Justia Utilities Law Opinion Summaries

The City and County of San Francisco and the San Francisco County Transportation Authority challenged a decision by the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) to issue a phase I driverless autonomous vehicle (AV) deployment permit to Waymo, LLC for fared passenger service in San Francisco and parts of San Mateo County. The petitioners argued that the PUC failed to follow the law and disregarded significant public safety issues. However, the record showed that the PUC considered and responded to the safety concerns raised by the petitioners, noting that few incidents involved Waymo driverless AVs, each was minor, and none involved injuries.The PUC had previously issued a decision establishing a pilot program for the regulation of AV passenger carriers, which included both drivered and driverless AVs. The petitioners participated in these proceedings but did not challenge the decision at that time. Waymo submitted an advice letter in December 2022 seeking a phase I driverless AV deployment permit, which was protested by the San Francisco entities. The PUC's Consumer Protection and Enforcement Division circulated a draft resolution authorizing Waymo's permit, and after considering comments and holding meetings, the PUC issued a final resolution in August 2023, authorizing Waymo to provide fared driverless AV service.The California Court of Appeal reviewed the case and found that the PUC acted within its authority and did not abuse its discretion. The court noted that the PUC's decision was supported by substantial evidence, including data showing that Waymo driverless AVs had not been involved in any collisions resulting in injuries. The court also upheld the PUC's use of the advice letter process, as it was authorized by the PUC's prior decision. The court denied the relief requested by the petitioners, affirming the PUC's decision to issue the phase I driverless AV deployment permit to Waymo. View "City and County of San Francisco v. Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

During Winter Storm Uri in February 2021, Black Hills Colorado Electric LLC incurred extraordinary natural gas costs to ensure continuous electric service to its customers. Holcim U.S. Inc., a large retail electric customer, argued that the Colorado Public Utilities Commission (PUC) set an unjust and unreasonable charge for electricity over a five-day period, disproportionately allocating utility costs to Holcim. Holcim also claimed that the PUC's charge constituted a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment.The District Court for the City and County of Denver upheld the PUC's decision, finding that the rate was just and reasonable and did not violate Holcim's constitutional rights. The court noted that the PUC's rate structure was based on total customer usage forecasts and was applied uniformly to all customers.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that the PUC's rate was just and reasonable, as it accurately reflected the cost of service, distributed costs among customers fairly, and maintained the utility's financial integrity. The court also found that Holcim's actual electricity usage during the storm did not impact the costs incurred by Black Hills, which were based on forecasted needs.Additionally, the court rejected Holcim's constitutional claims. It concluded that Holcim did not adequately develop its takings claim and that the PUC's decision did not violate Holcim's due process rights, as the PUC provided a fair hearing, considered competent evidence, and made its determination based on evidence rather than arbitrarily. View "Holcim U.S. Inc. v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm'n" on Justia Law

In 2021, the San Diego City Council approved new franchise agreements granting San Diego Gas & Electric Company (SDG&E) the exclusive right to provide gas and electric services in San Diego. Kathryn Burton, a San Diego resident, filed a lawsuit against the City and the Council members, alleging a violation of the Ralph M. Brown Act. Burton claimed that the Council members had discussed and agreed on their votes in a "secret serial meeting" using the mayor as an intermediary before approving the agreements.The Superior Court of San Diego County allowed SDG&E to intervene as a defendant. SDG&E, along with the City defendants, moved for summary judgment. The court granted the motion, concluding that Burton failed to comply with the Brown Act's requirement to make a prelitigation demand to the legislative body to cure or correct the alleged violation.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. Burton argued that she had satisfied the demand requirement through letters sent by her later-hired attorney, Maria Severson. However, the court found that Severson's letters did not mention Burton and were not sent on her behalf. The court held that Burton did not comply with the statutory requirement to make a demand before filing the lawsuit, as required by section 54960.1 of the Government Code.The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court, concluding that Burton's appeal lacked merit due to her failure to comply with the demand requirement. The court also found that Burton's challenge to the order allowing SDG&E to intervene was moot, as the summary judgment was properly granted regardless of SDG&E's participation. View "Burton v. Campbell" on Justia Law

Sherry Cole filed a formal complaint against Rocky Mountain Power (RMP) alleging she had been overbilled due to her power meter being cross-connected with her neighbor’s. Initially, an RMP employee confirmed the cross-connection and credited her account with $1,256.45. However, subsequent tests revealed no cross-connection, leading RMP to remove the credit and instead apply a $450 credit for the inconvenience. Cole then filed a complaint with the Idaho Public Utilities Commission, which dismissed her complaint due to lack of evidence of overcharging. Cole's motion for reconsideration was also denied by the Commission.Cole appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. The Commission had reviewed Cole’s complaint, RMP’s billing calculations, and an analysis by Jon Kruck, an investigator, which concluded that Cole’s energy usage was consistent and did not indicate a cross-connection. The Commission found no substantial evidence supporting Cole’s claims and dismissed her complaint. Cole’s petition for reconsideration was denied as she failed to present new evidence or demonstrate that the dismissal was unreasonable or unlawful.The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s decision, finding that the Commission’s factual findings were supported by substantial and competent evidence. The Court noted that Cole relied on anecdotal evidence and did not provide sufficient proof to counter the Commission’s findings. Additionally, the Court held that Cole’s constitutional arguments were waived as they were raised for the first time on appeal and were not supported by sufficient legal authority. The Court also denied Cole’s request for attorney fees, as pro se litigants are not entitled to such fees.The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the Idaho Public Utilities Commission dismissing Cole’s complaint and denying her petition for reconsideration. View "Cole v. IPUC" on Justia Law

Aenergy, S.A. (Aenergy) sought damages from the Republic of Angola for unpaid work related to power turbines to be installed in Angola. Aenergy had previously entered into contracts with Angolan utility subsidiaries to construct, supply, and maintain power plants and water infrastructure. The contracts involved General Electric (GE) turbines and were financed by a credit line from GE Capital. Aenergy alleged that a GE accounting error led to forged contract amendments, resulting in the Angolan government terminating the contracts and seizing turbines.Aenergy initially filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (SDNY), which dismissed the case on forum non conveniens grounds. The court found that Angola was an adequate alternative forum for the dispute. The Second Circuit affirmed this decision, emphasizing that Aenergy could bring similar claims in Angola, even if the breach-of-contract claim was time-barred. Aenergy's requests for rehearing and certiorari were denied.Aenergy then filed a new lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, focusing on breach of contract for unpaid work. The district court dismissed the case, citing issue preclusion based on the prior SDNY and Second Circuit rulings. The court also conducted a fresh forum non conveniens analysis, concluding that Angola remained the appropriate forum.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court held that issue preclusion applied because the adequacy of Angola as an alternative forum had already been determined in the previous litigation. The court found that Aenergy's trimmed-down complaint did not change the forum non conveniens analysis, and the Supreme Court of Angola's subsequent dismissal of Aenergy's administrative action did not alter the adequacy of Angola as a forum. View "Aenergy, S.A. v. Republic of Angola" on Justia Law

The case involves the regulatory approval of Duke Energy Indiana, LLC's proposed infrastructure improvements under the TDSIC statute, which allows utilities to recoup costs of approved improvements as they are completed. The Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission approved Duke's TDSIC plan, finding it reasonable. The key issue on appeal was the interpretation of the statute's cost-justification section: whether each improvement must be cost-justified individually or whether all improvements combined must be cost-justified.The Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission approved Duke's plan, interpreting the statute to mean that the overall plan must be cost-justified. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, applying a deferential standard of review to the Commission's interpretation. The appellants, including the Indiana Office of Utility Consumer Counselor and other groups, argued that the statute requires each individual improvement to be cost-justified.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the scope of the Commission's authority to approve a TDSIC plan is a question of law, requiring plenary review rather than deference to the Commission's interpretation. The Court concluded that the Commission must determine whether each individual improvement within a TDSIC plan is cost-justified. However, the Court found that the Commission had made the required determination in this case, as it considered the benefits of individual projects, including those with a benefit-to-cost ratio below 1.0, and concluded that the overall plan was reasonable. Therefore, the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's order approving Duke's TDSIC plan. View "Office of Utility Consumer Counselor v. Duke Energy Indiana, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Lonnie Hollis and Mason’s World Bar & Grill, LLC, filed a putative class action against the City of LaGrange, alleging that the City imposed excessive mandatory charges for utilities services, which they argued constituted an unauthorized tax under the Georgia Constitution. The plaintiffs claimed that the charges generated profits exceeding the actual cost of providing the services and were used to raise general revenues for the City, effectively making them illegal taxes. They sought a refund of these alleged illegal taxes, a declaration that the charges were illegal, and an injunction to prevent the City from continuing to impose such charges.The trial court granted the City’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, ruling that the Georgia Constitution prohibited the court from regulating the utilities charges. The court concluded that because the Georgia Constitution prevents the General Assembly from regulating or fixing charges of public utilities owned or operated by municipalities, the court similarly lacked the authority to review the plaintiffs’ claims.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court erred in its interpretation. The Supreme Court held that the constitutional provision in question, which restricts the General Assembly from regulating or fixing municipal utility charges, does not apply to the judicial branch. The plaintiffs’ claims required the court to exercise its judicial authority to determine whether the charges constituted illegal taxes, not to regulate or fix the charges. Therefore, the trial court’s ruling was vacated, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion. The Supreme Court emphasized that the trial court must address the City’s motion for judgment on the pleadings without misinterpreting the constitutional limitations on its authority. View "Hollis v. City of LaGrange" on Justia Law

Entergy Arkansas, LLC, a public utility company, challenged an order by the Arkansas Public Service Commission (APSC) regarding the allocation of costs from a refund mandated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Entergy Arkansas made short-term opportunity sales to third-party wholesale customers, which led to a complaint by the Louisiana Public Service Commission. FERC ruled that Entergy Arkansas violated the System operating agreement, resulting in a net refund of approximately $135 million to other System members. Entergy Arkansas sought to recover these costs from its retail customers, but the APSC denied the request and ordered Entergy Arkansas to refund a portion to its retail customers.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas upheld the APSC's order after a bench trial, finding that it did not violate Arkansas law, the filed rate doctrine, or the dormant Commerce Clause. Entergy Arkansas appealed, arguing that the APSC's order violated the filed rate doctrine by trapping costs and improperly allocating the bandwidth adjustment. They also contended that the order violated the dormant Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate commerce and imposing excessive burdens.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the filed rate doctrine did not apply because FERC did not preemptively decide the cost allocation of the refund. FERC explicitly left the allocation of costs to state commissions. Additionally, the court found that the APSC's order did not discriminate against interstate commerce or impose excessive burdens, as it was not driven by economic protectionism and any negative effects were speculative.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, upholding the APSC's order. View "Entergy Arkansas, LLC v. Webb" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, an electric distribution company, appealed from the trial court's dismissal of its consolidated administrative appeals from two final decisions by the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA). PURA had found the plaintiff violated statutory obligations related to emergency planning and storm recovery during an August 2020 tropical storm, intending to reduce the plaintiff's authorized return on equity (ROE) by fifteen basis points. Additionally, PURA imposed over $1.2 million in fines for violating storm performance standards and $61,000 in civil penalties for late reporting of minor accidents.The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's appeals, upholding PURA's decisions. The plaintiff then appealed to the higher court, challenging the ROE reduction, the fines for storm performance violations, and the penalties for late accident reporting. During the appeal, PURA decided not to implement the ROE reduction, rendering the issue moot. The court determined that neither the voluntary cessation nor the collateral consequences exceptions to the mootness doctrine applied. The court directed the vacatur of the portion of PURA's order authorizing the ROE reduction and the corresponding part of the trial court's judgment.Regarding the fines for late reporting of minor accidents, the court concluded that the failure to report a minor accident did not qualify as a "continued violation" under the statute. Instead, each monthly failure to report constituted a single, distinct violation. The case was remanded to the trial court to order PURA to recalculate the penalties accordingly.The court found sufficient evidence to support PURA's findings that the plaintiff violated storm performance standards by failing to provide a dedicated make safe crew for Bridgeport and inadequately communicating with city officials. The court affirmed the trial court's judgments in all other respects. View "United Illuminating Co. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority" on Justia Law

In 2021, the San Diego City Council approved new franchise agreements granting San Diego Gas & Electric Company (SDG&E) the exclusive right to provide gas and electric services in San Diego. Kathryn Burton, a San Diego resident, filed a lawsuit against the City and the Council members who voted for the agreements, alleging a violation of the Ralph M. Brown Act. Burton claimed that the Council members had discussed and agreed on their votes in a "secret serial meeting" using the mayor as an intermediary.The Superior Court of San Diego County allowed SDG&E to intervene as a defendant over Burton's opposition. SDG&E, joined by the City defendants, moved for summary judgment, arguing that Burton failed to comply with the Brown Act's requirement to make a prelitigation demand to cure or correct the alleged violation. The trial court granted summary judgment, concluding that Burton did not meet the demand requirement and lacked standing for her other claims.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court held that Burton did not comply with the demand requirement of section 54960.1 of the Brown Act, which mandates that an interested person must make a written demand to the legislative body to cure or correct the action before filing a lawsuit. The court found that the letters sent by attorney Maria Severson did not mention Burton and were not sent on her behalf, as Burton had not retained Severson at the time the letters were sent. The court rejected Burton's arguments of statutory interpretation, ratification, and substantial compliance.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that Burton's failure to comply with the demand requirement justified the summary judgment. The court also deemed Burton's challenge to the order granting SDG&E leave to intervene as moot, given the affirmation of the judgment. View "Burton v. Campbell" on Justia Law