Justia Utilities Law Opinion Summaries

Two development companies owned land in Johnson County, Texas, within the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the City of Mansfield but outside the city’s corporate boundaries. To develop this land, the companies needed access to retail water services, which, under state law, could be provided only by the Johnson County Special Utility District (“JCSUD”) because it held the exclusive certificate of convenience and necessity (CCN) for the area. However, a contract between JCSUD and the City of Mansfield required JCSUD to secure Mansfield’s written consent, which could be withheld at the City’s discretion, before providing water services within the city’s extraterritorial jurisdiction. The developers’ efforts to obtain water service were unsuccessful, as Mansfield demanded annexation and additional fees, ultimately refusing to formalize an agreement.After unsuccessful negotiations and attempts to compel service through the Texas Public Utility Commission, the developers sued the City of Mansfield in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. They alleged violations of the Sherman Act and brought state-law claims. The district court, adopting a magistrate judge’s recommendation, dismissed the antitrust claims with prejudice, holding that Mansfield was entitled to state-action antitrust immunity under Texas law, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether Mansfield was entitled to state-action immunity. The Fifth Circuit held that, although Texas law authorizes monopolies for water utilities through CCNs, it does not clearly articulate or authorize the City of Mansfield to act anticompetitively concerning the area in question, since the CCN belonged to JCSUD. Therefore, the court reversed the district court’s grant of state-action immunity and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Megatel v. Mansfield" on Justia Law

Several rural electricity distribution cooperatives entered into long-term, all-requirements contracts with a generation-and-transmission cooperative, requiring them to purchase nearly all of their electric service from the cooperative through 2050. Some of these distribution cooperatives later sought to terminate their memberships and contracts early. In response, the generation-and-transmission cooperative proposed a methodology for calculating an exit fee and submitted it to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) for approval.FERC initiated hearing procedures to determine a just and reasonable exit-fee methodology. In those proceedings, both the cooperative and FERC’s Trial Staff presented different approaches: the cooperative advocated a lost-revenues approach, while Trial Staff proposed a balance-sheet approach. An administrative law judge found that the cooperative’s methodology was not just and reasonable, but that the balance-sheet approach, with modifications, was. The cooperative sought review from FERC, which agreed with the administrative law judge, rejecting the lost-revenues approach and directing the cooperative to adopt the modified balance-sheet methodology.The cooperative then sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, arguing that FERC’s adopted methodology was arbitrary and capricious. The Tenth Circuit reviewed FERC’s orders under the standards of the Administrative Procedure Act. The court held that FERC did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in rejecting the lost-revenues approach, adopting the balance-sheet approach, implementing a transmission-crediting mechanism, or applying the methodology to certain members despite existing contracts. The Tenth Circuit concluded that FERC engaged in reasoned decisionmaking, supported by substantial evidence, and denied the petitions for review. View "Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, v. FERC" on Justia Law

A company was certified by the state regulator to operate as both a competitive retail electric and natural gas service provider. After receiving multiple consumer complaints, including allegations of unauthorized enrollments, deceptive sales practices, and improper telemarketing and door-to-door solicitation during a pandemic, the regulator initiated a formal investigation. The investigation uncovered evidence that the company and its vendors engaged in misleading marketing, falsified call recordings, forged consumer signatures, spoofed caller identification to appear as a utility or other trusted source, and failed to maintain required records. The company also solicited customers in violation of specific pandemic-related commission orders. The company argued that it lacked responsibility for vendors’ actions and had relied on the advice of counsel, and it challenged procedural aspects of the investigation.The Public Utilities Commission of Ohio conducted an evidentiary hearing and found the company had committed numerous violations of statutes and commission rules. It rescinded the company’s operating certificates, ordered it to cease operations in Ohio, imposed a $1.44 million forfeiture, and required the company to “rerate” affected consumers, providing restitution for the difference between the company’s rates and the utility’s default rates. The company’s application for rehearing was granted for further consideration but ultimately denied, and the company then appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio.The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the rescission of the company’s operating certificates, holding that the commission provided adequate notice and opportunity for hearing and that the findings of statutory and rule violations were supported by the evidence. However, the court found the commission failed to sufficiently explain the basis for the forfeiture amount, violating statutory requirements for reasoned decision-making. The court also determined the rerating order was unclear as to which consumers were affected. The court reversed the forfeiture and rerating orders and remanded the matter for the commission to clarify and support its decisions. View "In re RPA Energy, Inc." on Justia Law

Virginia Electric and Power Company sought certificates of public convenience and necessity to construct two high-voltage overhead transmission line projects in Loudoun County, including the Aspen-Golden and Apollo-Twin Creeks Projects. The Aspen-Golden Project involved approximately nine miles of transmission lines, some running beside Route 7 in the Lansdowne community. VEPCO evaluated several routes and preferred Route 1AA, asserting it minimized adverse impacts. The Apollo-Twin Creeks Project involved about 1.9 miles of transmission lines, some collocated with the Aspen-Golden lines, to serve data centers. VEPCO proposed overhead construction for both projects due to feasibility concerns with underground alternatives.The State Corporation Commission consolidated the applications for review. Loudoun County and Lansdowne Conservancy objected to overhead lines along Route 7, arguing for underground construction to protect scenic and historic assets, including Belmont Manor. They submitted an Updated Hybrid Proposal for partial underground construction, but VEPCO and Commission staff questioned its feasibility, cost, and engineering challenges. After public hearings and detailed testimony, the hearing examiner recommended approval of overhead construction along Route 1AA, finding underground options infeasible within required timelines and statutory criteria, and noting the proposal’s analytical deficiencies.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the Commission’s final orders, affirming the Commission’s approval of the CPCNs. The Court held that the Commission properly verified the need for the Aspen-Golden Project, reasonably rejected underground construction due to cost, engineering challenges, and timing, and gave due consideration to the local comprehensive plan and scenic easement. The Court concluded that the Commission’s decisions minimized adverse impacts to the extent reasonably practicable and found no abuse of discretion in declining to impose additional mitigation conditions or in approving the Apollo-Twin Creeks Project. The judgments were affirmed. View "Lansdowne Conservancy v. SCC" on Justia Law

A solar energy developer sought to build a facility in Maine with an initial capacity of 4.98 megawatts, later reduced to 1.99 megawatts after changes to state law. The developer submitted an interconnection application to the local utility, obtained necessary permits, made payments, and began construction. During the project’s development, delays occurred in procuring key equipment, such as the meter and voltage regulator, resulting in a projected completion date after the statutory deadline of December 31, 2024. Despite the developer’s efforts, the facility was not operational by the required date.The developer petitioned the Maine Public Utilities Commission for a good cause exemption from the Commercial Operation Date deadline under Maine’s Net Energy Billing statute. After discovery and intervention by the Office of the Public Advocate, a Commission staff report recommended granting the exemption. However, the Commission ultimately denied the exemption, finding insufficient evidence that the developer ever received an initial construction schedule projecting completion within the 2024 deadline. The developer subsequently petitioned to reopen the record to submit additional evidence, but the Commission did not act on the petition within the required timeframe, resulting in a deemed denial. The developer appealed to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the Commission’s orders. The Court held that the Commission’s factual finding—that the developer failed to prove receipt of an initial schedule with a timely completion date—was supported by substantial evidence. The Court also found the Commission’s interpretation of the statute reasonable, its decision not arbitrary, and its refusal to reopen the record not an abuse of discretion. The judgment of the Commission was affirmed. View "Ellsworth ME Solar, LLC v. Public Utilities Comission" on Justia Law

A landscaping company, owned by an individual, contracted with a homeowner to install Christmas lights on a tree located near a high voltage power line operated by a utility company. Neither the company nor its owner provided advance notice to the utility about the work, as required when working near high voltage lines. While performing the work, the owner came into contact with the electrified tree, fell, and suffered severe, permanent injuries. The owner sued the utility for negligence, claiming it failed to maintain the power lines and tree safely. The utility moved to dismiss the claim, relying on a tariff limiting its liability and arguing that statutory notice requirements had not been met. The utility also sought indemnity from the landscaping company for any liability it incurred due to the incident.The District Court for the City and County of Denver granted summary judgment to the utility, holding that the tariff barred the owner's claims, but denied summary judgment based on the statutory notice requirement, finding it only applied to the contracting party, not the individual employee. The court also found the landscaping company liable to indemnify the utility for any liability arising from the owner's claim, since it had failed to provide required notice under the High Voltage Safety Act (HVSA). The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the tariff did not bar the owner's claim because it could not limit liability to non-customers, and upheld that the statutory notice requirement applied only to the contracting party.The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed in part and vacated in part the appellate court’s judgment. The court held that the Public Utilities Commission lacked authority to approve a tariff limiting the utility’s liability to non-customers, that the owner was not subject to the HVSA’s notification requirement as he was not the contracting party, and that the HVSA’s indemnification provision did not require a separate causation analysis. View "Public Service Company of Colorado v. Outdoor Design Landscaping LLC" on Justia Law

A company sought approval from the Illinois Commerce Commission (ICC) to construct and operate a high-voltage transmission line for renewable energy, running from Kansas through parts of Illinois to Indiana. The applicant, a special purpose entity owned by Invenergy, did not have existing utility assets in Illinois and planned to use a common energy industry “project finance” model—securing long-term contracts and commercial agreements after regulatory approval to finance construction through a combination of debt and equity. The applicant presented testimony regarding its management’s extensive experience with large-scale energy projects and relationships with major lenders, but did not submit traditional financial statements.The ICC reviewed the application, accepted evidence about the applicant’s financing strategy and experience, and imposed a condition that required the applicant to secure full financing for the entire project before beginning any construction on Illinois easement property. The ICC found that the applicant satisfied the statutory requirement to be “capable of financing the proposed construction without significant adverse financial consequences” for the utility or its customers, and issued the certificate of public convenience and necessity (CPCN).On direct administrative review, the Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District, reversed the ICC’s grant of the CPCN. The appellate court concluded that the applicant failed to show it could currently finance the project at the time of the certificate’s issuance, and characterized the project finance method as speculative. It held that section 8-406.1(f)(3) of the Public Utilities Act required proof of present financing capability as a condition precedent to granting a CPCN.The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the appellate court’s judgment and affirmed the ICC’s decision. The court held that section 8-406.1(f)(3) does not require an applicant to prove current, present financing capability at the time of certificate issuance. Instead, it requires a showing of capacity to finance without significant adverse financial consequences, which may be established by substantial evidence of future financing ability and industry practices. The case was remanded to the appellate court for further proceedings on unaddressed issues. View "Concerned Citizens & Property Owners v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n" on Justia Law

A water authority was originally created by a single municipality to serve local water needs but over time expanded its service area to include numerous communities in two counties. The authority’s board was initially appointed solely by the founding municipality. In response to changes in the demographics of its customer base, the Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted a statutory amendment requiring equal board representation for the founding municipality and the two counties served. After the restructured board rejected a purchase offer from a private company, the authority attempted to transfer its assets into a trust. The founding municipality and the private bidder objected, asserting the municipality retained sole statutory power to convey the authority’s assets.The Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, Orphans’ Division, denied motions by the municipality and the private bidder for judgment on the pleadings in both the trust and declaratory judgment actions. The court held that any conveyance of the authority’s assets under the Municipality Authorities Act required the unanimous consent of the governing bodies now represented on the authority’s board. On appeal, the Commonwealth Court reversed, finding that the statutory change to board composition did not alter the founding municipality’s unilateral power to convey assets under the Act.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the Commonwealth Court’s decision. It held that the plain text of the relevant statute does not grant perpetual unilateral conveyance authority to the founding municipality, especially after legislative restructuring of the board. The court found that the right to effect a conveyance now rests collectively with the three municipalities represented on the board. The Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings. View "In Re: Chester Water Authority Trust" on Justia Law

Three Ohio natural-gas producers filed a class-action lawsuit in the Summit County Court of Common Pleas against East Ohio Gas Company (Dominion Energy Ohio). They alleged that Dominion Energy sold or used natural gas delivered into its pipeline system without properly compensating them, despite tariff provisions requiring reconciliation of delivered gas volumes. The plaintiffs claimed conversion, unjust enrichment, and violations of statutory provisions related to damages from criminal acts and theft. The class consisted of Ohio natural-gas producers participating in the Energy Choice Program whose wells were connected to Dominion Energy’s pipeline system.Judge Christine Croce partly granted Dominion Energy’s motion to dismiss by dismissing the conversion claim but allowed other claims to proceed. Dominion Energy appealed, but the Ninth District Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, finding that Judge Croce’s order was not a final, appealable order. Subsequently, Dominion Energy sought a writ of prohibition in the Ninth District against Judge Croce, arguing that the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) has exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of the class-action claims. The natural-gas producers intervened in the prohibition action.The Ninth District Court of Appeals applied the test from Allstate Insurance Co. v. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. and concluded that PUCO has exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims because the resolution of the dispute depended on the interpretation and application of PUCO-approved tariffs and practices normally authorized by public utilities. The court granted summary judgment for Dominion Energy and issued a writ of prohibition ordering Judge Croce to cease jurisdiction over the class action and vacate her prior orders.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the Ninth District’s judgment. The court held that PUCO has exclusive jurisdiction over the claims asserted by the natural-gas producers, and the common pleas court patently and unambiguously lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over those claims. View "E. Ohio Gas Co v. Croce" on Justia Law

PJM Interconnection, LLC, which manages electricity transmission across several Mid-Atlantic and Midwestern states, conducted its 2024/2025 capacity auction based on certain published parameters intended to ensure sufficient capacity for future electricity needs. After bidding closed, PJM discovered an error in the Locational Delivery Area Reliability Requirement for the Delmarva Power & Light Company South Zone, which would result in inflated auction prices and excess capacity charges for consumers. PJM sought to amend its tariff to correct this issue before finalizing the auction results, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved PJM's request.Capacity suppliers challenged FERC’s approval in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which vacated the decision, finding that the amendment was retroactive and violated the filed-rate doctrine. FERC, complying with the Third Circuit’s mandate, directed PJM to proceed with the unamended tariff, resulting in higher costs for consumers. Following this, agencies, customers, and entities representing customers’ interests filed a complaint under section 206 of the Federal Power Act, seeking modification of the auction outcome. FERC denied the complaint, stating that the Third Circuit’s ruling foreclosed any relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed FERC’s orders. The court held that FERC’s denial of the complaint was legally erroneous because the Third Circuit’s decision did not address whether FERC could use its section 206 authority to modify the auction result. The D.C. Circuit clarified that section 206(b) of the Federal Power Act provides a statutory exception to the general prohibition on retroactive rate changes. The court granted the petition for review, vacated FERC’s orders denying the complaint, and remanded the case to FERC for further proceedings. View "Maryland Office of People's Counsel v. FERC" on Justia Law