Justia Utilities Law Opinion Summaries

A catastrophic turbine failure occurred at the Hadjret En Nouss Power Plant in Tipaza, Algeria. The plant is owned by Shariket Kahraba Hadjret En Nouss (SKH), which is jointly owned by the Algerian government and Algerian Utilities International Ltd. SNC-Lavalin Contructeurs International Inc. (SNC) operated the plant on behalf of SKH. SNC entered into multiple contracts with various General Electric entities, including a Services Contract with General Electric International, which contained an arbitration clause.The insurers, reinsurers, and retrocessionaires (collectively the "Insurers") initiated litigation as subrogees of SKH against General Electric International, General Electric Company, GE Power, and GE Power Services Engineering (collectively the "GE Entities") in Georgia's state-wide business court. The GE Entities removed the case to federal court and moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration provision in the Services Contract. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia granted the motion, concluding that SKH was a third-party beneficiary of the Services Contract.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that SKH, as the plant's owner, was a third-party beneficiary of the Services Contract. Consequently, the Insurers, as subrogees of SKH, were bound by the arbitration clause. The court also affirmed that any questions regarding the arbitrability of specific claims should be resolved by the arbitrator, as the Services Contract incorporated the Conciliation and Arbitration Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce, which delegate such decisions to the arbitrator. View "Various Insurers, Reinsurers and Retrocessionaires v. General Electric International, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves five public utilities operating in California, including Pacific Bell Telephone Company and AT&T Mobility LLC, which challenged the property tax rates imposed by Merced County for the fiscal years 2017-2018 and 2018-2019. The utilities argued that the tax rates applied to their properties exceeded the permissible rates under Section 19 of Article XIII of the California Constitution, which they interpreted as requiring utility property to be taxed at the same rate as non-utility property.In the Superior Court of Merced County, the utilities sought partial refunds of the property taxes paid, claiming that the tax rates levied on them were higher than the average tax rates in the county. The County demurred, relying on the precedent set by the Sixth District in County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, which held that Section 19 does not mandate the same tax rate for utility property as for locally assessed property. The utilities conceded that Santa Clara was binding but sought to challenge its holding on appeal. The Superior Court dismissed the case, and the utilities filed a timely notice of appeal.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court's judgment. The court held that Section 19 of Article XIII of the California Constitution does not require utility property to be taxed at the same rate as non-utility property. Instead, the court interpreted the relevant language as an enabling clause, allowing utility property to be subject to taxation, rather than a limiting clause mandating equal tax rates. The court found that the historical context, language, and structure of Section 19 supported this interpretation, and thus, Merced County's application of the tax rates did not violate the constitutional provision. View "Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. County of Merced" on Justia Law

Sherry Cole filed a formal complaint against Rocky Mountain Power (RMP) alleging she had been overbilled due to her power meter being cross-connected with her neighbor’s. Initially, an RMP employee confirmed the cross-connection and credited her account with $1,256.45. However, subsequent tests revealed no cross-connection, leading RMP to remove the credit and instead apply a $450 credit for the inconvenience. Cole then filed a formal complaint with the Idaho Public Utilities Commission, which dismissed her complaint due to lack of evidence of overcharging. Cole's motion for reconsideration was also denied.The Idaho Public Utilities Commission reviewed Cole’s complaint and RMP’s response, which included calculations of her energy usage and an affidavit from an investigator who found no cross-connection. The Commission dismissed Cole’s complaint, finding no evidence of overcharging, and denied her petition for reconsideration, stating she failed to demonstrate the dismissal was unreasonable or unlawful. Cole appealed to the Supreme Court of Idaho, asserting multiple errors.The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the Commission’s decisions. The Court found that the Commission’s findings were supported by substantial and competent evidence, including the investigator’s analysis and the results of two breaker tests. The Court also held that Cole’s constitutional arguments were waived as they were raised for the first time on appeal and were not supported by sufficient legal authority. Additionally, the Court ruled that pro se litigants are not entitled to attorney fees, and since Cole appeared pro se and did not prevail, she was not awarded attorney fees. View "Cole v. Idaho Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

Volcano Telephone Company, a rural telephone service provider, receives subsidies from the California High-Cost Fund-A (A-Fund) administered by the Public Utilities Commission (PUC). Volcano Vision, Inc., an affiliate, uses Volcano Telephone’s broadband-capable facilities, subsidized by the A-Fund, to deliver broadband services without contributing to the underlying costs. The PUC considered Volcano Vision’s net revenues in setting Volcano Telephone’s A-Fund subsidy and future rates. The PUC also required Volcano Telephone to submit broadband service quality metrics related to Volcano Vision’s services.The PUC issued Decision No. 23-02-008, calculating Volcano Telephone’s A-Fund subsidy and approving rates for 2023. Volcano Telephone and Volcano Vision challenged this decision, arguing that the PUC’s implementation of broadband imputation constituted an unconstitutional taking and conflicted with federal law. They also contended that the order to submit broadband service quality metrics was outside the scope of the proceedings and the PUC’s jurisdiction. The PUC denied rehearing and modified the decision to clarify the reporting requirements.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court rejected the petitioners’ claims, affirming Decision Nos. 23-02-008 and 23-08-051. The court held that the PUC’s implementation of broadband imputation did not constitute an unconstitutional taking, as the A-Fund program is voluntary, and the petitioners failed to demonstrate that the rate of return was confiscatory. The court also found that the order to submit broadband service quality metrics was within the scope of the proceedings and the PUC’s jurisdiction. The court concluded that the PUC’s decisions were supported by substantial evidence and did not violate any constitutional rights. View "Volcano Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, LSP Transmission Holdings II, LLC, and affiliates, sought to build and operate interstate electricity transmission lines in Indiana. An Indiana statute granted incumbent electric companies the right of first refusal to build and operate new interstate transmission facilities connecting to their existing facilities. Plaintiffs argued that this statute violated the dormant commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution. The district court issued a preliminary injunction preventing the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission (IURC) Commissioners from enforcing the statute.The IURC Commissioners and several intervening defendants appealed the injunction. They argued that the IURC did not enforce the rights of first refusal and that the injunction would not redress plaintiffs' injuries. The district court had found that plaintiffs had standing because it believed the IURC enforced the rights of first refusal and that an injunction would prevent MISO from recognizing the statute.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction, finding that plaintiffs lacked standing. The court concluded that the IURC had no relevant responsibilities for enforcing the challenged statute and that any genuine redress would have to operate against MISO, a non-governmental entity not party to the lawsuit. The court noted that MISO had made clear it would not respond to the preliminary injunction as plaintiffs and the district court expected. The court also rejected a dissenting opinion's novel theory of standing, which was not presented by plaintiffs or adopted by the district court. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "LSP Transmission Holdings II, LLC v Commonwealth Edison Company of Indiana, Inc." on Justia Law

In the spring of 2018, People's Electric Cooperative and Oklahoma Gas and Electric Company (OG&E) submitted competing bids to provide retail electric service to the Tall Oak Woodford Cryo Plant in Coal County, Oklahoma. The Plant is located in People's certified territory, which grants them exclusive rights to provide electricity under the Retail Electric Supplier Certified Territory Act (RESCTA). OG&E's proposal relied on the Large Load exception to RESCTA, which allows a supplier to extend its service into another supplier's territory for large-load customers. OG&E used third-party transmission facilities to provide service to the Plant without extending its own distribution lines.The Oklahoma Corporation Commission enjoined OG&E from serving the Plant, finding that OG&E was not "extending its service" as authorized by RESCTA. The Commission determined that a retail electric supplier may not use third-party transmission lines to extend its service into another supplier's certified territory under the Large Load exception. OG&E appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case and upheld the Commission's determination. The Court held that Article 9, Section 20 of the Oklahoma Constitution requires a limited review of the Commission's order. The Court affirmed the Commission's interpretation that the Large Load exception does not permit a supplier to use third-party transmission lines to extend its service into another supplier's certified territory. The Court's decision applies prospectively only and does not affect existing retail electric services and facilities established under the Large Load exception. View "OKLAHOMA GAS AND ELECTRIC CO. v. STATE" on Justia Law

The Coachella Valley Water District (Water District) appealed a judgment finding that the rates it charged for Coachella Canal water violated Article XIII C of the California Constitution. The Water District argued that the rates were lawful and that no refund remedy was authorized. The court rejected both arguments, finding the rates unlawful and that a refund remedy was constitutionally mandated.In the lower court, the Superior Court of Riverside County ruled that the Water District's Canal Water rates and the Irrigation Water Availability Assessment (IWAA) violated Proposition 218. The court found that the Water District's historical priority argument was not persuasive and that the Water District had made no attempt to show that the rates complied with the California Constitution. The court deferred ruling on remedies and later awarded Class 2 customers approximately $17.5 million in refunds and interest for invalid charges from March 2018 through June 2022.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association (Howard Jarvis) had standing to challenge the Class 2 rates because domestic customers paid the rates indirectly. The court found that the Class 2 rates were taxes under Article XIII C and did not fall under any exceptions. The court rejected the Water District's arguments that the rates were justified based on historical priority and that they were expenditures of funds. The court also found that the IWAA was an assessment under Proposition 218 and that the Water District failed to show it was proportional to the benefits conferred on the properties.The court affirmed the lower court's ruling on liability and the amount of refund relief awarded. However, the court found that the injunction in the judgment was overbroad and modified the judgment to strike the paragraph enjoining the Water District from imposing any future Canal Water rates and charges that did not comply with Proposition 218. As modified, the judgment was affirmed, and Howard Jarvis was awarded its costs on appeal. View "Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Coachella Valley Water Dist." on Justia Law

San Diego Gas & Electric Company (SDG&E) owns an interstate electric transmission line running from Arizona to California. The Arizona Department of Revenue (ADOR) is responsible for valuing SDG&E's property in Arizona for tax purposes. In 2020, SDG&E reported a net "original plant in service" valuation of $48,817,396 and a net "related accumulated provision for depreciation" amount of $51,446,397, resulting in a negative valuation of $2,629,001. ADOR disagreed with this calculation and determined a different accumulated depreciation amount, resulting in a positive valuation.The Arizona Tax Court granted summary judgment in favor of SDG&E, finding that their valuation correctly followed the statutory requirements. ADOR appealed, and the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed the Tax Court's decision, holding that the statute did not permit a negative valuation for a plant in service and that accumulated depreciation could not reduce the full cash value to a negative number. The Court of Appeals remanded the case for further proceedings.The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the calculation prescribed by the statute for determining a reduced plant in service cost does not preclude a negative valuation. The Court found that the statutory language did not limit the reduction of the original plant in service cost by accumulated depreciation to a non-negative number. Additionally, the Court clarified that a negative valuation for one component, when summed with other component valuations, reduces the overall full cash value but does not "offset" the valuation of other components. The Supreme Court vacated the relevant portions of the Court of Appeals' opinion and affirmed the Tax Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of SDG&E. View "San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Arizona Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

In 2019, Nestle Purina Petcare Company sought to switch its electric supplier for its facility in Hartwell, Georgia, from Georgia Power Company to Walton Electric Membership Corporation. Georgia Power objected, citing the Territorial Electric Service Act, arguing that the premises were not new and did not meet the requirements to switch suppliers. Georgia Power contended that the premises had long been a manufacturing and warehousing facility and that the changes made by Nestle did not amount to the premises being "destroyed or dismantled" as required by the Act.The Georgia Public Service Commission (the "Commission") ruled in favor of Nestle, concluding that the premises were "destroyed or dismantled" and not "reconstructed in substantial kind," allowing Nestle to switch to Walton EMC. The superior court reversed this decision, finding that the premises were not "destroyed or dismantled" and that the modifications did not meet the statutory requirements. The Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court's decision.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and concluded that the appropriate standard of review was abuse of discretion. The Court determined that the Commission's decision should have been upheld. The Court held that "destroyed or dismantled" does not require complete destruction but can include substantial dismantling or stripping away of significant components. The Court also found that the premises were not "reconstructed in substantial kind" due to the significant differences in structure and function between the old and new facilities. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, allowing Nestle to switch its electric supplier to Walton EMC. View "WALTON ELECTRIC MEMBERSHIP CORPORATION v. GEORGIA POWER COMPANY" on Justia Law

The City and County of San Francisco and the San Francisco County Transportation Authority challenged a decision by the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) to issue a phase I driverless autonomous vehicle (AV) deployment permit to Waymo, LLC for fared passenger service in San Francisco and parts of San Mateo County. The petitioners argued that the PUC failed to follow the law and disregarded significant public safety issues. However, the record showed that the PUC considered and responded to the safety concerns raised by the petitioners, noting that few incidents involved Waymo driverless AVs, each was minor, and none involved injuries.The PUC had previously issued a decision establishing a pilot program for the regulation of AV passenger carriers, which included both drivered and driverless AVs. The petitioners participated in these proceedings but did not challenge the decision at that time. Waymo submitted an advice letter in December 2022 seeking a phase I driverless AV deployment permit, which was protested by the San Francisco entities. The PUC's Consumer Protection and Enforcement Division circulated a draft resolution authorizing Waymo's permit, and after considering comments and holding meetings, the PUC issued a final resolution in August 2023, authorizing Waymo to provide fared driverless AV service.The California Court of Appeal reviewed the case and found that the PUC acted within its authority and did not abuse its discretion. The court noted that the PUC's decision was supported by substantial evidence, including data showing that Waymo driverless AVs had not been involved in any collisions resulting in injuries. The court also upheld the PUC's use of the advice letter process, as it was authorized by the PUC's prior decision. The court denied the relief requested by the petitioners, affirming the PUC's decision to issue the phase I driverless AV deployment permit to Waymo. View "City and County of San Francisco v. Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law