Justia Utilities Law Opinion Summaries

A landscaping company, owned by an individual, contracted with a homeowner to install Christmas lights on a tree located near a high voltage power line operated by a utility company. Neither the company nor its owner provided advance notice to the utility about the work, as required when working near high voltage lines. While performing the work, the owner came into contact with the electrified tree, fell, and suffered severe, permanent injuries. The owner sued the utility for negligence, claiming it failed to maintain the power lines and tree safely. The utility moved to dismiss the claim, relying on a tariff limiting its liability and arguing that statutory notice requirements had not been met. The utility also sought indemnity from the landscaping company for any liability it incurred due to the incident.The District Court for the City and County of Denver granted summary judgment to the utility, holding that the tariff barred the owner's claims, but denied summary judgment based on the statutory notice requirement, finding it only applied to the contracting party, not the individual employee. The court also found the landscaping company liable to indemnify the utility for any liability arising from the owner's claim, since it had failed to provide required notice under the High Voltage Safety Act (HVSA). The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the tariff did not bar the owner's claim because it could not limit liability to non-customers, and upheld that the statutory notice requirement applied only to the contracting party.The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed in part and vacated in part the appellate court’s judgment. The court held that the Public Utilities Commission lacked authority to approve a tariff limiting the utility’s liability to non-customers, that the owner was not subject to the HVSA’s notification requirement as he was not the contracting party, and that the HVSA’s indemnification provision did not require a separate causation analysis. View "Public Service Company of Colorado v. Outdoor Design Landscaping LLC" on Justia Law

A company sought approval from the Illinois Commerce Commission (ICC) to construct and operate a high-voltage transmission line for renewable energy, running from Kansas through parts of Illinois to Indiana. The applicant, a special purpose entity owned by Invenergy, did not have existing utility assets in Illinois and planned to use a common energy industry “project finance” model—securing long-term contracts and commercial agreements after regulatory approval to finance construction through a combination of debt and equity. The applicant presented testimony regarding its management’s extensive experience with large-scale energy projects and relationships with major lenders, but did not submit traditional financial statements.The ICC reviewed the application, accepted evidence about the applicant’s financing strategy and experience, and imposed a condition that required the applicant to secure full financing for the entire project before beginning any construction on Illinois easement property. The ICC found that the applicant satisfied the statutory requirement to be “capable of financing the proposed construction without significant adverse financial consequences” for the utility or its customers, and issued the certificate of public convenience and necessity (CPCN).On direct administrative review, the Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District, reversed the ICC’s grant of the CPCN. The appellate court concluded that the applicant failed to show it could currently finance the project at the time of the certificate’s issuance, and characterized the project finance method as speculative. It held that section 8-406.1(f)(3) of the Public Utilities Act required proof of present financing capability as a condition precedent to granting a CPCN.The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the appellate court’s judgment and affirmed the ICC’s decision. The court held that section 8-406.1(f)(3) does not require an applicant to prove current, present financing capability at the time of certificate issuance. Instead, it requires a showing of capacity to finance without significant adverse financial consequences, which may be established by substantial evidence of future financing ability and industry practices. The case was remanded to the appellate court for further proceedings on unaddressed issues. View "Concerned Citizens & Property Owners v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n" on Justia Law

A water authority was originally created by a single municipality to serve local water needs but over time expanded its service area to include numerous communities in two counties. The authority’s board was initially appointed solely by the founding municipality. In response to changes in the demographics of its customer base, the Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted a statutory amendment requiring equal board representation for the founding municipality and the two counties served. After the restructured board rejected a purchase offer from a private company, the authority attempted to transfer its assets into a trust. The founding municipality and the private bidder objected, asserting the municipality retained sole statutory power to convey the authority’s assets.The Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, Orphans’ Division, denied motions by the municipality and the private bidder for judgment on the pleadings in both the trust and declaratory judgment actions. The court held that any conveyance of the authority’s assets under the Municipality Authorities Act required the unanimous consent of the governing bodies now represented on the authority’s board. On appeal, the Commonwealth Court reversed, finding that the statutory change to board composition did not alter the founding municipality’s unilateral power to convey assets under the Act.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the Commonwealth Court’s decision. It held that the plain text of the relevant statute does not grant perpetual unilateral conveyance authority to the founding municipality, especially after legislative restructuring of the board. The court found that the right to effect a conveyance now rests collectively with the three municipalities represented on the board. The Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings. View "In Re: Chester Water Authority Trust" on Justia Law

Three Ohio natural-gas producers filed a class-action lawsuit in the Summit County Court of Common Pleas against East Ohio Gas Company (Dominion Energy Ohio). They alleged that Dominion Energy sold or used natural gas delivered into its pipeline system without properly compensating them, despite tariff provisions requiring reconciliation of delivered gas volumes. The plaintiffs claimed conversion, unjust enrichment, and violations of statutory provisions related to damages from criminal acts and theft. The class consisted of Ohio natural-gas producers participating in the Energy Choice Program whose wells were connected to Dominion Energy’s pipeline system.Judge Christine Croce partly granted Dominion Energy’s motion to dismiss by dismissing the conversion claim but allowed other claims to proceed. Dominion Energy appealed, but the Ninth District Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, finding that Judge Croce’s order was not a final, appealable order. Subsequently, Dominion Energy sought a writ of prohibition in the Ninth District against Judge Croce, arguing that the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) has exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of the class-action claims. The natural-gas producers intervened in the prohibition action.The Ninth District Court of Appeals applied the test from Allstate Insurance Co. v. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. and concluded that PUCO has exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims because the resolution of the dispute depended on the interpretation and application of PUCO-approved tariffs and practices normally authorized by public utilities. The court granted summary judgment for Dominion Energy and issued a writ of prohibition ordering Judge Croce to cease jurisdiction over the class action and vacate her prior orders.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the Ninth District’s judgment. The court held that PUCO has exclusive jurisdiction over the claims asserted by the natural-gas producers, and the common pleas court patently and unambiguously lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over those claims. View "E. Ohio Gas Co v. Croce" on Justia Law

PJM Interconnection, LLC, which manages electricity transmission across several Mid-Atlantic and Midwestern states, conducted its 2024/2025 capacity auction based on certain published parameters intended to ensure sufficient capacity for future electricity needs. After bidding closed, PJM discovered an error in the Locational Delivery Area Reliability Requirement for the Delmarva Power & Light Company South Zone, which would result in inflated auction prices and excess capacity charges for consumers. PJM sought to amend its tariff to correct this issue before finalizing the auction results, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved PJM's request.Capacity suppliers challenged FERC’s approval in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which vacated the decision, finding that the amendment was retroactive and violated the filed-rate doctrine. FERC, complying with the Third Circuit’s mandate, directed PJM to proceed with the unamended tariff, resulting in higher costs for consumers. Following this, agencies, customers, and entities representing customers’ interests filed a complaint under section 206 of the Federal Power Act, seeking modification of the auction outcome. FERC denied the complaint, stating that the Third Circuit’s ruling foreclosed any relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed FERC’s orders. The court held that FERC’s denial of the complaint was legally erroneous because the Third Circuit’s decision did not address whether FERC could use its section 206 authority to modify the auction result. The D.C. Circuit clarified that section 206(b) of the Federal Power Act provides a statutory exception to the general prohibition on retroactive rate changes. The court granted the petition for review, vacated FERC’s orders denying the complaint, and remanded the case to FERC for further proceedings. View "Maryland Office of People's Counsel v. FERC" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over the rates charged for leasing space on utility poles in Pennsylvania, specifically between an electric utility (FirstEnergy) and a telephone company (Verizon). Historically, the parties operated under Joint Use Agreements (JUAs), which set reciprocal rates for attachment to each other's poles. After regulatory changes at the federal level and the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission’s (PUC) decision to assume jurisdiction over pole attachments, Verizon challenged the rates charged by FirstEnergy under the JUAs, arguing they were unjust and unreasonable compared to the newer, lower rates (the New Telecom Rate) applied to other telecommunications providers.Following the initial complaint filed by Verizon, the matter was transferred from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to the PUC after Pennsylvania reverse preempted federal regulation. The PUC’s Administrative Law Judge found in favor of Verizon, determining that Verizon was entitled to the New Telecom Rate for its pole attachments and that FirstEnergy must refund the difference between the rates charged and the New Telecom Rate, for a period set by the PUC. FirstEnergy and Verizon each appealed aspects of this outcome to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, which affirmed the PUC’s decision. The Commonwealth Court majority determined that the PUC had properly applied its regulations and statutory authority, while the dissent argued the PUC’s actions conflicted with the Public Utility Code and longstanding principles of ratemaking.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed whether the PUC lawfully shifted the burden of proof to FirstEnergy and adopted federal presumptions that were not supported by Pennsylvania law. The Court held that, under the Public Utility Code, the complainant (Verizon) bore the burden to prove that existing rates were unjust or unreasonable, and the PUC erred by adopting regulations that shifted this burden to the utility. The Supreme Court vacated the Commonwealth Court’s order and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "FirstEnergy v. PUC" on Justia Law

Mendocino Railway, a California railroad corporation, sought to acquire a 20-acre parcel in Willits, California owned by John Meyer through eminent domain. The property is adjacent to Mendocino Railway’s tracks and was intended for the construction and maintenance of rail facilities supporting ongoing and future freight and passenger operations. The company argued that, as a common carrier public utility under relevant statutes, it had the authority to exercise eminent domain for public use. The evidence at trial included testimony about the history of rail service on the line, Mendocino Railway’s acquisition and operations, including passenger excursions and more limited commuter and freight services, and the necessity of the property for expanding its rail facilities.The Mendocino County Superior Court conducted a bench trial and found that Mendocino Railway failed to qualify as a public utility entitled to exercise eminent domain. The court reasoned that the railway’s primary activity was excursion service, which does not confer public utility status, and was unconvinced by the evidence of passenger and freight services. The court further concluded that, even if Mendocino Railway had public utility status, it did not meet the statutory requirements for eminent domain, finding the primary purpose of the proposed taking to be for private business activities rather than public use. The court also found insufficient evidence regarding the project’s impacts on neighboring residents and questioned the credibility and timing of Mendocino Railway’s site plans.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, reversed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court held that Mendocino Railway met its burden of proving it was a common carrier public utility under California law, and that it satisfied the statutory requirements for eminent domain: public interest and necessity, proper planning for public good and least private injury, and necessity of the property for the project. The court remanded the case for further proceedings regarding compensation to Meyer. View "Mendocino Railway v. Meyer" on Justia Law

A private utility company entered into an agreement to purchase a township’s wastewater system, which served nearly 3,900 residents. The parties used a statutory procedure to determine the fair market value of the system’s assets, arriving at a purchase price of approximately $54.9 million. The utility, already certified to provide water and wastewater services in other areas, applied to the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (PUC) for a Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) to acquire and operate the system. As part of the process, the utility agreed to maintain current rates for three years.An administrative law judge at the PUC recommended denying the utility’s application, finding that the township was already providing safe, reliable, and financially viable service, and that the acquisition would result in substantial rate increases for customers, outweighing any potential benefits. The PUC, however, rejected the judge’s recommendation and granted the CPC, finding that the utility’s expertise, financial resources, and the policy goal of consolidating systems provided substantial affirmative public benefits. The PUC also found that potential rate increases were not certain harms, as increases might occur regardless of the transaction and could be mitigated over a larger customer base.On appeal, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania reversed the PUC’s decision, holding that benefits arising from the acquiring utility’s size and fitness were not sufficient to satisfy the statutory standard for public benefit, particularly when the existing service was adequate and the transaction would likely cause rate increases. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the Commonwealth Court’s decision, holding that the PUC could consider benefits derived from the utility’s size and expertise in its affirmative public benefits analysis and that the lower court erred by reweighing the evidence and categorizing potential rate increases as “known harms.” The case was remanded for further proceedings on whether the PUC’s findings were supported by substantial evidence. View "Consum Adv v. PUC" on Justia Law

An energy developer proposed to construct a solar facility in Bennington, Vermont, near an existing solar facility that it had previously built. Both the new and existing facilities were located on adjacent parcels, shared similar ownership structures, and would use connected infrastructure to access the electric grid. The developer submitted bids for three projects; only the first was initially awarded a contract and then built. Later, the developer resubmitted bids for the other two projects, which were awarded contracts. When the developer sought a Certificate of Public Good (CPG) for the second facility, concerns were raised about whether this new facility and the existing one constituted a “single plant” under state law, which would make them ineligible for the state’s Standard Offer Program due to a cap on plant capacity.The Vermont Public Utility Commission reviewed the CPG application for the new facility. It held evidentiary hearings and ultimately concluded that, under the statutory definition, the two facilities were a single plant because they had common ownership, were developed in a contiguous timeframe, were physically proximate, and shared necessary grid infrastructure. This meant the combined facility exceeded the program’s capacity limit. The Commission denied the CPG and rejected the developer’s motion for reconsideration, prompting an appeal.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the Commission’s decision. It affirmed, holding that the Commission applied the correct two-prong “single plant” test as previously explained in its own precedents, properly considered all statutory factors, and acted within its discretion in finding the facilities to be a single plant. The Court rejected arguments about due process violations, claim and issue preclusion, and the application of alternative legal standards. The Supreme Court also found no error in the procedures followed by the Commission and did not grant a remand or new hearing. The decision of the Public Utility Commission was affirmed. View "In re Petition of Otter Creek Solar LLC" on Justia Law

In 2016, the City of Los Angeles established new tiered water rates for residential customers of its Department of Water and Power (LADWP). These rates included a charge that funded a low-income subsidy, which was paid by customers who did not qualify for the subsidy, and utilized progressively increasing charges based on water usage tiers. Stephen and Melinda Dreher, LADWP customers, challenged the constitutionality of two aspects of these rates under article XIII D, section 6 of the California Constitution: (1) the inclusion of a low-income subsidy charge in the rates of non-subsidized customers, and (2) the structure of the tiered rates themselves, arguing they exceeded the proportional cost of water service to each parcel.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County ruled in favor of the Drehers regarding the low-income subsidy charge, finding it unconstitutional and issuing a writ to prevent the City from including this charge in future rates. However, the court denied the Drehers’ request for a refund of previously paid charges, concluding that such a claim was barred because the Drehers had not paid under protest, as required by Health and Safety Code section 5472. The court also found that, aside from the invalid low-income subsidy, the City’s tiered rates complied with constitutional proportionality requirements.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the payment under protest requirement of Health and Safety Code section 5472 applies to claims seeking refunds of water delivery charges fixed by city ordinance, and that the Drehers’ failure to comply with this requirement barred their retrospective refund claim. The court further held that the City met its burden to demonstrate that its tiered water rates (excluding the invalid subsidy) did not exceed the proportional cost of service attributable to each parcel, as required by article XIII D, section 6(b)(3). Thus, the judgment was affirmed. View "Dreher v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law