Justia Utilities Law Opinion Summaries

A privately owned water utility company provides water services to multiple customers in Raleigh and Fayette Counties, West Virginia. Near one of its service areas is an undeveloped tract of land known as the Appalachian Heights Site. The City of Mount Hope, a municipal water provider, received funding from the legislature, county commissions, and a developer to extend water service to this Site. After Mount Hope proposed annexing the Site, the utility company filed a complaint with the Public Service Commission (PSC), seeking to prevent Mount Hope from serving the Site, claiming exclusive rights to provide water there.Initially, the PSC’s chief administrative law judge found the Site to be within the utility company’s exclusive service territory, but no cease and desist order was issued. This recommended decision became final when no exceptions were filed. After Mount Hope annexed the Site, the utility company petitioned the PSC to reopen the case, seeking an order to enforce its exclusivity. The PSC reopened the matter, remanded for further proceedings, and eventually, after Mount Hope filed exceptions to a subsequent recommended decision re-affirming the utility’s exclusivity, the PSC found the Site to be in a “gray and overlapping” service area. This meant that future developers or customers at the Site could choose either provider. The utility company’s petition for reconsideration was denied.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed whether the PSC exceeded its statutory authority by reconsidering its prior decision and whether it properly found the Site to be in a gray and overlapping service territory. The court held that the PSC had authority to revisit its prior order and that, under applicable statutes and commission tests, the PSC’s finding that the Site was in a gray and overlapping service area was supported by the evidence. The court affirmed the PSC’s order. View "Beckley Water Company v. Public Service Commission of West Virginia" on Justia Law

A licensed California fisherman sought public access to fish at the Calaveras Reservoir, which is owned by the City and County of San Francisco and managed by the San Francisco Public Utilities Commission. The reservoir, a source of drinking water for millions, is governed by a watershed management plan that currently prohibits public access and fishing. After the City determined that, subject to environmental review and regulatory approval, shoreline fishing could potentially occur without compromising water quality, it began planning for a fishing program, which included infrastructure improvements and compliance with environmental laws.Previously, in a related proceeding, the Alameda County Superior Court ordered the City to determine whether fishing could occur without affecting water purity, but it did not require the City to immediately open the reservoir or apply for a permit. The City complied by starting the environmental review and planning process. Dissatisfied with the pace, the fisherman filed a new petition for a writ of mandate, seeking to compel the City to immediately apply for an amended water supply permit and open the reservoir for fishing. The Superior Court denied the petition, finding no ministerial duty requiring the City to proceed immediately and concluding that legal requirements, including environmental review and program planning, must be satisfied first.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the lower court's judgment. The appellate court held that the plaintiff had not established a clear ministerial duty requiring the City to immediately apply for a permit or open the reservoir for fishing. The court found that the governing statutes and regulations allow for the exercise of discretion and require compliance with environmental and permitting processes before fishing access can be provided. The judgment was affirmed. View "Dummer v. City and County of S.F." on Justia Law

Several electric suppliers, previously licensed to operate in Connecticut, entered into a settlement agreement with the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA) in 2022. This agreement resolved an investigation into the suppliers’ regulatory compliance. Under the agreement, the suppliers agreed to withdraw from the state market, make certain payments, and provide documentation demonstrating their compliance with the state’s renewable portfolio standards (RPS) for 2022. PURA approved the agreement, and the suppliers submitted the required documentation, after which PURA confirmed their compliance and returned their security deposits.Subsequently, PURA initiated its annual uncontested proceeding to review all suppliers’ compliance with the 2022 RPS, as mandated by statute. The plaintiffs resubmitted their compliance documents. However, PURA determined the suppliers had not fully satisfied their RPS obligations due to discrepancies in load data calculations and ordered additional payments exceeding $1 million. The suppliers then sought a declaratory ruling from PURA, arguing they had fulfilled their obligations under the settlement, but PURA declined, citing the ongoing RPS proceeding. After PURA issued its final decision in the uncontested proceeding, the suppliers filed suit in the Superior Court, seeking both an administrative appeal and a declaratory judgment. The Superior Court dismissed both claims: the administrative appeal for lack of a final agency decision, and the declaratory judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the administrative appeal, finding that PURA’s decision in an uncontested proceeding was not a “final decision” subject to judicial review under the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act. However, the Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of the declaratory judgment claim. It held that the suppliers had exhausted their administrative remedies by seeking a declaratory ruling and participating in the RPS proceeding, and that the trial court had jurisdiction to consider their request for a declaratory judgment regarding the applicability of the relevant statutes to their circumstances. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the declaratory judgment claim. View "Vistra Corp. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority" on Justia Law

Two North Carolina electric utilities sought approval from the North Carolina Utilities Commission to implement performance-based regulation (PBR), an alternative to traditional ratemaking, and to increase rates through multiyear rate plans (MYRPs). The General Assembly had enacted legislation authorizing PBR in 2021, aiming to allow utilities to adjust rates over a three-year period based on projected capital investments and to incentivize carbon emissions reductions. The utilities, Duke Energy Progress and Duke Energy Carolinas, filed applications with supporting testimony and proposals, prompting intervention from stakeholders including the Attorney General, industrial customer groups, and electric membership corporations. The parties contested issues such as interclass subsidization, electric vehicle (EV) charging revenue treatment, approval of projected future capital projects, allocation of fuel and transmission costs, and the authorized return on equity (ROE) for the utilities’ shareholders.Following evidentiary hearings, the North Carolina Utilities Commission approved both utilities’ requests for modified MYRPs, allowed a 10% reduction in interclass subsidies (less than what some intervenors wanted), permitted the exclusion of estimated residential EV charging revenue from decoupling mechanisms, and authorized certain projected capital projects as “known and measurable” for rate recovery. The Commission also discontinued the “equal percentage” methodology for allocating fuel costs, approving voltage-differentiated rates instead, and adopted a stipulation shifting some transmission costs from one utility to the other to mitigate customer rate disparity. ROEs of 9.8% for Duke Energy Progress and 10.1% for Duke Energy Carolinas were set, with the latter reflecting a shift in Commission membership and risk assessment.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed whether the Commission’s orders violated law, misinterpreted the PBR statute, or lacked evidentiary support. The Court held that the Commission properly interpreted and applied the relevant statutes, made sufficient findings supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence, and did not abuse its discretion regarding subsidy reductions, EV revenue exclusion, capital project approval, fuel cost allocation, or ROE determinations. The Court affirmed the Commission’s orders in full. View "State ex rel. N.C. Utils. Comm'n v. Carolina Indus. Grp. for Fair Util. Rates II" on Justia Law

Two affiliated electric utilities sought approval from the North Carolina Utilities Commission to increase rates and implement performance-based regulation (PBR) under recently enacted legislation. The utilities submitted general rate case applications that included multiyear rate plans (MYRPs), which would permit preapproved rate increases over three years. Numerous parties, including the Attorney General, business groups, and electric membership corporations, intervened to challenge various aspects of the applications, including how the utilities allocated costs among customer classes, how revenues from residential electric vehicle charging would be handled, proposed capital spending projects, and the utilities’ allowed return on equity.The North Carolina Utilities Commission held extensive evidentiary hearings, with intervenors offering expert testimony and raising objections about statutory interpretation and factual sufficiency. The Commission issued final orders approving the MYRPs for each utility, making modifications to proposed subsidy reductions, excluding certain revenues from decoupling mechanisms to promote electric vehicle adoption, approving projected capital investments, and adjusting how fuel costs would be allocated among customer classes. The Commission also set new rates of return on equity for the utilities, noting changes in economic conditions and balancing interests of customers and investors.The North Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the appeals as of right. It held that the Commission correctly interpreted and applied the relevant statutes, including the PBR statute’s requirements for minimizing interclass subsidies and for cost causation. The Court found the Commission’s factual findings and legal conclusions were supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence. The Court also determined that the Commission’s process and explanations met statutory and constitutional requirements. The Court affirmed the Commission’s orders in all respects. View "State ex rel. N.C. Utils. Comm'n v. Carolina Indus. Grp. for Fair Util. Rates III" on Justia Law

An electric utility company sought to recover capital costs it incurred repairing damage from five catastrophic storms that hit Connecticut after it had entered into a settlement agreement with the state’s utility regulator. The settlement agreement, approved in 2018, established new base rates for the company from 2018 through 2020 and created a mechanism—called the new capital tracker—allowing the company to recover certain infrastructure investments. During negotiations, the parties amended the agreement to address storm-related costs, allowing the utility to seek recovery of these costs either in a future rate case or a separate proceeding. The utility initiated a contested case to recover storm operation and maintenance costs but did not seek review or approval of related capital costs at that time, instead seeking to recover those capital costs during an annual rate adjustment in 2021.The Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA), in its decision on the 2021 rate adjustment, denied the company’s attempt to recover over $17 million in capital costs related to storm repairs in its current base rates, reasoning that the settlement agreement did not unambiguously provide for such recovery and that approval of those costs should occur in a future rate case. The utility appealed. The Superior Court upheld PURA’s decision, deferring to PURA’s rate-making discretion and finding substantial evidence to support its action, without interpreting the disputed sections of the settlement agreement.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the matter and held that the trial court erred by not first interpreting the settlement agreement to determine whether it was clear and unambiguous before deferring to PURA’s discretion. The Supreme Court found the agreement to be ambiguous regarding recovery of storm-related capital costs and concluded that neither the administrative record nor extrinsic evidence resolved this ambiguity. The case was remanded for further proceedings to resolve the contractual ambiguities. View "Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority" on Justia Law

A Maine resident who suffers from a rare and incurable form of blood cancer was a long-time customer of an electric utility that uses smart meters emitting radiofrequency signals to track electricity usage. After the utility received regulatory approval, it allowed customers to keep analog meters for an additional fee, citing health and safety concerns that had been raised but not resolved by the state public utilities commission. The resident, concerned that radiofrequency radiation might worsen his cancer symptoms, requested a waiver of the opt-out fee, supported by a letter from his oncologist. The utility denied the waiver, and after the resident refused to pay the fee, his electric service was disconnected.The resident sued in the United States District Court for the District of Maine, alleging disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Fair Housing Act. He also claimed the fee constituted an unlawful surcharge under the ADA. The district court denied the utility’s initial motion to dismiss but, after discovery, granted summary judgment in favor of the utility. The district court limited the resident’s expert witnesses to general, not specific, causation testimony, and excluded the opinions of his treating physicians as untimely disclosed expert testimony. The court found a lack of admissible evidence connecting smart meter radiation to the resident’s health, and held the opt-out fee was not an unlawful surcharge.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. It held that, without timely, admissible expert evidence of specific causation linking the smart meter’s radiation to a non-speculative risk of harm to the resident’s health, the resident’s claims could not survive summary judgment. The court also held that the opt-out fee was not a discriminatory surcharge because waiver of the fee was not required under the ADA. View "Friedman v. Central Maine Power Company" on Justia Law

A public utility company implemented a power-purchase-agreement rider connected to its contractual share in two coal-fired plants operated by a regional power corporation. This rider could result in either surcharges or credits to retail customers, depending on whether the market revenues from selling the plants’ output exceeded their costs. For the years 2018 and 2019, an independent auditor was hired to review the prudency of all costs and sales associated with this rider and to determine if the company’s actions served the best interests of retail ratepayers. The audit found that while the plants cost customers more than the market price for energy, the company's processes were generally consistent with good utility practice. The audit noted that the “must-run” strategy for plant operation might not always be optimal but considered other factors, such as employment and fuel diversity.The Public Utilities Commission of Ohio previously authorized the rider and allowed cost recovery, subject to annual prudency audits. After the independent audit, the Commission held hearings at which parties, including consumer advocacy groups, challenged the prudency of the must-run strategy and raised concerns about the independence of the audit process. They argued that commission staff improperly influenced the auditor and sought to subpoena a staff member for testimony. The Commission denied the subpoena, finding that testimony from other witnesses covered the relevant issues and that the auditor’s independence was not compromised.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the Commission’s findings and procedures. The Court held that the Commission did not commit reversible error in crediting evidence supporting the must-run strategy’s prudency, nor did it violate due process or its own rules by denying the subpoena, since the parties had ample opportunity to cross-examine other key witnesses. The Court also found the Commission was not required to apply an appearance-of-impropriety standard to assess the auditor’s independence. The Commission’s orders were affirmed. View "In re Rev. of the Power-Purchase-Agreement Rider of Ohio Power Co. for 2018 and 2019" on Justia Law

After a motor vehicle accident in Norfolk, Connecticut, downed electrical wires from a utility pole owned by an electric supplier trapped the vehicle’s occupants. First responders waited about an hour before the utility’s specialist confirmed the wires were de-energized, delaying rescue. The Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA) investigated the supplier’s response, conducted a hearing in which the supplier participated, and ultimately found the response imprudent. PURA ordered the supplier to adopt a thirty-minute target response time for certain life-threatening situations, among other directives.The electric supplier appealed PURA’s decision to the Superior Court, arguing that the investigation and hearing constituted a “contested case” under Connecticut’s Uniform Administrative Procedure Act, which would entitle it to judicial review. The Superior Court rejected this argument, finding that the statutes and regulations cited by the supplier did not require PURA to hold a hearing in these circumstances, and therefore the proceeding did not qualify as a contested case. The court dismissed the supplier’s administrative appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.On further appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s dismissal. The Supreme Court held that the proceeding was not a contested case because no state statute or regulation required PURA to determine the supplier’s legal rights, duties, or privileges after an opportunity for a hearing in this context. The Court explained that references to statutes requiring hearings in other circumstances did not convert the proceeding into a contested case when the relevant factual predicates were absent. The holding also clarified that PURA’s decision to hold a hearing voluntarily, or to follow contested case procedures, did not create contested case status where no such hearing was legally mandated. Thus, PURA’s determinations and orders in this investigation were not subject to judicial review under the contested case provisions. View "Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority" on Justia Law

A longtime Speaker of the Illinois House of Representatives was prosecuted in federal court for engaging in extensive bribery schemes. The first involved a major utility company, Commonwealth Edison (ComEd), which, facing financial difficulties, funneled more than $3 million to the defendant’s political associates through intermediaries and sham contracts in exchange for the defendant’s legislative support of ComEd’s agenda over several years. The government presented evidence that these payments resulted in concrete legislative actions by the defendant that benefitted ComEd, including support for specific bills and regulatory changes. The second scheme involved the defendant’s agreement to recommend a Chicago alderman for a state board appointment in exchange for business referrals and benefits to the defendant’s family.Following a lengthy trial in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the jury convicted the defendant on several counts, including conspiracy, federal-program bribery, honest-services wire fraud, and Travel Act violations. The jury acquitted him on some counts and was deadlocked on others. The district court denied the defendant’s motions for acquittal and for a new trial, then imposed a sentence of imprisonment and a substantial fine.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and the adequacy of the jury instructions. The Court of Appeals held that sufficient evidence supported each conviction and found no prejudicial error in the jury instructions, including those related to the definition of “official act,” “corruptly,” and the intent elements of bribery. The court also concluded that any potential instructional error regarding state law bribery under the Travel Act was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The convictions and sentence were affirmed. View "USA v. Madigan" on Justia Law