Justia Utilities Law Opinion Summaries

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Summit Carbon Solutions, LLC plans to build an interstate pipeline through Iowa, passing through Shelby and Story Counties. Both counties enacted ordinances imposing various requirements on pipelines, including setback, emergency response plan, and local permit requirements. Summit challenged these ordinances, arguing they were preempted by the federal Pipeline Safety Act (PSA) and Iowa law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Summit, permanently enjoining the enforcement of the ordinances.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa reviewed the case and ruled in favor of Summit, finding that the PSA and Iowa law preempted the counties' ordinances. The court issued a permanent injunction against the enforcement of the ordinances. The counties appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the PSA preempts the Shelby and Story County ordinances' setback, emergency response, and abandonment provisions. The court found that the ordinances were safety standards, which are preempted by the PSA. Additionally, the court held that the ordinances were inconsistent with Iowa law, as they imposed additional requirements that could prohibit pipeline construction even if the Iowa Utilities Commission (IUC) had granted a permit. The court affirmed the district court's judgment in both cases but vacated and remanded the judgment in the Story County case to the extent it addressed a repealed ordinance. View "Couser v. Shelby County" on Justia Law

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San Francisco operates a combined sewer system that collects and treats both wastewater and stormwater. In 1996, California voters approved Proposition 218, which added provisions to the California Constitution requiring voter approval for property-related charges, except for "sewer, water, and refuse collection services." Plaintiffs Robert Gluck and Adam Hertz filed a class action against the City and County of San Francisco, challenging the constitutionality of the City's sewer charges related to stormwater services. They argued that stormwater services funded by the City's sewer charges were not "sewer" services covered by the exception to Proposition 218's voter approval requirement and that the charges failed the proportionality requirement.The trial court sustained the City's demurrer without leave to amend, concluding that the City's combined sewer system provides "sewer" services falling within the voter approval exception of article XIII D, section 6(c). The court also found that the plaintiffs' fourth cause of action failed because it was based on the premise that stormwater management is not a "sewer service."The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment regarding the first three causes of action, agreeing that the City's combined sewer system provides "sewer" services exempt from the voter approval requirement. However, the court reversed the judgment regarding the fourth and fifth causes of action, concluding that the City did not establish that the plaintiffs' allegations regarding the City's reliance on wastewater factors to support charges for stormwater services were insufficient as a matter of law to establish a violation of the proportionality requirement of article XIII D, section 6(b)(3). The case was remanded for further proceedings on these claims. View "Gluck v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

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A qualified nonresident transmission company challenged an Iowa statute that granted incumbent utilities a right of first refusal (ROFR) for electric transmission projects, arguing it was unconstitutionally enacted. The statute prevented the company from competing for projects. The Iowa District Court for Polk County declared the statute unconstitutional under the Iowa Constitution's title and single-subject requirements and issued a permanent injunction against the statute's enforcement.The district court's decision was appealed by the State of Iowa, the Iowa Utilities Board (IUB), and two incumbent utilities, MidAmerican Energy Company and ITC Midwest, LLC. They argued that the district court could not retroactively enjoin their participation in projects awarded under the ROFR while the case was pending. They also contended that the district court lacked jurisdiction and that the nonresident company should have challenged the IUB's rule under Iowa Code chapter 17A.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment and permanent injunction. The court held that the ROFR statute was void ab initio due to its unconstitutional enactment. The court determined that the district court had the authority to enjoin the parties from participating in projects awarded under the ROFR, as the incumbents were on notice of the constitutional challenge and no physical construction had begun on the projects. The court also rejected the argument that the IUB's rule could only be challenged under chapter 17A, as the constitutional challenge to the statute inherently invalidated the rule. The court deferred any remaining federal law issues to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). View "LS Power Midcontinent, LLC v. State" on Justia Law

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Utility companies operating in Placer County, California, filed a complaint against the County and the Board of Equalization, seeking a refund of taxes. They alleged that the tax rate imposed on their state-assessed property was unconstitutionally higher than the rate imposed on locally-assessed property. The tax rate for state-assessed property is calculated under Revenue and Taxation Code section 100, while locally-assessed property is taxed under a different formula. The utility companies argued that this discrepancy violated article XIII, section 19 of the California Constitution, which mandates that utility property be taxed to the same extent and in the same manner as other property.The Superior Court of Placer County sustained the County's demurrer, effectively dismissing the complaint. The trial court relied on the precedent set by the appellate court in County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, which held that the tax rates imposed on utility property were constitutional. The utility companies acknowledged that the Santa Clara decision was binding on the trial court but maintained that they had a good faith basis for their claims on appeal.The California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that the utility companies had not established that the trial court erred. The appellate court found that the utility companies did not present a valid basis for defining comparability to state a valid claim. The court noted that while the utility companies argued for comparable tax rates, they failed to provide a clear standard or formula to determine what constitutes comparability. Consequently, the court held that the utility companies did not meet their burden of proving that the County's tax rates were unconstitutional. View "Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. County of Placer" on Justia Law

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Petitioners, who own New York’s electric-transmission grid, sought to finance upgrades required when new power sources connect to the grid. This would allow them to raise rates and earn a return on these investments. However, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) denied their requests to change the rules prohibiting owner upgrade funding.The transmission owners filed two petitions with FERC on April 9, 2021, under Sections 205 and 206 of the Federal Power Act, requesting amendments to the Open Access Transmission Tariff (OATT) to allow them to fund interconnection upgrades. On September 3, 2021, FERC rejected the Section 205 filing, stating that the owners’ agreement with the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) limited their Section 205 rights. FERC also dismissed the Section 206 complaint, concluding that the owners failed to demonstrate that the existing funding mechanism was unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or preferential. The owners’ requests for rehearing were deemed denied by operation of law on November 4, 2021, and FERC issued a new order on March 24, 2022, modifying its original orders.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and upheld FERC’s decisions. The court found that FERC acted reasonably in dismissing the Section 205 filing, as the owners had relinquished their rights to file for changes to the OATT without NYISO’s approval. The court also agreed with FERC’s dismissal of the Section 206 complaint, noting that the owners failed to provide sufficient evidence that the current rates were unjust or unreasonable. The court concluded that FERC’s orders were not arbitrary or capricious and denied the owners’ petitions for review. View "Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v. FERC" on Justia Law

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The case involves the Huntington Sanitary Board (HSB) challenging an order by the Public Service Commission of West Virginia (PSC) that designated HSB as the most suitable capable proximate utility (CPU) to acquire and operate the failing sewer system of the Hubbard Heights subdivision in Wayne County. The sewer system, originally servicing 27 customers, had fallen into disrepair and ceased operations, posing health and environmental risks. The PSC's order was issued under the Distressed and Failing Utilities Act, which aims to remediate struggling utilities.The PSC initiated proceedings after a petition was filed by a former president of the Hubbard Heights Homeowners Association (HOA). The PSC found that the sewer system met the statutory definition of a failing utility and considered various alternatives to acquisition, ultimately determining that acquisition by a CPU was necessary. HSB, along with other utilities, was identified as a potential CPU. The PSC held public and evidentiary hearings, during which no utility expressed willingness to acquire Hubbard Heights. The PSC designated HSB as the most suitable CPU based on its size, financial capacity, and proximity.HSB appealed, arguing that the PSC lacked jurisdiction because the customer count had fallen below the statutory threshold of 25 and that the PSC failed to consider alternatives to acquisition adequately. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case, affirming the PSC's order. The court held that the PSC had continuing jurisdiction over Hubbard Heights despite the reduced customer count, as the utility had not sought to be divested of its status, and the PSC had not relinquished jurisdiction. The court also found that the PSC had considered alternatives and provided a reasoned analysis in designating HSB as the most suitable CPU, complying with the statutory requirements. View "Huntington Sanitary Board v. Public Service Commission" on Justia Law

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Gauley River Public Service District (Gauley River) experienced multiple interruptions in water service to the Mount Olive Correctional Complex (Mt. Olive) over a three-month period. This led the Public Service Commission of West Virginia (Commission) to investigate whether Gauley River was a distressed or failing utility under the Distressed and Failing Utilities Improvement Act. The Commission found Gauley River to be a distressed utility due to its prolonged lack of adequate management and operational deficiencies.The Commission ordered Gauley River to negotiate an operation and maintenance agreement with West Virginia-American Water Company (WVAWC) to provide oversight and managerial control. Gauley River and WVAWC submitted a proposed agreement, but the Commission rejected it, finding it did not meet the required terms. The Commission then ordered the parties to execute a standard operation and maintenance agreement structured by the Commission.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case. The court held that the Commission acted within its statutory authority under West Virginia Code § 24-2H-7(b) in ordering Gauley River and WVAWC to implement an alternative to acquisition. The court found that the ordered agreement did not amount to an acquisition of Gauley River by WVAWC but was designed to remediate the utility's deficiencies. The court affirmed the Commission's order, concluding that the terms of the agreement were lawful and necessary to address Gauley River's operational issues. View "Gauley River Public Service District v. Public Service Commission" on Justia Law

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Norfolk Southern Railway Company challenged the constitutionality of Code § 56-16.3, which allows broadband service providers to install fiber optic cables across railroad property. The statute, enacted in 2023, aims to promote broadband expansion in Virginia. Cox Communications filed applications to install fiber optic cables under Norfolk Southern’s tracks, which Norfolk Southern did not initially oppose. However, a dispute arose over the license fees, leading Cox to proceed without a licensing agreement, prompting Norfolk Southern to seek relief from the State Corporation Commission (the “Commission”).The Commission rejected Norfolk Southern’s arguments without a hearing, finding the claims insufficient to establish undue hardship. Norfolk Southern appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia, which stayed the Commission’s judgment during the appeal.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case de novo, focusing on whether Code § 56-16.3 violated Article I, Section 11 of the Virginia Constitution. The court emphasized that eminent domain statutes must be strictly construed and that the burden of proving public use lies with the condemnor. The court found that Code § 56-16.3 did not reference public use and allowed a private company to take property for financial gain, which is not a public use under the Virginia Constitution.The court held that the application of Code § 56-16.3 in this case constituted a taking of Norfolk Southern’s property for a nonpublic use, violating the Virginia Constitution. Consequently, the court reversed the Commission’s judgment and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of Norfolk Southern. View "Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. SCC" on Justia Law

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Samuel and Peggy Edwards, residents of Rexburg, Idaho, refused to allow PacifiCorp, doing business as Rocky Mountain Power Company, to install a smart electrical meter on their property due to health concerns. Rocky Mountain considered this refusal a violation of its terms of service, which required access to electrical meter bases. After negotiations failed, Rocky Mountain informed the Edwards that their electrical service would be terminated unless they allowed the installation. The Edwards filed a formal complaint with the Idaho Public Utilities Commission (PUC), arguing they had not denied access and should be allowed to opt-out of the smart meter installation.The PUC consolidated the Edwards' complaint with similar complaints from other customers and granted Rocky Mountain's motion to dismiss, concluding that the Edwards had not provided evidence that smart meters presented a legitimate safety concern and that Rocky Mountain had the authority to access and replace meters. The Edwards' motion for reconsideration was also dismissed by the PUC, leading them to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court.The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed whether the PUC properly determined that Rocky Mountain had the authority to access the Edwards' property to replace the existing meter with a smart meter. The Court affirmed the PUC's decision, concluding that the tariff provisions allowed Rocky Mountain to access and replace meters. The Court also found that the Edwards' constitutional arguments were waived due to insufficient support and authority. The PUC's orders dismissing the Edwards' complaint and denying reconsideration were affirmed. View "Edwards v. IPUC" on Justia Law

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Dongkuk S&C Co., Ltd., a Korean producer of utility scale wind towers, challenged the United States Department of Commerce's final determination that its wind towers were being sold in the United States at less than fair value, resulting in an antidumping duty order. Commerce's investigation covered sales from July 1, 2018, to June 30, 2019, and found that Dongkuk's sales were below normal value, leading to the imposition of antidumping duties.The Court of International Trade (CIT) initially remanded Commerce's decision to adjust Dongkuk's steel plate costs, questioning the analytical support for Commerce's determination. Commerce provided additional analysis on remand, demonstrating that the cost variations were due to the timing of steel plate purchases rather than the physical characteristics of the wind towers. The CIT subsequently sustained Commerce's remand redetermination and upheld the choice of surrogate financial data for calculating constructed value profit and selling expenses.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the CIT's decision. The court held that Commerce's determination to adjust Dongkuk's steel plate costs was supported by substantial evidence, as the cost variations were unrelated to the physical characteristics of the wind towers. Additionally, the court upheld Commerce's use of SeAH Steel Holdings Corporation's consolidated financial statement as a reasonable source of surrogate data for calculating constructed value profit and selling expenses, despite Dongkuk's preference for SeAH Steel Corporation's standalone financial data. The court found that Commerce's decision was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. View "DONGKUK S&C CO., LTD. v. US" on Justia Law