Over time, the utility charged one telecommunications provider higher rates, while continuing to invoice another provider at the original rate, resulting in a disparity in charges. After amendments to the Public Utility Regulatory Act (PURA) in 2005 prohibited discriminatory pole attachment rates and required uniform and federally capped rates, the provider paying the higher fee sued, seeking relief for breach of contract and statutory violations.The trial court, after abating proceedings while the Public Utility Commission (PUC) considered the matter, granted partial summary judgment for the utility on statutory and unjust enrichment claims, but for the provider on the breach-of-contract claim. The utility appealed. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the agreement did not incorporate new statutes into its terms, and thus the provider could not base its contract claim on the utility’s alleged statutory violations.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case. It held that the parties’ contract—by its express terms—incorporated post-1984 legal changes affecting their rights and obligations, including the 2005 PURA amendments. The Court concluded that the provider could pursue its contract claim based on the utility’s alleged failure to comply with current law, including prohibitions on discriminatory and excessive pole attachment rates. The Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "SPECTRUM GULF COAST, LLC v. CITY OF SAN ANTONIO" on Justia Law

Two development companies owned land in Johnson County, Texas, within the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the City of Mansfield but outside the city’s corporate boundaries. To develop this land, the companies needed access to retail water services, which, under state law, could be provided only by the Johnson County Special Utility District (“JCSUD”) because it held the exclusive certificate of convenience and necessity (CCN) for the area. However, a contract between JCSUD and the City of Mansfield required JCSUD to secure Mansfield’s written consent, which could be withheld at the City’s discretion, before providing water services within the city’s extraterritorial jurisdiction. The developers’ efforts to obtain water service were unsuccessful, as Mansfield demanded annexation and additional fees, ultimately refusing to formalize an agreement.After unsuccessful negotiations and attempts to compel service through the Texas Public Utility Commission, the developers sued the City of Mansfield in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. They alleged violations of the Sherman Act and brought state-law claims. The district court, adopting a magistrate judge’s recommendation, dismissed the antitrust claims with prejudice, holding that Mansfield was entitled to state-action antitrust immunity under Texas law, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether Mansfield was entitled to state-action immunity. The Fifth Circuit held that, although Texas law authorizes monopolies for water utilities through CCNs, it does not clearly articulate or authorize the City of Mansfield to act anticompetitively concerning the area in question, since the CCN belonged to JCSUD. Therefore, the court reversed the district court’s grant of state-action immunity and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Megatel v. Mansfield" on Justia Law