Justia Utilities Law Opinion Summaries

In 2013, legislation was enacted requiring the City of Asheville to involuntarily transfer the assets it uses to operate a public water system to a newly-created metropolitan water and sewerage district. The City filed a complaint and motion seeking injunctive relief, alleging that the involuntary transfer provisions of the legislation were unconstitutional. The trial court concluded that the involuntary transfer violated various provisions of the North Carolina Constitution and permanently enjoined the State from enforcing the legislation. The court of appeals reversed, in part, the trial court’s order and remanded to the trial court for the entry of summary judgment in favor of the State. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the challenged legislation constitutes a prohibited local act relating to health and sanitation in violation of Article II, Section 24(1)(a) of the North Carolina Constitution. View "City of Asheville v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action suit on behalf of approximately 1.5 million Puerto Rican residents who are customers of Autoridad de Energia Electrica de Puerto Rico (PREPA), alleging that PREPA used a portion of its overall revenue to subsidize municipalities’ energy use. Plaintiffs claimed violations of the Takings Clause and their procedural due process rights because PREPA deprived them of their property interest in electricity and/or the funds they paid for electricity. The district court granted summary judgment for PREPA,concluding that Plaintiffs had not identified a valid property interest, that no taking had occurred, and that no valid procedural due process claim existed. The First Circuit affirmed on other grounds, holding that because Plaintiffs did not identify a valid property interest, they did not have standing to bring the takings and due process claims. View "Santiago-Ramos v. Autoridad de Energia Electrica de P.R." on Justia Law

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has exclusive jurisdiction over interstate wholesale electricity sales. States regulate retail sales. In states that have deregulated their energy markets, “load serving entities” (LSEs) purchase wholesale electricity from generators for delivery to retail consumers. PJM, which manages segments of the electricity grid, operates an auction to identify need for new generation and to accommodate long-term contracts. PJM predicts demand for three years and assigns a share of that demand to each participating LSE. Producers enter bids. PJM accepts bids until it purchases enough capacity to satisfy anticipated demand. All accepted sellers receive the highest accepted rate (clearing price). LSEs then must purchase, from PJM, electricity to satisfy their assigned share. FERC regulates the auction to ensure a reasonable clearing price. Concerned that the auction was not encouraging development of sufficient new in-state generation, Maryland enacted a program, selected CPV to construct a new power plant and required LSEs to enter into 20-year contracts with CPV. Under the contract, CPV sells its capacity to PJM through the auction, but—through mandated payments from LSEs—receives the state price rather than the clearing price. The district court issued a declaratory judgment holding that Maryland’s program improperly sets CPV's rate for interstate wholesale capacity sales to PJM. The Fourth Circuit and Supreme Court affirmed. Maryland’s program is preempted because it disregards the rate FERC requires under its exclusive authority over interstate wholesale sales, 16 U.S.C. 824(b)(1). FERC has approved PJM’s capacity auction as the sole rate-setting mechanism for those sales. Maryland attempts to guarantee CPV a rate distinct from the clearing price, contrary to the Federal Power Act’s division of authority; states may not seek to achieve ends, however legitimate, through regulatory means that intrude on FERC’s authority. View "Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC" on Justia Law

Maryland Underground Damage Prevention Authority cited Reliable Contracting Company for violating Md. Code Ann. Pub. Util. Cos. 12-101, under which advance notice must be given to the one-call system of certain types of excavation, and imposed a civil monetary penalty. Reliable Contracting petitioned for judicial review, asserting that the Authority’s enabling statute conferred judicial power on a non-judicial body in violation of separation of powers principles. Reliable Contracting also contended that the statute failed to provide adequate guidance to the Authority for the assessment of such penalties. The circuit court upheld the constitutionality of the statute. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and remanded, holding (1) the Authority is an administrative agency in the executive branch of State government that exercises quasi-judicial powers subject to judicial review, and therefore, its enabling law is not contrary to the State Constitution’s Judicial Vesting Clause or Separation of Powers Clause; and (2) because the Authority is an administrative agency, Md. Code Ann. State Gov't 10-1001 provides guidelines for the exercise of its discretion in assessing civil penalties. View "Reliable Contracting Co. v. Underground Facilities Damage Prevention Auth." on Justia Law

Maryland Underground Damage Prevention Authority cited Reliable Contracting Company for violating Md. Code Ann. Pub. Util. Cos. 12-101, under which advance notice must be given to the one-call system of certain types of excavation, and imposed a civil monetary penalty. Reliable Contracting petitioned for judicial review, asserting that the Authority’s enabling statute conferred judicial power on a non-judicial body in violation of separation of powers principles. Reliable Contracting also contended that the statute failed to provide adequate guidance to the Authority for the assessment of such penalties. The circuit court upheld the constitutionality of the statute. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and remanded, holding (1) the Authority is an administrative agency in the executive branch of State government that exercises quasi-judicial powers subject to judicial review, and therefore, its enabling law is not contrary to the State Constitution’s Judicial Vesting Clause or Separation of Powers Clause; and (2) because the Authority is an administrative agency, Md. Code Ann. State Gov't 10-1001 provides guidelines for the exercise of its discretion in assessing civil penalties. View "Reliable Contracting Co. v. Underground Facilities Damage Prevention Auth." on Justia Law

The Santa Clara Valley Water District Act vests the Santa Clara Valley Water Management District with the power to impose groundwater extraction fees. Great Oaks Water Company, a water retailer, brought this action challenging such a fee imposed on water it draws from wells on its property. The trial court awarded Great Oaks a complete refund on the groundwater charges paid and, in the alternative, a partial refund, finding that the charge violated the Act and Article 13D of the California Constitution. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding (1) the disputed fee is a property-related charge for purposes of Article 13D and thus is subject to some of the constraints of that enactment, but the fee is also a charge for water service and, as such, is exempt from the requirement of voter ratification; (2) Plaintiff’s pre-suit claim did not preserve any monetary remedy against the District for the violations of Article 13D found by the trial court; and (3) the trial court erred in treating the matter as a simple action for damages rather than a petition for a writ of mandate and thus failed to apply a properly deferential standard of review to the question of whether the District’s setting of the fee, or its use of the resulting proceeds, complied with the Act. View "Great Oaks Water Co. v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist." on Justia Law

Brian Wade, in the course of servicing a well situated under a high voltage line owned by Flowell Electric Association and Dixie Escalante Rural Electric Association, Inc. (collectively, Flowell), came into contact with the line, resulting in serious injuries to Wade. Wade was acting on behalf of Rhodes Pump II, LLC, his employer, at the time of the accident. Wade received workers’ compensation benefits from Rhodes and also filed a tort action against Flowell. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Wade and awarded both compensatory and punitive damages. Flowell subsequently brought this action for High Voltage Overhead Lines Act (HVOLA) indemnification against Rhodes. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Flowell, concluding that Rhodes had failed to give Flowell adequate notice of its “intended activity.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Flowell timely filed its HVOLA indemnification action; (2) the Workers’ Compensation Act’s exclusive remedy provision does not preclude liability under the HVOLA; (3) HVOLA does not violate due process or equal protection as applied to Rhodes; and (4) a genuine issue of material fact remains regarding whether Rhodes adequately notified Flowell of its intended activity. View "Flowell Elec. Ass’n v. Rhodes Pump, LLC" on Justia Law

Colorado law required electricity generators to ensure that 20% of the electricity they sell to Colorado consumers comes from renewable sources. Colorado's scheme may require Coloradans to pay more for electricity, but voters overwhelmingly approved the ballot initiative proposing the renewable energy mandate. The issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit's review centered on whether "Colorado's renewable energy mandate survive an encounter with the most dormant doctrine in dormant commerce clause jurisprudence." The Energy and Environment Legal Institute (EELI) argued that Colorado consumers receive their electricity from an interconnected grid serving eleven states and portions of Canada and Mexico. Because electricity could go anywhere on the grid and come from anywhere on the grid, and because Colorado was a net importer of electricity, Colorado's renewable energy mandate effectively meant some out-of-state coal producers, like an EELI member, would lose business with out-of-state utilities who fed their power onto the grid. And this harm to out-of-state coal producers, EELI argued, amounted to a violation of one of the three branches of dormant commerce clause jurisprudence. Therefore, EELI sought to have the mandate declared unconstitutional. In the end, the district court disagreed with EELI's assessment and after review, the Tenth Circuit disagreed too, and affirmed that court's judgment. View "Energy & Environment Legal v. Epel" on Justia Law

The Districts and the Trust petitioned for review of FERC's order determining that the La Grange Hydroelectric Project fell within the mandatory licensing provisions of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 817(1). Because the Trust has failed to establish standing either for itself or on behalf of its members, the court dismissed its petition for lack of jurisdiction. As to the merits of the Districts' arguments, the court concluded that FERC’s evidence of actual use in the past, together with current use of the Tuolumne River by California DFG crews, constitutes substantial evidence supporting FERC’s finding that La Grange is located on a navigable water of the United States; FERC properly relied on the results of its backwater analysis to conclude that the La Grange reservoir extends onto federal lands; and the Districts' challenges to FERC's finding that the La Grange Project is subject to FERC's mandatory licensing jurisdiction based on Congress's "authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States" are without merit. Accordingly, the court denied the petition, concluding that FERC's jurisdictional determinations were supported by substantial evidence and reached by reasoned decisionmaking. View "Turlock Irrigation Dist. v. FERC" on Justia Law

In 2009, Central Arkansas Water, which owns and operates Lake Maumelle as a public water supply, authorized the collection of a “watershed fee” imposed on wholesale customers, including Appellants. That same year, Pulaski County and Central Arkansas Water (collectively, Appellees) entered into a watershed protection agreement. Appellants filed suit on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated taxpayers, arguing that the watershed fee constituted an illegal exaction and that the the watershed protection agreement necessitated Central Arkansas Water to expend public funds illegally. The circuit court entered summary judgment for Appellees, concluding that the agreement was a proper contract for administrative services. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court correctly ruled that the watershed protection agreement was a valid agreement under Arkansas law. View "Sullins v. Cent. Ark. Water" on Justia Law