Justia Utilities Law Opinion Summaries

A fire destroyed a hydroponic tomato facility belonging to a new business, Sunnyland Farms, Inc. The day before the fire, Sunnyland's electricity had been shut off by its local utility, the Central New Mexico Electrical Cooperative (CNMEC), for nonpayment. Sunnyland's water pumps were powered by electricity, and without power, Sunnyland's facility had no water. Sunnyland sued CNMEC, alleging both that CNMEC had wrongfully suspended service, and if its electrical service had been in place, firefighters and Sunnyland employees would have been able to stop the fire from consuming the facility. After a bench trial, the court found CNMEC liable for negligence and breach of contract. The trial court awarded damages, including lost profits, of over $21 million in contract and tort, but reduced the tort damages by 80% for Sunnyland's comparative fault. It also awarded $100,000 in punitive damages. The parties cross-appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the contract judgment, vacated the punitive damages, held that the lost profit damages were not supported by sufficient evidence, affirmed the trial court's offset of damages based on CNMEC's purchase of a subrogation lien, and affirmed the trial court's rulings on pre- and post-judgment interest. Sunnyland appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals regarding the contract judgment, punitive damages, and interest, and reversed on the lost profit damages and the offset. The Court also took the opportunity of this case to re-examine the standard for consequential contract damages in New Mexico. View "Sunnyland Farms, Inc. v. Central N.M. Electric Cooperative, Inc." on Justia Law

In these appeals the Supreme Court considered whether the Virginia Constitution provides for a cause of action by a landowner for inverse condemnation when the allegation of the complaint is that the landowner's property has been damaged by a diminution in value resulting from a public utility's construction and operation of an electrical transmission line for public use on nearby property. The trial court sustained the public utility's demurrers with prejudice, finding that because the complaints did not allege that the entire property had been rendered useless, and because the property had not lost all economic value, a damaging under the Constitution had not occurred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court applied the wrong standard in reviewing the pleadings; but (2) under the proper standard, the complainants could not state a cause of action for declaratory relief for inverse condemnation when the sole damage alleged was a diminution in value arising from the public use of proximately located property, and therefore, the circuit court's judgment sustaining the demurrers was correct under the proper standard.View "Byler v. Va. Elec. & Power Co." on Justia Law

Robert Madrid worked for Petitioner Public Service Company of New Mexico (PNM) as a bill collector. "Angered by a particularly obstinate customer," and without permission, Madrid drove to the customer's home and disconnected the customer's gas service. It would later be determined that the customer was not a customer of PNM. PNM fired Madrid. Madrid responded by filing a grievance against PNM with his union, arguing that Madrid's termination violated its collective bargaining agreement with the Company. In making its argument, the union hypothesized that PNM treated Madrid more harshly than other employees guilty of similar conduct. The union sent PNM three discovery requests for documents to prove its hypothesis. Those requests became the subject of the appeal before the Tenth Circuit, as PNM refused to comply. An ALJ determined that PNM had engaged in an unfair labor practice, and ordered the Company to comply with the discovery requests. The National Labor Relations board adopted the ALJ's decision. PNM appealed the Board's order, and the Board cross-petitioned to have its order enforced. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit was unpersuaded by PNM's arguments on appeal, and affirmed the Board's decision.View "Public Service CO of NM v. NLRB" on Justia Law

The United States petitioned the district court for an order enforcing a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) subpoena served on Golden Valley Electric Association (Golden Valley) for power consumption records concerning three customer residences. The court granted the petition and ordered compliance. Golden Valley complied with the subpoena but appealed the order. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Golden Valley's compliance with the district court's enforcement order did not moot the appeal; (2) the DEA's subpoena sought information relevant to a drug investigation, was procedurally proper, and was not overly broad; and (3) the subpoena complied with the Fourth Amendment.View "United States v. Golden Valley Elec. Ass'n" on Justia Law

Electric distribution utilities that opt to provide service under an electric security plan must undergo an annual earnings review. If their plan resulted in "significantly excessive earnings" compared to similar companies, the utility must return the excess to its customers pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 4928.143(F). In the case below, the Public Utilities Commission found that Columbus Southern Power's 2009 earnings were significantly excessive by over $42 million. There were three appeals from the order. Columbus Southern Power asserted that section 4928.143(F) was unconstitutionally vague, and the Ohio Energy Group and the Office of the Ohio Consumers' Counsel (collectively, OEG) and Industrial Energy Users-Ohio (IEU) raised different arguments that the commission erred in applying the statute. The Supreme Court affirmed the commission's order, holding (1) the statute was not unconstitutionally vague, and (2) neither OEG nor IEU showed that the commission unreasonably interpreted or applied section 4928.143(F). View "In re Columbus S. Power Co." on Justia Law

Kansas One-Call System (One-Call) managed and operated a centralized notification center for diggers working on underground utility infrastructure to use before they started excavating pursuant to the Kansas Underground Utility Damage Prevention Act (KUUDPA). The Kansas Legislature later amended the KUUPDA, which financially affected One-Call. One-Call sued to enjoin enforcement of the amendments on the grounds that the amendments violated (1) the original purpose provision of the Kansas Constitution, (2) the one-subject rule, (3) the separation of powers doctrine, and (4) the Equal Protection Clause and the Taking Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the State. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the challenged amendments were valid. View "Kansas One-Call Sys. v. State" on Justia Law

This case was remanded to the district court for determination of whether a class should be certified and for determination of what, if any, part of the City's franchise fees for gas and electricity services are related to its administrative expenses in exercising its police power. The district court certified a class, found the franchise fees cannot exceed $1,575,194 per year for the electric utility and $1,574,046 for the gas utility, entered judgment in favor of the certified class against the City in the amount by which such fees exceeded that amount for an approximately ten-year period, and retained jurisdiction to determine the amount of money to be refunded to members of the class. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment as modified, concluding that certain amounts allocated or not allocated by the district court as proper components of the franchise fees should be modified. Remanded.View "Kragnes v. City of Des Moines" on Justia Law

Appellants, a group of individuals, filed a complaint with the Montana Public Service Commission (PSC) against NorthWestern Energy (NWE) concerning NWE's provision of street lighting services. The PSC dismissed the complaint on the ground that the four named complainants lacked standing under Mont. Code Ann. 69-3-321. Appellants then filed an amended complaint in which they named four additional complainants. The PSC concluded (1) Appellants were procedurally barred from amending their complaint, and (2) the court would not reconsider its earlier ruling on standing in any event. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the original complainants lacked standing to pursue their complaint in the PSC under section 69-3-321; but (2) the PSC's and district court's rationales for rejecting the amended complaint were incorrect as, in this case, there was not a categorical procedural bar to the filing of an amended complaint following an order of dismissal for lack of standing.View "Williamson v. Mont. Pub. Serv. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an environmental organization, filed this administrative mandamus action to challenge the issuance of a federally required permit authorizing the Moss Landing Powerplant (MLPP) to draw cooling water from the adjacent Moss Landing Harbor and Elkhorn Slough. This case presented issues concerning the technological and environmental standards, and the procedures for administrative and judicial review, that apply when a thermal powerplant, while pursuing the issuance or renewal of a cooling water intake permit from a regional board, also sought necessary approval from the State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission (Energy Commission), of a plan to add additional generating units to the plant, with related modifications to the cooling intake system. The court held that the superior court had jurisdiction to entertain the administrative mandamus petition here under review. The court also held that the trial court erred when it deferred a final judgment, ordered an interlocutory remand to the board for further "comprehensive" examination of that issue, then denied mandamus after determining that the additional evidence and analysis considered by the board on remand supported the board's reaffirmed findings. The court further held that recent Supreme Court authority confirmed that, when applying federal Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1326(b), standards for the issuance of this permit, the Regional Water Board properly utilized cost-benefit analysis. The court declined to address several other issues discussed by the parties. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.View "Voices of the Wetlands v. CA State Water Resources Control Bd., et al." on Justia Law

Appellant TW Telecom of New Mexico (TW Telecom) appealed a final order issued by the New Mexico Public Regulation Commission (PRC) in "In the Matter of the Development of an Alternative Form of Regulation Plan for Qwest Corporation" (AFOR III Final Order). TW Telecom claimed that the PRC (1) adopted certain conclusions from a previous final order, lacking justification in the AFOR III record; (2) deregulated Qwest Corporation's (Qwest) rates in violation of the New Mexico Telecommunications Act and the separation of powers doctrine in the New Mexico Constitution; and (3) deprived TW Telecom of proper due process. The claims raised in this appeal involved three cases before the PRC that concerned the development of various alternative forms of regulation plans issued by the PRC, and Qwest's compliance with the terms and conditions therein.  The cases addressed various issues, including pricing provisions and detailed requirements for the filing of tariff changes, tariffs for new services, promotional offerings, packaged services, and individual contracts for services. Upon review, the Supreme Court annulled and vacated AFOR III Final Order and remanded the case back to the PRC for further proceedings. The Court concluded that the PRC indeed violated TW Telecom's due process because it adopted conclusions from a previous proceeding without affording the parties an opportunity to be heard. The Court did not address TW Telecom's second claim. View "TW Telecom of New Mexico v. New Mexico Public Regulation Comm'n" on Justia Law