Justia Utilities Law Opinion Summaries

A condominium association in Southwest Washington, D.C., which owns a large complex of over 200 townhomes, challenged the way the District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority (D.C. Water) calculates a stormwater runoff fee known as the Clean Rivers Impervious Area Charge (CRIAC). The association is classified as a multi-family customer because its water is supplied through several master-metered service lines, rather than each townhome having an individual meter. This classification results in the CRIAC being calculated based on the total impervious surface area of the property, rather than using a tiered system that applies to individually metered residential properties. The association argued that this method, which ties the fee calculation to how the property is metered, is arbitrary and capricious, as the metering method does not affect the amount of stormwater runoff.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia granted summary judgment to D.C. Water. The court found that D.C. Water’s classification and billing methodology were reasonable and consistent with industry standards, relying on declarations from D.C. Water officials and legislative history. The court also rejected the association’s constitutional and equal protection claims, which were not pursued on appeal.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. It affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment on the constitutional claims, as those were not contested on appeal. However, the appellate court vacated the summary judgment on the claim that D.C. Water’s use of metering as a factor in CRIAC calculation was arbitrary and capricious. The court held that D.C. Water had not provided an adequate explanation for why metering should affect the fee, and remanded the case for further proceedings on that issue. View "Capitol Park IV Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority" on Justia Law

Three public interest organizations brought suit against a utility company that provides natural gas services in the District of Columbia, alleging that the company violated the Consumer Protection Procedures Act (CPPA) by making false and misleading statements about the environmental effects of its natural gas. The organizations claimed these statements appeared in customer bills, on the company’s website, and in other public documents. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief to address the alleged unfair and deceptive trade practices.The utility company responded by filing a special motion to dismiss under the District’s Anti-SLAPP Act, followed by a motion to dismiss under Superior Court Civil Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The company argued that the CPPA does not create a right of action against entities regulated by the Public Service Commission (PSC), citing D.C. Code § 28-3903(c)(2)(B) and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals’ decision in Gomez v. Independence Management of Delaware, Inc., 967 A.2d 1276 (D.C. 2009). The public interest organizations countered that the statutory limitation only applied to the Department of Licensing and Consumer Protection, not to private actors like themselves, and that subsequent amendments to the CPPA had rendered Gomez obsolete. The Superior Court granted the utility’s motion to dismiss, finding that Gomez remained controlling and that the CPPA’s exemptions for PSC-regulated entities had not been altered by later amendments.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the Superior Court’s dismissal. The court held that, although the plain text of the CPPA does not expressly bar private suits against PSC-regulated entities, binding precedent from Gomez requires that the limitations in D.C. Code § 28-3903(c)(2) apply to private actions as well. Therefore, public interest organizations may not sue entities regulated by the PSC under the CPPA. View "Client Earth v. Washington Gas Light Company" on Justia Law