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The Florida Public Service Commission applied the correct standard of review in its final order approving a nonunanimous settlement agreement between certain parties relating to the rates or service of a public utility providing electric service. Further, competent, substantial evidence supported the Commission’s decision. At issue was whether the Commission properly applied its public interest standard in considering and approving the settlement. The Supreme Court held (1) the public interest was the appropriate standard to apply, and there was no need for the Commission to make an express individual prudence determination; (2) the final order adequately explained the Commission’s decision; and (3) the Commission’s finding that the settlement agreement was in the public interest was supported by competent, substantial evidence. View "Sierra Club v. Brown" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs filed suit for damages resulting from defendants' manipulation of natural gas trading at four regional hubs in the western part of the United States. The Second Circuit held that plaintiffs had Article III standing, but they failed to plausibly allege injury under any of their claims. In this case, plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the Commodities Exchange Act (CEA) because it was not plausible on the record that they were injured by the manipulations West Desk perpetrated. For similar reasons, plaintiffs failed to establish antitrust standing. Accordingly, the court modified the order and judgment to remove the dismissal for lack of standing and affirmed the judgment as modified. View "Harry v. Total Gas & Power North America, Inc." on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs filed suit for damages resulting from defendants' manipulation of natural gas trading at four regional hubs in the western part of the United States. The Second Circuit held that plaintiffs had Article III standing, but they failed to plausibly allege injury under any of their claims. In this case, plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the Commodities Exchange Act (CEA) because it was not plausible on the record that they were injured by the manipulations West Desk perpetrated. For similar reasons, plaintiffs failed to establish antitrust standing. Accordingly, the court modified the order and judgment to remove the dismissal for lack of standing and affirmed the judgment as modified. View "Harry v. Total Gas & Power North America, Inc." on Justia Law

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At issue in this appeal was whether a certain Public Utility Commission of Texas (PUCT) order conflicted with a prior Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) order. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's order and rendered judgment in favor of PUCT and TIEC, holding that PUCT's order was not in conflict with any FERC order. The court held that FERC's orders requiring the Entergy compliance filing did not call for a retroactive reallocation of 2007 Bandwidth Payments; Entergy's compliance filing did not contain a retroactive reallocation that FERC approved in the 2015 FERC Order; the 2015 FERC Order did not retroactively reallocate 2007 Bandwidth Payments; and PUCT's Order was consistent with the 2015 FERC Order. View "Entergy Texas, Inc. v. Nelson" on Justia Law

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At issue in this appeal was whether a certain Public Utility Commission of Texas (PUCT) order conflicted with a prior Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) order. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's order and rendered judgment in favor of PUCT and TIEC, holding that PUCT's order was not in conflict with any FERC order. The court held that FERC's orders requiring the Entergy compliance filing did not call for a retroactive reallocation of 2007 Bandwidth Payments; Entergy's compliance filing did not contain a retroactive reallocation that FERC approved in the 2015 FERC Order; the 2015 FERC Order did not retroactively reallocate 2007 Bandwidth Payments; and PUCT's Order was consistent with the 2015 FERC Order. View "Entergy Texas, Inc. v. Nelson" on Justia Law

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The DC Circuit granted a petition for review of FERC's assertion of Natural Gas Act (NGA) jurisdiction over the transportation and sale of natural gas for resale from the City of Clarksville, Tennessee to the City of Guthrie, Kentucky. As a preliminary matter, the court rejected FERC's standing and ripeness challenges to the court's authority to hear the petition for review. On the merits, the court saw no reason to deviate from the clear and unambiguous language of the statute, as well as FERC precedent, and held that Clarksville was a municipality that was exempt from regulation under NGA Section 7. The court also rejected FERC's alternative argument and held that the articulation of the scope of FERC's jurisdiction did not mean that Congress gave FERC jurisdiction over everything within the three areas listed by FERC. Therefore, the court vacated FERC's order. View "City of Clarksville, Tennessee v. FERC" on Justia Law

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The Eleventh Circuit denied a petition for review of the Commission's decision to revoke petitioner's license to generate hydroelectricity at the Juliette Dam. The court held that the Commission was authorized to revoke petitioner's license under section 823b of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 823b, because petitioner violated a compliance order by never submitting effectiveness protocols or documentation of its consultation with the Resource Agencies and substantial evidence supported the Commission's conclusion that the violation was done knowingly. Furthermore, the record showed that petitioner was given adequate notice and opportunity to be heard and that the Commission took into consideration the nature and seriousness of petitioner's violation and its compliance efforts. The court rejected petitioner's remaining arguments. View "Eastern Hydroelectric Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Nebraska Power Review Board (Board) transferring two newly annexed territories from the Elkhorn Rural Public Power District (ERPPD) to the City of Neligh’s electrical service area and assessing the economic impact at $490,445.90. At issue on appeal was what compensation was owed to ERPPD for reintegration costs under Neb. Rev. Stat. 70-1010(2)(b). The Court held that the Board’s actions were arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable because the Board erred in failing to award compensation for reintegration costs under section 70-1010(2)(b) to ERPPD for the lost substation unit. View "In re Application of City of Neligh" on Justia Law

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In 2016, the court of appeal held that if the advocacy of an intervenor contributes to a California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) proceeding by assisting CPUC in the making of any order or decision (Pub. Util. Code 1802(i))[3]) that is part of the final resolution of the proceeding, whether or not on the merits, CPUC may determine whether, in its judgment, the intervenor’s contribution was substantial enough to merit a compensation award. The court of appeal vacated CPUC's subsequent award. CPUC's determination of “substantial contribution” to some interim or procedural “order or decision” is not alone, sufficient to justify "awarding every penny" claimed for work in connection with the proceeding as a whole. CPUC needed to show how its findings fit into the statutory requirement that compensable work be traceable to some “order or decision,” which is a measure of whether an intervenor achieved some degree of advocacy success. CPUC retains ample discretion to assess whether a given type of contribution counts as “substantial” in a proceeding. In exercising that discretion, CPUC may recognize that even small victories may have a major impact on the course of a proceeding, but there must still be some objective indication of successful advocacy. The remand decisions did not trace the amounts of fees and costs to specific orders or decisions. View "New Cingular Wireless PCS, LLC v. Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit against Edison, alleging claims related to the flow of electricity due to neutral-to-earth voltage (NEV) that came from Edison's electrical substation and flowed onto plaintiff's property. On retrial, the jury found in favor of plaintiff and awarded her damages on her nuisance claim, but the trial court denied plaintiff's motion for attorney fees. Both parties appealed. The Court of Appeals held that, based upon the evidence presented at trial, the court could not conclude as a matter of law that the harm plaintiff suffered did not outweigh the public benefit of Edison's conduct. The court held, however, that the trial court erred in admitting irrelevant evidence related to stray voltage incidents involving prior owners or tenants of the house or other properties, and that the admission of that evidence was prejudicial to Edison. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment and remanded for retrial of the nuisance claim. The court dismissed as moot plaintiff's cross-appeal. View "Wilson v. Southern California Edison Co." on Justia Law